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Abstract 
 
Natural gas is a troublesome and ‘wayward’ material (Bridge, 2004; 396). 
Amongst other qualities, it is invisible, intangible, naturally odorless, highly 
inflammable, and constantly resistant to the forces that contain it. This thesis 
provides an account of how these qualities both introduce a series of 
insecurities to everyday social environments, and also make it a challenging 
material to govern. Specifically, I examine the way that security is performed 
around gas circulations in the UK’s transmission and distribution pipelines, and 
I describe how a range of specialized security practices have been developed 
according to the particular challenges that gas’s materiality presents. 
 
In developing this account, I make two claims. First, I argue that performances 
of security cannot be adequately understood without attending to the specific 
qualities of the circulating elements around which it is practiced. Here I build 
upon Dillon’s (1996) observation that security has tended to be treated as a 
noun that is independent of the elements that it is practiced in relation to. As a 
consequence, it has typically been framed as a broadly transferrable set of 
practices that can be more-or-less unproblematically applied to very different 
elements. I suggest that this abstraction has resulted in the further reduction of 
security into two broad practices: acts of circulatory filtration (in which risky 
elements are separated from flows of safe bodies, materials and things), and 
acts of circulatory maintenance (whereby security is performed by ensuring the 
continuity of particular circulations). It is my contention in this thesis that 
security scholars need to pay better attention to the ways in which the specific 
material qualities of circulating elements are generative of particular forms of 
securing practice. Indeed, by examining the way that security is performed 
around gas, I describe a series of practices that far exceed those described in 
	 ii 
accounts that present security as a matter of circulatory filtration or 
maintenance.  
 
My second claim is that the spaces and scales at which security is analyzed 
need to be expanded. I demonstrate how the critical security studies and 
energy security literatures have both tended to focus on security’s practice 
within particular nodes, at the exclusion of the performances of security (and 
forms of insecurity) that develop across the journeys of circulating elements; as 
they move between nodes. Indeed, I suggest that circulation has often been 
reduced in these accounts to thin, straight, and featureless lines that are largely 
inconsequential for performances of security. I seek to trouble this reduction, 
following gas as it travels through the UK gas transport infrastructures, tracing 
the various forms of (in)security that develop across these journeys.  
 
As a consequence of these two claims, security takes quite a different form in 
this account to its various depictions in the existing security literatures. I 
describe it as consisting of a series of ontological projects that are enacted 
across the lengths and breadths of gas’s circulations, and through which the 
material reality of natural gas is constantly (re)organised in attempts to 
facilitate, ‘compensate for’, and ‘cancel out’ particular kinds of perceived 
potential phenomena (Foucault, 2007; 36). Significantly, these performances 
are shown to be structured, or ‘programmed’ (Latour, 1991), through the 
coming together of multiple interests that pertain to a variety of 
heterogeneous actors and manifold referent objects. Different interests are 
shown to come together across gas’s journeys, and to undergo ongoing 
processes of negotiation that result in a variety of security performances, 
through which different imperatives are pursued. As such, I suggest that gas 
becomes ‘modulated’ (Deleuze, 1992) – it is constantly transformed from 
moment to moment, across the full duration of its circulatory journeys. 
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“A substance synonymous with fluidity and effervescence, gas is defined by 
unpredictable motion both at the molecular level and within popular culture, where 
the gaseous and ethereal serve as antonyms for the solidity and fixity of the 
terrestrial.” 
 
Bridge (2004; 396) “Gas, and How to Get it” 
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1 
Introduction 
	
	
	
“If you have a failure at 40 bar [on the UK’s high pressure gas transport system], you 
have a bomb. It will just rupture, and if it is above ground it will blow bits for many, 
many tens of meters. So you will know about it. If it is an underground failure, it will 
blow a hole. […] This is a bomb. Don’t ever forget that.” 
 
(Interview, Senior Engineer, National Grid - 9th April 2015) 
	
	
	
I. Threats from the Underground 
 
At 7.15am on the morning of the 10th of January 1985, an explosion took place 
in a block of luxury flats in Putney, Southwest London. It killed eight people, 
demolished six apartments, and shattered all nearby windows within a quarter 
of a mile radius (HSE, 1985). Only thirteen minutes earlier, a resident of Flat 
No. 12 had called the local gas distribution company to report a suspected gas 
leak (Ibid).  
 
Gas’s explosiveness is demonstrative of its vitality and energy. Whilst these 
qualities make it useful for heating homes, for cooking food and for generating 
electricity, they also introduce a series of threats to everyday social 
environments. Gas can injure bodies, claim lives and destroy property, and 
these threats are made more difficult to avoid by the ways that it evades 
human senses. It is a material that is invisible, intangible, and naturally 
odourless to humans, and it consequently presents particular difficulties for 
knowing where it is, how it is moving, and what forms of agency are available 
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to it at any one point in space and time. It is also remarkably recalcitrant. It is 
lighter than air, so rises irretrievably unless it is contained, and like all gases, it 
is compressible, expanding or compacting to fill any volume. In the process, it 
exerts varying amounts of outwards force upon the walls that contain it, and if 
this force exceeds the limits of its containers, the gas will escape, potentially 
causing injury, loss of life, or damage to property. 
 
A consequence of these challenging material qualities is that natural gas 
requires a highly specific set of securing practices to be performed around it at 
all times. Without the conduct of these practices, it could not be safely 
transported, nor could it be usefully consumed. As Bridge (2004; 396) 
describes, “[a] whole industry has emerged […] dedicated to corralling the 
waywardness and variability of gas and rendering it a commodity compliant 
with the workings of the market”. Should these practices be disrupted – even 
for a moment – then the vitality, recalcitrance, and ‘waywardness’ of natural gas 
will overcome the structures that govern it; it either becoming diffused within 
the atmosphere, or accumulating in potentially flammable or explosive 
volumes.  
 
Despite this, gas’s combustibility is just one way in which it is perceived as 
becoming ‘dangerous’ (Dillon and Reid, 2001). Amongst various other 
perceived dangers, UK society has become reliant upon it. It is now one of the 
primary components of the country’s energy mix, and is widely used for 
heating buildings, warming water, cooking food, manufacturing products and 
generating electricity. As such, numerous forms of social, political and 
economic function have come to rely upon its continued circulation. Without it, 
basic social functions such as heating homes, washing bodies and cooking 
food would face severe disruption. Vulnerable people such as the ill or elderly 
could die from exposure to the cold, and many actions that are dependent 
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upon electricity (including lighting, manufacture, transport and 
communications) would be put under severe strain1. Due to the relative inertia 
of large energy infrastructures such as the UK’s gas system (Haarstad and 
Wanvik, 2016), gas circulations could also not be quickly or easily replaced with 
circulations of other kinds of energy product. For the short to medium term at 
least, UK society will remain dependent upon its uninterrupted circulation.  
 
As a result of these ‘dangerous dimensions’ (Dillon and Reid, 2001), a large 
variety of actors have become involved in governing gas’s circulation at a 
range of scales – from the global to the molecular. From politicians to ground 
workers, local planning authorities to polyethylene pipes, a vast array of 
heterogeneous actors have become engaged in managing and regulating the 
circulation of gas on an everyday basis.  
 
Whilst these ground workers and gas pipes may not possess the visual 
spectacle of body scanners, iris scans, passport controls, or the plethora of 
other border control checks that are currently deployed in our ever-vigilant 
contemporary world – and whilst their practices are rarely afforded the 
grandiose rhetoric that is commonly associated with performances of 
geopolitical security – it is my contention in this thesis that they must each be 
seen to be intricately involved in performing security around natural gas in 
different ways, at various points in space and time. For within their actions we 
can observe numerous attempts to “gradually compensate[…] for, check[…], 
finally limit[…], and, in the final degree, cancel[…] out” different forms of 
contingent phenomena2 that relate to gas’s circulation (Foucault, 2007; 37), 
and regardless of their apparent banality, these actions can thus be understood 
as constituting security practices. 
																																																						
1 Such strains would be particularly acute, given that electricity demand would rise in the short-
term as members of the public turned to electric heating and electric stoves to replace 
functions that were previously enabled by by gas’s circulation. 
2 These include explosions and supply shortages. 
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II. Research Agenda 
	
This thesis explores the specifics of these gaseous security performances and 
examines how attempts are made to deal with the problematic material 
qualities of circulating natural gas. In the chapters that follow, I provide an 
account of the actors that implicate themselves in gas’s governance, and 
discuss the different kinds of phenomena that these actors seek to influence by 
taking action upon gas’s circulation. Central to creating this account is 
investigating how each actor perceives gas’s ontological configurations to be 
productive of different kinds of (in)security at specific moments in space and 
time. It involves asking how gas, through its associations with other 
heterogeneous elements3, comes to be seen to present different dangers, 
challenges and opportunities, according to the different perspectives of the 
actors that are involved in its governance. 
 
Building upon this aim, I seek to examine the forms of action that these actors 
take upon gas’s circulation, and the various ways through which they hope to 
secure against particular forms of perceived potential phenomena. I thus 
describe how security is practiced in relation to gas, documenting the efforts 
that are made to render it actionable in different ways, and exploring how its 
ontological constitution is variously altered so that particular kinds of gaseous 
event come to be facilitated, compensated for, or cancelled out.  
 
 
 
																																																						
3 The term ‘element’ is used in this thesis in the same way as it appears in the actor-network 
theory and assemblage literatures (Latour, 1996a, 1993; Law, 2000; DeLanda, 2006; Barad, 
2007): as a constituent part of a larger relational arrangement (elements, under this definition, 
include humans). It should not be confused with the term ‘element’ as it appears in the recent 
literature on elemental materials that has been developed by authors such as Pete Adey, 
(2015a) and Derek McCormack (2015), or in terms of a chemical or ‘natural’ definition. 
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Agenda 1: Entity-Attentive Security Research 
 
In investigating performances of gaseous security in this way, I seek to pursue 
two related agendas. The first involves challenging the way that objects, 
bodies and ‘things’ have featured in the academic literature on security to 
date. This is a thesis about a particular circulating material – natural gas. Yet its 
argument is also situated within a wider critique of the way that this literature 
has underappreciated the objects around which security is practiced.  
 
As Dillon (1996) has observed, security has often appeared as a noun, but as 
he contends, this is not the case. He writes; security “is not a noun that names 
something, it is a principle of formation that does things. It is neither an 
ontological predicate of being, nor an objective need, but the progenitor 
instead of a proliferating array of discourses of danger” (p. 16). In appearing as 
a noun, however – as a thing that has been abstracted from the specificities of 
its practice – security has become depicted as a set of practices that are 
distinct from the elements that it is conducted upon, and that is therefore able 
to be practiced in a similar manner in relation to a variety of different objects. 
Regardless of whether the topic of security’s concern is ‘national security’, 
‘economic security’, or ‘energy security’, there is thus an assumption that the 
study of security in one context can help to inform the study of security in 
another.  
 
Whilst I do not wish to vilify the search for similarities between security 
practices, I am concerned with how this abstraction has led to the specificities 
of circulating bodies, materials and things being overlooked in studies of 
security. Security’s generalization across topics has led to it frequently being 
distilled into two different kinds of practice that work to obfuscate the way that 
the distinct qualities of these elements are deeply entangled in security 
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performances. Either security is seen to involve efforts to filter circulations into 
one of two categories (those that are deemed to be inherently safe, or those 
that are potentially risky), or it involves attempts to maintain the smooth and 
efficient flow of people, objects and things. According to these two 
approaches, insecurity either stems from the inclusion of potentially hazardous 
elements (as according to a filtration perspective), or from the interruption of 
particular flows that are essential to the continued functioning of a given 
referent object (as according to a circulatory maintenance approach). Whether 
security appears as practices of filtration or circulatory maintenance however, 
the elements that are acted upon nearly always feature as passive entities that 
present little problem for security’s performance. They never resist, break, spill, 
rupture, or act in any unpredictable way, and they also do not change whilst in 
motion, or transform during security’s practice. From point of origin to eventual 
destination, they remain unchanged. The thing that arrives is always the same 
as it was when it left.  
 
This is particularly the case for circulating materials. There has been some 
recognition of the way that bodies are performed and altered through 
security’s practice (see for example, Mark Salter's (2007) work on confessing 
security subjects, or Nick Vaughan-Williams' (2015) work on the dehumanizing 
of detained migrants)4, but studies of security in relation to objects have almost 
entirely overlooked the challenging vitality of these materials and the ways that 
they are transformed through security’s practice. Energy – for this thesis is 
about a circulating energy product – has been similarly dematerialized. Whilst 
it is perhaps the circulating material that has received most attention from 
security researchers5 to date, the literature relating to its circulation has almost 
totally erased its material specificities. As Bridge (2014: 3, citing Hildyard et al. 
																																																						
4 Despite this, there is still little work on the security challenges that the vitality and resistance 
that is expressed by these bodies present. 
5 Much of this work has not been conducted by scholars from the field of ‘critical security 
studies’, but has developed in isolation. 
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2012) has observed; “wind, water, biomass, fossil fuels are all made equivalent 
under the banner of ‘energy’, ignoring the different affordances that each of 
these distinctive materialisations of energy provides”. As a result, security has 
been overwhelmingly reduced to practices of circulatory maintenance that 
involve political and economic negotiations at the level of international 
geopolitics. The liveliness of circulating energy products has therefore 
disappeared from view. 
 
In this thesis, I argue that we cannot hope to understand security performances 
unless we closely attend to these numerous lively, and potentially troublesome, 
qualities. As I demonstrate in the chapters that follow, the way that security is 
practiced depends upon the specific qualities of these different entities. The 
gas examined in this thesis has challenging material qualities – it is invisible, 
intangible and odourless, and it therefore evades easy observation and control. 
It is not passive. It exerts force upon pipe walls, and it escapes and explodes. It 
is also not fixed and immutable. Amongst the many changes that it may 
undergo during its travels, it slows down and speeds up, it expands and 
compresses, and it transforms chemically. It is thus a material that presents 
unique problems for its governance, and it consequently requires highly 
specific sets of security practices to be conducted around it in order to 
facilitate, compensate for, and cancel out, particular kinds of phenomena. 
Without understanding the qualities of natural gas and the challenges that it 
presents, we can barely begin to even scratch the surface of the way that 
security is performed in relation to this lively material. 
 
Yet gas is not alone in being a vital and problematic circulating shape-shifter. 
Whilst its transformations may be particularly pronounced, all circulating 
entities possess different troublesome qualities, and all elements undergo 
ontological alterations across their circulatory journeys. These alterations may 
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take the form of physically observable changes to their physical constitution, 
but they may also take the form of less visible changes to their relationships 
with other elements6. Through these various alterations, new ways of acting, 
and new kinds of relational phenomena may be opened up that become the 
focus of security’s practice. It is thus only by recognizing the ability of these 
elements to relationally transform and to have consequences that we can ever 
come to adequately understand how security may be affected by their 
clogging up, igniting, breaking, freezing, melting, exploding, decaying, 
transforming, expanding, or various other affective expressions.  
 
In addition to their challenging vitality, we also need to pay attention to the 
ways in which elements are transformed in and through security’s practice. In 
contrast to studies that present security as being a practice through which 
elements may pass without mutating, I present security as an ontological 
project through which entities and their relations with other elements are 
specifically manipulated in order to facilitate, compensate for, or cancel out 
particular kinds of emergent phenomena. In the chapters that follow, I show 
how natural gas is repeatedly transformed throughout its circulation, in relation 
to different forms of gaseous phenomena that are seen to have the potential to 
emerge in different contexts. Across its journeys, it is dried, chemically altered, 
heated, compressed, and liquefied. It also has its relationships with other 
elements carefully manipulated in order to prevent the formation of particular 
forceful associations. In these ways, it becomes ontologically altered – different 
forms of relationally-produced agency being facilitated, compensated for, and 
cancelled out by altering its constitutive relations. Without understanding the 
way that circulating elements such as gas are transformed and why – how their 
																																																						
6 Such transformative qualities may not be immediately obvious. For example, attempts are 
often made to ‘cancel out’ entities’ transformative qualities through the design of circulatory 
infrastructures. Airline passengers, for instance, have any items that could potentially enable 
them to threaten other passengers removed from their persons prior to their boarding. In this 
way, particular kinds of agency and threatening phenomena are prevented from emerging 
mid-flight. 
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constitution shifts/is shifted and mutates/is mutated – I consequently suggest 
that we can understand very little about how security is actually performed. As 
such, I put forward a call for a form of more entity-attentive security research; a 
form of research that holds in focus the specific relational transformations 
undergone by circulating elements in and through security’s practice in its 
attempts to facilitate, ‘compensate for’, ‘limit’, or ‘cancel out’ (Foucault, 2007) 
particular kinds of possible future. 
 
Agenda 2: Circulations Beyond Nodes 
 
My second agenda in this thesis is to advocate for the expansion of the sites 
and scales at which security’s performances are studied. Despite a burgeoning 
academic interest in the ways that security is conducted in relation to 
circulations of different kinds (Dillon, 2005), studies of security’s performance 
have tended to restrict their analyses to particular nodal sites through which 
circulations pass. Sites of analysis have included airports (Adey, 2004; Salter, 
2008; Martin, 2010; Amoore and De Goede, 2005), maritime ports (Cowen, 
2009, 2010), points of terrestrial border crossing (Coleman, 2005; Ackleson, 
2005; Ribas-Mateos, 2015), control rooms (Peters, 2014; Adey and Anderson, 
2011b), and even cashpoints and supermarket checkouts (Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero, 2008; Amoore and de Goede, 2008). Likewise, studies of energy 
security have tended to focus upon the national-scale nodes of production and 
consumption – energy’s circulation between these nodes typically becoming 
erased in the process. In privileging such nodal locations however, I suggest 
that scholars have often overlooked the details and qualities of the circulatory 
journeys that elements undertake, including their routes, volumes, materialities 
forces, velocities and rhythms. They have also failed to engage with the way 
that these elements and their circulatory qualities may present challenges for 
security between nodes, and the various ways in which security consequently 
comes to be performed across the extents of their circulatory journeys. 
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In contrast, this thesis makes a case for attending to the full extents of these 
circulations. By following gas’s circulations between nodal sites, I look to 
explore its circulatory qualities and its potential dynamism during its travels. In 
the process, I explore how these various qualities can come to present various 
kinds of opportunity and challenge for security’s performance. Indeed, in the 
chapters that follow, I describe how gas’s circulations are far more complicated 
than simple straight lines between two points, outlining how these various 
circulatory qualities are generative of a host of security concerns and 
possibilities that become the focus of attempts to compensate for them, cancel 
them out, or efficiently exploit them.  
 
In following gas as it moves in these ways, I seek to document how security is 
continually performed across entities’ circulatory journeys. Indeed, I suggest 
that limiting security’s analysis to nodal sites betrays an assumption that 
security is only practiced within nodes; that once the human body has had its 
identification and luggage checked within airport security stations, then 
security’s practice is finished – that body is rendered secure. Yet such an 
approach, I suggest, entirely overlooks how security’s subjects are performed 
whilst they are in transit. In the chapters to come, I will show how gas’s 
challenging material qualities depend upon particular practices of security 
being constantly performed around it throughout its circulation. Without these 
practices, I argue, it would not be able to be consumed, and it might come to 
realise certain of its potentially hazardous capacities.  
 
Yet whilst I advocate attending to these performances of security that take 
place across elements’ circulatory journeys, they are often not easily visible at 
first sight – particularly when they are incorporated into the design or 
architecture of systems of circulation in ways that pre-emptively ‘compensate 
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for’ or exploit particular forms of threatening or opportune phenomena. 
Despite this, I suggest that they are ubiquitous. What may appear to be a 
simple door that separates a flight deck from a passenger cabin for example, 
may actually be the focal point for a complex set of design decisions and 
operational rules that have been carefully developed in an attempt to ‘cancel 
out’ the possibility of a repeat of the hi-jacking events that led to the attacks on 
the World Trade Centre (Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation 
Division, 2002)7. Other security practices may also be performed more 
dynamically, whilst in transit. Should a passenger show signs of threatening 
behaviour mid-flight for example, then a flight marshal might seek to ‘cancel 
out’ these threats by subduing that passenger8. Security is thus not limited to 
certain critical nodes – it is performed throughout the duration of entities’ 
journeys in ways that are sometimes hard to see. Limiting our analyses to 
particular nodes therefore risks overlooking much of this securing work, and as 
a consequence, there is thus considerable scope to expand the sites and scales 
at which security practices are studied, scholars needing to spread their 
analyses out across elements’ circulatory travels. 
 
 
 
																																																						
7 Indeed, as can be seen in the debates that have followed the recent Germanwings airline 
crash and the role that the security protocols surrounding these doors played into this event, 
such practices may also be generative of new forms of insecurity (BBC, 2017). 
8 If it has been deemed pertinent for a flight marshal to board that flight in the first place. 
These two examples are also fairly remarkable, and risk drawing attention away from the 
proliferation of more mundane practices that are employed to produce secure subjects 
throughout the duration of travelers’ journeys. Such practices may consist of seemingly banal 
actions of devices such as no smoking lights; the seatbelt signs that light up during turbulence, 
take-off and landing; the reminders to passengers to turn on flight modes on their 
smartphones; and even in the making available of flight socks in long haul flights that reduce 
the chance of passengers developing deep vein thrombosis. In each of these examples, 
attempts are being made to ‘cancel out’ and secure against certain forms of disruptive or 
threatening phenomena, and to make the circulation of bodies traveling by air as smooth and 
efficient as possible. 
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III. Conceptual Approach 
	
In line with the first of these two agendas, I have tried to avoid committing to 
established ways of viewing security’s actors, its practices, its referent objects, 
and the logics that it operates according to. This is not a thesis that fits neatly 
into conventional conceptual brackets such as ‘national security’, ‘biopolitical 
security’, or even ‘energy security’. Instead, it begins with the object under 
study – natural gas – and follows this object along its various journeys, 
observing the different forms of action that are taken upon it, and investigating 
the multiple motivations and interests that lie behind these actions. In this way, 
security’s actors, practices, referent objects and logics were allowed to emerge 
in an inductive manner from their empirical contexts, and different actors, 
practices, referent objects and logics were identified as a result.  
 
As shall be discussed in later chapters, this approach has given rise to a 
number of deviations from conventionally accepted conceptualizations of 
security. Unlike discourse-based approaches such as the work on securitization 
(a body of work that understands security to consist of decisional speech acts 
that are undertaken by authoritative human figures, and through which 
exceptional situations are defined9), many different forms of human and 
material actor were brought into focus through this thesis’s fieldwork. These 
actors were defined through the particular kinds of action that they took upon 
gas, but unlike many studies of security, such actions could not be limited to 
acts of defining exceptional phenomena and ‘cancelling them out’. Instead, the 
acts observed here were often also productive, with different actors seeking to 
take action upon gas in ways that brought about particular forms of 
phenomena. In taking these actions, different actors could be seen to attempt 
to enhance the security of their individual interests.  
																																																						
9 See the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. A good introductory text is: 
Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998). 
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As such, the forms of security that are described in this thesis do not fit into a 
typical account of security as bordering, but in many ways share similarities 
with accounts of biopolitical security, in which the productivity of populations is 
sought through security’s practice (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). Yet the 
practices of security observed here also did not precisely fit a biopolitical 
approach, for biopolitical accounts take as their referent objects a single 
object; species life. Within my fieldwork, I observed different actors taking 
action upon natural gas according to a proliferation of individual interests. 
These actors did not seek to enhance the security of species life per se, but 
instead pursued the security of their own referent objects. Such concerns were 
at times differently articulated – from the security of supply for different groups 
of people (national populations, regional areas, individuals) – to the economic 
security of individuals and businesses – to the security of global climate. 
Different actors were also found to be concerned with the security of multiple 
different referent objects at once, and to attempt to take actions upon gas in 
order to pursue these various agendas.  
 
I have subsequently come to see security as being a performance that is 
conducted by a heterogeneous assemblage of bodies, materials, texts, images 
and ‘things’10. This notion of performance and emergence (drawn from actor-
network theory and the work on assemblages), I suggest is critical, for it can be 
used to highlight the ‘indeterminacy’ of the security structures and entities that 
become involved in security’s practice (McFarlane and Anderson, 2011). 
Should the actors within security performances change, or should the way that 
																																																						
10 The concept of the assemblage has become influential within human geography and within 
research on security in recent years. Influential authors include Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari (1987), Jane Bennett (2005); Manuel DeLanda (2006) and Colin McFarlane and Ben 
Anderson (2011). The term ‘assemblage’ is used to refer to a collectivity of heterogeneous 
elements that are united through a series of contingent relationships with one another. Power 
is not equally distributed across these assemblages, but neither is power centralized. Instead, it 
is seen to circulate between elements (Bennett, 2005).  
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these actors behave transform, then the way in which security is conducted will 
also change, with new forms of threatening phenomena potentially emerging 
as a result. 
 
I consider the objects that become the focus of security’s practices to be 
performed through these security assemblages. Natural gas is enacted through 
the specific arrangements of the socio-material assemblages that surround it, 
and as the elements within these assemblages and their relationships with the 
gas change, so the gas – and the potential phenomena that can emerge in 
relation to it – also transform. Security therefore involves the management of 
these assemblages. It entails the manipulation of gas’s relations with other 
elements in highly specific ways that depend upon the way that the gas is 
ontologically configured at any one moment. I suggest that, by manipulating 
these relations, particular kinds of gaseous phenomena can be facilitated, 
compensated for, or cancelled out. Should the elements that are involved in 
these performances change however, or should the relationships between 
them transform, then the gas may come to hold a form that no longer ensures 
the security of its different governing actors’ interests. As such, security’s 
performance may break down, and particular kinds of threatening phenomena 
may consequently emerge. 
 
This I suggest, is particularly significant for understanding security’s 
performance in relation to circulating elements, for as gas moves, it comes into 
contact with new actors, and its existing relations change. These new actors 
may express different interests to the actors before them, and they may seek to 
alter gas’s ontological arrangements in ways that satisfy their own definitions of 
security. In the process, new forms of emergent phenomena may consequently 
also unfold, and as such, security cannot be seen to be performed in a fixed 
and singular way across the extent of elements’ circulations. 
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IV. Research Design 
	
Of specific focus in this thesis are the circulations of natural gas that travel 
within the UK’s onshore gas transport networks. Whilst gas’s circulation could 
have also been followed beyond the UK mainland – as it travels under seas, in 
boats, or across continents – I have restricted my analysis to gas’s UK 
circulatory journeys as a matter of practical necessity. 
 
The UK’s gas networks can be split into several more-or-less discrete systems 
that involve largely different sets of actors. The first of these handles gas’s 
onshore arrival. Gas arrives onshore either through the high pressure undersea 
pipelines that are owned by extraction companies, or via liquefied form in 
shipping tankers. It then immediately enters one of seven processing terminals 
that are distributed around the UK’s coastline, each of which work to 
chemically alter it to ensure that it meets the national gas quality regulations 
(see Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996). These terminal facilities are 
typically owned by companies such as Shell, Exxon Mobil, and Total.  
 
From these processing terminals, gas then enters the National Transmission 
System (NTS). The NTS consists of a more-or-less linear network of pipes that 
transport it along the length and breadth of the country11 in large volumes and 
at high pressure (figure 1). This system is owned and operated by National 
Grid, and can be thought of as being akin to a motorway network, in that it 
directs large volumes of gas to wide regional areas.  
 
																																																						
11 The NTS does not directly serve Northern Ireland, but provides gas to it and the Republic of 
Ireland via an interconnector. Northern Ireland’s distribution network is only relatively small. It 
is mostly owned by Phoenix Natural Gas, which serves the Greater Belfast and Larne area. In 
contrast, the Republic of Ireland has a more extensive distribution network, operated by Bord 
Gais (see figure2). 
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From the NTS, natural gas then enters one of five local distribution networks12. 
Each of these networks is owned and operated by a separate private company 
(figure 2), and they can be thought of as being the gas industry equivalent of 
the UK’s A-roads – they take gas out of the NTS and distribute it to homes and 
buildings across regional areas. These systems are necessarily more rhizomatic 
than the NTS, due to the way that they feed the consumption habits of a vast 
number of dispersed consumers. They consequently transport the gas in much 
smaller volumes and at much lower pressures across streets, under peoples’ 
feet, and into homes and businesses.  
 
It is useful to briefly note here the history of these distribution networks, for 
unlike much of the UK’s gas infrastructure (which was installed in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, when natural gas from the North Sea was first introduced as a 
commercial energy product), many of the distribution networks contain legacy 
pipes that were previously used in ‘town gas’ systems. These systems were 
much smaller, involving the distribution of a type of manufactured gas to 
consumers across small, localized networks13. During the development of the 
NTS however, these networks were connected up and converted to run on 
natural gas. This history is significant because, as shall be explored in later 
chapters, their ageing design continues to present particular challenges for 
gas’s governance in the contemporary context.  
																																																						
12 There are 23 NTS off-take points around the country. Some off-takes also serve large 
consumers such as power stations and factories. 
13 Town gas was a methane-based gas that was produced by baking coal in isolation from 
oxygen. It was first commercially introduced to the UK at the beginning of the 1800s, and it is 
unlikely – but possible – that some of the pipework within these systems dates as far back as to 
this period.  
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Figure 1 - Map of the UK National Transmission System, courtesy of National Grid 2015 (does 
not directly serve Northern Ireland – see footnote 11) 
 
 
Figure 2 - Map of the Distribution Networks in the UK and Republic of Ireland, courtesy of 
National Grid 2015 (Northern Ireland distribution network excluded due to size – see footnote 
11) 
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Research Scope 
 
In addition to focusing my analysis on gas’s travels across the UK mainland, 
further analytical cuts were made for similar practical reasons. Gas’s journeys 
through the NTS were followed extensively in this research, but given the time 
needed to gain permissions to work with each distribution company, and given 
the similarities in many of their practices, my analysis of gas’s travels within 
local distribution networks has been limited to just one system; the network 
that serves consumers in the North of England, and that is operated by 
Northern Gas Networks. For the same reasons, a single processing terminal 
was visited during this thesis’s fieldwork – the terminal facility owned and 
operated by Shell in St. Fergus, Scotland. 
 
Research Objectives 
 
Within the scope of this research, I sought to trace gas along the full extents of 
its circulatory journeys. Rather than constrain my analysis to particular nodal 
sites, I followed the gas as it travelled, conducting fieldwork according to three 
objectives that relate to the research agendas outlined earlier. These 
objectives were: 
 
1) To identify the heterogeneous actors that become involved in gaseous 
security performances 
 
2) To document the circumstances and logics under which securing action is 
considered necessary and is undertaken upon circulations of natural gas 
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3) To observe and document the various practices that are employed to 
render natural gas ‘known’ and ‘secure’ throughout the duration of its 
circulations 
 
I designed these objectives to explore the way that different actors come to be 
involved in gaseous security performances along their circulatory journeys, and 
to investigate the manner in which they became involved in performing 
security and why. At every stage in gas’s journeys, I sought to identify the 
different associations that gas developed with other elements, and I 
documented the different forms of action that came to be taken upon it. I also 
interrogated the logics and motivations behind these actions. Close attention 
was paid to the way that gas came to be perceived as being productive of 
particular kinds of opportunity and threat throughout its journeys, and also to 
the ways in which its specific material qualities necessitated specialised 
techniques for its governance. A more detailed description of these objectives, 
and of the design of the research process can be found in chapter 3. 
 
Research Methods 
 
Methodologically, my approach was heavily influenced by the work of so-called 
‘follow the thing’ studies (Cook, 2004; Christophers, 2011; Cook and Harrison, 
2007), and also by the work on actor-network theory (see Latour, 2005; Callon, 
1986a; Law, 2007). It involved identifying the routes that gas takes as it 
circulates across the UK, and then “follow[ing] the connections” (Latour, 2005; 
175) that it formed with other elements throughout its journeys. By conducting 
interviews with the operators of pipelines, and by organizing numerous site 
visits to factories, company offices, control rooms, and pipelines, I developed a 
list of the different heterogeneous associations that gas formed (and could 
potentially form) across its circulatory routes. This list was also further 
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expanded through the analysis of documentary materials that related to gas’s 
governance, found either online, or in industry archives. 
 
Perhaps most useful in these initial stages of tracing gas’s circulatory journeys 
and associations were my early interviews with pipeline operators. By sitting 
down with practitioners and tracing gas’s journeys through pipelines using 
maps, the various devices, measurements, actions, opportunities and risks that 
become wrapped up in the circulation of gas at different points in space and 
time could be systematically identified. Site visits also helped me to expand 
this list, for any relations that were not mentioned in interviews could often 
either be inquired about when observed in person, or interviewees would be 
reminded of them through their physical presence. 
 
As new elements and associations were identified through these different 
methods, I then observed and interrogated the relations that they formed with 
natural gas in order to “learn from them not only what they do, but how and 
why they do it” (Latour, 1999; 19). Such practices were again largely conducted 
through site visits and interviews, and these methods enabled me to observe 
the various actions that were taken upon gas’s circulation, and permitted me to 
interrogate the actors involved in a way that allowed me to assess the logics 
behind their actions and the different kinds of gaseous phenomena that they 
perceived as being possible to emerge at particular moments. 
 
By following gas in these ways, it has been possible to construct the following 
account of how gas’s circulation is secured in a UK context. In this thesis, I 
outline the ways that gas comes to present particular forms of threat and 
opportunity at different points in its circulation, and I document the different 
forms of action that are consequently undertaken upon it to render it 
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actionable, and to facilitate, compensate for, and cancel out, particular kinds of 
gaseous phenomena.  
 
V. Outline of Chapters 
 
In chapter 2, I review the current security literature that relates to the 
governance of circulations. I take three conceptual slices through this work 
(security’s spatialities, its logics, and its relationship with materials), and 
through these slices, I identify a number of analytical shortcomings that form 
the basis for the research agendas of this thesis. These shortcomings are also 
shown to share many similarities with those found in the related, but largely 
discrete, field of energy security; a body of work that this study also hopes to 
speak to through its analysis. 
 
In the first section on spatialities, I draw attention to how this literature’s 
current pre-occupation with circulation has opened security up to analysis at 
different spaces and scales. Yet whilst this work has been extremely productive, 
I argue that there remains a tendency to overlook the performances of security 
that take place across the duration of these circulations; researchers instead 
privileging nodal sites such as airports and points of border crossing. In doing 
this, I argue that the way in which security comes to be performed in relation to 
bodies, materials and things, across their circulatory journeys, has often been 
ignored.  
 
In the section on logics, I then describe how a tension exists between the 
literatures that relate to a logic of continuation, and a logic of productivity. I 
demonstrate how these two logics might be usefully brought into conversation. 
Specifically, I draw attention to how the work on continuation imagines the 
protection of multiple forms of referent object but excludes practices of 
security that are not actions that produce exceptional decisions, and I then 
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hold this in contrast with the work on biopolitical productivity, which adopts an 
expanded view of what constitutes a security practice, but limits itself to a 
singular referent object: populations. I consequently suggest that it should be 
possible to simultaneously appreciate multiple referent objects at the same 
time as adopting a broader definition of security practices.  
 
In the chapter’s final section, I then explore the way that the roles of materials 
within security performances have been conceptualised to date. Whilst this 
literature has been significantly rematerialized in recent years, I highlight how it 
still demonstrates a tendency to overlook the vitality of materials within 
practices of circulatory security. In particular, I suggest that the materials in 
circulation have often been assumed to be passive and inert in this work, and 
security has consequently featured as a set of practices that relate to circulatory 
maintenance or filtration within particular nodal sites of security’s performance.  
 
In chapter 3, I move on to describing the methodological framework for this 
thesis. Drawing on the observations from the previous two chapters, I establish 
the research agenda for this thesis, and outline a series of research questions. I 
then describe in detail the actor-network theory (ANT) inspired approach that 
was adopted for this study, discussing how ANT provides valuable tools for 
overcoming the challenges that natural gas presents for conducting a 
traditional ‘follow the thing’ study. In particular, I describe in this chapter how 
the buried quality of the UK’s national gas infrastructure obstructed my 
attempts to follow the gas, and consequently liken the approach I adopted to 
to burrowing, rather than following.  
 
In chapter 4, I begin my empirical analysis. Here, I explore the unique 
challenges that natural gas presents for security governance, highlighting how 
gas’s inability to press upon human senses unless it is held within highly 
	 23 
specific relational arrangements has led to difficulties for its governance and 
commercialization. I describe how a complex security apparatus has been 
developed around the circulation of natural gas to overcome these challenging 
material qualities, in order to render the gas knowable and actionable in 
different ways. In the process, I demonstrate how two different forms of ‘map’ 
are developed to visualise gas’s fields of possible relations, such maps 
enabling action to be taken upon the gas and for potential gaseous 
phenomena to be managed.  
 
The first of these maps constitute what I call ‘blueprints’. These are more-or-
less durable stabilizations of knowledges of gas’s potential associations and 
connected phenomena. They provide a point of reference against which 
gaseous phenomena can be identified, and help security actors outline the 
associations that lead to the emergence of these phenomena.  
 
The second type of map takes the form of ‘snapshots’. These are context-
specific, ‘in the moment’, visualizations of gas’s immediate relations. I describe 
how a series of snapshots are constantly produced through security 
apparatuses, and demonstrate how these snapshots are compared against 
gaseous blueprints in order to identify particular phenomena whilst they are in 
the midst of their emergent becoming. As gas begins to actualize particular 
configurations of associations, I argue that attempts are made to trace out the 
phenomena they could lead to, efforts subsequently being taken to manipulate 
gas’s relations in ways facilitate, compensate for, or cancel out, particular kinds 
of gaseous event before they actualise.  
 
In chapter 5, I then turn to critique the way that circulations have featured 
within the literature on security. Such circulations, I argue, have consistently 
appeared as featureless, linear lines that pass between two or more points. In 
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opposition to this depiction, I detail some of the specific qualities of gas 
circulations, and describe how these qualities can come to present particular 
challenges for gas’s governance.  Drawing upon the literature on mobilities 
(and in particular the work of Cresswell, 2010), I identify six qualities of gas 
circulations that, at different times and in different places, present particular 
challenges for security’s practice. These qualities include: gas’s paths and 
circuits, its volume, its materialities, the forces that operate upon it (and the 
forces that it exerts), its velocity, and its rhythms. Each of these qualities is 
shown to become entangled within the practices of security that are performed 
around gas as it is moving at different moments in space and time. 
 
Developing upon the arguments made in the previous two chapters, chapter 6 
then explores the way in which security can be understood to consist of 
projects of ontological manipulation that are conducted across the length of 
gas’s circulation. As gas circulates, it develops new associations and forms of 
agency, and encounters new elements that each have their own particular 
interests. I describe how security consequently becomes ‘programmed’ in 
different ways to match the negotiated interests of these different interested 
parties. Such programming involves the careful alteration of gas’s socio-
material relations: relations that condition the forms of gaseous phenomena 
that can emerge in the future. I explore in detail how gas’s relationally-
constituted reality is thus carefully reconfigured in specific ways in order to 
facilitate, compensate for, and cancel out certain phenomena. Five specific 
practices are identified in particular; relational distancing, relational blocking, 
the alteration of gas’s relations of interiority, the creation of relational 
reinforcements, and the configuration of indicative relations. I show how each 
of these different practices are employed in different ways and at different 
times to modulate gas; to differentially perform it according to the various 
actors and interests that become involved with it in its circulation.  
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In chapter 8, the thesis’s conclusion, I then turn to review the contributions that 
this thesis makes to the existing literatures on security. I return to the question 
of the circulating entity; the way that bodies, materials and things have tended 
to be underappreciated in these literatures, and reiterate how we cannot 
adequately attend to security’s practice without recognising the challenging 
vitality of these elements, and the ways that these elements and their various 
qualities become ontologically manipulated across the extent of their 
circulatory journeys. I finish with a discussion of the possible next steps for 
entity-attentive security research. 
	 26 
 
 
2 
Securing Circulations 
	
	
“What distinguishes the new security problematic in the first instance is therefore the 
primacy of the preoccupation with global/local ‘circulation’. Circulation in this context 
means every conceivable kind of circulation or flow of peoples and things, of energy 
and finance, of water and food, of capital and information, of images and discourses, 
of science and technology, of weapons and ideas, of drugs and of sex (AIDS to 
prostitution), of microbes and diseases. In short, the new global security problematic is 
concerned with the circulation of everything” (Dillon, 2005; 2) 
	
I. Introduction 
 
As is acknowledged by Dillon in the extract above, circulations have become 
an increasingly prominent concern within contemporary practices of security. 
This concern has been borne out of two factors. The first has been an increase 
in awareness for the ways that the global circulation of bodies, food, water, 
energy, finance, information, consumer products, and waste constitute “a 
condition of possibility for the promotion and protection of a liberal way of 
life” (Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; 220), and the second has been an enhanced 
appreciation for the capacity of circulations to contain hazardous elements that 
might undermine the stability of social structures (including ‘dangerous’ human 
bodies such as the ‘terrorist’ or the ‘illegal immigrant’, as well as nonhuman 
elements such as bombs, narcotics and pathogens).  
 
In response to these concerns, a large interdisciplinary security literature has 
developed around the topic of circulatory security. Such studies have attended 
relation to a variety of circulations, including (but not limited to) the movement 
of bodies by air (Adey, 2004; Martin, 2010; Kirschenbaum, 2013; Amoore and 
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Hall, 2009), land (Ackleson, 2005; Coleman, 2005) and by water (Rajaram, 
2008; Peters, 2014; Peters and Turner, 2015; Mountz, 2015), in addition to the 
movement of such diverse ‘things’ as cargo containers (Cowen, 2010, 2009), 
finance (de Goede, 2012; Langley, 2014; Aitken, 2011; Boy, Burgess and 
Leander, 2011), luggage (Adey, 2004), pathogens (Elbe, Roemer-Mahler and 
Long, 2014; Elbe, 2007; Hinchliffe and Bingham, 2008; Bingham and Lavau, 
2012; Clark, 2013b), and narcotics (Ackleson, 2005; Bourne, 2015; Grayson, 
2008).  
 
As with any sizable interdisciplinary literature however, the field of security 
studies has witnessed the development of a range of intellectual positions, with 
differing perspectives on topics such as; the spatial dimensions of circulatory 
(in)security; the constitution of security’s referent objects; the constitution of 
security actors and security practices; the logics that drive security’s 
performance; and the extent to which materials may play a role in security 
performances. In this chapter, I provide an overview of the critical security 
studies literature that specifically relates to circulation. I identify three areas in 
which intellectual controversy has arisen: the spatialities of (in)security, the 
logics through which security operates, and the roles of materials in security 
performances. Each of these topics is then used to structure a separate section 
of this chapter, with areas in need of further critical development being 
outlined in the process. I conclude by describing the ways in which these 
observations underpin the research agendas of my thesis. 
 
Section II explores the ways in which space has been conceived in this 
literature. I show how the current emphasis on circulation has introduced new 
geographical perspectives to the study of (in)security, and whilst I take note of 
particular exceptions (c.f. Amoore, 2006; Vaughan-Williams, 2010; Cowen, 
2009; 2010), I highlight the overwhelming preoccupation of this literature with 
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centralised nodal sites, at the expense of studies of security’s performance 
across the extent of elements’ circulatory journeys.  
 
In section III, I review the logics through which security is seen to operate in 
relation to circulations. I begin by describing the literature that frames security 
as a project of survival, before moving on to discuss other approaches that are 
concerned with the logics of continuation and productivity. For each of these 
perspectives, I compare the way that security’s actors and practices have been 
differently defined, and place emphasis on how security is increasingly 
regarded as a relational project that consists of multiple interactions between 
dispersed heterogeneous elements. I conclude this section by developing a 
provisional framework for conceptualising security, bringing together aspects 
of the work relating to the logics of continuation and productivity to outline a 
position in which multiple referent objects are recognized, and in which 
security appears as a set of productive (rather than simply protective) practices. 
 
Finally, in section IV, I describe the ways that materials have featured in these 
studies. I identify four main roles that have been prescribed to matter in this 
literature; architectures, decision makers, obstacles, and travellers. I highlight 
the continuing tendency of this work to downplay the vitality of these materials, 
and in particular, I draw to attention the way that scholars continue to overlook 
the transformations materials undergo as they travel. This, I suggest, is due to a 
tendency to focus on the assemblages that govern these circulations, instead 
of the particular qualities and agencies of the entities in circulation. 
 
By developing my analysis along these three lines, I conclude the chapter by 
arriving at the two central agendas of the thesis. First, I describe the objective 
of providing an analysis of security that closely attends to the specific qualities 
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and vitality of entities, and second, I justify the expansion of security’s analysis 
to spaces of circulation beyond nodal sites. 
 
II. Spatialities 
 
Security studies scholars’ recent increased interest in circulation has been 
broadly situated within a wider inter-disciplinary agenda to increase the depth 
and breadth of security’s conceptual and empirical framing. With regards to 
depth, many scholars have attempted to expand their analyses beyond the 
confines of traditional accounts that position the nation state as the primary 
referent object of security’s practice (the state being perceived as that which is 
at threat and must therefore be secured), to instead look at a plurality of 
referent objects, including (but not limited to): economies (Walker and Cooper, 
2011; Aitken, 2011), climates (Dalby, 2014; Barnett, 2003), natural 
environments and ecological systems (Dalby, 2009, 2002; Hodson and Marvin, 
2009), religions (Laustsen and Wæver, 2003; Eroukhmanoff, 2016; Kent, 2006), 
supply chains (Cowen, 2009) and human individuals (Jones, 1999; Duffield, 
2006). In terms of breadth, attempts have been made to incorporate sources of 
insecurity that exceed traditional focuses on foreign military forces, with 
greater attention being paid to the multiplicity of threats that emerge from 
such diverse spheres as political arenas, economies, societies and 
environments (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Collectively, these 
expanded accounts of security have become grouped under the banner 
‘critical security studies’14 (Ibid). 
 
																																																						
14 The term ‘critical’ is used only as a linguistic device to indicate a shift away from traditional 
state-centric accounts (rather than to suggest that traditionalist studies are universally acritical). 
The label ‘critical security studies’ is also intended to refer to the general orientation of this 
work towards a questioning of the constitution of security and its referent objects, rather than 
to imply a singular coherent set of theoretical approaches (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 
2010). 
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The development of a critical security agenda has led to multiple re-imaginings 
of the spaces and scales of (in)security. Rather than geographical focus being 
restricted to the territorial outlines of nation states, and sources of insecurity 
being seen to operate only upon these territorial limits, scholars have 
broadened the geographical scope of security’s analysis to look both within 
and beyond the borders of the nation state, examining multiple referent 
objects that occupy very different spaces and scales. Moreover, in widening 
the sources of insecurity under consideration beyond military forces, such 
approaches have documented a variety of threats that possess very different 
origins and spatial characteristics. Geographers’ interest in security has 
consequently burgeoned since this critical turn, with researchers from across 
the discipline now working to explore the “uneven and entangled geographies 
of security and insecurity [that can be] located at a range of spatial scales 
and/or traced across a host of different networks spread far and near across the 
globe” (Philo, 2012: 2). 
 
Yet it has not simply been the progression from traditional accounts that has 
intrigued human geographers. Whilst the origins of the critical security agenda 
are often cited as being located in the international political context that 
followed the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union (c.f. Buzan, 1997; 
Krause and Williams, 1996; Walt, 1991; Collins, 2016; Baldwin, 1995), much of 
the geographical work on security developed significantly later, largely as a 
response to the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre. As Dillon (2005) has 
documented, these attacks generated a vastly increased awareness of the ways 
in which global circulations can create insecurity. Indeed, whilst such 
circulations are nothing new, their widespread prioritization within security 
agendas, and the generalized expansion of security to cover all forms of global 
circulation, is distinctive of the contemporary period, and has since become a 
major feature of what Dillon calls ‘the new global security problematic’ (p.2). It 
	 31 
is this emphasis on circulation, I suggest, that has provided the catalyst for 
geographers’ growing interest in security.  
 
In the global security problematic, circulations are regarded as deeply 
enmeshed within, and productive of, the contemporary social world. As Dillon 
(2005) puts it:  
 
“In a systematically interdependent world everything is connected or, in principle, is 
able to be connected, to everything else. Therefore, everything now matters. The 
smallest perturbations or anomalies in one system of circulation have the potential to 
cascade rapidly into large-scale crises affecting very many other local and global 
systems of circulation” (p.2).  
 
As such, social existence is predicated upon global circulations of various kinds 
of ‘stuff’ (bodies, food, water, energy, manufactured products, data, waste and 
so forth), and insecurities stem from two sources: turbulence in circulations that 
may place stress upon, or directly undermine, the functioning of essential 
societal systems15; and the potential of these circulations to contain threatening 
bodies and things that, through their unregulated travel, may interfere with or 
destabilize the functioning of these systems. In these two ways therefore, 
circulations have become framed as major sources of insecurity that permeate 
practically all aspects of contemporary everyday life. Moreover, it is because of 
these two kinds of insecurity, I suggest, that security has often become framed 
as either a set of practices that are focused around filtering out flows of 
threatening entities from circulations that are perceived to be harmless, or as a 
set of practices that work to maintain the smooth, efficient, and uninterrupted 
flow of ‘stuff’. 
 
																																																						
15 An example of such an approach is provided by Edensor (2010) who describes how “the 
indefatigable maintenance of largely invisible key flows of water, electricity, gas and telephony 
is vital to secure the security and stability of the city” (p.3). 
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This acknowledgement of the pervasiveness of circulations within the fabric(s) 
of social life, and of their increased enrolment within contemporary security 
agendas, has opened these security performances up to extremely broad 
geographical analysis across multiple spheres and scales. Geographical 
research has included studies of (in)security in relation to the nation state 
(Graham, 2012b; Mountz, 2013), populations (Sparke, 2006; Adey, 2009), 
urban environments (Hodson and Marvin, 2009; Graham, 2012a, 2010b; 
Coward, 2009), and individual bodies (Amoore and Hall, 2009), and interest 
has been drawn from across the discipline, geographers from different sub-
fields exploring circulatory security in relation to such diverse topics as 
economics (Boy, Burgess and Leander, 2011), development (Essex, 2013), 
culture (Prout, 2009), politics (Amoore and de Goede, 2008), and human health 
(Bingham and Lavau, 2012; Elbe, Roemer-Mahler and Long, 2014). 
 
Within this work, security has most commonly been engaged with through a 
post-structuralist lens, network-based conceptual approaches such as those 
developed in the work on actor-network theory (Callon, 1986a; Law, 2007; 
Latour, 2005) and assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; DeLanda, 2006; 
Dittmer, 2013; McFarlane and Anderson 2011) featuring particularly heavily. 
Such network approaches have gained popularity mainly because they provide 
“a useful way of thinking about how spatial relations come to be wrapped up 
into complex networks”16 (Murdoch, 1998: 357), thereby enabling scholars to 
understand how circulations connect up with, and come to structure, the 
fabric(s) of social life. Indeed, most such studies share a conceptualization of 
space that consists of sets of contingent relations between heterogeneous 
elements that always retain the potential to shift and transform (Callon, 1986a). 
Rather than perceiving space as a pre-existing or absolute container for action, 
																																																						
16 Such networks, Latour (1999) reminds us, should not be confused with commonplace 
definitions that consider networks as fixed or rigid technical structures in which actors are 
transported but are not deformed. Rather, these approaches emphasize the contingent 
qualities of networks and their potential for transformation. 
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or as a passive backdrop against which social phenomena play out, they regard 
it as phenomenal or emergent; as existing as an outcome of constantly-
developing relationships between heterogeneous elements. Circulations (which 
themselves are also the products of networks of contingent social relations) are 
just one of the many sets of elements that construct these spaces. Space and 
circulations are therefore co-constituted; they connect up with one another 
through complex relational webs, alterations in one set of relations potentially 
affecting the structure of others.  
 
In addition to highlighting the social production of space, network approaches 
have had value for helping the security literature to overcome ‘the tyranny of 
distance’ (Murdoch, 1998). Rather that space being absolute, network 
approaches have allowed security scholars to think in terms of relational space 
(the space of relations). Here, the traditional dualisms that have plagued spatial 
imaginations in the past are overcome (Murdoch, 1998) – the local is 
simultaneously global, society and nature are complexly intertwined rather than 
abstractly separated, and the micro is potentially equal to the macro (Latour, 
1993; Law, 2007). In this relational space, two actors that were previously 
separated by extreme distance can be very close. Through their relational 
connectedness, an event on one side of the world may be generative of 
insecurities for a nation/city/individual/object on the other. In this manner, 
network approaches enable researchers to better appreciate the ways in which 
elements previously considered disconnected due to their physical distance, 
can become intricately involved in the construction of other faraway spaces, 
and may be productive of forms of (in)security within these distant contexts.  
 
Perhaps most significantly however, network-based approaches have 
emphasised the inherent precariousness of the networks that construct 
infrastructures and social worlds. Rather than these networks existing 
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independently of their spatial contexts, they require the continued practice of 
particular sets of social relationships. Infrastructures and social spaces are thus 
never static, fixed, or finalized, but are dynamic and perpetually open to 
alteration, change, destabilization, and potentially collapse. They are thus 
enacted, or performed, and emerge out of the practices of multiple 
heterogeneous elements. As a result, security appears in these accounts as 
both an outcome and a project. It is the product of a series of relational 
performances; an outcome of particular configurations of contingent social 
relations that must be maintained in order for certain societal functions to 
persist, but at the same time it is also a project of organizing elements and 
maintaining sets of relations in order to ensure that particular outcomes 
continue to be produced. 
 
In these different ways therefore, the concept of the network has had multiple 
benefits for understanding security’s geographical dimensions, the ways in 
which security is integrated into the fabrics of social life, and the manner in 
which security is cooperatively practiced. Yet despite these benefits, it is 
important to reflect upon how network-influenced approaches have also 
limited the spatialities of security under analysis. Network metaphors 
encourage us to destabilize the tyranny of distance in absolute space, but this 
emphasis on relationality also invites security’s abstraction in ways that tend to 
erase the frictions, distances, and circulatory complications that emerge across 
the extent of entities’ physical journeys. This is not to suggest that there is a 
fundamental problem with network-based approaches to security (indeed, 
frictions, distances, and interruptions are by no means incompatible with these 
approaches, for they are also relationally produced), but is more of an issue 
with the ways in which they have been employed by security scholars.  
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Visual representations of networks almost invariably depict straight, featureless, 
lines connected by spherical nodes, whereby these lines (or circulatory 
trajectories) typically only imply a relationship/connection between nodes. 
Physical distance, friction and other circulatory qualities are rarely accurately 
depicted (if at all), and the nodes instead take primary importance. Such 
representations lend themselves particularly well to circulatory infrastructures 
(see, for example, tube and flight maps)17, and linear depictions of circulatory 
trajectories have consequently become common in portrayals of all kinds of 
globalised networks (Shields, 1997)18. As such, despite the prominence of lines 
depicting circulations in these representations, the ways in which they are 
simplified and abstracted has led to analytical emphasis being placed upon the 
locations where “resources are concentrated”: on ”the knots and the nodes” 
where multiple entities “are connected with one another” (Latour, 1987: 180).  
 
The consequence of this is that the security practices that surround telephone 
wires, data cables, utility pipes, roads, railways, shipping channels, flight paths, 
and the various other kinds of circulatory infrastructure in-between nodes have 
received relatively limited attention in the critical security studies literature, 
whilst the assemblages and security practices that take place within and around 
these nodes have taken primary position. Indeed, the critical security literature 
is teeming with accounts of security’s practice within a wide variety of nodal 
spaces, including (but not limited to); airports (Martin, 2010; Adey, 2004; 2009; 
Salter, 2008; Bennett, 2008; Amoore and Hall, 2009); maritime ports (Cowen, 
2010, 2009; Peterson, Joann and Treat, 2008); sites of overland border 
																																																						
17 Latour (1987) himself uses the example of a telephone infrastructure to explain the 
constitution of actor-networks, describing how “[t]elephone lines, for instance, are minute and 
fragile, so minute that they are invisible on a map and so fragile that each may be easily cut; 
nevertheless, the telephone network 'covers' the whole world” (p.180). 
18 As Shields (1997; 1) notes, “whether on the ground, in the air, or in space, our world is 
increasingly portrayed not as a solitary blue planet, seen from space, but as a map or disc on a 
video screen, criss-crossed with animated lines representing a world of people, goods and 
capital, all in flight”. 
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crossing (Coleman, 2005; Ackleson, 2005; Rossmo, Thurman, Jamieson and 
Egan, 2008); control rooms (Adey and Anderson, 2011b; Anderson and Adey, 
2012); financial data centres (Goede, 2006), and other critical nodes within 
these systems (Collier and Lakoff, 2008; Aradau, 2010). Even at smaller scales, 
descriptions of security have tended to focus upon nodes such as cashpoints 
(Amoore and De Goede, 2005) and supermarket checkouts (Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero, 2008).  
 
Such problems are not just limited to the critical security literature, however. 
Also relevant to this study is the field of energy security - a body of work that 
shares many topical similarities with critical security studies, but which has 
developed largely in isolation from it. Like critical security studies, this security 
research similarly suffers from dominant narratives of security remaining 
focused on nodes, but here the ‘nodes’ take the form of the national scale 
nodes of production and consumption, with security being framed in terms of 
the potential consequences of energy interruptions for the maintenance of 
national and economic security within these nodes (c.f. Bielecki, 2002; 
Bradshaw, 2009; Yergin, 2006; Wicks MP, 2009; Cornell, 2009; Garibaldi, 2008; 
Bilgin, 2009; Amineh, 2003; Correljé & van der Linde, 2006).  
 
When framed in terms of nodes of consumption, energy security is typically 
regarded as the security of supply (this is the dominant security narrative in this 
literature – see, for example; Bohi & Toman, 1996; Drexel, 2009; European 
Commission, cited in Ölz et al. 2007; Sovacool, 2011b; Yergin, 2006; Wu et al. 
2012; Toft et al. 2010), and when it is located in nodes of production, it is 
typically framed in terms of the security of demand (c.f. Birol, 2006; Bradshaw, 
2009; Bridge, 2014; Cherp et al. 2012; El Badri, 2008; Lajous, 2004; TNK-BP, 
2006; Yergin, 2006; Johansson, 2013; Hoogeveen & Perlot, 2007). Yet both of 
these narratives portray security as being “lodged in the larger relations among 
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nations and how they interact with one another” (Yergin 2006; 69), and like 
with the displacement of circulations in critical security studies, here security is 
reduced to simply the transactional outcome of economic and political 
arrangements between two or more nodal points, the specificities of the 
energy’s journeys and the way that security becomes manifested along the way 
being largely overlooked. As a consequence, whilst considerable effort goes 
into developing, maintaining, regulating and managing the global circulation 
of energy products, this work is notably absent in academic analyses of energy 
security. Indeed, as Marriott and Minio-Paluello (2014) have recently 
complained, “the mobility systems of fuel itself […] remain largely invisible. The 
institutions, practices and processes that create and enforce [these systems] are 
rarely examined holistically” (p. 99). As such, energy security’s everyday 
performances are strangely lost in this field, as are the sources of insecurity, 
friction and disruption that necessitate them19. 
 
Whilst I highlight the reductive tendencies of both of these literatures here, I 
do not mean to suggest that there is a complete absence of research that 
attends to the governance of circulations between nodes. Indeed, within 
critical security studies, Amoore (2006) and Vaughan-Williams (2010) have 
offered particularly exciting invitations to extend accounts of security’s practice 
beyond the traditional nodal sites of physical state borders, describing some of 
the work that is done to “divide bodies at international boundaries, airports, 
railway stations, on subways or city streets, in the office or the neighborhood” 
(Amoore, 2006; 338). Despite this call however, there remains a shortage of 
																																																						
19 There has been work on energy security that has employed other spatial scales, yet there still 
remains an absence of accounts that attend to the specifics of energy’s journeys. This broader 
work includes those studies that have expanded energy security’s definition to include 
considerations of energy’s availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptability in relation to 
global, national, regional, local and individual scales (c.f. APERC, 2007; Von Hippel et al., 2011; 
del Rio & Burguillo, 2008; Tilman et al., 2009; Turton & Barreto, 2006; Vivoda, 2010; Bollen et 
al. 2010; McCollum et al., 2013; Jacobson, 2009; Mitchell et al. 2013; Pachauri and Spreng, 
2004; Parajuli, 2011; Malla, 2013; Priemus and Visser, 1995; Sovacool, 2011a; Reddy & Srinivas, 
2009; Wang et al. 2015; Kowsari & Zerriffi, 2011). 
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detailed empirical accounts of the ways that security is practiced around 
bodies, materials and things whilst they are in motion. In a similar way, 
Cowen’s (2009; 2010) work hints at a progression beyond nodal thinking, as 
she describes how attempts are made across supply chains to reduce the 
sources of friction and interruption that emerge around the maritime transport 
of goods. Yet ultimately, her analytical focus remains on the nodal spaces of 
maritime ports, her analyses describing the way that securing work is projected 
out beyond national borders to the nodal spaces of other maritime ports. 
 
Similarly, in the energy security literature there have also been attempts to 
study the security issues that can emerge across energy’s journeys. Nincic 
(2009, 2010) and Liss (2011) have examined attempts to counter maritime 
threats to the continued circulation of shipped energy products (pirates, 
geopolitical frictions over arctic sea routes, terrorist attacks, military 
interventions), and a sizable literature has also developed around the topic of 
critical infrastructure protection (c.f. Koknar, 2009; Amin, 2005; Jaradat & 
Keating, 2014; Rudner, 2008; Farrell et al. 2004). Whilst these scholars engage 
with security at the level of energy’s circulatory infrastructures however, focus 
remains firmly placed upon critical nodes and choke points, rather than on the 
broader everyday performances of security conducted across these systems. 
 
As a result, whilst the current approaches employed in the security literature 
have been undeniably productive for understanding contemporary practices of 
security (and I certainly do not wish to suggest that nodes, or ‘moorings’, are 
not important), it is my contention that these studies have frequently come at 
the expense of analyses of the (in)securities that may develop across the 
journeys of circulating entities. This is a matter that clearly merits greater 
academic attention. Indeed, this is one of the central objectives of my thesis: to 
follow the journeys of one particular circulatory thing (here, natural gas) beyond 
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the centralised points through which it passes, closely documenting the ways in 
which specific insecurities and security practices develop, as these gaseous 
molecules travel. 
 
A number of studies from outside the specific fields of security research may 
help us to do this. In terms of more general practices of circulatory 
governance, valuable work has developed around the close management of 
food circulations (Nimmo, 2011; Twilley, 2014; Dunn, 2011; Atkins, 2004, 2011, 
2010), the interruptions, discontinuities, frictions and seams in global cargo 
flows (Gregson et al., 2016), much of the work on mobilities (c.f. Cidell, 2012; 
Peters, 2014; Peters & Turner, 2015; Cresswell, 2010; 2014; Merriman, 2015), 
and the safe and efficient global transport of different energy products 
(Mitchell, 2009; 2013; Barry, 2013). Indeed, these latter two authors have been 
particularly influential to this thesis: Mitchell (2009; 2013) has analysed the 
political potentialities and governing practices that surround the movements of 
various kinds of energy product, and Barry (2013) has explored the regulation 
of information relating to the circulation of oil and the forms of politics that 
subsequently emerge as it flows within pipelines. Like myself, these authors are 
similarly concerned with the governance practices that are employed along the 
extent of energy’s journeys between nodes, and both document the 
emergence of particular kinds of politics along these travels. Neither, however, 
explores such practices through a security lens. 
 
III. Logics 
 
In addition to undergoing an expansion in the spatial scales at which circulation 
has been explored, the critical security literature has also undergone significant 
developments with regards to the way that security’s guiding logics have been 
conceptualised. As Peoples & Vaughan-Williams (2010) acknowledge, one of 
the unifying threads that runs through the critical security literature is a shared 
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interest in what security means, what logics drive its practice, and who and 
what its referent objects are. Many definitions of security have been produced 
within this work, and security has consequently been described as an 
“essentially contested concept” (Baldwin, 1997: 10, cited in Peoples & 
Vaughan-Williams 2010). 
 
One of the most influential definitions relates to the concept of securitization 
that was produced by the ‘Copenhagen School’ of scholars during the 1990s20. 
Security is regarded in these accounts as operating according to a logic of 
survival, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998: 27) broadly defining it as “survival 
in the face of existential threats”. Circulations are considered to be a major 
source of such threats. The introduction of new elements through circulations 
can open up a series of possibly destabilizing aleatory scenarios, but the 
enrolment of these elements within social processes may simultaneously be 
essential for the continued functioning of liberal life. ‘Securitization’ refers to 
the process through which such threats are addressed. It is seen to involve the 
elevation of particular conditions to a level above that of everyday politics in 
order to justify the use of exceptional measures in response (Wæver, 1995). 
Securitization consequently operates along a spectrum of politicization: at one 
extreme is the banal, every day, and non-politicized, and at the other is that 
which presents existential threats and must therefore be securitized (Buzan et 
al. 1998). As such, security is seen to function specifically in the domain of 
exceptional politics, conditions only becoming matters of security when they 
exit the field of public political debate. The definition of security employed in 
this work is therefore founded upon a principle of exceptionalism: it is about 
making a distinction between that which is considered to constitute the 
everyday, safe, and routine, and that which is to be considered deviant, 
threatening and alien. Moreover, it is about claiming the authority to 
																																																						
20 See, for reference, the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. 
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indisputably prescribe the mode of response to these threats, and for this 
mode of response to exceed the boundaries of normal lawful conduct. 
 
As Ole Wæver (1995) has argued, the elevation of conditions to the level of the 
exceptional is typically achieved through the conduct of ‘speech acts’; 
discursive practices through which an actor “claims a special right to use 
whatever means are necessary to block [particular existential threats]” (p.35). 
Yet for securitization scholars, the actual existence of such threats is not as 
important as the act of declaring something a matter of security (Buzan, Wæver 
and De Wilde, 1998). Indeed, the perception and definition of threats is 
subjective, and may be open for political exploitation (Ibid). What they claim is 
important however, is how particular speech acts are made, how they develop 
traction, and what forms of exceptional measure and political formation may 
become legitimized as a result.  
 
There is therefore substantial overlap between the Copenhagen School 
conceptualization of security and those found in more traditional security 
studies texts. Existential threats may be framed in terms of military or terrorist 
forces that endanger the survival of the nation state, and these threats may be 
seen to justify the use of exceptional measures (such as heightened 
surveillance and indefinite detention). Yet this work has also lent itself to 
broader analyses that take alternative referent objects as their focus. 
Securitization scholars have been concerned with the survival of entities from 
numerous spheres, including; environments and the flora, fauna and human 
inhabitants that may live within them; economics, including the economic 
survival of national economies, large businesses and financial institutions; 
politics, including the survival of international institutions such as the EU, 
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individual states and local political units; and social structures such as 
community identities and collective livelihoods21.  
 
Furthermore, in expanding the referent objects under study, the securitization 
literature has also remained open to a much broader range of sources of 
insecurity than traditional security accounts. In principle, any phenomena can 
be considered a security issue, provided that it is seen to present threats to the 
continued existence of a referent object, and provided that these threats are 
considered to necessitate the adoption of exceptional political measures.  
 
Moreover, the securitization literature has expanded the range of actors 
considered to potentially be involved in security’s practice. As Wæver (1995) 
notes, securitizing speech acts do not have to be articulated only by state 
representatives, but can instead be performed by specific human actors that 
have sufficient social and political capital to convince others of the existence 
and severity of particular threats (even then however, attempts at securitization 
may not be successful due to other contextual factors22).  
 
It is this kind of survivalist logic that underpins the majority of accounts of 
energy security. Turbulence or uncertainty in the continued circulation of 
energy products is presented as potentially threatening to the continued 
existences of nations that rely on its sale or consumption, and as a result, 
attempts are made to securitize energy in ways that legitimise particular 
																																																						
21 See Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) for a detailed overview of these different empirical 
focuses. 
22 Such contextual factors may include the context in which the speech act is made (including 
its location and timing), the content of the speech act and its connections to historical 
discourses, and the adherence of the speaker to social/political/economic conventions (Wæver, 
1995). Ultimately, in order for a matter to become securitized, a speech act must be accepted 
by its audience (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010). For a discussion on similar ideas in 
relation to the stability of financial systems, see the work on financial performativity - a 
summary of which is provided by Morris (2016). 
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exceptional forms of intervention, such as state intervention in liberalised 
energy markets (Bridge, 2014). 
 
Despite the influence of these securitization approaches and the ways in which 
they have expanded upon traditionalist accounts however, the emphasis these 
authors place upon exceptionalist speech acts as conducted by influential 
elites has not been universally accepted in the critical security studies literature. 
Indeed, one particularly significant point of contention has concerned how 
such approaches have mobilised a definition of security that discretely situates 
it within the sphere of exceptionalist politics. As Rita Abrahamsen (2005) 
explains;  
	
“The insistence on defining security as ‘existential threat’ and the sharp distinction 
between normal, everyday politics and ‘emergency action’ means that many of the 
processes and modalities whereby issues come to be feared and experienced as 
potentially dangerous cannot be adequately captured within this perspective. In most 
cases, this is a very gradual process and only very rarely does an issue move directly 
from normalcy to urgency. Rather than emergency action, most security politics is 
concerned with the much more mundane management of risk, and security issues can 
be seen to move on a continuum from normalcy to worrisome/troublesome to risk and 
to existential threat – and conversely, from threat to risk and back to normalcy. The 
process of securitization is thus better understood as gradual and incremental, and 
importantly, an issue can be placed on the security continuum without necessarily ever 
reaching the category of existential threat” (p. 59). 
 
In Abrahamsen’s approach, security continues to be viewed in terms of a logic 
of survival, but she also introduces two significant consequences. The first is 
that the issues, threats and conditions that fall under the scope of securitization 
practices must be expanded. Rather than phenomena becoming security 
matters only through the suspension of normal political conduct, any issue that 
is considered to have the potential to escalate to the point at which it presents 
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existential risks may become the focus of securitization attempts. Due to their 
potential to produce various forms of societal instability, many of the 
circulations that saturate, and that are productive of, day to day social 
existence may therefore become the focus of securitization. As such, 
securitization and politicization cannot be cleanly separated into two discrete 
outcomes (Acharya, 2006): security performances permeate every day, ‘normal’ 
and non-political scenarios, shifting, adapting, scaling up and receding, all in 
response to the contingent behaviour of the circulations in focus. 
 
Moreover, Abrahamsen’s critique also has a second corollary, for it necessitates 
the broadening of the kinds of security practice that are included within 
analyses of security. Whilst advocates of the Copenhagen School approach 
would consider any securitizing speech act that does not result in the 
acceptance of political norms being suspended as being a failed attempt at 
securitization, this expanded approach accommodates a multiplicity of security 
utterances that are issued by a broad range of actors (Abrahamsen, 2005). As 
such, this approach focuses much more closely on the diffuse construction of 
discourse. Instead of placing exclusive priority upon singular influential speech 
acts, it explores the broad formation of discourses of security and interrogates 
the consequences that these discourses may have for the way that people, 
spaces and things come to be governed. 
 
Yet despite Abrahamsen’s approach showing a recognition of some of the 
ways in which security practices may become folded into the politics of the 
everyday, she continues to make significant exclusions regarding what can or 
cannot be regarded as a security issue, what is or is not a securitizing practice, 
and who or what might be considered to be involved in security’s conduct. 
Such exclusions ultimately derive from her analytic restriction of security 
practices to discursive acts, and from her adoption of a definition of discourse 
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that principally associates it with the deployment of language. According to 
this definition, discourse is semantic associations that condition the forms of 
action that are possible within a given moment and which prescribe the kinds 
of political future that can consequently unfold, and as a result, security is 
reduced to a set of practices that relate to words and their utterance, whilst the 
actors involved in its performance are also limited to those who have the ability 
to speak.  
 
Broadly building upon the Foucault-inspired work of the Paris School (c.f. Bigo, 
2001; Amoore, 2006; De Goede, 2007; Salter, 2008), a body of literature has 
recently emerged that provides an alternative to such linguistic restrictions. 
This work has been developed by a range of authors from political geography, 
political science, and international relations, and offers a conceptualization of 
security that rejects the focus on exceptionalism advocated by the 
Copenhagen School, while at the same time greatly expanding the criteria for 
what qualifies as a security actor and a security practice.  
 
Indeed, if the work on securitization through speech acts is considered to have 
its foundations in a linguistic definition of discourse, this more recent body of 
work can be thought of as framed around a materialist definition of discourse23. 
Here, discourse remains that which enables and constrains what can be said, 
known, or enacted, but instead of being constituted only through verbal 
utterances, it forms through the specific arrangements of relations between 
human, material, and immaterial actors within particular spatio-historical 
contexts. Security thus remains a set of discursive practices, but here the 
discourses feature as complex socio-material networks. Security accordingly 
consists of a diffuse set of practices that are performed by complex and 
constantly shifting associations between heterogeneous actors (Huysmans, 
																																																						
23 See Barad (2007) for an excellent outline of how materialized discourses may be 
conceptualised. 
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2011), and these practices involve the rearranging of socio-material relations in 
ways that make possible or constrain the emergence of particular eventful 
phenomena. As such, circulations might be understood to be organised 
through meticulous practices of relational manipulation24.  
 
An example of such a socio-material network is described by Huysmans (2011, 
citing Neyland 2009). He describes the careful construction of a system of 
words, bodies and practices around the circulation of mail in the attempt to 
‘cancel out’ the threat of letter bombs. Here, a speech act that is constructed 
through a MI5 webpage that advises members of the public about how to 
identify possible letter bombs, forms only one part of “a whole set of banal, 
little connections (e.g. postal delivery, postal sorting, explosive or incendiary 
substances, posting, unusual place of origin, couriers, recipients, the place of 
origin of the sender, police)” (p. 376). These connections are carefully 
structured to constrain what phenomena are possible within a given moment; 
like linguistic discursive arrangements they similarly enable and constrain what 
can be said, known, or enacted, but they are instead constructed through the 
relationships between people, bodies, words and things. 
 
Whilst socio-material accounts of security consequently appreciate the role of 
speech in security performances, they also expand significantly beyond these 
acts (grand or otherwise), drawing attention to how they are mediated by the 
practices of diverse entities and materials such as websites, newspapers and 
signs. Moreover, they can also go entirely beyond the formation of linguistic 
acts to explore distinctly non-verbal security practices, with studies describing 
in detail how a wide variety of human and non-human actors (including CCTV 
cameras, physical barriers to access, identity cards, passports, border guards, 
and algorithms) come together at different times and in different places to 
																																																						
24 Often however, these accounts still lean towards descriptions of security that distills it into 
practices of circulatory filtration and maintenance. 
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collectively identify particular kinds of threat and opportunity, and respond to 
them. 
  
Yet whilst such studies share in common a conceptualization of security as 
diffuse and distributed, there are some significant variations in the ways in 
which security actors and security practices are defined in this work. One of the 
most common perspectives, as seen in the work of scholars such as Amoore 
and de Goede (2008), Huysmans (2011), and  Vaughan-Williams (2010) involves 
the definition of security actors through their participation in practices of 
drawing lines between acceptable and exceptional subjects. Although rarely 
explicitly outlined in this work, security typically operates in these accounts 
according to a logic of the continuation, or persistence of, particular 
identifiable qualities of the referent objects that are in need of protection, 
rather than change and transformation being completely avoided, as implied 
by survivalist logics. Phenomena that may potentially threaten these qualities 
are identified and isolated through the actions of diverse, contingent and 
constantly changing networks of human and non-human actors, and instead of 
critical moments whereby exceptions are decisively defined, security 
performances are envisioned as “a myriad of decisions in a process that is 
continuously made and remade” (Huysmans, 2011: 376). Such decisions are 
diffuse, rarely coherently organised, and do not necessarily have to entail the 
suspension of normal modes of political practice. Any action or form of 
decision that contributes to the outcomes of threat delineation and isolation is 
regarded as a security practice, and security actors are defined through their 
participation in these practices. As such, a security actor can be any human or 
non-human entity that is involved in the distributed process of producing 
decisions, regardless of whether it has the capacity to ‘speak’, let alone to 
speak with authority.  
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In this way, circulations are divided into flows of safe and risky entities, a 
heterogeneous collection of actors working together to define and isolate 
those forms of circulation that present threats. Such circulations are also 
managed according to their risks of interruption. Attempts are made to identify 
and apprehend the forms of contingent phenomena (such as sources of 
rupture and friction) that could produce insecurities through their interaction 
with essential circulations. Indeed, this highlights a failing in this work that I 
hope to begin to address in this thesis; namely that security’s practice tends to 
be reduced in these accounts to practices of circulatory maintenance or 
circulatory filtration. 
 
Moreover, as a number of scholars have noted (c.f. Amoore and de Goede, 
2008; Huysmans, 2011; Ciuta, 2010), the extension of the responsibility for 
security to human and nonhuman actors makes the practical matter of 
identifying a security actor and a securing action very difficult to definitively 
achieve. Decisions are made possible, and emerge out of, the multiple actions 
of a dispersed array of bodies, objects and things that at any one moment are 
folded into, and are constitutive of, everyday realities. As Huysmans (2011; 
377) writes, “[m]any little and banal daily activities, meetings, and regulations 
are actively part of the shaping of securitizing practices”, and these 
connections therefore “challenge the boundary between security practice and 
everyday life”25. Furthermore, even practices, devices and technologies that 
may seem exceptional can become normalized and routine, making distinction 
between that which composes the everyday and that which constitutes a 
security performance an almost impossible task26. It is also very hard to 
																																																						
25 It is worthwhile noting that Huysmans (2011) uses the term ‘little security nothings’ to 
describe these ‘infinitesimal mediations’ (p. 379). This term is avoided in this account because 
it is deemed to be both inadequate and misleading due to the way that it discursively 
dematerializes security practices and potentially reduces their significance. 
26 Goold, Loader and Thumala (2013) provide a good example of this in their discussion of the 
way that CCTV cameras and public surveillance has become normalized over time. Many other 
contemporary examples exist however, including the deployment of risk algorithms within the 
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ascertain what actually defines a decision, due to how the diffused nature of 
these performances may cause individual actors to be unaware that they are 
making decisions in their everyday lives, and to be unaware of the cumulative 
significance of their decisions.  
 
Arguably, these issues could severely reduce the analytical value of security as 
a concept. Every action that is performed by any element could consequently 
be interpreted through a security lens, with the risk of security consequently 
becoming a totalizing concept (Ciuta, 2010). Moreover, the diffusion of 
causality in these perspectives also potentially undermines the accountability of 
specific actors for the emergence of securing practices, and for the forms of 
exceptional politics that come to be employed (Huysmans, 2011).  
 
Yet whilst these concerns are certainly not unfounded, I maintain that they are 
insufficient to warrant the jettison of security as a concept, and definitely do 
not require the abandonment of these diffuse perspectives. Security cannot be 
adequately understood without attending to practices that exceed 
exceptionalist speech acts: it often takes forms that are hidden from view and 
might not require public acceptance (see, for example, the continuation of 
contemporary practices of mass surveillance), its practices frequently become 
normalised and fades into the background of everyday life (consider, for 
example, CCTV practices), or it may involve a series of seemingly low-key 
practices that place a situation on a spectrum of securitization (Abrahamsen, 
2005), whereby such situations can scale up, or scale down in political priority. 
Such approaches may extend security to every extremity of social existence, 
but whilst it might not always be possible to exhaustively identify all of the 
elements and connections that contribute to the formation of these outcomes, 
it is still possible (and indeed, important) to try to identify how certain 
																																																																																																																																																														
sphere of public commerce and the widespread public adoption of military-developed global 
positioning technology through the use of satnavs and smartphones. 
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securitization practices emerge and attempt to determine their consequences 
for the structuring of social life – even if we must ultimately recognize that any 
findings developed will necessarily always be incomplete and partial. As such, 
whilst security practices can proliferate under these approaches, security as a 
terms is not emptied of its meaning (Ciuta, 2010). 
 
In addition to these post-structuralist based approaches that focus on the 
definition of exceptions, a second related, but distinct, body of thought has 
developed out of close readings of Foucault's (2007) lectures on biopolitical 
security apparatuses. This work diverges from approaches founded upon the 
distinction of exceptional subjects (which likewise have tended to draw heavily 
on aspects of Foucault’s work) in that these authors define security through a 
logic of social productivity, rather than the survival or continuation of referent 
objects. In this work, security actors and practices are similarly identified 
through their roles in diffuse security performances, but these performances 
are centred around the task of enhancing social effects instead of simply 
demarcating unacceptable phenomenal subjects.  
 
For Foucault, biopolitics is a form of security practice27 in which species life is 
taken as security’s referent object. It involves the regulation of bodies at the 
level of populations, and instead of limiting security to a strategy of identifying, 
apprehending, vilifying, and eliminating rogue elements within these 
populations, it concerns itself with the science of making ‘life live’ (Dillon and 
Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; 269). The central project of biopolitical security 
assemblages is therefore to maximize the productivity of populations whilst 
simultaneously minimizing the influence of threatening elements. Circulations 
are “the space of operation in biopolitics” (Ibid; 268), and it is through their 
management that this productivity is increased. This may entail restricting flows 
																																																						
27 Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008; 266) state; “there is no biopolitics which is not 
simultaneously also a security apparatus”. 
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of undesirable entities, but it can also involve maintaining circulations and 
altering their characteristics (volume, quality, timeliness, and so on) in order to 
optimize the conditions for human life. As such, security is “not a politics of 
identity – enacting a self-other dialectic through discursive practices of identity 
production. It is a complex array of changing mechanisms concerned with 
regulating the contingent economy of species life” (Ibid; 268).  
 
In agreement with the ‘security as continuation’ approaches described above, 
biopolitical security perspectives maintain that security is performed by a 
multiplicity of heterogeneous actors that permeate and infuse everyday life. 
Yet in contrast, the definition of what constitutes a securing actor and a security 
practice is significantly broadened. Security is still considered to incorporate 
moves to defend particular referent objects (in this case, productive 
populations), but “it is their very fructification that is being sought, not their 
simple protection” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008; 271). Security is about 
arranging, organizing, and regulating human bodies, their socio-material 
milieus, and the forceful relationships that exist between these elements in 
order to optimize the productivity of a wider population. Put in terms of 
discourse, it involves arranging particular discursive apparatuses in order to 
enhance social productivity. As such, security performances may similarly 
include practices through which exceptional subjects are delineated, but they 
also exceed these practices to cover the active transformation of security’s 
subjects in the pursuit of popular productivity.  
 
In broadening the kinds of actors and practices involved in security 
performances in this way, significant challenges are raised for effectively 
discriminating between those practices that relate to security, and those that 
constitute more generalized actions of governance. Security in this work often 
features as incredibly mundane sets of routines and behaviours, such as the 
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profiling of consumers through supermarket ‘Nectar’ cards (Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero, 2008), and as a result, the line between what distinguishes a security 
practice and a practice of governance is increasingly blurred. Ultimately what 
must separate these actions are the logics that guide them and the referent 
objects that they attend to. A security practice in this literature is therefore 
defined as any practice that, regardless of an actors’ intent, forms part of a 
wider project of enhancing the productivity of a wider population. 
 
When held in relief (exceptionalist accounts of security and biopolitical 
accounts) there appears to be a trade-off. Whilst the literature on diffuse 
security performances of exceptional subjects rarely explicitly isolates its 
analysis to singular referent objects (and it therefore remains open to security 
analyses that examine the full diversity of elements described earlier in this 
chapter - including environments, religions, political structures, economic units, 
and social groups), the work on diffused biopolitical performances of security 
restricts itself to the single referent object of species life. At the same time 
however, the literature on exceptionalist security performances also commits 
itself to a limited definition of security in which continuation and protection 
determine the actions and actors that are associated with security’s 
performance. Here security is about identification, isolation, restriction, and 
containment, whereas the biopolitical security literature remains open to 
security actions that are not simply protective, but are also productively 
transformative. Security in biopolitical accounts is therefore more broadly 
concerned with management and regulation (although identification, isolation, 
restriction and containment may all feature in these practices).  
 
In the case of gas, it is apparent that there are potentially multiple referent 
objects of security at play (nations, governments, economies, corporations, 
individuals, populations, environments), and that security is not simply a 
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restrictive practice, but a productive one. The question presented by this work 
is therefore whether it is possible to combine the best of these two materialist 
security approaches – a biopolitical security approach, and an exceptionalist 
approach – in a meaningful way in order to analyse security’s performance in 
relation to energy’s circulation, and the plethora of interests that become 
involved with it throughout its travels. 
 
My answer to this question is ‘yes’. Biopolitical accounts of security do not 
prohibit the analysis of security’s performance of the exception, for in these 
accounts the delineation of subjects is just one part of a larger project of 
optimizing social production. But whilst biopolitical accounts do take species 
life as their exclusive referent object, they also explicitly acknowledge that 
biopolitical security practices have formed out of, and are situated within, a 
particular socio-historical context. As a result, they constitute only one of 
potentially multiple kinds of security practice. Other manifestations of security 
may exist, and whilst these can operate according to similar productive logics, 
they could also take alternative referent objects as their points of reference. 
 
In this thesis, I therefore look to explore security’s performance on this basis. 
Security from this position involves the re-ordering of socio-material discursive 
apparatuses in order to alter the conditions that determine the forms of 
perception, speech, and action that can emerge in a given moment. These 
practices do not have to be restrictive. They can operate according to a logic 
that seeks to enforce certain forms of relational stasis, but they may also be 
productive, focused around enhancing productivity and creating new forms of 
relational architecture and social condition. Crucially however, the security 
actors involved in these alterations do not have to be united under a common 
logic (such as, for example, enhancing the productivity of species life). Whilst 
they may all simultaneously act upon the same elements in various ways, the 
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referent objects that they seek to protect/prolong/improve may all be different, 
with security actors making alterations to socio-material apparatuses according 
to their different interests.  
 
As a consequence of this position, this thesis must inhabit a zone of 
indistinction. It must begin from the starting point that it is not always possible 
to determine what is and what is not a security practice, as opposed to a 
normal function of governance. Despite this however, it ‘stays with the trouble’ 
(Haraway, 2010, 2016), and attempts to explore how ‘secure’ subjects are 
performed through the diffuse practices of heterogeneous elements, 
documenting the way that these practices shift, adapt, scale up, and recede, all 
in accordance with the contingent behaviour of the circulatory phenomena in 
focus.  
 
IV. Materials 
 
Finally, in addition to the limitations described in the previous two sections, the 
security literature is also limited in the way that it has portrayed the roles of 
materials in security performances. Indeed, this is critical for the main argument 
of this thesis, for in order to better understand security, I argue that we have to 
attend to the specific materialities of the circulating elements in focus.  
 
Broadly speaking, there have been two main approaches to materials in this 
work. On the one hand, a large literature limits security to human actors that 
are capable of speech, and on the other a burgeoning literature regards 
materials as active participants in the production of security’s subjects.  
 
This second literature has been strongly influenced by the post-structuralist 
network-based theoretical perspectives described previously, and through 
these approaches, the need to treat humans and nonhumans on equal terms 
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has been extensively emphasized. Both nonhumans and humans are regarded 
as having the same potential to act (Law, 2007; Latour 1993), and power is 
seen to circulate between these entities through complex webs of social 
relations. It is from the arrangement of these relations that relational power 
architectures are constructed, and that security’s emergent subjects are 
produced.  
 
Understanding security to operate through such diffuse webs of relations has 
helped researchers to break down the faceless mass of ‘the nation state’ into a 
multiplicity of ‘petty sovereigns’28 that collectively enact state decisions. Such 
petty sovereigns have been shown to include (amongst other actors); 
politicians (Heath-Kelly, 2015), border guards (Amoore, 2011, 2007), CCTV 
analysts (Adey, 2004; Salter, 2008), the designers of risk algorithms (Amoore, 
2011), and even academics who may unintentionally reproduce security 
discourses through their writing (Eriksson, 1999). Moreover, these approaches 
have also extended the scope of security research to examine various kinds of 
non-state actors that may become involved in security performances, including 
private companies (Petersen, 2008; Aitken, 2011; Walker and Cooper, 2011; 
Sparke, 2006) and members of the public (Amoore, 2006; Closs Stephens, 
2007). Perhaps most radically however, they have also thrown light upon the 
role of material actors within performances of security. Broadly speaking, there 
are four ways in which materials have featured in this work: as material 
architectures, as decision makers, as obstacles, and as travellers.  
 
The first of these, material architectures, refers to the way that materials have 
effects on circulating bodies/things and can constrain/facilitate their abilities to 
act in different contexts. The quintessential security architecture described in 
																																																						
28 See (Butler, 2004) ‘Precarious Life’ p. 66 for a description of ‘petty sovereigns’. Whilst Butler 
frames petty sovereigns as principally consisting of human actors, the concept of the petty 
sovereign – of a decentralized actor that articulates sovereign power – has been expanded to 
also incorporate different kinds of materials in other scholars’ accounts. 
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this literature is the airport. The materials that construct and constitute these 
spaces are arranged in specific ways to “control and direct the masses of 
passengers” moving between destinations (Pascoe, 2001; 226), and materials 
are distributed to enable the more or less frictionless movement of these 
bodies (Salter, 2008), with wide corridors, escalators, moving walkways, large 
directional signs on floors and above heads, and a wide variety of fences, 
doors and barriers all efficiently channelling flows of human bodies in different 
directions. Space is not passive here. The materials that constitute space are 
actively enrolled in security’s performance; they enable bodies to move 
smoothly, and they thereby maintain the uninterrupted circulation of people. 
Yet they also simultaneously constrain these bodies. Materials such as CCTV 
cameras, x-ray scanners, metal detectors, guard uniforms, weapons and 
barriers combine with other discursive elements to produce affective 
atmospheres of security. Such atmospheres may have disciplining affects, 
enabling the production of mollified and confessing security subjects (Salter, 
2007), but they may also express themselves in other ways, such as in boredom 
and excitement (Anderson, 2015)29. 
 
The second material form of this literature, materialized decision makers, refers 
to the way that heterogeneous collectives are productive of the decisions over 
which circulating bodies and things are considered to be safe (and should 
therefore be permitted to travel onward), and those that are exceptional (and 
therefore require arrest). This literature has shown human acts of decision to 
only be made possible through the cooperation of distributed materials, which 
have included such seemingly mundane objects as the RFID passports that 
help to identify and track passengers (Salter, 2003; Torpey, 2000; Walters and 
																																																						
29 Other architectures have also been shown to produce different forms of securitized subject. 
For example, Vaughan-Williams (2015) has described how migrants are 
dehumanized/animalized through the ‘zoo-like’ physical conditions that are forced upon them 
within the European border security and detention systems, and Cowen (2009) has examined 
how materials within maritime port spaces are organised in ways that minimise the frictional 
forces operating on cargo circulations. 
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Vanderlip, 2015), and posters that explain the kinds of incident that members 
of the public should find suspicious and should consequently report (Closs 
Stephens, 2007). Radically however, materialist security scholars have also 
demonstrated that materials may become intimately involved in the drawing of 
lines of exceptionality. Numerous studies have described how such diverse 
objects as x-ray machines and body scanners (Amoore and Hall, 2009; Diken 
and Laustsen, 2006); polygraph devices (Adey, 2004); chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear and explosive device detectors (Bourne, Johnson and 
Lisle, 2015); gait scanners (Adey, 2004; Cresswell, 2010); cash points (Amoore 
and de Goede, 2008); and database-connected electronic profiling systems 
(Lyon, 2007; Norris, 2003; Amoore, 2006, 2016; Amoore and Hall, 2009; 
Vaughan-Williams, 2010; Amoore and De Goede, 2005; de Goede, 2012) can 
all assume a pivotal role in the multiple daily processes through which 
exceptional circulations are defined.  
 
The primary contribution of this literature has been to showcase how the 
allocation of responsibility in security’s performance is troubled by the 
mediated quality of these decisions. Amoore (2011), for example, has 
demonstrated how the algorithms through which travellers are flagged as risks, 
are actually the products of numerous software engineers, politicians and 
policy makers, and have often been expanded and developed in different 
security contexts30. As such, they may contain remnants of their histories that 
																																																						
30 The software that is used in the delineation of airport security risks, for instance, may also 
have been developed for military, insurance, and financial applications (Amoore, 2011). 
Interestingly, many of these systems also operate on the assumption that human agency can 
be broken down into the associations they have formed between different heterogeneous 
elements. For example, algorithmic border security systems such as the NetReveal system 
developed by Detica draw upon vast quantities of data (including phone records, credit 
histories, online bookings, travel histories, and even blood donor records and flight meal 
preferences) in order to build relational profiles of travelers and assess their relative risk 
(Vaughan-Williams, 2009, 2010). Human agency is seen to be the product of these relations, 
and lines are consequently drawn between those associations that are considered to be 
productive of particular forms of threatening agency, and those that are considered to be safe. 
Sorted identities are then attached to their corresponding bodies through the use of biometric 
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affect the framing of subsequent decisions. Exactly where the origins of a 
particular decision are located thus becomes difficult to ascertain. 
 
Moreover, the complexity of such decisions’ emergence has been shown to not 
just enhance the uncertainty with which responsibility can be allocated: it can 
also endow decisions with an opacity that makes their rigorous scrutiny and 
interrogation, and the holding to account of individual elements, extremely 
difficult to achieve. Amoore (2011) provides one example of this, describing 
how the ‘black boxing’ of risk profiling systems can make it hard for secured 
subjects to challenge the way that they are digitally categorized as existential 
risks. As such, diffuse decisions can effectively stifle opportunities for 
resistance. 
  
The third material form, material obstacles, then involves the destabilizing 
potential of materials for smooth circulations. Materials may present existential 
threats through the way that they can interrupt critical circulations, as in the 
case of the disturbances to air traffic caused by the Icelandic ash cloud in 2010 
(Adey and Anderson 2011a), but they may also create certain forms of friction, 
such as in the tensions created between materialized practices of securitized 
filtration within airport spaces and the smooth movement of bodies (Adey et 
al., 2013; Adey, 2004).  
 
Finally, materials have undertaken the role of travellers in this literature. Over a 
decade ago, Adey (2004) lamented the shortage of critical security accounts 
that attended to such circulations, writing of how there remained a “tendency 
to limit our understanding of mobilities to humans” (Ibid; 502). Whilst the 
majority of contemporary studies of security still remain concerned with 
security’s performance in relation to such human circulatory figures as the 
																																																																																																																																																														
identifiers (iris scans, finger prints, passport photographs), and personal codifiers (such as bank 
account PIN numbers), thereby enabling the physical division of safe and risky subjects. 
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terrorist (Heath-Kelly, 2015; Amoore and De Goede, 2005; Aradau and van 
Munster, 2008; Petersen, 2008); the ‘illegal’ immigrant (Huysmans, 2000; Doty, 
1998; Money, 1999; Walters, 2010; Astor, 2009; Jordan and Brown, 2007) and 
the asylum seeker (Rajaram, 2008; Gill, 2010; Mountz, 2011; Darling, 2009), a 
sizable body of work has now also developed around various kinds of material 
flow. De Goede (2012, 2007, 2006, 2003), for example, has written about the 
securing of financial circulations; Adey (2004) has discussed the circulation of 
luggage; Cowen (2010, 2009) and Mutlu (2015) have looked at the circulation 
of shipping containers; Elbe, Roemer-Mahler and Long (2014), Hinchliffe and 
Bingham (2008) and Clark (2013) have documented the securing of influenza 
and other forms of contagion; Ackleson (2005) and Bourne (2015) have 
described the securing of narcotics; Bingham and Lavau (2012) have examined 
the securing of moving foodborne pathogens, and Duffield (2001) has looked 
at the securitization of international aid. This list is not exhaustive, but it is 
indicative of the broad literature that is now available relating to the 
performance of security in relation to diverse material travellers. 
 
Yet whilst this literature has opened up to the movements of a wide variety of 
materials, few studies have closely attended to the way that these materials are 
contingently performed as secure subjects. This, I suggest, is a result of a 
tendency of this literature to focus on the apparatuses and practices of 
security, over the specificities of the entities being secured and the particular 
transformations that they undergo through security’s practice. Indeed, this, as I 
suggested in the previous chapter, is itself symptomatic of a habit of treating 
security as a noun (Dillon, 1996); as a thing that can, to some extent, be 
abstracted from its contextual specificities in ways that enable its deployment 
in relation to a variety of very different objects. This seems to be the case with 
the way that security has been seen to operate in relation to circulations. 
Closely following Foucault’s (2007) distinction, circulatory security is typically 
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reduced in this work to two sets of practices: to practices of circulatory 
filtration, and to practices of circulatory maintenance. Little attention is paid to 
the way that materials are changed through these practices, nor to how 
particular phenomena are ‘compensated for’, ‘limited’ or ‘cancelled out’ 
(Foucault, 2007)31, and material circulations consequently often appear in this 
work as if on rails. Work goes into ensuring that they continue to smoothly 
circulate, or to ensure that they periodically change track/are diverted so as to 
separate risky entities from safe ones, but across these journeys, matter 
typically remains unchanged. Objects almost invariably require only periodic 
filtration and reliable modes of transport in order to be secured.   
 
A result of this is that travelling materials are frequently presented as almost 
entirely passive or inert. The vibrancy and contingency of objects that is 
emphasized within the ANT and assemblage literatures is strangely 
underplayed in relation to the movement of materials (Adey and Anderson, 
2012). This is problematic, for it not only overlooks the way that security has to 
be performed in sites other than points of filtration in order to transform, 
subdue, or enhance the productivity of particular circulations, but it also fails to 
acknowledge the potential of these entities to develop unexpected and 
destabilizing forms of agency. Moreover, it also ignores the ways in which the 
specific qualities of different entities require very different forms of security 
practice (often which operate at a relational level) in order for them to be 
rendered secure. 
 
Indeed, this critique also extends to the materials performing security. Whilst 
materialist security scholars have been willing to open their analyses up to the 
participation of materials, relatively little attention has been paid to how these 
																																																						
31 Foucault does appreciate that materials undergo transformations throughout their travels, 
but his reflection on these transformations is only very fleeting. Almost no attention is paid to 
their specifics or to their consequences, and concern is instead principally placed upon the 
production of human bodies, rather than the subjectification of materials.  
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performances may be complicated by materials acting in ways other than 
intended. This is particularly odd given that material failures, unexpected 
interactions, and autonomous agency are not new concepts in the literature on 
networked infrastructures (see for example, Graham, 2010b); a body of work 
that shares considerable thematic overlap with numerous security studies’ 
debates.  
 
Again, this is a set of criticisms that can also be levelled at the energy security 
literature. The term ‘energy’ is employed in this work in a classical 
thermodynamics sense to cover all kinds of energetic material. This 
terminology, which only began to be employed after many oil-dependent 
nation-states attempted to diversify their energy mixes following the OPEC oil 
crisis in the 1970s (Patterson, 2008), works to discursively dematerialise energy 
products (Bridge, 2014). Provided nation states can acquire sufficient gigawatt 
hours of energy, the material composition of that energy is of secondary 
importance. Oil, coal, gas, nuclear and other energy sources consequently 
became reframed as more or less fungible, and energy itself became 
increasingly discursively dematerialised. Indeed, as Bridge (2014: 3, citing 
Hildyard et al. 2012) observes, this is an ongoing process; “wind, water, 
biomass, fossil fuels are all made equivalent under the banner of ‘energy’, 
ignoring the different affordances that each of these distinctive materialisations 
of energy provides”.  
 
Likewise, the vitality of the materials that constitute energy infrastructures has 
similarly been attended to in a limited capacity. As Haarstad and Wanvik (2016) 
have noted, there has been a tendency to assume the exaggerated fixity and 
rigidity of energy infrastructures. Whilst there is undoubtedly value in 
considering the political implications of such obstinacy and inertia, this heavy 
emphasis through terms such as energy ‘lock-in’ (Unruh, 2002), ‘carbon 
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democracy’ (Mitchell, 2009, 2011b), and ‘petro cultures’ (Marriott and Minio-
Paluello, 2014) has, these authors have argued, worked to obscure instances of 
change and instability (Haarstad & Wanvik 2016). 
 
As such, we arrive at another of the central claims of this thesis. Far more 
attention needs to be paid to the vitalism and transformations of circulating 
entities, the vitalism of the heterogeneous elements that support these 
circulations, and the ways that these different lively entities affect the security 
of various referent objects through their clogging up, igniting, breaking, 
freezing, melting, exploding, decaying, transforming, expanding, or by them 
expressing themselves through a plethora of other vibrant affects. What we 
need is a form of entity-attentive security research: one that, whilst holding in 
focus the configurations of particular security apparatuses, also focuses on the 
entities that are in circulation, the ways in which the particular qualities of these 
entities are seen to be productive of particular kinds of future phenomena, the 
ways in which these qualities necessitate highly specific kinds of securing 
practice, and the ways in which these entities are transformed through 
security’s practice, in order to facilitate, ‘compensate for’, ‘limit’, and ‘cancel 
out’ particular kinds of emergent phenomena (Foucault, 2007). 
 
Indeed, beyond the security literature, we again can find numerous accounts 
that may inform such an entity-attentive agenda. The work on circular 
economies, for instance (Gregson, Crang, Fuller and Holmes, 2015; Hobson, 
2015; Kama, 2015; Gregson and Crang, 2010, 2015a; Gregson, Crang and 
Antonopoulos, 2016), explores the hard work that goes into transforming 
materials (particularly waste products) in ways that also transform their 
economic values. Likewise, relevant research has developed within the field of 
food geographies, with numerous accounts usefully documenting current and 
historical developments in practices of circulatory governance, most notably 
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with regards to the management of the decay of different kinds of 
consumables32 (Nimmo, 2011; Twilley, 2014; Dunn, 2011; Atkins, 2004, 2011, 
2010). Most influentially for this study however, are Mitchell (2009; 2011) and 
Barry’s (2013) accounts of the governance of energy circulations. Mitchell 
(2009, 2011b) valuably describes the way that the materialities of carbon fuels 
can be productive of particular forms of (un)democratic politics and can be 
mobilised for political purposes. Indeed, the materialities of specific resources 
– principally oil and coal – are shown in this work to condition the forms of 
politics that have historically emerged. In the case of coal, for instance, its 
material qualities, when combined with its increasingly widespread 
consumption, worked to draw the balance of power away from nation states 
and empower coal workers. This was because coal required large labour forces 
to excavate, and this facilitated the formation of powerful unions that could 
challenge state sovereignty through strike action. In contrast however, oil’s 
liquidity and the subterranean pressures that build up behind it are shown to 
make the possibility of industrial action much harder to achieve, due to it rising 
to the earth’s surface largely of its own accord and consequently requiring 
much smaller workforces to extract.  
 
Whilst there is much to learn from Mitchell’s account in terms of the ways in 
which the materialities of circulating entities can be politically productive 
however, Mitchell pays very little attention to the capacities of circulating 
energy products to transform and mutate during their circulation. Viscous 
liquid oil invariably remains viscous liquid oil. Solid coal retains its solidity. 
Energy products rarely stay rigidly and permanently the same throughout their 
journeys though – indeed, they would be useless if they did, for energy works 
in its moments of metamorphosis 33. As such, whilst we need to attend to the 
																																																						
32 For a fascinating discussion of material decay, see DeSilvey (2006, 2017). 
33 This is actually a benefit of a thermodynamic approach. The transformations undergone by 
energetic materials and the ways in which energy flows through these different material forms 
	 64 
political futures made possible through these materialities, we also need to 
attend to how they, and the contingent futures associated with their material 
expressions, can potentially shift and transform. 
 
Barry (2013) is much more attentive to the capacities of materials to transform. 
Here, he provides an in-depth account of the ways that oil is ontologically 
manipulated as it circulates within pipelines in ways that mitigate particular 
forms of political dispute. Building upon his earlier work on the formation of 
increasingly ‘informed materials’ (Barry, 2005), he argues that the governance 
of information surrounding this energetic material is central to how oil 
companies attempt to “manag[e] the unruliness of persons and things” (p.4); 
such companies seeing threats to oil’s movement arising from both the 
material qualities of oil circulations, and from the human actors that are 
concerned with the development of pipelines. Through regulating the 
production and distribution of this information, oil companies therefore sought 
to “govern the[ir] potentially disruptive activity” (p.4). As such, in this ‘informed 
materials’ sense, the specific qualities that materials develop across their 
journeys are shown by Barry to be highly significant for the forms of politics 
that consequently emerge, and particularly valuably, emphasis is placed upon 
how the transformation of circulating materials is often a key part of their 
governance. As such, Barry is much closer to the entity-attentive approach that 
I seek to advocate, albeit I focus specifically on security, and also place greater 
empirical emphasis upon the transforming physical qualities of energy as it 
circulates. 
 
In this thesis, I consequently aim to follow natural gas as it circulates, tracing 
the processes through which it is rendered secure in multiple ways. In what 
																																																																																																																																																														
are often politically, socially, economically and environmentally significant - for example, the 
efficiency of energy’s transformations – sunlight to heat, heat to motion, motion to electricity, 
electricity to light – is a critical factor within contemporary energy systems. 
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follows, I document the transformations that gas undergoes throughout the 
duration of its circulations, and attend to not just its own vitality, but also to the 
vibrancy of the other material actors involved in the ongoing processes of its 
securing. Particular interest will be placed upon how such materials come to 
present challenges for security’s performance, and how particular strategies are 
(or perhaps are not) assembled to manage and address these contingencies. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have thus highlighted three areas of controversy that have 
emerged within the security literature relating to the global circulation of 
bodies, materials and ‘things’. In section II, I attended to the ways that 
(in)security has been framed geographically. I described the recent shift in 
security studies away from traditional perspectives that regard security only in 
terms of the nation state, towards approaches that appreciate a multiplicity of 
referent objects and possible threats. Building upon this observation, I 
explained how this shift has led to a significant expansion in the geographical 
framing of security in critical security studies, with research now including 
studies of security’s performance that extend within and beyond national 
borders. I also explored the emphasis that has been placed upon global 
circulations since the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre, describing how 
this has had significant consequences for the way that space has been 
imagined in relation to (in)security; circulations being seen to extend 
(in)security into the sphere of the everyday. 
 
This analysis then led me to argue that contemporary security research has 
tended to overlook performances of security that take place in locations other 
than the nodal sites through which circulations pass. I claimed that the 
circulatory journeys of entities through pipes, cables, road infrastructures, 
airways and shipping lanes, and the various ways in which these entities are 
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secured whilst in transit, have typically received limited attention in this 
literature. I also drew attention to how similar reductions had taken place in the 
related, but distinct, field of energy security. Their consequences, I suggested, 
have been that security research has often failed to recognize the vast amount 
of securing work that is conducted on a daily basis around these circulations; 
work that may be critical to the continued stability of various forms of social 
structure. A central aim of this thesis is therefore to follow gaseous molecules 
across their circulatory journeys, and to document the forms of security practice 
that are employed in the process.  
 
In section III, I then examined the competing logics through which security has 
been seen to operate in this literature. Beginning with the work on 
securitization theory, I demonstrated how security has been framed according 
to a logic of survival. I showed how this approach remains open to the 
possibility of multiple referent objects (such as environments, political 
structures, economic units, and social formations), and described how security 
has been defined in terms of the continued survival of these objects. Whilst 
influential, however, I argued that this work limited security’s analysis to 
specific securitizing speech acts through which security threats are defined by 
their elevation above the level of everyday politics.  
 
I proceeded in this section to contrast the literature on securitization theory 
against two broadly post-structuralist approaches that have extended security’s 
practice beyond grand speech acts, using these approaches to explore how 
security is folded into the politics of everyday life. The first – relating to the 
diffused performance of bordering – was shown to adopt a similar view to the 
securitization literature, in that it recognizes multiple referent objects and 
regards security as a project of protection. However, I also showed how this 
approach is distinct from the securitization literature in that it has defined 
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security through a logic of continuation, rather than survival – the difference 
being that continuation better reflects the potential of referent objects to 
change during security’s performance. Particular qualities and capacities of 
referent objects are the focus of protection in this approach, protection taking 
place through the delineation and arrest of potential threats. Crucially, these 
threats are distinguished through a series of diffuse security practices that are 
spread out across the social fabrics performing contemporary liberal life, rather 
than via grand speech acts.  
 
The second approach I described was then the body of work concerned with 
the biopolitical logic of social productivity. Here I showed how, in comparison 
to other approaches, this work regards security as a productive practice 
through which the fructification of a referent object is optimized. Yet this 
approach was also criticised for the way that it limits security to a set of 
practices that are exercised in relation to a singular referent object: species life. 
According to this work, multiple diffuse elements were seen to come together 
to arrange social fabrics in such ways as to maximize the productive output of 
species populations, limiting its utility for analysing security’s conduct in 
relation to an expanded field of referent objects. 
 
I consequently argued that aspects of both of these literatures have different 
merits and drawbacks for understanding the ways that gas may come to be 
secured. Specifically, I highlighted how continuation approaches take a diffuse 
approach to security that remains open to multiple referent objects, but which 
limit their analyses to practices through which threats are excluded. I then 
contrasted this with biopolitical approaches that restrict their analyses to a 
single referent object, but open their definition of security to include broader 
productive practices. By then holding these two positions in relief against one 
another, I suggested that a middle ground, in which security was seen as a set 
	 68 
of practices that involves both protection and production, but which also 
operates upon multiple referent objects, could prove productive for examining 
contemporary security practices. I thus described a form of security in which 
the notion of the ‘exception’ is reframed, and gas shown to become governed 
in and through its mundane ordinariness, it having securing practices 
constantly performed around it in ways that facilitate some forms of gaseous 
phenomena, but that also ‘compensate for’, ‘limit’ or ‘cancel out’ others 
(Foucault, 2007). As such, I contend that security is not performed exclusively 
under exceptional circumstances, but takes a more managerial form.  
 
Finally, in section IV of this chapter, I focussed on the role of materials within 
security performances. I demonstrated how a sizable materialist security 
literature has now developed, and outlined four of the most prominent roles 
assumed by materials in this literature. The first of these roles was that of 
material architectures through which particular kinds of securitized subject are 
produced. The second was the role of materials in the development of security 
decisions that define the kinds of circulations that are exceptional (and also the 
kinds of circulation that are acceptable). The third role then concerned the way 
that materials present particular forms of obstacles to circulation (either 
through their interruption of circulations, or through their creation of frictions), 
and the final role then concerned the way in which materials have featured as 
travellers, security consequently being seen to operate in relation to these 
entities. 
 
Developing upon this analysis, I described how this materialist security 
literature has tended to overlook the vitality of materials within practices of 
circulatory security. In particular, I drew attention to the way that focus has 
been placed upon the apparatuses and practices of security, rather than the 
entities themselves and the transformations they undertake. Circulating 
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materials have consequently often been presented in this work as passive and 
inert, and security has typically featured as a set of practices that relate to 
actions of circulatory maintenance and filtration. Again, the consequences of 
assuming materials to be passive are significant: overlooking the manner in 
which materials can ignite, explode, decay, bend, break, change direction, 
have embodied affects and manifold other forms of vital agency throughout 
the duration of their transit not only ignores a vast range of potential sources of 
insecurity, but ignores a large amount of securing work that is performed as a 
result: work that has to take into close consideration the specific qualities of the 
circulating elements in question.  
 
In drawing these reflections together, I arrive at the two research agendas that 
underpin this thesis. The first agenda is to challenge the abstraction of security 
and its associated concepts from the circulating elements around which it is 
performed. I suggest that security’s practice cannot be understood without 
attending to the ways in which it accommodates, and takes into consideration, 
the specific qualities of the circulating elements in relation to which it is 
practiced. In other words, I advocate a form of ‘entity-attentive’ security 
research. I pursue this agenda in the chapters that follow, documenting the 
ways in which gas’s specific ontological qualities become folded into security’s 
practice. 
 
My second agenda is then to expand the spaces and scales at which security is 
analysed. Instead of limiting analyses of security to specific nodal sites through 
which circulations pass, I suggest that far more attention needs to be paid to 
the forms of (in)security that develop across the length of elements’ journeys. 
Indeed, I suggest that a vast amount of securing work is conducted around 
circulations on a daily basis, and that this work cannot simply be reduced to 
practices of circulatory filtration, or circulatory maintenance. Instead, I advocate 
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a form of security research that conceptualises security as being more 
managerial, through which attempts are made to regulate the conditions 
surrounding circulating elements to facilitate, compensate for, or cancel out, 
particular forms of perceived phenomena. 
  
These two agendas form the basis for the empirical analyses that follow. In the 
next chapter, I describe the way that they have been incorporated into the 
methodology of this thesis, and outline the form that fieldwork consequently 
took. 
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3 
Burrowing 
 
 
 
“I’m standing in the middle of what is usually a very busy crossroads that runs by the 
side of my house. It is currently cordoned off in all directions due to major gas works, 
and at its centre, a sizable hole has been dug to reveal a large cast iron gas main34. 
One of the engineers from Northern Gas Networks who is working on the site 
explained to me that this pipe had been classified as being ‘at risk’, and that these 
works were part of a larger programme of mains replacement that was being 
conducted across the country. Despite having spent months researching the UK’s 
natural gas infrastructures, I am still surprised by the scale of this rusting pipe, 
particularly given that – during the four years that I have lived here – I have been 
totally unaware of its presence and of the potential threats that it poses.  
 
Extract from field notes: Neville’s Cross mains replacement works – 25/8/15 [Site Visit] 
 
 
I. ‘Buried’ Associations 
 
Natural gas can be thought of as natural in two senses of the word. First, it 
forms deep within the ground independently of human action, as opposed to 
the manufactured gas that was used in the UK before 1970 (this gas was the 
product of hard labour; workers having to feed iron retorts with coal), and 
second, natural gas is naturalized.  Whilst it plays a crucial role in many 
people’s daily lives - we heat our homes with it, cook with it, and use it to warm 
water for bathing comfortably - most of us never give it much consideration. 
We come home from work, twist the tap on the hob, give it a press, then click! 
A spark. An eruption of yellow-blue flame. It is just there, ready and waiting. It 
provides heat in an instant and is worthy of no further thought. 
 
																																																						
34 See ‘Image 1’ and ‘Image 2’ in Appendix C. 
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Yet in other ways, ‘natural gas’ is also far from natural. Its presence beneath the 
earth is made knowable through a multitude of technologically complex 
devices, and it is only via the deployment of a series of established 
knowledges, bodies and technological instruments, that this gas is securely 
extracted, processed, pressurized, transported, and consumed. As Bridge 
(2004; 396) notes “[a] whole industry has emerged […] dedicated to corralling 
the waywardness and variability of gas and rendering it a commodity compliant 
with the workings of the market”. As such, natural gas is not simply there, 
ready and waiting, primed to provide heat at the push of a button. Far from 
it!35 Without complex sets of actors and practices to manage, regulate and 
secure its transport, natural gas would remain deep beneath our feet, trapped 
tightly between layers of rock, or it might come to realize a plethora of 
different forms of potentially hazardous gaseous phenomena. Natural gas, as a 
known and securely commodified object, requires such complex sets of 
associations in order for it to exist. 
 
In our day-to-day lives however, we rarely give these associations much 
thought. The work that has been done to create and regulate natural gas has 
become buried beneath its “immediate ‘thingness’” (Christophers, 2011; 
1068), and its “relations [have been] reconfigured so [that] they come to stand, 
instead, for a reality that by virtue of this process, has become a feature of the 
natural world” (Law 2010; 6). In other words, the webs of associations that 
shape natural gas, and which may be strung out widely over space and time, 
are translated; they are made equivalent to the ‘thing’ in question and are 
obscured from view; a substitution that can quickly become accepted, or 
naturalized (Callon, 1986a).  
 
																																																						
35 An interesting aspect of natural gas is that, unlike electricity, it moves surprisingly slowly. At 
its fastest, it will reach a speed of 23 miles per hour within pipes. Given the apparent 
immediacy of its delivery when consumed however, such material qualities often escape the 
perception of most domestic consumers. 
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Of significance for this thesis, the ‘burying’ and erasing from public 
consciousness of these relations has also been systematically facilitated. Many 
of gas’s movements and associations are literally buried in order to hide them 
from view, and as I shall describe in chapters 6 and 7, this burying constitutes a 
particular security practice through which gas’s circulations are protected from 
external interference. The ground forms a barrier that both hides the gas from 
sight and mind, and that also physically obstructs human interactions with it. 
 
As a result of such processes of metaphorically and literally burying gas’s 
relations, many of the actors and practices that are involved in ensuring gas’s 
secure extraction, transport, and consumption have become concealed from 
everyday view. I have argued in previous chapters that security’s practice can 
only be understood through attending to these associations, and by exploring 
the way that attempts are made to manipulate them in order to facilitate, 
compensate for, and ‘cancel out’ particular forms of gaseous phenomena. As a 
consequence, and in order to investigate how security is performed in relation 
to natural gas, this thesis attempts to attend to and describe the constitutive 
associations through which gas is secured as a particular kind of thing. In doing 
this, I seek to pursue the two agendas that I have outlined in preceding 
chapters. I look to explore the way that security is practiced in relation to the 
specific ontological qualities of the thing in motion (natural gas), and I aim to 
expand the spaces and scales at which security practices are examined.  
 
To pursue these two aims, I have adopted a methodological approach that is 
inspired by classic multi-sited ethnographic36, or ‘follow the thing’, studies (c.f. 
																																																						
36 ANT and other ‘follow the thing’ approaches have often been equated with the method of 
‘multi-sited ethnography’. This term describes an approach where analysis is conducted at 
periodic junctures however, and because of this, it does not adequately convey the practice of 
staying with circulating elements for the duration of their journeys. Whilst it can be employed 
in this manner, ANT is not restricted to multi-site analysis, and can instead enable us to 
perform ‘continuous’ research, whereby relations are traced as they develop across both time 
and space. 
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Cook, 2004; Cook and Harrison, 2007; Cook, 2006; Christophers, 2011; 
Marcus, 1995; Harvey, 1990). Such studies attempt to “get behind the veil” of 
translation (Harvey, 1990; 423), in order to “map out” (Cook and Harrison, 
2007; 40) the constellations of actors that become involved in the shaping of 
‘things’, and to identify “the material circumstances of [their] origination and 
circulation” (Christophers, 2011; 1068). This typically involves tracing entities 
backwards37 through their circulatory routes, identifying the multitudes of 
heterogeneous actors that form associations with them, and documenting the 
various ways in which these entities are consequently formed. A follow the 
thing approach is thus complementary to the two aims of this thesis, enabling 
me to follow gas as it circulates, and to trace the webs of associations that form 
around the gas as it travels. Whilst following gas across these journeys, I 
framed my analysis around three research objectives. These were: 
 
1) To identify the heterogeneous actors that become involved in security’s 
performances across gas’s circulatory journeys 
 
2) To observe and document the various practices that are employed to 
render natural gas ‘known’ and ‘secure’ throughout the duration of its 
circulations 
 
3) To document the circumstances and logics under which securing action 
is considered necessary and is undertaken upon circulations of natural 
gas 
																																																						
37 Sometimes researchers will also follow things forwards. For example, Cook and Harrison 
(2007) begin their analysis of the networks of production for West Indian Hot Pepper Sauce in 
the pepper growing fields of Trelawny, Jamaica. They then follow these peppers through from 
their germination to the point of their consumption. The purpose of such studies however, 
remains to “make powerful, important, disturbing connections between Western consumers 
and the distant strangers whose contribution to their lives were invisible, unnoticed, and largely 
unappreciated” (Cook, 2004; 642). As such, the point of consumption remains the intended 
point of political intervention.  
	 75 
 
Each of these objectives was designed to enable me to dig beneath the 
surface of natural gas circulations as they appear in their normalized and 
everyday capacities, and to trace the ways that security is performed in relation 
to gas’s specific ontological qualities, whilst it is circulating. The third objective 
was designed to enable me to examine why different forms of action are taken 
upon natural gas by these different actors, at various points in space and time. 
 
In this chapter, I describe how I conducted fieldwork in order to attend to the 
multiple associations through which gas is secured as a particular kind of thing, 
beginning with what my methodological approach owes to actor-network 
theory, before moving to discuss how the particularities of gas’s materiality 
(and the specificity of the forms and practices of gaseous security) place in 
question some of the methodological injunctions associated with ANT. 
 
Actor-Network Theory as Method 
 
I adopt a ‘follow the thing’ approach that is indebted to the practice and ethos 
of  actor-network theory (c.f. Latour, 1987, 1993, 1996a; b, 2005; Callon, 
1986a; Law, 1992, 2000, 2007, 2002; Law and Singleton, 2013; Murdoch, 1998; 
Law and Hassard, 1999; Mol, 2002). Conceptually however, this thesis goes 
beyond the confines of actor-network theory to draw upon certain 
complementary approaches, including select work on the concept of 
assemblage (c.f. DeLanda, 2006; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Bennett, 2005) 
and post-humanism (c.f. Haraway, 1991; Barad, 2007). As a consequence, 
actor-network theory is employed in the thesis in two ways. First, it is treated as 
a set of conceptual tools, not all of which I necessarily utilize or endorse, and 
second it is employed as a methodological framework.  
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Specifically, actor-network theory (hereafter ANT) provides a methodological 
and conceptual “toolkit” (Law, 2007; 2) for dealing with “complex and the 
elusive” sets of associations such as the naturalized relations that constitute gas 
(Bosco, 2006; 136). Indeed, these associations/relations are ANT’s principal 
focus. It conceptualizes a world that is constructed from sets of contingent 
relations that are formed between heterogeneous elements (known in this 
literature as ‘actors’ or ‘actants’38), and it is through these relations that power 
is seen to be exchanged and dispersed. Social relations are thus 
simultaneously power relations; a notion that is drawn from Foucault’s (2007) 
work on the ‘microphysics of power’, where power is regarded as being 
productive: it is a force that, through its exchange, enables elements to act. 
This power is impossible to store or to hold, and instead must be continually 
(and contingently) transferred between elements; elements that, for ANT at 
least, must be seen to consist of both human and nonhuman actors, and which 
must be regarded as having equal agential potential (Latour, 1993).  
 
It is according to the arrangement of these power relations that ANT considers 
objects/subjects to be constructed. In ANT, “nothing has reality or form 
outside [of] relations” (Law, 2007; 2), and any apparently whole element/actor 
is performed, shaped, and made real, through the heterogeneous webs of 
associations that exist between it and other elements. They can therefore be 
understood as being the “effect[s] of an array of relations; the effect[s] of a 
network” (Law, 2000: 1)39. The specifics of these relations is critical, for the 
identities of the associated elements, the kinds of association that are formed, 
and the way in which these associations are arranged, all work to shape the 
																																																						
38 The term ‘actor’ is used to refer to any entity that has the ability to have an effect (Law 2000), 
and the term ‘actant’ was later developed to emphasize the involvement of materials in the 
emergence of social phenomena, and to acknowledge that both humans and nonhumans will 
always be involved in social processes (c.f. Latour, 1999). 
39 The term “network” in actor-network theory is thus used to refer to these complex webs of 
relations, and the hyphen between ‘actor’ and ‘network’ indicates their inter-relatedness, for 
“an actor is always a network of elements” (Law, 2007: 8). 
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entity in question - both ontologically, and in terms of the way that they are 
humanly encountered and known. Moreover (and crucially for a study of 
security’s practice), such associations are seen to affect the ways in which 
entities can act, action here being regarded as a product of the exchange of 
enabling power. It is only through the specific arrangement of power relations 
that entities are enabled to function in particular ways, and these exchanges 
are rarely equal, a situation that causes “the capacity [of elements] to act [to 
be] unequally distributed” (Law, 1991; 167). For these reasons therefore, ANT 
has been understood as a form of materialized relational semiotics, whereby 
elements only come to be defined and understood through the webs of 
associations that exist between them (Law, 2007).  
 
As such, an actor-network approach is broadly complementary to the 
materialized-discursive security framework that was proposed in the previous 
chapter. Under ANT, heterogeneous associations are seen to contingently 
condition the forms of perception, knowledge, speech and action that are 
possible in a given moment, and security can be understood to consist of a set 
of practices through which these relations are organised to bring about or 
inhibit the emergence of relationally aleatory phenomena. ANT thus provides 
us with a vocabulary and conceptual framework for attuning ourselves to these 
relations; it enables us to develop a ‘sensibility’ to “the messy practices of 
relationality and materiality of the world” (Law, 2007; 2). 
 
Yet the main source of ANT’s value for this project stems from the 
methodological tools that it offers for tracing such complex webs of 
associations. As Latour (1996b) describes, “[ANT] is a method to describe the 
deployment of associations like semiotics; it is a method to describe the 
generative path of any narration” (p.374, his emphasis). As such, it has been 
described as a general ethos, disposition or toolkit of techniques for studying 
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power relations (Callon, 1986a), through which researchers can effectively 
make visible the actors and relations that are obfuscated through processes of 
translation and naturalization (Law, 1992).  
 
There are three elements of ANT as method that I consider to have particular 
value for attending to the objectives of this study, the first of which regards the 
emphasis that ANT places upon the practice of following. Indeed, ANT’s 
primary methodological proposition is to “follow networks and to study the 
materials they are made of and the relations established between these 
materials” (Murdoch, 2006; 73). In this process, the aim of researchers should 
be to “learn from [materials, bodies, things] not only what they do, but how 
and why they do it” (Latour 1999; 19). This involves going along with the 
elements in focus, observing the way that they form associations with other 
bodies, materials and things, and investigating the reasons that lie behind the 
interactions between these elements. In this regard, ANT complements all of 
the research objectives of this thesis, for it advocates an approach through 
which gas can be followed and through which the when’s, how’s, and why’s of 
security’s practice can be documented. 
 
On its own however, this tool does little to differentiate ANT from other ‘follow 
the thing’ approaches. Yet ANT’s approach becomes more distinct when we 
consider a second ethos, or instrument in its toolkit: its insistence that 
researchers must stay “as open minded as possible about which elements will 
link together, how strong the links will be, what types of action will arise, and 
thereby how spaces come to be arranged” (Murdoch, 1998; 369). This involves 
abandoning prior assumptions about who or what should be considered a 
security actor, what should or should not be considered a security practice, and 
what is or is not, a referent object. In this respect, ANT is well-suited for 
attending to the first research agenda of this thesis: exploring security’s 
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performance in relation to the specific ontological qualities of circulating 
elements, rather than simply applying existing generalizations to an empirical 
context.  
 
Finally, and closely associated to this previous practice, ANT contributes the 
‘principle of generalized symmetry’ (c.f. Callon, 1986a; Latour, 1993). This 
principle asserts that materials should be afforded the same attention as 
humans, and should be considered to have equal potential to act (at least in 
the first instance). In accordance with this tool, ANT requires researchers to 
reject the anthropocentrism that is often inherent within social scientific 
accounts, and instead demands that we treat all actors equally, making no 
assumptions or assessments of their relative importance until after data 
collection (Latour, 1993). I consider this emphasis on the heterogeneity of 
agential elements and their often surprising vitality to be particularly useful for 
attending to the material liveliness of natural gas, and for enabling me to 
explore the way that other materials and things become involved in performing 
security around gas across its travels. Having established the methodological 
ethos/tools underpinning this thesis, I now turn to an issue that haunts any ANT 
inspired work that seeks to follow constitutive associations – how to bound and 
thus limit the study.   
 
Scope of Study 
 
Gas transport networks span the globe. They stretch over oceans and 
continents, reach across national borders, and link up with thousands of sites in 
which gas is extracted, processed, and consumed. In the UK alone, the 
domestic gas transport network consists of literally thousands of miles of pipes 
that stretch out rhizomatically to form a dense capillary-like fabric that covers 
the majority of the country. As such, following gas over the full extent of its 
circulatory journeys is an impossible task. In order to construct a research 
	 80 
project that was practically achievable, I have had to draw clear spatial limits 
around the gaseous journeys under observation. I consequently chose to focus 
upon gas circulations within the UK. My fieldwork entailed following gas’s 
movement through different onshore gas infrastructures, identifying the points 
at which it arrived onshore40, and tracing its movements between these points 
and the different locations in which it was consumed or released. In this way, I 
avoided limiting my analysis to a number of fixed nodal sites, but instead could 
document the ways that security was practiced around natural gas throughout 
these circulatory journeys. 
 
Given the scale and rhizomatic nature of parts of the UK’s gas infrastructures 
however, simply restricting my fieldwork to a UK context was not enough to 
make the project practically feasible. Additional cuts consequently had to be 
made to the scope of analysis, each of which broadly related to one of the four 
semi-discrete infrastructures that make up the UK’s gas transport networks.  
 
The first of these infrastructures concerns the various, dispersed facilities that 
relate to gas’s onshore reception, processing and storage before it enters the 
UK’s national gas transport networks. These facilities include the processing 
terminals at which this gas is chemically altered before it enters the gas 
transport networks, the LNG terminals at which liquefied natural gas is received 
and converted back into gaseous form, and the multiple gas storage facilities 
that are located across the UK. These sites are all managed and operated by 
different private interests. Processing terminals are the responsibility of 
extraction companies such as Shell, Total, ExxonMobil and BP. There are then 
three LNG processing terminals: Isle of Grain (operated by National Grid), 
Milford Haven (a joint venture between Petronas and Shell), and South Hook 
																																																						
40 There are 7 processing terminals at which gas arrives in the UK. There are also a number of 
liquefied natural gas terminals, and a series of international interconnectors (pipelines) through 
which gas is delivered to the UK market.  A small amount of bio-methane is also introduced to 
the network at a number of sites around the UK. These were also included in this study. 
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(co-owned by Qatar Petroleum, ExxonMobil and Total). Each of the UK gas 
storage sites are run by separate private companies.  
 
Given the number of different organisations that are involved in receiving gas 
and preparing it for transport, the time investment required to gain 
permissions to visit each of these sites was beyond the scope of this study. 
Such time constraints were also enhanced by the fact that many facilities are 
sites of ‘Critical National Infrastructure’41, and their security clearance 
requirements meant that gaining access to these sites was a prohibitively time 
consuming endeavour.  
 
Whilst I could have excluded these facilities from the scope of my research, it 
became increasingly apparent during fieldwork that the work conducted in gas 
processing terminals had significant implications for the way that security was 
being performed elsewhere downstream. Within gas terminals, the chemical 
structure of natural gas is manipulated in ways that strip it of certain 
threatening capacities, and this directly affects the kinds of gaseous 
phenomena that can occur throughout its travels. As such, it conditions the 
forms of action that are taken upon it later in its journeys. As a result, I deemed 
it necessary to visit one of these terminals, and organized a visit to Shell’s 
processing terminal in St Fergus, Scotland. This site receives and processes a 
quarter of the UK’s total daily gas supply42, and is consequently a site of critical 
importance for the continued functioning of the UK gas infrastructure.  
 
																																																						
41 A site of critical national infrastructure is defined by the governments’ Centre for the 
Protection of National Infrastructure as: “Those critical elements of national infrastructure 
(facilities, systems, sites, property, information, people, networks and processes), the loss or 
compromise of which would result in major detrimental impact on the availability, delivery or 
integrity of essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of 
life” (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, 2016). 
42 Evidence from interview with operations manager at St. Fergus gas processing terminal, 
Shell, 2015. 
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As part of this visit, I was given a full day tour of the terminal facilities. I was 
shown gas’s point of arrival on the mainland (see image 3 in appendix C), and 
was able to follow it through the various processes that were conducted upon 
it, observing the different actions that were being taken. Throughout the tour, 
these processes were explained to me by a guide, who detailed the reasons 
behind the different forms of action that could be taken at different times, the 
various kinds of gaseous phenomena that could possibly emerge during 
terminal operations, and the forms of action that would consequently be 
conducted in response. The tour was then followed by a 2-hour interview with 
the operations manager for the terminal. 
 
The second system that was explored during fieldwork was the National 
Transmission System (NTS)43. After gas is received by the infrastructures above, 
it then enters the NTS. This system consists of a series of large, high pressure 
pipes that transport processed gas around the country in large volumes, and 
gas is taken off from this system at various regional locations, where it is then 
piped by other, smaller, networks to individual properties. National Grid 
currently operates this system. Given the major role that the NTS plays in the 
onshore transport and governance of natural gas, the way that security is 
performed around the gas traveling within it became a major focus of this 
study, and efforts were taken to examine its processes as extensively as 
possible. I organised numerous visits to National Grid’s headquarters in 
Warwick44, conducted multiple interviews with National Grid staff, attended a 
range of conferences, briefings and industry events that related to the 
governance of gas within the NTS, and participated in a series of site visits to 
different locations across this system where particular actions were being taken 
																																																						
43 For a diagram of the NTS, please refer back to figure 1, on page 16. 
44 I only had one official ‘tour’/visit of National Grid’s headquarters, but each interview with 
National Grid staff took place there, and would nearly always involve me being shown new 
parts of the building, unexplained aspects of daily NTS operations, and the organizational 
structure of National Grid. 
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upon the gas. A full list of the data produced and sites visited can be viewed in 
Appendix A. 
	
The third infrastructure that was examined in this thesis was the distribution 
networks. There are five ‘local distribution networks’ that serve regional areas 
across the UK, and these are owned and operated by separate network 
operators (see figure 2 on page 17). These networks consist of dense 
rhizomatic tangles of pipes that take gas off the NTS and deliver it to 
consumers across regional areas. Their pipes are split into a variety of different 
pressure tiers, and these pipelines take gas off from the NTS at high pressure, 
gradually reducing it over the course of the gas’s journey to households.  
 
Due to the spatial extent of these networks (they consist of literally thousands 
of kilometres of pipes that sprawl out in a capillary-like fabric covering large 
areas of the country), and due to the time investments that would have been 
required to conduct research with all 5 networks, I opted to restrict my analysis 
to gas’s circulations within just one; the North of England system that is run by 
Northern Gas Networks. Whilst it is likely that there will be some minor 
variances in practices between these networks (and regardless, I am not 
seeking to provide a representative account), the day to day operations of 
these systems are often very similar, according to practitioners that I met at 
various industry events45. They often outsource to the same contractors, buy 
and install the same equipment, and they all have their conduct regulated by 
OFGEM according to the same criteria.  
 
																																																						
45 I participated in many informal conversations at industry events, where representatives of 
multiple networks were present. Many of the people I interviewed from Northern Gas 
Networks and National Grid also had experience either working for, or working with, other 
network operators too, and were able to point me towards similarities and differences in 
practice. 
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Fieldwork within this system entailed conducting a series of interviews with 
different members of staff from Northern Gas Networks, as well as participating 
in numerous site visits to different locations where particular kinds of securing 
actions were being taken upon the gas. I also attended a range of industry 
conferences and events that related to the governance of gas within these 
distribution systems, and which explored the particular security challenges that 
the gas distribution industry was currently facing. Substantial archival research 
was also conducted to learn about the history of these networks, for many of 
the current challenges that these systems face have resulted from their 
advancing age and from their having been initially designed to transport town 
gas, rather than the natural gas that is in circulation today. 
 
The final infrastructural system that was examined during fieldwork was the 
parts of the gas transport infrastructure that are owned and operated by 
domestic consumers. Whilst the operators of distribution networks are 
responsible for the gas up until the point at which it enters properties, internal 
pipework and the appliances that are used to burn the gas fall under the 
responsibility of the property owner and their contracted gas fitters. In the case 
of an incident in which gas escapes, responsibility broadens to include a range 
of other actors. National Grid operates a national gas emergency hotline. 
Distribution network operators will despatch emergency gas engineers to 
survey the site, and in the case of the realization of a fire or explosion, blue 
light services (the fire and rescue service, police, and ambulance services) and 
local authorities will take responsibility for dealing with the incident.  
 
Having already limited my analysis of gas’s journeys through distribution 
networks to the North of England, I chose to similarly restrict my analysis to its 
movements across this part of the country. Research involved conducting 
interviews with the actors listed above, which in the case of this regional area 
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included Durham and Darlington Fire Service, Durham Constabulary, the 
Northeast Ambulance Service, Durham County Council, Northern Gas 
Networks, and National Grid.  
 
In addition to these interviews, I also drew upon a series of other data sources. 
Documents such as the contingency plans and the operational arrangements 
that had been drawn up by these organizations to deal with gas incidents, 
along with post-incident investigation reports and industry standards helped 
me to develop an understanding of the different actors that come to be 
involved with managing gas within these networks, the way that they take 
action upon the gas, and the reasons for these particular actions – particular 
forms of feared gaseous phenomena being outlined within many of these 
documents. 
 
Also contributing to this analysis, a number of site visits were conducted that 
had particular relevance for the way that gas is governed in these parts of the 
gas infrastructure. These visits included a trip to a material failures analysis 
laboratory (owned by DNV-GL, and which is used to forensically investigate the 
causes behind casualties and fatalities related to gaseous phenomena), and a 
series of visits to sites across the North of England where gas leaks had been 
reported, and where I observed the way that distribution companies attempted 
to assess these leaks for risks, with reference to the specifics of the properties 
nearby. 
 
II. Burrowing 
 
Despite these arrangements however, natural gas proved to be a particularly 
challenging element to follow. ANT places heavy emphasis upon observation 
as the primary strategy through which an element’s associations can be 
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traced46, but gas presents difficulties for observing it, due to a number of its 
troublesome material qualities (such as its invisibility, intangibility and natural 
odorlessness), and also because of the security practices of concealment that 
are conducted around it. As a result of these challenges, my fieldwork began to 
take on a quality that perhaps has more in common with burrowing than with 
following. It became like Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) rhizome: as I tried to 
observe the journeys of gas, I encountered roots, rocks and other obstacles 
that caused my fieldwork to take unexpected twists and turns, and that led me 
to follow gas backwards and forwards, horizontally and vertically. As such, far 
from simply excavating these gaseous security practices and laying them bare 
for all to see, this study provides an account that is more tunnel-like, its vision 
curtailed by the practical limitations and obstacles it encountered. 
 
Troublesome Materialities 
 
“I stood in the rain with three engineers from Northern Gas Networks, the four of us 
huddled around one of their vans. By our side, a series of muddy holes had been dug 
in the ground, revealing sections of an old and rusty cast iron mains pipe that was 
transporting gas to a nearby university college47. “You know, it can be a little like 
witchcraft trying to find these leaks sometimes”, one of the engineers explained to 
me. “Under the right conditions, gas can travel quite a long distance underground, 
and trying to pin-point exactly where it is coming from can be a bit of a nightmare – 
particularly when you have a pipe like this, which is really old and somehow didn’t 
make it on to our [digital] maps”48.  
 
Extract from field notes: Gas leak at St Mary’s College, Durham – 6/2/15 [Site Visit] 
 
One of the main ways that gas presented challenges for its observation 
concerned the primary focus of this study: its troubling material qualities. 
Particular of these qualities – namely, its sensory evasiveness, its 
																																																						
46 As Law (2007) has explained, ANT is essentially a descriptive practice; one through which the 
processes of social formation are observed and then documented. 
47 See 'Image 4’ in Appendix C. 
48 Later, I asked him why certain pipes had come to be excluded. He explained to me how the 
paper maps that were used previously had been stored at multiple locations, and that in the 
process of their collation and digitization, some of them had been lost. 
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indistinguishability, and its hazardous vitality – presented three specific 
obstacles for this study’s analysis. Regarding the first of these, natural gas is 
quite different to the papayas or bottles of hot pepper sauce that are 
described in classic ‘follow the thing’ accounts. Whilst these other elements 
might be relatively easy to hold in focus throughout their circulation, gas’s 
molecules are invisible, intangible, and naturally odourless. How then, as a 
social scientist, was I supposed to go about following a material that almost 
totally evades human sensation? Indeed, as is demonstrated in the extract 
above, it is not just social social scientists that are affected by these traits. Gas 
also frequently exceeds the capacities of industry practitioners to locate and 
follow it – even when they are equipped with specialized tools that have been 
designed to render it visible.  
 
Instead of following gas directly, I consequently opted to trace gas’s presence 
through the associations that it developed with other actors that were visible, 
or perceptible. In ANT, every entity is seen to have multiple points of origin, 
and “one has to choose some of them to tell stories” (Farias and Bender, 2012; 
16). Gas is no exception to this. The UK’s gas transport infrastructure consists 
of a dense tangle of diverse interrelated materials, each of which brings with it 
its own unique connection to the gas in circulation, and each of which can tell 
us a different story about the ways in which gas is governed. In order to extract 
meaningful accounts, I therefore had to follow this “Ariadne’s thread of 
interwoven stories” (Latour, 1993; 3).  
 
In the context of this thesis, this task boiled down to identifying particular 
associations that were made between the gas and other actors, and following 
these connections (Latour, 2005), observing (or asking them questions about) 
the qualities of their relationships with one another, and identifying all new 
actors and connections that appeared in the process. In this sense, the ANT 
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approach adopted in this thesis was similar to ‘snowballing’ interview sampling 
methods in that new participants/connections were established through the 
interrogation of existing participants.  
 
Pipelines are the most consistent of these gaseous associations, and their 
presence is often coterminous with (or, more accurately, co-constitutive of) the 
circulation of natural gas. This relationship means that it is possible to 
vicariously encounter natural gas, and to identify and follow its circulatory 
routes, regardless of whether the gas within them can be physically seen, felt 
or heard. In this thesis, gas pipes consequently often became a proxy for the 
gas circulations themselves. From them, I could trace out the different actors 
that the gas came into contact with across its circulatory journeys. 
 
In instances where gas did not circulate in pipes however (often when it either 
leaked or was released along its journey), I found that a similar approach could 
usually be adopted. Gas’s vitality meant that numerous actors would typically 
swell around the location of its escape so as to attempt to ‘cancel out’ 
particular forms of threatening phenomena. Unlike the gas itself however, 
these attempts were observable, and through them, I was able to identify the 
different actors it became involved with, and I could observe the different ways 
that these actors tried to visualize gas’s uncontained circulation. I was also 
often able to interrogate these actors as to why they took particular forms of 
action.  
 
This exploration of gas’s circulations external to pipes took several forms in this 
study. One method involved interviewing different members of National Grid, 
Northern Gas Networks, Durham Constabulary, Durham and Darlington Fire 
and Rescue Service, the Northeast Ambulance Service, and Durham County 
Council – in particular, members who were involved in attending to incidents 
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where gas had escaped from particular areas of pipelines. I explored this topic 
over the course of multiple interviews, asking practitioners to explain to me the 
different kinds of uncontained gas circulation that they would attend to, the 
ways that they would seek to render the gas actionable and take action upon 
it, and the reasons that they sought to take these different forms of action.  
 
In addition to interview data, I also found a series of documents to be useful for 
tracing the kinds of associations that formed around gas in the event of its 
escape49. In many cases, interviewees provided me with copies of the 
contingency plans and the operational guidelines that they used to attend to 
various forms of gas escape. These documents included texts such as the 
EM72 and EM74 gas escape procedure documents that are used by Northern 
Gas Networks50, the standard operating procedure documents used by the fire 
and rescue service, and the County Durham and Darlington Civil Contingencies 
Units’ (2012) ‘Natural Gas Pipelines Emergency Plan’51. Alongside these 
documents, I also found that government legislature such as the Civil 
Contingencies Act (2004); the Pipelines Safety Regulations (1996); and the Gas 
Safety (Management) Regulations (1996) had particular significance for 
understanding the way that different actors formed associations with the gas, 
and also with one another.  
 
Added to these particular documents, a series of publically available industry 
exercise reports were further useful for tracing gas’s associations52. Every year, 
National Grid (in its capacity as system operator) organizes a network-wide live 
rehearsal around a chosen hypothetical event. Sometimes this event involves 
																																																						
49 See ‘Image 5’ in Appendix C for examples. 
50 EM72 refers to the Northern Gas Networks (2013) ‘Northern Gas Networks’ Work Procedure 
for First Call Operatives Dealing with Gas Escapes and Other Emergencies’, and EM74 refers 
to the Northern Gas Networks (2010) ‘Northern Gas Networks’ Work Procedure for Escape, 
Locate and Repair Operatives Dealing with Gas Escapes and Other Emergencies’. 
51 Durham County Council and Darlington Borough Council (2012). 
52 See, for example, National Grid (2008, 2013) and Northern Gas Networks (2012). 
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the escape of natural gas. Following rehearsals, every organization is then 
required to produce a report that details the actions that they had taken, and 
that highlights the areas where their procedures could be improved in the 
future. Such reports consequently provided this study with a particularly 
detailed outline of how different actors came to be involved in governing gas 
as it circulates outside of pipes, as well as the forms of action that can be taken 
to visualize and control its movement, the reasons for these actions, and the 
challenges that the gas presented during these exercises for performances of 
security. 
 
Incident investigation reports were useful for similar reasons. Following an 
event where gas escapes and actors swell around it, reports are often 
produced that detail the events that led to the emergence of these particular 
phenomena. A number of these reports (see for example, HSE, 1985; Benn et 
al., 1977) were drawn upon in this study to explore both the actions that had 
been taken upon gas circulations within particular incidents, and also to 
explore the way that attempts were made to visualize gas’s circulation after the 
incident, so that actions could be taken to prevent these events from being 
realized in the future. 
 
The final data source that was drawn upon in studying gas’s circulation beyond 
pipelines took the form of site visits. The first of these involved an industry 
training event at RAF Spadeadam (a facility formerly used by British Gas to 
research suitable materials for the construction of the NTS, and now used by 
DNV GL for the modelling of gas explosions). Entitled ‘Understanding the 
Causes of Gas Fires and Explosions’, this event involved two days of live 
demonstrations, in which I and a number of industry practitioners were 
introduced to different forms of flammable and explosive gaseous phenomena 
that could potentially be realized across gas’s circulatory journeys. During this 
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event, the way that gas could come to circulate outside of pipes was visualized 
through a series of diagrams, lecture presentations, and live demonstrations, 
and through these visualizations, the organizers aimed to educate attendees to 
the possible risks and challenges that gas’s uncontrolled circulation could 
present. A photograph (‘Image 6’), and an extract from my field notes (‘Field 
Note Extract 1’) that were taken during this event can be found in Appendix C. 
 
The second set of site visits then involved personally observing the swelling of 
actors around gas’s uncontained circulations. During my fieldwork with 
Northern Gas Networks, I was taken on an ‘escape chasing’ day by their 
Health, Safety and Environment Manager. This involved multiple site visits 
across the Northeast, in which I was taken to a series of different locations in 
which gas escapes had been reported by members of the public. Once at 
these locations, I was then able to observe the different actors that became 
involved with gas as it circulated outside of pipes, and I was able to witness 
various attempts made by these actors to locate gas’s escape, assess the risks 
that it presented, and take different forms of action upon it53. I was also invited 
to ask questions during these visits, and was consequently able to determine 
the motivations and interests that lay behind different actions. 
 
In these ways, I was therefore able to explore gas’s journey outside of pipes, 
even when the gas itself was not physically observable. Yet there were 
instances where gas’s escape did not involve the accumulation of actors 
around it, and where the conduct of practices of visualization and security 
governance were not visible. Whilst gas could not be followed as easily in 
these instances however, it was still possible to inquire about how leaks 
became known to different governing actors, and why they could not be (or 
were not being) addressed in the same ways. As such, even though gas could 
																																																						
53 See ‘Field Note Extract 2’, ‘Image 7’, ‘Image 7’ and ‘Image 8’ in Appendix C. 
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not be literally followed in these cases, I could often still gain a vicarious 
knowledge of the conditions that it needed to form in order for it to escape, 
and I was still able to discern some of the problems that its challenging 
materiality presented for performing security around it. 
 
*** 
 
The second challenge that related to gas’s unique material qualities concerned 
its molecular diversity. Isolating a single element and following it – whilst 
possible with a papaya – is far more difficult to achieve in the case of natural 
gas. This is because gaseous molecules become inextricably mixed up with 
other molecules as it moves. Because of this, following a single molecule (or 
even a specific volume of gas) as it circulates is practically impossible. In this 
sense, it presents similar difficulties to those experienced by Christophers 
(2011) in following money: natural gas is an entity that begins to lose “its 
distinguishability” as it circulates (p. 1076, his emphasis). It is a super-spook; an 
elusive material that loses its shadower in a molecular crowd.  
 
During fieldwork however, I found that pipelines could help with this problem, 
too. Unlike money, the “individuality [of which] both allows it to be traced, and 
more significantly, imparts to the process of tracing its very meaning” 
(Christophers, 2011; 1076), I came to regard the identification of individual 
molecules, or even specific volumes of gas, as being unnecessary for the 
objectives of this thesis. This thesis is concerned with the practices of security 
that are employed upon gas throughout its circulation, and I subsequently 
found that it was possible to identify many of these practices by using the 
pipes as a proxy for the circulating gas. By following pipes, and by observing 
the actors and practices that presented themselves along the way, I was able 
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to observe specific forms of action that were being taken upon gas as it 
travelled.  
 
Despite this, I did have to carefully watch out for instances where gas’s 
governing actors did seek to visualize volumes of gas as they circulated. For if 
it became apparent that gas was managed at the level of molecules, particular 
volumes, or pockets of gas, then it would have become necessary to follow 
these units and to ascertain when and how they became the focus of security 
concerns. During fieldwork however, it quickly became apparent that gas is 
principally managed according to its pressures within different parts of these 
systems, and that it is not tracked by its governing actors on a molecule-by-
molecule (or even volume-by-volume) basis. This is not to say that its 
movement at the level of the molecular was not significant for the practices of 
security that were observed to surround it – indeed, there were moments when 
it was observed to be periodically broken down into its constitutive molecules 
(such as after processing), yet these molecules were never followed along their 
circulatory journeys beyond such points of inspection. Instead, their 
visualization was used to alter the gas that subsequently came through the 
system. As such, whilst the scale of the molecular became a subject of interest 
in this thesis, it was not considered necessary to identify and follow any one 
particular molecule in order to develop an account of security’s practice in 
relation to the gas. 
 
The management of gas’s circulation by pressure did introduce a secondary 
problem, however. Gas’s journeys turned out to be extremely convoluted, and 
unlike a bottle of hot pepper sauce (which might make its way from point of 
production to point of consumption in a more-or-less linear manner), natural 
gas was found to be able to take any one of potentially thousands of routes 
between its points of production and consumption. Along these routes, it does 
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not necessarily move in a linear trajectory. It travels from regions of high 
pressure to areas of low pressure, and this movement is manipulated by 
increasing its pressure at particular locations, and lowering it at others (typically 
through its consumption or release54). As a result, gas may travel both 
backwards and forwards along the same pipes, dependent upon its pressure in 
different areas at different points in time. Whilst this is interesting due to the 
way that it challenges implicit assumptions of the linearity of circulatory 
governance found in many studies of security – including the work of Foucault 
(2007) – it did raise further challenges for fieldwork, due to how gaseous 
security practices could not be simply documented by linearly following pipes 
from one end to another. I will return to this problem and the way it was 
addressed in the next section of this chapter.  
 
*** 
 
Staying with gas’s troubling materiality for now however, a final further 
problem was presented by gas’s considerable vitality, and by the dangers that 
this vitality presented for my own health and safety. Gas is an extremely 
flammable and explosive material, and its circulation consequently presents 
significant risks to public health. Getting physically close to gas pipes is thus a 
potentially hazardous exercise, and one that would have neither been 
permitted by the university, or by my research participants. This was not such a 
problem for researching gas’s circulations in distribution networks, for the 
pressures and volumes with which gas travels are low enough to not present 
significant risks (indeed, a large amount of my research with Northern Gas 
Networks involved peering into various holes and physically observing the work 
that was being conducted in them). Yet in areas where gas circulates at high 
pressure, the risks to health are much higher. Even experienced engineers are 
																																																						
54 This is a process known as balancing, and it can involve gas traveling back and forth 
throughout the system, dependent upon where demand is coming from. 
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only allowed to approach and work on high pressure pipes if the gas inside is 
completely removed, or has had its pressure significantly reduced. As a 
consequence, actually approaching gas pipes to follow gaseous circulations 
was, in the majority of cases, practically unfeasible.  
 
Finding my own body physically distanced from high pressure circulations of 
natural gas was interesting for understanding the practices of security that are 
performed around gas, but it also limited the security performances that I 
could observe within this area of the gas network. I therefore sought to find 
other ways of conducting research into gas’s high pressure movements – 
methods that did not involve putting my body at risk. As shall be described in 
the following section, the fieldwork eventually conducted similarly involved 
following the relations that surrounded natural gas, but in a way that did not 
involve my body being physically close to gas’s high pressure movements. 
 
Concealed Circulations 
 
Following a more formal interview, I sat with the emergency operations manager at his 
‘hot desk’ in National Grid House, Warwick. In front of us was laid out a detailed map 
of the current configuration of the NTS, and on which was depicted the different 
routes that gas took across the country. Also included on it were the characteristics of 
these routes (the pipe materials, diameters and maximum operating pressures) and 
the various pipeline assets that were dispersed across this network (compressor 
stations, off-takes, storage facilities and so forth). As he took me through gas’s 
journeys within each section of the NTS, he explained the different ways that gas 
could travel within this system, as well as the kinds of actions that could be taken upon 
it at different points in its journeys and the kinds of risk that were perceived to be able 
arise on the system. Occasionally, he would bring up a series of slides on the 
computer in front of us, using the diagrams within them to explain aspects of gas 
physics and the way that different devices and control systems could be used in 
relation to the gas, across the NTS.  
 
Extract from field notes: National Grid House – 8/8/14 [Site Visit] 
 
A significant challenge was also presented to research by the way that gas 
circulations are intentionally concealed. Practices of concealment are 
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performed around gas to secure its circulation in two ways: its subterranean 
concealment, and the public unavailability of maps of this system. The first of 
these regards how gas systems are buried55. In the UK, the ground is employed 
as a specific political technology for securing circulations of natural gas. Its 
opacity and solidity not only conceal gas’s movements, but they also present a 
physical barrier that prevents external parties from causing damage to these 
circulatory infrastructures56. Indeed, it is through the enrolment of the ground 
in this way that efforts have been made to ‘cancel out’ both the phenomena of 
intentional sabotage to pipelines and also the phenomena of accidental 
damage. As a result, I found my fieldwork to come up against the very security 
practices that I sought to document. This infrastructure had been specifically 
designed to deter and inhibit people like me – people who wished to observe 
and gain a knowledge of gas’s circulatory movements and the kinds of 
insecurities that its movements can generate.  
 
The second concealment practice then concerned the way that gas’s governing 
actors attempt to prevent maps and accurate diagrams of its infrastructures 
from entering the public domain. Maps of the NTS and distribution networks 
are not available anywhere online (the map in figure 1 on page 17 is not an 
accurate representation), and all sensitive infrastructural sites located across 
these networks have had their identifying details removed from publically 
available maps, such as those produced by Google and the Ordinance Survey. 
Maps of these systems do exist, but they are typically not permitted to 
circulate beyond company offices without authorization. 
 
																																																						
55 This practice is adopted in the UK and a number of other countries, but in areas of the world 
where there is either very low population density (such as in parts of Canada or the United 
States), or where there is high seismic activity (such as in Chile), natural gas may be transported 
overland, either by surface-level transmission pipes, or by pipes that are suspended above the 
ground to reduce the risk of damage being incurred due to the grounds’ movements.  
56 In addition to burying gas, nondescript buildings, walls, fences and earthen mounds are 
often employed to conceal pipeline assets that rise above the ground. 
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For a study that is dependent upon using gas pipes as a proxy for these 
invisible, intangible, and (at least whilst in the NTS) odourless, circulations of 
natural gas, the combination of these two practices presented serious 
observational challenges for documenting the security practices that are 
conducted in relation to natural gas. Indeed, these practices of concealment 
are so successful, that as can be observed in the extract that opened the 
previous section, these pipes and the gas circulations within them can 
sometimes evade the perception of practitioners, even when they are 
equipped with digitized maps57. As a consequence, I found myself to be a 
geographer without a map, and a social scientist without a somatically 
perceptible object to study. 
 
The solution I adopted involved identifying a number of more easily visible 
associations that gas developed, and from these teasing out the “Ariadne’s 
threads” (Latour, 1993; 3) of relations that gas developed in connection to 
them. In practice, this involved initially identifying as many gaseous 
associations as possible – principally through online research. As is required by 
ANT, no presumptions were made as to who or what would do the work 
(Latour, 1987), and provided these associations fell within the spatial 
parameters that were established by this thesis, they could potentially exist 
between the gas and any number of different organisations, people, materials, 
locations, and documents. Many of the actors first identified were located 
above the earth’s surface (such as energy companies, operational facilities, 
industry institutions, and so on), and whilst this process began fairly simply, the 
																																																						
57 One of the more peculiar security practices that I encountered during fieldwork regarded 
pipes such as these that had been excluded from the digital maps used by distribution 
companies. When distribution engineers know that a gas pipe is present but it is not on their 
maps (usually because a property will use gas, but the gas main feeding that property is not on 
their systems) and is not metal (so therefore not identifiable with a metal detector), a common 
(but unofficial) practice is to use divining rods to ascertain the location of buried pipes. I initially 
thought this was a joke, but it was subsequently backed up by multiple disconnected sources 
during fieldwork. For an example of an email exchange that I had with an engineer regarding 
this, see ‘Image 10’ in Appendix C. 
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actors, contacts and associations seen to surround the circulating gas quickly 
proliferated, each then becoming incorporated into the scope of the study’s 
analysis. 
 
Indeed, one of the more successful strategies in these early stages involved 
applying for student membership to various energy, gas and pipeline industry 
working groups. These institutions included the Institute for Gas Engineers and 
Managers (IGEM); the UK Institute for Trenchless Technology (UKITT); the 
Energy Institute (EI); the Pipeline Industries Guild (PIG); and the Durham Energy 
Institute (DEI). Membership of these institutions enabled me to access 
databases of group members and industry professionals, and from these I 
could then identify contacts that held positions within relevant departments of 
different organisations such as Northern Gas Networks, National Grid, and 
DNV-GL. Membership also permitted me to attend a range of industry events, 
including conferences (which covered topics such as the current operational 
challenges faced within the gas transmission and distribution networks, and 
preparations for emergency scenarios within these networks), expositions (in 
which engineering and technology firms advertised pipe materials and assets 
for use within transmission and distribution systems58), and perhaps most 
valuably, group visits to infrastructural facilities. 
 
Eventually, this led me to develop contacts with people who worked in the St 
Fergus gas processing terminal, National Grid and Northern Gas Networks, 
who had access to detailed maps of these pipeline infrastructures, and who 
were willing to sit down with me and take me through the various forms of 
action that were conducted upon gas at different stages in its journeys within 
these systems. These could be understood as constituting a form of ‘enriched 
																																																						
58 These were particularly useful, for employees would often describe the functions and 
limitations of existing hardware and software, and were often keen to introduce me to other 
relevant contacts that worked in different areas of the industry. 
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interview’ (Dowling, Lloyd and Suchet-Pearson, 2015, 2016), and as is 
described in the extract from my field notes above, this process of enrichment 
allowed for the development of extremely detailed analyses of the various 
routes that gas takes, the way that gas moves through these systems, the ways 
that these movements are visualized and rendered actionable by different 
actors, and the ways that different forms of action are taken upon them.  
 
Such maps also depicted gas’s journeys at various scales. Some provided 
visualizations of gas’s nation-wide circulatory movements through the NTS, 
whilst others consisted of technical drawings of gas’s movements through small 
local areas, and even individual facilities (see ‘Image 11’ and ‘Image 12’ in 
Appendix C). By attending to these different circulatory routes so meticulously, 
and by asking research participants to identify all of the different forms of 
action that could be taken upon gas across its journeys at different scales and 
why, I was able to develop a highly detailed understanding of the way that 
security comes to be performed in relation to gas across its circulations, and to 
identify many of the different actors that become involved in these 
performances. As such, two of the most substantial problems for research were 
able to be overcome. Not only did I circumvent the difficulties that I faced 
through the concealment of UK gas circulations, but I also came to research 
the security practices that surrounded high pressure gas circulations without 
putting my body at risk. 
 
These map-based exercises also me helped to address the challenge 
presented by the convolutedness and non-linearity of gas’s movements within 
these networks. In addition to tracing the different forms of action that could 
be taken at junctures along these pipes, these practitioners emphasised the 
way that gas moved non-linearly within them, and the way that actions were 
taken up and down these networks, dependent upon these movements. This 
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was also supplemented by visits to both the Gas National Control Centre for 
the NTS (the control room through which gas’s circulations at the national scale 
are visualized and managed), and also the Northern Gas Networks’ Regional 
Control Room, where gas’s circulations are similarly mapped at a local level. 
Through these visits, I was able to observe the way that gas’s pressures across 
these different networks were visualized, and the way that different forms of 
action were taken upon the gas in different locations, dependent upon these 
pressures and the directions and volumes in which the gas was consequently 
moving. 
 
Additionally, the governing practices surrounding gas’s circulations were 
traced through other means. As new actors were identified via online research, 
interviews and discussions, a plethora of additional actors, interests and actions 
that were associated with gas’s circulation began to emerge. These 
associations included legislature and industry standards (which often 
established particular ways that gas’s relations should be arranged in different 
contexts), different types of pipeline material and asset/device (such as meters, 
valves, pressure regulators, compressor stations, inline inspection devices, gas 
detectors and so forth), and various different industry organizations (such as 
Linewatch and the UK Onshore Pipeline Association, UKOPA). Each of these 
different associations were also investigated for the ways that they variously 
became related to gas, and were interrogated concerning the reasons behind 
the different forms of actions that they took upon the gas (either through 
interviews, email exchanges, documentary analysis or site visits). Again, these 
associations were typically productive of a range of further associations that 
would likewise become incorporated into this study.  
 
*** 
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Finally, gas’s concealment presented a challenge regarding the ethics of 
conducting research into UK pipeline security. In trying to document an 
infrastructure that is so meticulously concealed through specific security 
practices, I ran the risk of actively undermining security’s performance. As a 
result, there was a danger that my own research would become perceived as 
being a security threat, and that similar attempts to ‘cancel it out’ would 
consequently be made against it.  
 
Indeed, concerns expressed by participants included the risk of this thesis 
facilitating the sabotage of critical pipeline infrastructures, and also of it 
potentially enabling pipes to be illegally and dangerously tapped into so that 
gas could be stolen. As such, I had to carefully navigate the tension between 
the interests of my fieldwork and the interests of gas’s security actors. 
Specifically, I had to provide participants with assurances that all information 
relating to the locations of gas circulations would be omitted from the 
manuscript59, and I also had to promise to ensure that all fieldwork data would 
be encrypted and stored securely on non-networked hard drives.  
 
Reflections on Methods for Following and Burrowing 
 
In addition to the fieldwork challenges that were presented by gas’s materiality 
and concealment, I also encountered a series of problems that related to my 
research methods. These can be broadly summarized as issues with the specific 
methods that I employed in my research, and the challenges that were 
presented by my own positionality as a researcher within these webs of 
gaseous associations. These different methodological issues have 
consequently resulted in this thesis not claiming to reveal gas’s relations, but to 
																																																						
59 The maps included in Appendix C (‘Image 11’ and ‘Image 12’) have been reproduced with 
permission. They have either been heavily cropped, or have had specific information that 
would enable their location to be identified edited out. No detailed maps of the NTS were 
permitted out of the facilities I visited. 
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instead weave a partial and situated narrative of the associations observed 
whilst burrowing. 
 
In terms of the problems that these methods presented for my fieldwork, semi-
structured interviews, documentary analysis, and site visits each were found to 
have specific benefits and drawbacks regarding the forms of gaseous 
association that they enabled me to observe within particular contexts.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were found to be particularly helpful for generating 
rich and detailed data concerning the actions taken upon circulations of natural 
gas. Indeed, the way that these interviews involve two-directional synergetic 
conversation made them especially well-suited for coming to terms with the 
complexity of gas’s associations and with the dense technical language that is 
associated with its governance. This was particularly helpful during the early 
stages of my research. In the interview extract below for example, I can be 
seen struggling to understand the relationships between category 1 and 
category 2 responders in the event of a serious gas incident.  
 
Speaker 1: That was going to be a question of mine - I mean, what is the role of the 
category 2 responder? 
 
Speaker 2: I mean, I have no idea …when the civil contingencies act was put in they 
seemed to think that all…category two responders, which is ourselves, the water 
companies…or the utilities, sort of all getting together to deal with a major civil 
crisis...but…what do we do? You know, we respond to and deal with gas 
emergencies. You know (laughs bemusedly). I find it very difficult to understand how 
category two responders are meant to be part of this sort of community of…of 
responders who, all of a sudden will leap into action.  
 
Speaker 1: That’s really interesting. Chatting to the guys from the blue light services, 
they seem very clear on their particular roles…  
 
Speaker 2:  Of course, but that’s their job!  
 
Speaker 1: …OK. But it is really interesting to hear that the category 2 responders 
don’t feel as if it is such a well-defined relationship though. I can see in say, something 
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like a big event that National Grid might be involved with, they will have a mobile 
command unit to manage flows and stuff…  
 
Speaker 2: They probably wouldn’t manage flows from their mobile unit they would 
manage it from their own system 
 
Speaker 1: Oh. What are mobile command units used for then?  
 
(Interview: Health, Safety and Environment Manager, Northern Gas Networks, 2015) 
 
 
In this instance, the flexible two-way nature of semi-structured interviews can 
therefore be seen to be helpful for coming to terms with the technical 
language that is used within these networks, and for identifying the various 
elements that came to play a role in these security performances. 
 
A further significant benefit of these interviews involved how they were 
typically held in participants’ offices. This often had benefits, for respondents 
had at hand relevant information and resources that they were willing to share 
with me (including photographs of assets, network maps, asset diagrams, 
figures and database entries, and computer software), and they would often 
incorporate explanations of these, tours of their facilities, and also 
demonstrations of software and control systems, into my visits. Furthermore, it 
also often meant that they would introduce me to other colleagues who were 
involved in managing gas in different ways. This was especially useful, for it led 
me to identify new relevant actors, associations and actions, and it enabled me 
to follow these up with further interviews, site visits and documentary analysis. 
In this sense, many of my interviews became enriched or enhanced (Dowling, 
Lloyd and Suchet-Pearson, 2015, 2016), and they often took on the form of a 
form of site visit, allowing me to observe more of gas’s various associations and 
the ways in which it gas was managed on a day-to-day basis. 
 
	 104 
Despite these benefits however, semi-structured interviews also had 
drawbacks. Most significantly for a study of the socio-material relations 
surrounding natural gas, they privileged human actors that can verbally express 
themselves. Whilst interviews are never simply just encounters with humans – 
they frequently draw upon, and indeed, are made possible through, 
associations with other material elements, there is a risk of certain material 
actors being misrepresented or ignored within interview conversations, 
particularly in the case of ‘humble’ or ‘banal’ materials that may become 
“invisible and unremarked upon, a state they usually achieve by being familiar 
and taken for granted” (Miller, 2010; 50).  
 
As numerous materialists, including Lorraine Daston (2007) and Jane Bennett, 
(2005, 2009) have emphasised however, materials and nonhuman actors are 
not speechless, and they do not have to rely upon interviews for their 
representation. Indeed, they come to speak through their abilities to call a 
society of other things into existence (Daston, 2007); societies that may include 
human associations (such as in interviews, when they press upon interviewees’ 
memories and come up in conversation), but that can also consist of their 
assertions on a multiplicity of other elements. Gas, for example, may speak of 
its presence through its associations with unearthed gas pipes, or through gas 
company vans. Yet usefully for this research, gas also expresses itself through a 
plethora of documents. These included legislative documents, industry 
standards, policy documents, annual company reports, live-practice exercise 
reports, meeting minutes, gas fitting manuals, operations handbooks for 
specific pipeline devices, promotional materials for industry services and 
equipment, schematic maps and infrastructural plans, and various forms of 
archival materials on topics such as past and present gas industry practices and 
government policy. The analysis of all of these different materials provided yet 
another way of tracing the relationships that gas formed with different 
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organisations, bodies and materials. Often the level of detail within them also 
typically greatly exceeded that which could be expected of respondents to 
provide in the time available in interviews. As such, they often enabled me to 
develop an extensive understanding of many aspects of the functioning of gas 
infrastructures and governance systems that I would otherwise not have 
acquired, and they also frequently assisted me in identifying further actors that 
had either been overlooked in interviews, or that had not been observed 
during site visits.  
 
Yet documentary analysis similarly had drawbacks, too – again related to the 
form of gaseous associations that they made observable. Typically, texts 
provided accounts of how actors were supposed to act in given situations, 
rather than documenting the actual everyday practices of actors involved in 
performing gaseous security. Whilst this is interesting for the way that attempts 
are made in these documents to structure the conditions through which 
particular forms of gaseous phenomena can emerge, any instances where 
these regulations and arrangements differ from these actors’ actions risk being 
omitted from accounts. 
 
In contrast, site visits are not subject to this limitation. Site visits took a form 
similar to ethnography in this study, in that the objective was to specifically 
observe how actors behaved in relation to one another within particular 
environments. Yet unlike ethnography, these visits did not take place over an 
extended period of time, but were typically short – lasting anywhere between 
30 minutes and a couple of days60. The reason that they were chosen over 
ethnography was due to a matter of practical necessity. Because of the number 
and geographical spread of the sites that I wished to study, and also because I 
had to be supervised during fieldwork due to security and health and safety 
																																																						
60 Typically, they lasted several hours. 
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concerns, my observations were typically limited in their duration to the 
amount of time that participants were willing to spend taking me to different 
sites and supervising my observations. 
  
Numerous site visits were arranged as part of my fieldwork. Typically, they 
would either comprise of group events that were organised by an industry 
body (with which I would gain prior permission to conduct research), or they 
would consist of supervised site observations that I arranged directly with 
research participants. During these visits, I would attempt to identify and 
document all of the bodies and elements that presented themselves, thickly 
describing their arrangements, the forms of relation they established, and the 
kinds of action that were undertaken upon the gas during these encounters. 
Where permitted, photographs were also taken for future reference. 
 
Site visits also had the benefit of permitting informal semi-structured interviews 
to be conducted whilst I was in the field. This had value, for it enabled me to 
question participants about the different roles that people and materials 
assumed within gaseous security performances, and it allowed me to inquire 
about the reasons and motivations behind their actions. Furthermore, whereas 
it may have been easy for participants to overlook the role of materials whilst 
speaking to me in their offices (and it may have been hard for me to become 
aware of any omissions that were being made), they also had the benefit of 
reminding participants of these elements through their physical presence. As 
such, site visits often entailed rich explanations of the functions of different 
elements that I had not previously identified, and they also made it simpler for 
me to identify any omitted actors, due to the way that I found myself face-to-
face with these unknown elements, and was able to immediately learn about 
these through further questioning.  
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Like all of the methods employed in this thesis however, site visits were also 
limited in the kinds of data that they could produce. Most significantly, they 
were limited in their ability to deal with the challenges that were presented 
through the burying of gas pipes. Indeed, within this thesis’s fieldwork, site 
visits had to be conducted at locations where gas infrastructure had either 
emerged from the ground or was excavated, or where gas had escaped and 
actors had visibly grouped around it. As such, site visits alone were not 
sufficient to enable gas and its associations to be followed across its circulatory 
journeys. 
 
When used in conjunction however, many of the limitations that were present 
within these individual methods were able to be overcome, and a detailed 
account was consequently able to be produced of the way that security is 
performed in relation to gas’s circulation. The presence of these limitations 
mean that it is never possible to produce a comprehensive account, however. 
Different associations may not have presented themselves during the times 
when my fieldwork was conducted, others may not have occurred in the 
locations where these methods were employed, and others may have totally 
evaded the ‘torch-like’ field of vision that was illuminated by them. Indeed, 
some of gas’s associations may have totally exceeded human capabilities to 
perceive them altogether.  
 
This is not a failing of my fieldwork however, but a recognition that it is never 
possible to comprehensively reveal the subjects of our inquiries through 
research. Instead, we are forced to appreciate how, as researchers, we are 
individually positioned within a world that is in its emergent becoming (Barad, 
2007). What was possible for me to observe during fieldwork was not only 
conditioned by my position within space and time, and by the tools and 
associations that were available to me in that moment, but they were also 
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affected by the limits of my own individual perceptive capacities. Indeed, whilst 
gas’s invisibility may be common to human senses, my personal position as a 
social scientist who was not trained in engineering or the operation of pipelines 
may have meant that certain associations and nuances of these gaseous 
security practices evaded my perception. As such, what it was possible to know 
within a given instant was conditioned by my positioning. Indeed, as Barad 
summarizes; “Knowing is not a bounded or closed practice, but an ongoing 
performance of the world”: it is “a feature of the world in its differential 
becoming” (2007; 149). As researchers, we will therefore always be reduced to 
burrowing, in some manner. 
 
In highlighting such limitations to observation however, I diverge from Latour’s 
claims regarding what kind of entities matter (2005; 150). Latour argues that we 
should ignore elements that cannot be perceived, stating; “What would be the 
use of adding invisible entities that act without leaving any trace and make no 
difference to any state of affairs?” Yet in contradiction to Latour, I contend that 
acknowledging the potential existence of associations that we might not have 
the ability to perceive is critical for security studies. The securing actions that 
are taken to protect referent objects from sources of known and unknown 
contingent threat often cannot be understood without appreciating the 
possibility of ‘invisible’ entities that evade our perception. Indeed, these may 
never be encountered directly, but may have vicarious ‘knock on’ effects on 
other elements that have significant implications for the forms of phenomena 
that emerge. As such, there may be much in the world that has effects on 
human bodies and other elements, but which may exceed the ability of 
individuals to perceive or understand them at different points in space and 
time, and for this reason, gas circulations cannot ever be simply excavated and 
followed. Instead, we are limited to burrowing down to them, encountering 
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rocks and obstacles on the way, and peering through the murky gloom to take 
an incomplete and partial glimpse of the associations that surround it. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the methodological approach that is adopted in this 
thesis. Specifically, it has described how my fieldwork was conducted 
according to a methodology inspired by classic ‘follow the thing’ studies and 
by the methodological literature on ANT. This approach involved following 
natural gas as it circulated across the UK, tracing the relationships that it 
developed with other elements, and identifying the forms of securing action 
that came to be taken upon it during these circulatory journeys.  
 
Specifically, I described how gas’s associations and the practices that were 
conducted in relation to it came to be observed through the application of 
three specific methods; semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis, and 
a series of site visits. I explained how these techniques permitted me to 
produce an account of the way that security is performed in relation to gas as it 
circulates, and how they enabled me to describe the manner in which a range 
of different interests and motivations came to structure the performances of 
security that were observed. 
  
This approach was designed to enable me to pursue the two research agendas 
outlined in this thesis’s introduction. Regarding the first of these, I seek to 
document the way that gas’s specific ontological qualities influence the way 
that security is performed in relation to it. Regarding the second, I seek to 
explore the way that gaseous security performances come to take place across 
gas’s circulations, as it moves between nodal points. 
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I have shown that ANT is a valuable tool for pursuing these agendas. I have 
argued that the emphasis ANT places upon following and tracing the relations 
between heterogeneous elements make it well-equipped for studying the 
material-semiotic relations that shape and condition the formation of natural 
gas. I have also suggested that its insistence upon rejecting prior assumptions 
about which elements will act, how they will act, and why they act, makes it 
well-suited to a study that seeks to avoid adopting established 
conceptualizations of security, due to how these frameworks have tended to 
erase the specific material qualities of circulatory elements.  
 
The materiality of gas and the way in which it is concealed through specific 
security practices was however, shown to pose some difficult challenges for an 
approach that is based upon practices of following. Specifically, I described 
how various aspects of gas’s materiality and concealment, as well as the 
inherent limitations in my own research methods and the influence of my own 
positionality, mean that it is impossible to produce a comprehensive, or ever 
truly ‘complete’ account of these gaseous security performances. As such, 
rather than following gas and excavating its circulations for all to see, I have 
described how I have had to burrow rhizomatically, encountering rocks, roots 
and other obstacles along my way, my field of vision becoming impeded by a 
series of methodological and positional constraints.  
 
In the following chapters, I document the actors, practices and interests that 
came to be observed during this fieldwork, and describe the various ways that 
gas consequently becomes subject to a series of security performances 
throughout its circulation.  
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4 
Rendering Gas Actionable 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Rendering entities actionable is a precondition of security. To systematically 
take action upon an element to facilitate, cancel out, or compensate for 
particular kinds of phenomena that may emerge in relation to it, attempts must 
be made to understand their ontological constitution and the ways that 
particular phenomena form. As Dillon (2007) puts it; to conduct securing 
actions, governing actors must first “take into account the nature of the thing 
to be governed” (p.45). All performances of security consequently involve 
attempts to develop bodies of knowledge around the objects to be secured, 
and different knowledge practices can greatly affect the forms of action that 
may be taken upon those elements. It is for this reason that the practices 
through which particular bodies, materials and things are rendered actionable 
within contemporary practices of security have become a focus of concern 
within recent critical security studies debates (c.f. Amoore and Hall, 2009; 
Dillon, 2007; Adey and Anderson, 2011a; Anderson, 2010).  
 
As Gavin Bridge (2014; 3) has acknowledged, “the securitisation61 [of energy 
similarly] depends on knowledge practices (definitions, measurements, 
																																																						
61 Bridge’s (2014) emphasis upon discourse and use of the term ‘securitization’ here does not 
limit the applicability of his comments to linguistic accounts of security. All forms of security 
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assessments, technologies of visualization)”. As a consequence, the securing of 
natural gas is dependent upon similar kinds of practice. When we consider the 
materiality of gas (rather than its abstract depiction in graphs of its extraction 
rates, projected consumption, and estimated future costs)62 however, it quickly 
becomes apparent that it is a material that provides a particularly interesting 
case through which to examine these kinds of knowledge practice.  
 
This is because natural gas is quite unlike many of the materials that have 
formed the focus of other materialist enquiries. It is, for example, distinctly 
different from Jane Bennett’s (2009)63 black plastic glove, her discarded bottle 
top, or her dead rat. Unlike these materials, it frequently refuses to present 
itself readily for human sensorial experience. During my research I have not 
seen natural gas. I have not smelled it (at least, not before an odorant was 
added precisely so that I could smell it). I have not touched or tasted it. On 
occasion I have heard it, but then only in ways that are not obviously 
attributable to it: as a whisper or shiver in a pipe, or as a quiet, barely 
noticeable hiss from a dank and muddy hole. Apart from these rare moments, 
gas has remained silent, invisible, intangible – imperceptible. It is a material 
that is innately immune to human sensorial discernment; it exceeds our senses 
and refuses to grant us a direct audience. It is therefore unlike Bennett’s 
collection of forceful materials. It is unable to seduce me into contemplation, 
																																																																																																																																																														
require particular means of rendering their objects of concern knowable in order to take action 
upon them. 
62 For a good example of how different energy products are rendered visible in these 
dematerialized ways, see the Wicks report (Wicks MP, 2009). 
63 Jane Bennett’s (2009) book, “Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things” has been a 
particularly influential text in human geography’s recent ‘material (re)turn’ (Whatmore, 2006). In 
this work, Bennett draws attention to the vitality of matter, and to the way that material ‘things’ 
may become implicated in political events. In her opening chapter, “The Force of Things”, she 
highlights the collective agency of the collection of material elements that I describe above (a 
black plastic glove, a bottle top, a dead rat) and demonstrates how these materials collectively 
pressed upon her senses and inspired her to write her materialist critique. Given the emphasis I 
place upon the role of materials in security’s performance and their vitality, she therefore 
provides a logical entry point for a materialist analysis of gaseous security performances. 
	 113 
spur me into action, or motivate me to write, merely by its presence. Its 
physicality has little somatic affect. 
 
This imperceptibility presents particular challenges for governing gas, for if a 
material defies human senses so entirely, then how can its ‘nature’ be 
accounted for? How has gas come to be an object that is known; an object that 
can be governed and commercialised? These are the questions that I seek to 
address in this chapter. In the pages that follow, I explore some of the 
difficulties that gas presents for rendering it actionable, and I demonstrate how 
a complex set of practices have consequently been developed around these 
difficulties to define, measure, assess, and visualize gas circulations so that 
securing actions can be taken upon them. Following the central claim of this 
thesis – that the ontological constitution of the entities in circulation should be 
the principle object of study within studies of security, the specificities of the 
actions employed to render gas’s troublesome materiality actionable are 
emphasized here. Indeed, without attending to the specificities of gas’s 
dynamic materiality, I suggest that it is impossible to understand how this 
material is rendered actionable and how it comes to be secured. 
 
In section II, I begin a discussion of the material peculiarities of natural gas and 
the different ways that these qualities may force us to reconsider how materials 
can be known and governed. Drawing upon the work of Jane Bennett (2009), I 
first acknowledge the similarities between gas and the materials that have 
typically appeared within materialist studies. Like the black plastic glove and 
her other elements, I suggest that gas is humanly encountered through its 
intra-actions with forceful heterogeneous collectives, and that through these 
relationships, gas is able to vicariously press upon human senses in ways that 
render it intelligible. Where gas is distinct from these other materials, I suggest, 
is in the spatial and temporal incoherence of its affective encounters with 
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humans. These claims are then developed through a brief exploration of some 
of the ways that humans have encountered gas historically – by examining 
examples of gas-human encounters prior to the systematic application of 
particular gaseous knowledge practices, I suggest that we can most clearly 
observe the peculiar qualities of natural gas that have made it such a 
challenging material to render actionable and secure. 
  
In the following two sections of the chapter (sections III and IV), I describe how 
a system of practices has been developed to systematically render natural gas 
more coherent so that different forms of action can be taken upon it. In section 
III, I argue that gas’s rendering actionable (or ‘securable’) is partly achieved 
through attempts to map out what Manuel DeLanda (2013) describes as 
‘possibility spaces’. DeLanda uses the concept of the possibility space to serve 
as a spatial metaphor for the constellations of possible relations that exist 
between the internal elements that constitute a given entity, and the relations 
that this entity may form with other external elements. He argues that a virtual 
multiplicity – a plethora of possible relations – surrounds each entity, and that it 
is through the actualization of certain sets of these relations that different 
phenomena (desirable or undesirable) can come to emerge. Building upon this 
premise, I illustrate how maps, or ‘blueprints’, of natural gas’s possible 
relational arrangements are developed through the recording and aggregating 
of various forms of materially-mediated encounter. It is then through the 
consultation of these (inevitably incomplete) blueprints that I argue that 
attempts are made to anticipate certain kinds of gaseous phenomena, and that 
efforts are taken to facilitate, cancel out, or compensate for future scenarios. 
 
In the chapter’s fourth section, I then argue that blueprints are typically used in 
conjunction with a second set of mapping practices. These practices consist of 
attempts to produce ‘snapshots’ of natural gas’s shifting relational constitution 
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whilst it circulates. I describe how a vast array of sensory devices have come to 
be deployed across the UK gas networks to produce certain kinds of relational 
snapshot. By identifying how gas’s relations are arranged at a particular 
moment in time, and by comparing these formations to blueprints of its known 
possible relations, I suggest attempts are made to pre-empt the formation of 
particular gaseous phenomena, and to respond to them whilst in the midst of 
their emergent becoming. 
 
In this section, I also describe how efforts have been taken to greatly expand 
the forms of action that are able to be conducted upon gas by improving the 
visualizations that are produced by these sensors (namely, by enhancing the 
accuracy, reliability and speed with which snapshots are created). Importantly, 
individual sensors are shown to not produce comprehensive or coherent 
visualizations of gas’s ontological composition, but instead capture information 
on particular facets, or qualities, of the gas whilst it moves. For many forms of 
securing action to be taken however, gas’s ontological configuration needs to 
be visualized more holistically, and the associations between these various 
facets often need to be rendered known. I thus describe how many of the 
sensors used within UK gas networks have been carefully arranged to form a 
kind of reflective apparatus through which gas’s material qualities at various 
points in space and time are transmitted back to centralized points and are 
assembled into more-or-less coherent forms.  
 
Central to each of these arguments is how security’s practices of rendering gas 
as actionable operate upon a moving, incoherent target. I argue that, whilst 
current governance practices may be more-or-less effective, gas has always, 
and will always, exceed the abilities of humans to comprehensively ‘know’ and 
control it, and that any account of its various formations will always be 
necessarily provisional and incomplete – due to the way that security’s 
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knowledge practices are situated within a world that is in the midst of its 
emergent becoming (Barad, 2007). In this way, I seek to destabilise the 
coherence of natural gas as a secured ‘object’, and in doing so, I seek to 
address some of the criticisms that I levelled earlier against the energy security 
and critical security studies literatures (namely, that the elements described 
within these literatures have typically featured in ways that render them 
dematerialised, unchanging and passive). In contrast, the practices described 
in this chapter highlight the dynamism of the gas in circulation, and draw 
attention to the way that this dynamism necessitates forms of knowledge 
production that are constantly performed across the full extent of gas’s 
circulatory journeys. 
 
II. Affective Incoherence64 
 
In order to examine the difficulties that natural gas’s material qualities present 
for systematically rendering it actionable, it is helpful to first consider human 
encounters with it prior to the systematic application of gaseous knowledge 
practices. I therefore begin this section with a description of a number of 
historic encounters with natural gas, and through these anecdotes, explore 
some of the ways in which gas is similar to other kinds of material, whilst at the 
same time showing how it demonstrates a number of peculiar qualities. These 
material peculiarities are then discussed in relation to the problems they 
present for knowing natural gas and for taking action upon it. 
 
In the 1300s, natural gas appeared as an ethereal light that danced upon the 
waters of the river Tiber at night. The darkness of the night, the presence of 
																																																						
64 In using the term ‘coherence’ here, I do not intend to suggest that it actually is possible for 
an entity to have a fundamental, coherent whole. Instead I wish to draw attention to how 
different materials may appear as more-or-less coherent wholes at different points in time. 
Following Barad (2007), the apparent coherence within human perceptive registers at any one 
moment is considered to be a contingent relational effect. 
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oxygen, and an electrical charge (likely caused by lightning), are thought to 
have come together to render the presence of gas bubbling up from under the 
water perceptible to humans at that particular moment (Etiope, 2015). In a 
similar manner, from at least the 1200s, natural gas has appeared in the form of 
the mysterious ‘eternal’ flames that issued (and in places continue to issue) 
from the soil in Azerbaijan65. To form these flames, gas, oxygen and an 
unknown source of ignition had to come together and alert people to the gas’s 
existence (Searight, 2000). In the 1500s, gas became humanly sensible in a 
different way; through its intra-action66 with a clay vessel, charcoal, oxygen and 
a source of heat in the laboratory of the Flemish alchemist, Johanne Baptiste 
van Helmont. In this laboratory, gas was rendered momentarily perceptible as 
it ignited inside of the vessel and suddenly shattered it (van Helmont and van 
Helmont, 1662). More recently again, from the 1700s, natural gas repeatedly 
appeared in British coal mines – miner’s bodies, candles, oxygen from the 
earth’s surface, and the cracked walls of the mine workings becoming arranged 
in ways that led to the gas expressing itself violently upon the miners’ bodies 
(Galloway, 1882). In a similar way, William Hart’s observation in 1821 of a 
strange effervescence on the waters of a creek in Fredonia, New York (the 
event commonly associated with the birth of the American natural gas 
industry), was only made possible through the collective intra-actions of natural 
gas, sunlight and water, which together pressed upon Hart’s vision in that 
specific moment (Speight, 2007). As such, like most other materials, natural gas 
historically only became humanly known and actionable through its intra-
actions with other heterogeneous elements.  
 
																																																						
65 The name ‘Azerbaijan’ literally means “Land of Fire” (Etiope, 2015). 
66 The term ‘intra-action’ used here is borrowed from the work of Karen Barad (2007). It is used 
to make strange the common notion of causality in which one or more completed wholes 
interact with one another to produce an effect, and instead emphasizes the way that these 
elements are themselves constructed, or materialized, through these productive encounters. 
As such, “’individuals’ only exist within phenomena (particular materialized/materializing 
relations) in their ongoing iteratively intra-active reconfiguring” (Barad, in Kleinman, 2013; 77). 
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Today, natural gas becomes present to human senses in similar entangled 
ways. For most people, it enters their fields of perception through its collective 
intra-action with the dials on gas meters and domestic appliances, or through 
its relations with other infrastructural elements, such as the monolithic visual 
presence of transnational pipelines, or in the work of the engineering teams 
that repair gas distribution networks. It may also appear more vicariously, such 
as through YouTube videos of its combustion as it is released from gas-infused 
drinking water67. Even in cases that seemingly involve direct gas-human 
encounters (such as when a stove is lit, or when gas is smelled in the street), 
these experiences are similarly facilitated through material mediations, the gas 
either intra-acting with the stove’s burners and a source of oxygen, or 
collaborating with the artificial odorants that are infused within it to enable it to 
be smelled68. Whilst natural gas therefore exceeds somatic perception in its 
isolation, it can become affective and humanly knowable through specific 
forms of intra-action with other heterogeneous actants. As such, it must always 
be experienced vicariously, in a distanced and mediated manner. In this sense, 
it is thus similar to Bennett's (2009) materials, for through its intra-action with 
other elements, it develops ‘thing power’ – a collective force that draws bodies 
into engagement with it. 
 
																																																						
67 I refer here to a series of videos that have been uploaded by members of the public and 
consumer rights advocates that have helped to generate controversy around contemporary 
practices of ‘fracking’ in the United States. In these videos, natural gas is claimed to have 
entered local water supplies, with water being shown to have become flammable in the 
process. See for example: Gas Drilling Awareness Association (2011) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4LBjSXWQRV8 
68 This example of smell highlights an important aspect of the affective capabilities of materials 
– affects do not have to be limited to visual registers, nor do they have to be limited to 
physical sensations. A case in point is the way that fear is employed as a specific security 
device in gas’s governance. Through the enrolment of discursive materials such as posters, 
leaflets, television advertisements, and even scratch and sniff cards (see Appendix D), 
concerted efforts have been made by network operators and gas supply companies to 
cognitively link the smell of gas to a series of risks that they seek to publicly associate with the 
smell of gas. The motive for these practices involves how fear is believed to translate into 
particular forms of public action – specifically here, an increase in the number of reports of gas 
escapes, an increase in the speed with which these leaks are reported, and an increase in the 
urgency with which people evacuate potentially unsafe atmospheres. 
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In order to understand how natural gas becomes perceptible to humans 
through these entanglements however, and in order to understand how people 
have come to be able to take action upon it, we need to further recognise how 
experiences of gas’s affects depend upon the ontological constitution of the 
human bodies involved, and on the capacities of these bodies to be affected 
by the gas in different ways (Anderson, 2014). Human bodies have a limited 
range of senses through which natural gas can develop forms of affective 
contact with them, and all bodies differ in terms of these affectivities. Certain 
bodies may completely lack particular sensory capacities, whilst others will 
differ in terms of their sensitivity to particular kinds of contact69. Each body’s 
affectivity will also be conditioned by their different relational contexts. As 
Barad (2007) usefully summarises, bodies “do not simply take their places in 
the world [but] are intra-actively co-constituted” (Barad 2007; 170). Had 
Bennett (2009) not previously encountered the works of Thoreau and Merleau-
Ponty for example, and had she not been thinking about them whilst she was 
walking, she may not have been struck by the singularity of her litter 
assemblage. In much the same way, gaseous encounters are conditioned by 
the knowledges, experiences and relational contexts of the bodies that 
become involved in these encounters. A child may not recognise the smell of 
gas and know the risks that its presence entails, but in contrast to the child, an 
adult may experience alarm upon smelling it, due to their encounters with gas 
in the past. Bodies must therefore be understood as being always in the 
process of becoming; like gas, they are produced through their entanglements 
within the world, and gas’s intelligible affects can only be understood through 
attending to these entanglements.  
 
																																																						
69 Such distinctions are never fixed either, and different bodies may experience heightened or 
dulled affectivities at different moments in time. 
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What is particularly significant about this differential and contingent affectivity 
when considering the ways that natural gas is rendered actionable in 
contemporary security practices however, is that it forces us to acknowledge 
that the elements being secured may have qualities and affects that not only 
go unobserved or unrecognised at a particular moment in space and time, but 
which might totally exceed human intelligibility altogether. As Graham Harman 
has extensively argued, we consequently need to reject assumptions of “any 
privilege of human access to the world” (2007; 189), and instead recognise that 
large parts of the universe may remain entirely closed off to our limited 
affective experience. Each affective encounter is partial, situated, and context 
sensitive, and no objects, bodies, or things can ever encounter one another in 
their entirety. Instead, they always make contact vicariously through their 
relations with others, touching only obliquely at particular points. As such, 
“things as encountered in relation, are always a kind of distortion” (Harman, 
2011; 37). What is perceived by one entity, with its specific affectivities in a 
given moment, is always an incomplete picture. We can therefore only ever 
know of gas through our bodily-subjective, and materially-mediated, affective 
encounters with it, and whilst efforts may be taken to “assemble different 
apparatuses for satisfying particular knowledge projects” (Barad, 2007; 171), 
the various visualizations of gaseous matter that are produced will always be 
provisional and will never be objectively complete. We must therefore 
recognise that knowledge practices, and our ability to know security’s objects, 
are situated within the wider material configurations of the world in its intra-
active becoming, and that what can be known and rendered actionable within 
a given moment is not exclusively defined by human intent. Gas’s intelligibility, 
and our ability to take action upon it, is thus part of “an ontological 
performance of the world in its ongoing articulation” (Ibid; 149).  
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The corollary of this for gaseous security practices is that it means that any 
effort to render gas humanly intelligible and actionable must be regarded as 
being necessarily provisional and incomplete. Not only can we never entirely 
know gas and the possible roles that it could play in future phenomena, but 
due to the becoming nature of the world, ’matter’ “is phenomena in their 
ongoing materialization” (Barad, 2007; 151). As gas moves through space and 
time, it will develop new forms of association and new ways of intra-acting, and 
in the process, new gaseous phenomena will become intelligible to human 
perception. Security’s knowledge practices are thus forced to visualize a 
moving target, and that which is known as ‘gas’ is consequently never stable. 
 
What arguably makes natural gas so particularly difficult to render known and 
actionable, however, is the specificity of the associations that are required for it 
to form in order for it to become humanly intelligible, and the rarity with which 
these associations naturally come together. Indeed, these requirements have 
typically resulted in natural gas appearing to human senses in a very different 
manner to Bennett’s bottle cap, dead rat and black plastic glove. To a greater 
or lesser extent, these elements all hold their shape within human affective 
registers with a certain degree of spatial-temporal consistency70. In contrast 
however, natural gas is incoherent and unstable. It requires the formation of 
highly specific, and often fragile, sets of relations in order for it to become 
present to human senses, and this has often resulted in it making only very 
brief, infrequent, appearances within human affective registers: it danced 
fleetingly upon the waters of the Tiber in pre-Roman periods (Etiope, 2015). It 
appeared momentarily as it unexpectedly shattered van Helmont’s scientific 
apparatuses in the 1600s (van Helmont and van Helmont, 1662). It detonated 
suddenly, without warning, in 18th century British coal mine workings 
																																																						
70 The dead rat, which is prone to more rapid decay, may hold its shape to a lesser extent than 
the glove and the bottle cap, but for each of these objects there is a degree of coherence and 
durability in their becoming intelligible. 
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(Galloway, 1882; Fynes, 1873). It appeared in bubbles on an American creek in 
the late 1800s (Speight, 2007). Put simply, the specificity and rarity of the 
relations needed to render natural gas humanly intelligible has meant that 
encounters with it have been historically evanescent, infrequent, and 
geographically dislocated.  
 
Indeed, such qualities presented significant impediments to the construction of 
gaseous knowledges and to its governance and commercialization. One such 
impediment regarded how the substantial physical distance between gas’s 
humanly affective events meant that, like Tim Ingold's (2011; 127) wayfarer (the 
distance between whose eyes and feet prevented him from acquiring a 
panoramic vantage point of the footprints that he had left in the sand), 
witnessing gas’s affects and reviewing them in relation to one another, was 
often impossible. Gas was encountered inconsistently across different countries 
and continents, and as such, it was always experienced in ways that were at 
once too close up, and at the same time, too far away. 
 
The length of time between gaseous encounters also limited how much about 
gas could be known, and what forms of action could therefore be conducted 
upon it. The rarity with which the relations that were required for humans to 
perceive it formed meant that gaseous encounters were typically infrequent, 
and extensive experience of gas in a single lifetime was therefore very 
unusual71. As such, gas’s affects were similarly experienced in ways that were 
typically experienced at once too close up temporally, and at the same time, 
																																																						
71 It was only from the 1600s, as coal mines started to get deeper and gas could not so easily 
escape, that natural gas started to become more frequently and consistently encountered 
(Galloway, 1882). Indeed, the specificity of the relations needed to form in order for gas to be 
rendered visible served as a particular impediment for the development of scientific gaseous 
knowledges, for even when it was thought to be present, its affects could not be separated 
from those of other gaseous materials. As Brock (2012) records, “in the absence of any suitable 
apparatus to collect and study such aerial emissions, it was impossible to distinguish between 
them chemically” (p.52). 
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too far away, for knowledges to be developed regarding the conditions of its 
emergence, and its relations to particular phenomena. Without these 
knowledges, the forms of action that could be undertaken upon it were 
severely limited. 
 
Furthermore, even in encounters that, on first glance, may appear to possess a 
greater degree of spatial-temporal consistency (as in the case of eternal 
flames), there was always an ephemeral quality to the gaseous encounter. The 
flame that heralded the presence of gas also consumed it: oxygen, methane 
and heat collided, and at that exact moment of revelation, natural gas would 
disappear from view, something new taking its place. Indeed, this is a key 
feature of gas-human contacts: natural gas typically becomes intelligible in the 
moment of its withdrawal or transformation – there is always a distance 
between gas’s presence and the gaseous affects that are registered, 
interpreted and acted upon. As such, gas rarely leaves people with anything 
other than traces of its past72. It is a material that, as soon as it is encountered, 
has always already eluded human perception and control.  
 
In the following sections I describe the specialized knowledge practices and 
‘reflective apparatus’ that has been developed in response to these 
troublesome qualities in order to render gas knowable and actionable within 
contemporary performances of gaseous security. To take action upon gas and 
to systematically facilitate, cancel out, or compensate for, particular forms of 
gaseous phenomena, I argue that these strategies have had to be specifically 
designed to enhance gas’s spatio-temporal coherence within human affective 
registers. 
																																																						
72 These traces are not fragments. A fragment is spatio-temporally coherent; a solid shard of a 
previous whole that can be held, turned over, contained, controlled – governed. Whilst both 
traces and fragments can have affects and speak of a dismantled whole that cannot be fully 
reconstructed, the trace is unique in that it recalls a phenomenon from the past and that has 
already eluded control. 
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III. Blueprints 
 
Central to overcoming gas’s affective inconsistency and rendering it 
actionable, is I suggest, the production of particular kinds of gaseous trace. 
Historically, knowledges of gas as an element have developed out of the 
creation of traces that could persist over time and space, and that could thus 
be encountered with a greater degree of spatio-temporal coherence. Like 
Barad’s (2007) description of Stern and Gerlach’s experiment, in which the 
movement of silver atoms became semi-solidly etched onto glass (a relational 
association that allowed evidence of this phenomena to travel beyond the 
confines of the laboratory and to be experienced by others), so the behaviour 
of gas came to be imprinted in a more durable way upon other materials73. 
Whilst the gas may have immediately left exceptionally ephemeral traces – a 
bubble on the water, the shattering of a container, a sudden flash of light and a 
muffled roar – the affective intensity with which these entanglements 
expressed themselves was so strong that they formed particular kinds of 
relation with other materials that helped to extend the life of the ephemeral 
trace74. Such expressions included (but are certainly not limited to) the pagan 
shrine that was dedicated to the lights observed from the shore of the Tiber 
(Etiope, 2015); the letter written by Marco Polo in which he documented his 
																																																						
73 We might think of such traces as translating gaseous encounters into ‘immutable mobiles’ 
(Latour, 1986); objects that could hold their form with a greater or lesser consistency, not just 
across time, but also across space. It was through this relative immutability that gas’s affects 
overcame the tyranny of spatio-temporal distance and could be vicariously experienced far 
away from the initial sites of encounter in a more-or-less coherent manner. 
74 Here, I consider the intensity of natural gas’s affects in particular encounters to have been 
key to its initial formation as an object. Humanly-experienced gaseous entanglements typically 
tend to express themselves upon human bodies with a greater affective intensity (with greater 
‘thing power’) than bottle caps, dead rats, and discarded plastic gloves. Bubbles, flames and 
explosions expressed a peculiar affective intensity that not only drew people into engagement 
with them, but which also consistently compelled them to record their encounters in writing, 
artwork, and architecture. Bennett’s materials undoubtedly continue to have reverberations 
(indeed, I am writing about them now), but the intensity of natural gas’s affects, and the way in 
which it leaves a wake of lingering traces, has been key to its stabilisation as an object, and to 
its eventual commercialisation and governance.  
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encounters with the eternal flames in Azerbaijan (Etiope, 2015); and the 
newspaper articles, investigation reports, parish death registers, and miners’ 
memoirs that evidenced UK mine gas explosions in the 1700s and 1800s 
(Fynes, 1873). Such material expressions are themselves further vicarious traces 
of gaseous encounters, and as these secondary and tertiary traces travelled 
through space and time, each of these were encountered by additional bodies 
and things, with further traces being produced as a result. In this way, gas’s 
reverberations came to be increasingly amplified, its affects becoming 
experienced across time and across space with a greater degree of spatio-
temporal consistency.  
 
In attempting to render gas actionable, the production of more durable 
gaseous traces became systematic. Numerous knowledge projects were 
conducted, and continue to be conducted – from the chemical experiments of 
Lavoisier in the 1700s, to the pipeline tests conducted by British Gas75 in the 
1960’s. Within these projects, various actors have attempted to produce and 
record particular kinds of gaseous trace, adding their findings to a widening 
corpus of gaseous knowledge. 
 
Initially, these knowledge projects76 typically entailed exploring the conditions 
under which gaseous affects could be produced (as can be seen in the work of 
early chemists such as Johan Baptiste van Helmont, Robert Boyle, Joseph 
Priestley, and Antoine Lavoisier), but later they began to explore the ways that 
gas intra-acted with an increasingly broad range of bodies, materials and 
things. Common to all of these efforts, however, was the objective of breaking 
down, and making known, the ontological structure of gas, and the possible 
																																																						
75 British Gas, as it is referred to in this thesis, was the organization responsible for installing 
and operating the NTS, prior to the privatization of the gas industry in the 1980’s. The role of 
NTS operator is now overseen by National Grid. 
76 Bensaude-Vincent and Stengers (1996) describe knowledge projects as the process through 
which materials become enriched with information, resulting in the production of (increasingly) 
‘informed materials’.  
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relations that this gas could form with other elements in order to produce 
particular effects. By mapping these relations, attempts could be made to 
identify specific forms of gaseous phenomena that could possibly actualize, 
and action could then be taken in the present to facilitate, compensate for, or 
cancel out, certain kinds of gaseous event. 
 
I suggest that we might best understand these knowledge practices, and the 
ways in which they operate, through the application of DeLanda's (2013, 
following Deleuze), concept of ‘possibility spaces’. To explain what DeLanda 
means by the term ‘possibility space’ however, I now briefly turn to discuss how 
he sees elements (bodies, objects, things) to be ontologically constituted.  
 
Relations of Interiority/Exteriority 
 
For DeLanda (2006), elements and their agency arise from the specific 
configuration of their internalised relations (their ‘relations of interiority’) and 
their relationships with other external entities (their ‘relations of exteriority’)77. 
Relations of interiority describe the interactions between an entity’s constitutive 
parts, and it is through these interactions that its irreducible properties can be 
understood to emerge. It is, for example, through the configuration of natural 
gas’s individual molecules, in particular the specific number and arrangement 
of the hydrogen and carbon atoms contained within it and their relation to one 
another, that it becomes energetic, that it develops the abilities to combust, 
and amongst other actions, comes to produce heat and light.  
 
																																																						
77 This distinction is somewhat artificial. The performance of such ‘agential cuts’ must, 
according to Karen Barad (2007), be viewed as being contingent – what is humanly intelligible 
is performed by the world in its becoming. The distinction between what relations are ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’ the object is therefore one of aesthetics, and is employed here as a conceptual 
tool to help visualize security’s practice. 
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Crucially however, the internal relations of an entity do not “explain the 
relations which constitute [its] whole” (DeLanda 2006; 11). Instead, an entity’s 
ability to act in different ways is further dependent upon its relations of 
exteriority. Entities may possess myriad ways of acting that remain latent, or 
virtual, until specific relationships with other external entities are formed. Such 
a notion is encapsulated in the image of the fire triangle (figure 3), for whilst 
natural gas’s relationships of interiority can be seen to provide it with the latent 
capacity to combust, it requires the presence of two external agents, oxygen 
and a source of heat, for it to ignite. Until such relations of exteriority become 
actualised therefore, its capacities to burn, to emit heat and light, will remain 
dormant, or virtual.  
 
 
Figure 3 - Diagram of the 'fire triangle' 
 
Above this first layer of actions (burning, heating, lighting), endless layers of 
other virtuals can be understood to proliferate. As Michel Cassé writes, “every 
virtual particle surrounds itself with a virtual cosmos and each in turn does 
likewise indefinitely” (1993; 72-73, cited by Deleuze and Parnet, 2006; 112). 
The bourgeoning of this constellation of virtual relations thus opens out a 
cloud of potential futures that are yet to be actualised. As such, whilst natural 
gas may burn should its virtual relations with oxygen and heat become 
actualised, other latent capacities can be understood to unfold beyond the 
fringes of these relations. A simple example of this can be seen in the opening 
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out of gas’s capacities beyond combustion to its latent ability to take life. In 
order for this agency to be realised, not only do exterior relations with oxygen 
and heat have to be actualised, but a proximate living body must also be 
available for the gas to form external relations with.  
 
Virtual constellations are more complex than this simple example suggests 
however. Some virtuals may never be actualised, some may be entirely beyond 
the plane of human perception, and beyond each successive layer of virtuals 
there will always lay a potentially infinite number of further virtual relations. 
Significantly for this thesis, additional complexity arises from both the internal 
and external relations of entities being able to shift as they move through 
space and time, leading to transformations in their ontological constitution and 
their agency. Internal changes may occur through the inclusion or exclusion of 
internal components (such as in the case of natural gas flows acquiring rust 
particulates as they flow through corroding pipes, or gas having its hydrogen 
sulphide molecules removed in processing terminals), or through alterations in 
the relationships between these constitutive parts, as for example, in shifts in 
distance between gas molecules and changes in the way their atoms vibrate. 
Such relational shifts are significant for the governance of circulating entities, 
for they can affect their irreducible properties and the constellation of virtuals 
that surround them. In this way, new capacities and potential futures are 
opened up. 
 
Blueprints & Possibility Spaces 
 
DeLanda uses the term ‘possibility space’ as a spatial metaphor for these 
rhizomatic clouds of actual and possible relations (DeLanda, 2013). A possibility 
space is effectively the field of virtual relations that surrounds a particular 
element. Within this field resides a plethora of known and unknown forms of 
association and phenomena that may present various opportunities and 
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existential threats for security, and because what is unknown is regarded as 
constituting the ‘ultimate danger’ (Dillon, 2003)78, I want to suggest here that it 
is the possibility spaces of circulating elements that have become the central 
focus of security’s knowledge practices. Security involves attempts to map out 
entities’ actual and possible relational formations in advance, and requires 
efforts to identify all of the forms of phenomenal agency that may develop 
through these different configurations of gaseous associations. By identifying 
particular phenomenal formations, action can then be taken upon the relations 
of elements in order to facilitate, cancel out, or compensate for different 
phenomena, prior to their emergence. 
  
I want to suggest that security actors visualize gas’s fields of virtual relations 
through the construction of what might be thought of as ‘relational blueprints’. 
The blueprint serves as a metaphor here to illustrate how more-or-less stable 
maps are produced of gas’s spaces of possibility. These blueprints are then 
used as points of reference against which different kinds of relational 
manipulation – different kinds of securing action – can be considered and 
deployed. These maps are not literal blueprints. They do not necessarily take 
the form of diagrammatic representations of gas’s possible associations 
(indeed, they often take the form of texts such as scientific papers, industry 
standards and government legislation), and their usage is not intended to 
suggest that gas’s relations can be completely mapped out and translated into 
totally stabilized forms79.  
 
I now turn to discuss a variety of practices that have been deployed to produce 
these blueprints, and describe how these different texts work to render gas 
																																																						
78 Dillon is writing specifically about the performance of security in relation to forms of life here, 
but I believe that the same principle applies to material elements that become the focus of 
security’s practices of knowing and rendering actionable. 
79 Crucially, such blueprints are more-or-less stable. Whilst they have a degree of durability, 
their structure is not fixed, and they are in a perpetual state of being drawn. 
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more spatio-temporally coherent in ways that make possible different forms of 
securing action.  
 
Making Blueprints (1): Experiments 
 
Experiments are one of the most common knowledge practices through which 
gas’s spaces of possibility have been charted to date. Typically, these 
experiments involve holding an object of concern (in this case, gas) within a 
specialized apparatus whilst an investigator forces it to make a series of 
contacts with other elements. The purpose of these experiments is to force the 
gas to affect the different elements being introduced to it in ways that are 
humanly intelligible. In premise, this is a little like installing a wing mirror on a 
motorbike. Whilst the driver may not be able to see what is behind them 
without the wing mirror (due to the positioning of their body within the bike-
road-body assemblage), the wing mirror enables them to vicariously encounter 
the road behind them in a mediated manner. Similarly, by bringing gas into 
contact with other elements upon which it has somatically perceptible affects, 
different facets of its ontological constitution can be vicariously experienced.  
 
These experiments have typically involved attempts to multiply the intra-
actions that develop between the gas and the other elements that it is 
introduced to. Extending the motorcycle analogy, a useful image for visualizing 
this kind of practice is the Mod’s pimped up Vesper (see figure 4). By 
multiplying the number of reflective devices that are deployed to vicariously 
encounter the gas, more facets of its ontological formation can be brought into 
view. Whilst it is still impossible to experience an object in its entirety (and 
indeed we would never know if we had), investigations are thus able to expand 
the field of human perception by multiplying the kinds of vicarious contacts 
that are made with the object of enquiry. In this way, experiments provide a 
means of mapping out gas’s spaces of possibility by “perform[ing] causal 
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interventions into [gas’s] beings and becomings in order to discover what [its] 
capacities are” (DeLanda, 2013, p. 92) and also how they develop. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Photograph of a Mod's Vesper 
 
By observing these affects, attempts are then typically made to map out the 
lines of causality that resulted in their production. This usually involves the 
application of scientific reason, in which elements are combined under test 
conditions, in ways that isolate individual relations and enable the identification 
of particular causal associations. In this way, particular relational phenomena 
can be systematically identified, and the relations of interiority and exteriority 
necessary for their actualization can be catalogued.  
 
An example of such an experimental apparatus can be seen in the tests 
conducted by British Gas’s Engineering Research Station (ERS) during the 
development of the UK transmission system in the late 1960’s. Amongst other 
agendas, the ERS was concerned with the behaviour of pressurised gas as it 
travelled within pipelines of different material types, particularly when 
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subjected to a range of environmental conditions. One specific line of enquiry 
regarded what would happen when different types of pipeline were struck by 
heavy machinery. As a former engineer of the ERS recalled; 
 
“there were lots of tests […] using diggers, hitting pipes […]. The distances that you 
see [in the industry standards] …you have got safe distances for all sorts of [pipeline 
type] …they came about initially from full scale tests. Blow it up and see how far stuff 
went!” (Interview with former ERS engineer, 2015) 
 
What is being described here is a series of experiments through which natural 
gas was made to intra-act with different pipe materials and industrial 
appliances. Numerous traces were produced and recorded through the 
conduct of these experiments (including projectile travel distances, 
temperature readings, and photographs of damage to pipework and of gas 
cloud dimensions), and in analysing these traces, different gaseous phenomena 
could be identified and the lines of contingency that led to them could be 
mapped out. Typically, these lines were mapped using ‘event trees’ such as the 
one in figure 5, below.  
 
 
Figure 5 - Diagram of a gas escape 'event tree' (C-FER Technologies, 2014) 
 
Efforts were then taken to avoid or compensate for particular future scenarios 
by altering gas’s relational associations in the present. In this instance, the 
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blueprints that were produced through these experiments helped to inform the 
UK’s pipeline industry standards (IGEM, 1995). Specifically, they helped to 
identify the spatial extents of different kinds of possible gaseous affects 
(including jet fires, vapour cloud fires and vapour cloud explosions), and this 
information enabled a series of recommendations to be developed as to how 
far away from pipelines different kinds of property should be built (see figure 
6). By building these properties beyond the perceived spatial extents of 
particular gaseous affects, the phenomena of human casualties or deaths could 
be, if not entirely cancelled out, at least greatly reduced in likelihood.  
 
Indeed, the term likelihood is important here. Not only were gas’s contingent 
associations mapped out through these experiments, but as is demonstrated in 
the figure below, different kinds of phenomena, and the associations that lead 
to them, were assessed in terms of their likelihood, or risk, of being realized. In 
the case of these particular experiments, this risk was calculated in relation to 
the phenomena of the loss of a single human life. Figure 6 thus demonstrates 
how property developments of different types should be allocated different 
recommended development distances, these distances having been calculated 
according to the relative amount of time that individuals are likely to occupy 
them. The less time that a certain kind of building is occupied, the lower the 
chance of gas forming relations with an individual human body in the event of 
an escape, and therefore the lower the risk of a casualty. As such, commercial 
buildings, which are typically occupied for fewer hours of the day than 
residential properties, are typically permitted to be developed closer to 
pipelines. In the immediate proximity of pipelines, however, no property 
development is permitted to take place.  
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Figure 6 - Graph showing risk relative to distance from pipelines (C-FER Technologies, 2014) 
 
As such, we can see through this example that experiments provide one means 
through which to render gas’s possible relations known. By systematically 
bringing gas into contact with other elements, the lines of causality that lead to 
the emergence of particular gaseous phenomena can be identified, and 
attempts can be made to facilitate, cancel out, or compensate for, the future 
formation of phenomena by acting upon gas’s relations in the present.  
 
Making Blueprints (2): Investigations 
 
A second way that blueprints of gas’s possibility spaces is through the conduct 
of investigations following the emergence of particular gaseous phenomena. In 
many respects, these investigations follow a similar method to experiments, in 
that attempts are made to collect traces of gaseous affects, and from them, 
efforts are taken to establish the lines of causality that led to the emergence of 
particular phenomena. Typically, however, these investigations only take place 
after a gaseous event, typically once the gas has already departed the scene. A 
simple example of such a practice can be seen in the case of the investigations 
that follow domestic gas explosions, or other incidents that cause loss of life, 
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casualties, or damage to property. As a former network operations director for 
Northern Gas Networks described to me;  
 
“we have got to find out what the cause was. […] The thing you would first look at was 
what time. Usually if there is a gas explosion in a house caused by somebody and a 
cooker, it happens early in the morning, just as they get out of bed. Because they 
have left it overnight and they have got up and something has ignited. And it’s bad, 
but you would start from there...” (Interview, former Network Operations Director, 
Northern Gas Networks, 2015) 
 
What is being described here is a process of trying to map out the causal 
relations that led to the emergence of a particular kind of existential threat. 
Vicarious gaseous traces that were imprinted upon the property and its 
environs during the event are subsequently collected and investigated for the 
nature of their associations with the gas. Often the investigation of these traces 
extends to forensic levels of detail. During a visit to DNV-GL’s Loughborough 
Materials and Failure Research Laboratory80 for example, I observed the work 
of an engineer who was attempting to determine the causal relations behind a 
recent incident of carbon monoxide poisoning that had claimed the lives of an 
elderly couple. On his table in a sectioned-off area of the laboratory was an 
ageing gas heater that had been clinically dismantled, its parts removed and 
laid out neatly for inspection. Like an autopsy, the engineer pored over and 
inspected these parts in minute detail – tests were conducted, reports were 
written, and the cause of death was eventually pronounced. A problem with 
the heater’s burner jets had resulted in the gas burning inefficiently, with lethal 
quantities of carbon monoxide having consequently been produced.  
 
																																																						
80 DNV-GL is a corporation that specializes in research and data analysis within the UK gas 
industry. 
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The purpose of investigations such as these is both to allocate responsibility 
and to ascertain previously unidentified associations that may lead to certain 
kinds of undesirable phenomena. Attempts can then accordingly be taken to 
cancel out or compensate for similar scenarios in the future. A case in point is 
the explosion in Putney with which this thesis opened. By identifying the 
conditions that led to the failure of a particular component (in this case, cast 
iron pipes), efforts could then be taken to avoid future incidents caused by 
similar sets of associations forming around them. In this case, this was achieved 
by establishing legislation that enforced the replacement of these components. 
 
Such investigations do not have to be conducted only around major events 
however. During my fieldwork, I also observed the broader collation of 
knowledge around more mundane escape events. As the former operations 
director for Northern Gas Networks explained to me; 
 
“If there is an escape on a […] pipe, it is logged. […] It is recorded, and where it was, 
was it a joint, what type of joint it was, and that is going on as we speak, so that’s 
information that is being built up” (Interview, former Networks Operations Director, 
Northern Gas Networks, 2015)  
 
This form of data aggregation is conducted on an international scale. In each 
gas-related escape event, the pipe materials, their dimensions, locations, age, 
connected assets, typical operating pressures, environmental conditions (such 
as soil acidity, compactness, land use) and so on, are catalogued within large 
industry databases81. This information is then shared between networks, and is 
used to assess the risk of failures on installed pipework that possesses similar 
characteristics. By investigating the everyday behaviours of gas’s material 
associations in this way, and by recording a history of these behaviours, gas 
companies are able to project a visualization of gas’s spaces of possibility onto 
																																																						
81 Site visit – RAF Spadeadam (2014). 
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their infrastructural environments and take particular forms of pre-emptive 
action upon pipework that is considered to present higher levels of risk.  
 
From these various examples, whether they follow major events, or are 
conducted around aspects of the everyday functions of gas networks, 
investigations can therefore be seen to provide another means through which 
attempts are made to collect gaseous traces and to establish the causal 
connections between the gas’s associated elements that lead to particular 
kinds of phenomena. By again visualizing gas’s spaces of possibility in this way, 
action can be taken to facilitate, cancel out, or compensate for, particular kinds 
of future gaseous phenomena in advance of their emergence. 
 
Making Blueprints (3): Simulations 
 
A third way that attempts were observed to be made to map out gas’s spaces 
of possibility was through practices of simulation. There are two ways in which 
simulation was observed in this study; computer modelling and live rehearsals. 
Simulation typically involves the adoption of a hypothetical scenario, and from 
this, attempts are then made to map out the gaseous associations that are 
likely to develop. Computer simulations work by taking a series of given 
parameters (gas pressures, volumes, chemical composition, affected regions) 
and by charting the relations that could form within them, based upon existing 
knowledge of gas’s behaviours. As a result of these assumptions, computer 
simulations are useful for identifying possible links between various known 
elements in an emergent event, but are less adept at identifying elements that 
may become involved in phenomena but that have not been previously 
identified. A typical computer simulation can be seen in the following example 
described by a health, safety and environment manager at Northern Gas 
Networks; 
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“I wanted a model. We actually modelled self-isolating distribution. I found we had a 
single pipeline feeding [confidential], and we have a single pipeline running up 
[confidential] in [confidential]. So I put a couple of scenarios together, whereby 
someone damaged that pipeline, pressure decayed, we lose…I think it was 12000 
customers in [confidential], and I think it was like 7000 customers in [confidential], 
mainly to get participants to escalate the incident and say we need self-isolation and 
restoration – we need to consider it. Run the risk assessment, and then ask our 
directors for their permission to take it further” (Interview, Health, Safety and 
Environment Manager, Northern Gas Networks, 2015)  
 
In this example, computer simulation was used to map out the contingent 
spread of gaseous affects from a single hypothetical incident (accidental 
damage to a pipeline caused by an excavation company). To simulate these 
affects, a number of known or anticipated parameters were established, 
including pipeline design, gas pressures, weather conditions, and consumer 
demand, and gas’s likely behaviour was modelled according to these 
conditions. In this scenario, the simulation predicted that gas would be 
prevented from reaching around 19000 consumers connected to the North of 
England gas distribution network. The scale of this incident is particularly 
significant, due to the way that network operators are currently required to 
attend every property that is affected by an outage to ensure that the 
appliances of affected consumers are shut off prior to supply being returned. If 
a company was not to take this action, users who had left their appliances on 
after the interruption to supply would find their properties filling up with gas 
following the return of the gas supply. Unsurprisingly, this could result in 
domestic explosions. 
 
In an incident that exceeds 5000 properties however, supervising consumers’ 
reconnection to the gas network can be an extremely time consuming and 
resource-intensive endeavour, and one that is likely beyond the capabilities of 
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a single distribution company to manage quickly. As such, any outage that 
affects in excess of 5000 properties is currently regarded as constituting a 
major incident – a classification that qualifies the distribution company to 
receive support from other gas networks. Even with this support however, the 
duration of an outage can still reach into weeks and months, and in a case 
where such an outage occurs over winter, there is also a risk that elderly or 
vulnerable people will perish from the cold82. As a consequence, there is 
currently an ongoing debate in the UK gas industry as to whether the number 
of deaths that would be incurred from explosions (if consumers were given 
responsibility for managing their own isolation and supply restoration), would 
exceed the number of deaths that would be incurred from the cold, if they 
were not. It is within this debate that the simulation described above was 
situated. The health, safety and environment manager wanted to use 
computational simulations to identify potential phenomena (death from cold) 
and to use the identification of this phenomena to trigger a conversation 
around possibly altering the way that action is taken upon gas in the event of 
future supply interruptions.  
 
As such, simulation can be seen to involve attempts to calculate and project 
lines of contingency from a set of known parameters, with the objective of 
assessing the risk of these relations becoming actualized. From this, an attempt 
is then made to assess the necessity of re-ordering the way that gas’s relations 
are arranged in order to address certain forms of threat. Whilst, in this case, 
these simulation practices cannot be seen to involve attempts to completely 
cancel out all kinds of threatening phenomena (the health, safety and 
environment manager recognized that risks to consumers cannot be totally 
																																																						
82 In most gas outages, distribution companies will provide consumers with electric heaters for 
the duration of the supply interruption. In an incident of this scale however, electricity networks 
are expected to not be able to cope with such large unexpected increases in electricity 
demand.  
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avoided), we can observe attempts to minimise the likelihood of casualties 
being incurred, and to reduce the number of people negatively affected.  
 
The second way that simulation was observed to be employed in practices of 
rendering gas actionable was through the conduct of live rehearsals. Live 
rehearsals operate in a similar manner to computer simulations, in that 
hypothetical events are established, and a set of known elements and 
behaviours are identified. From these, attempts are then made to work out 
what possible relations gas will subsequently develop. Live rehearsals differ 
from computational simulations however, in that, rather than relying on 
assumptions of how elements will act in a given scenario, rehearsals involve the 
observation of the actual emergent behaviour of incorporated elements. 
Unanticipated forms of action, association, and resultant phenomena may 
consequently emerge and become intelligible through the conduct of these 
rehearsals. Indeed, these features have considerable value, for as a 
contingency planning officer from Durham Constabulary described to me 
regarding a recent rehearsal that had been conducted between ‘category one’ 
responders83 in Durham’s Local Resilience Forum, rehearsals can help to 
answer a series of questions. 
 
“Do people understand [the emergency plan]? Do they know where it is actually 
accessible? Do they know that it is there? Because we have a lot of documents, but do 
people actually know that they are there to help them? So there is a lot of these 
																																																						
83 The UK’s Civil Contingencies Act (2004) splits the actors involved with the management of 
incidents are split into two groups. Category one responders are those actors that are directly 
involved with the management of an incident. These principally consist of ‘blue light’ services 
(police, ambulance, and fire services). They typically also involve the local planning authority for 
that area. In the case of a major gas escape where loss of life had occurred, or where severe 
risk was presented to human life, category one responders would be responsible for managing 
the incident. Category two responders consist of relevant co-operating organizations that may 
be called upon to assist with dealing with an incident. The relevance of category two 
responders depends upon the nature of the incident. In the case of a major gas escape, local 
distribution companies or the transmission system operator, National Grid, may be called upon 
to shut off the gas to particular areas, or to reduce its pressure.  
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learning points that need to be brought to the fore” (Interview, Contingency Planning 
Officer, Durham Constabulary, 2014).  
 
It is in the asking of these kinds of questions that we can most clearly see the 
differences between the mapping practices that are involved in live rehearsals 
and those found within computational forms of simulation. Such questions 
could not be answered through computational forms of simulation due to the 
way that they require a method of mapping that does not prescribe or assume 
the ways that elements will behave in a given moment.  
 
It is also for these reasons that rehearsals have an additional benefit. Live 
rehearsals can help governing actors to identify new elements that may 
become involved in the formation of gaseous phenomena and to identify any 
alterations in gas’s associations that may have taken place since the last time 
mapping practices had been conducted. As the police officer continued; 
 
“We accept that it is a constant learning cycle. Things are changing all the time. 
People are changing, organisations are changing…companies […] pipeline 
distributions are changing…so we have to be on the ball all of the time. […] [We will 
say to them:] ‘we want you to test the plans this year to see if the plans are fit for 
purpose’. So we would put a test together to challenge the document…to […] see if 
the plans actually work. The information in there, is it up to date, is it relevant, are 
rendezvous sites identified? Are those locations still physically there? Or has someone 
built a house on them?” (Interview, Contingency Planning Officer, Durham 
Constabulary, 2014).  
 
In this way, live rehearsals demonstrate how gas is a material that is in a 
constant state of emergent becoming, and they highlight how the blueprints 
that are produced of gas’s spaces of possibility are therefore in a constant state 
of flux. Rather than maps of gas’s spaces of possibility ever being finalized or 
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complete, security’s actors must work to constantly update these blueprints in 
order to ensure that security’s modes of response remain efficient and 
effectual. As new associations and alterations to gas’s existing associations 
become identified and incorporated into gaseous blueprints, so these 
developments inform security’s practice, with existing actions undergoing 
alteration in order for particular phenomena to continue to be secured against. 
Indeed, it is for this reason that rehearsal practices are regularly conducted 
across the gas industry. Every year, they are conducted at the scale of 
individual organisations, county-wide local resilience forums, and national 
cross-industry events84. As the emergency operations manager from National 
Grid reflected: 
 
“[we have] had an emergency plan for the last twenty years…and we have had to do it 
and exercise it constantly” (Interview, Emergency Operations Manager, National Grid, 
2014) 
 
From these examples, we can therefore observe the systematic application of 
simulation as a means of identifying new forms of gaseous phenomena and the 
contingent relational formations that lead to them. Through these practices, 
attempts can then be made to alter the way that action is taken upon gas’s 
relations and regulate the kinds of phenomena that may emerge in the future. 
 
Making Blueprints (4): Speculations 
 
The final knowledge practice through which gas’s possibility spaces are 
mapped out regards speculation. Speculation, as defined by de Goede (2012; 
xx) is like other forms of possibility space mapping, in that it “refers to the 
constitution of a visual field, a field of possible political intervention”. Yet it 
																																																						
84 See (Northern Gas Networks, 2012; National Grid, 2012a; b; Wales and West Utilities, 2012) 
for examples of post-rehearsal reports produced following these events. 
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also differs from these other practices in that it imagines “a future without 
historical continuity with the past” (Cooper, 2006; 119). It is more imaginative 
than these other practices, with security actors working to creatively visualize 
gaseous associations and related phenomena that could conceivably happen, 
but that have no historical precedent.  
 
Table top exercises are one of the most common practices through which 
speculative mapping is conducted to render actionable future gaseous events. 
Such exercises are typically conducted by a range of practitioners, either from 
within single businesses, or from multiple different industry organisations and 
other wider institutions (such as emergency services, local authorities, and 
other service providers), but within all table top exercises, the purpose is to get 
as broad a perspective as possible by assembling people from different 
backgrounds and training so that a wide range of possible eventualities can be 
identified. Participants then attempt to brainstorm potential scenarios that may 
affect the operation of gas networks.  
 
No scenario is too extreme for consideration in such practices. Indeed, at a 
regional gas industry conference in 201485, Philip Swift, the operations director 
for Western Power Distribution86 explained how “you can never over-react” in 
speculative practices, and proceeded to describe how meteor strikes, space 
debris and solar flares had all been discussed in relation to the continued 
security of UK service provision during the table top exercises conducted by his 
Local Resilience Forum. As Assistant Chief Constable for Devon and Cornwall 
Police, Paul Netherton (another presenter at this same conference) stated; “you 
never expect the unexpected”. Speculative practices are thus one means 
																																																						
85 “Don’t Panic! Emergency Planning Conference” - Bristol, 19th November, 2014. Organised 
by the Institute for Gas Engineers and Managers (IGEM) South West and Wales sections. 
86 Western Power Distribution is responsible for the management of four electricity distribution 
networks covering the south west of England, and the south and west of Wales. The presence 
of electricity distribution companies at a gas industry conference is indicative of the way that 
speculative exercises are seen to benefit from cross-industry partnerships. 
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through which attempts are made to anticipate and render knowable the 
unexpected and the unlikely. 
 
These speculative practices do not have to involve extreme scenarios however. 
They can also include fairly mundane events, such as a gas escape in a 
residential street and the way that it might interrupt traffic or put bodies at risk. 
Yet whether they are extreme or mundane, all speculative practices involve 
attempts to trace back the layers of contingent associations that may emerge, 
and to identify possible risks that might arise from the events that are 
imagined. As the contingency planning officer for Durham Constabulary 
described regarding the table top exercises that are conducted by the Local 
Resilience Forum for County Durham;  
 
“[We might ask:] what are the key concerns here? One would be that it is right next to 
the A19. Do I have to close the A19? Because if I do, the ramifications are quite 
serious. Also, there is a residential area directly the other side of the A19. Are you 
going to evacuate the area? Or are you going to tell them to stay inside and shut their 
doors and windows? What are the risks to those people, and what are the risks 
involved in actually trying to get them out en masse? To evacuate a large area like 
that is a massive task. Have you got the resources to do it? So we would challenge 
them on these types of questions. So we would ask table one, but table two would 
have a different viewpoint. So it’s about bouncing ideas off people, and some of the 
might have direct experience around this thing” (Interview, Contingency Planning 
Officer, Durham Constabulary, 2014). 
 
In this manner, particular scenarios therefore come to be imagined through 
speculative exercises, and attempts are made to map out the gaseous relations 
that may unfold and their possible consequences. Speculative practices thus 
provide another means through which a ‘visual field’ of gas’s spaces of 
possibility can be mapped out, and how ‘political interventions’ can be 
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conducted to facilitate, compensate for, or cancel out, particular types of 
possible phenomena. 
 
Making Blueprints (5): Formalisations 
 
To conclude this section on blueprints, I want now to briefly discuss how the 
outputs of these different gaseous knowledge practices become translated into 
various kinds of blueprint. Each of these practices (experiments, investigations, 
simulations, speculations) involves the lines of contingency that are established 
through them becoming formalised and rendered more-or-less coherent via 
the publication of different kinds of output. These formalisations are highly 
significant, for they enable gaseous knowledges to travel through both time 
and space, and for them to be reflected upon and consulted in different 
locations and at different times. In this way, gas can become intelligible and 
actionable in a more spatio-temporally coherent manner, action being able to 
be taken upon it beyond single isolated encounters87. 
 
For experiments, the maps produced of gas’s spaces of possibility through 
these methods have typically become formalised within relatively durable and 
stable documents such as scientific publications, government legislation and 
industry standards88. In a similar manner, investigative practices have often 
involved the publication of incident reports89, but they may also become 
incorporated into government legislation and industry standards90. Likewise, 
simulation and speculative practices may become formalised through the 
																																																						
87 A nice example of this is how the UK industry standards for the installation of gas 
transmission pipelines (IGEM, 1995) have subsequently been adopted by other countries and 
networks around the world. 
88 See, for example: (Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996, IGEM, 1995, The Gas Safety 
(Installation and Use) Regulations 1998). 
89 See, for example, the incident report produced following the explosion in Putney that was 
described in the introduction to this thesis (HSE, 1985). 
90 See, for example, the updates to government legislation that followed the publication of the 
report into the Putney explosion (HSE, 2001; HSE and OFGEM, 2011). 
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publication of exercise reports, but they may also later become incorporated 
into industry-wide contingency plans, or the contingency plans of local 
resilience forums, and individual organisations91. Like experiments and 
investigations, they may also potentially inform government legislation and 
industry standards, should their findings be considered sufficiently significant92. 
 
In these ways, we can therefore observe the production of multiple types of 
blueprint through the conduct of different gaseous knowledge practices. Each 
of these blueprints works to collate the findings produced through different 
methods and permits gas’s field of possibilities to be visualized in ways that 
provide these gaseous associations with a degree of spatio-temporal 
coherence that makes them possible for governing actors to comprehend and 
consult. From referring to these maps, governing actors can then determine 
how to best take action upon gas’s associations in the present in order to 
facilitate, cancel out, or compensate for, different kinds of possible 
phenomena. They may develop strategies for maximising the efficiency of 
gas’s transport, or for altering its circulation in ways that promote social 
productivity, but conversely, they may also draw lines through gas’s field of 
possible relations, delineating between those relations and phenomena that 
are to be considered acceptable, and those that are to be considered 
unacceptable. In this way, gaseous blueprints provide a means of stabilizing 
these knowledges, each blueprint working to systematically overcome the 
challenges presented by gas’s affective incoherence and to render gas’s 
possible affects coherent and actionable in a number of different ways. 
 
																																																						
91 See, for example: (Durham County Council and Darlington Borough Council, 2012). 
92 An example of this can be seen in the attempt of the health, safety and environment 
manager at Northern Gas Networks to use simulations to challenge current the UK legislation 
that requires distribution companies to supervise the isolation of consumer appliances 
following an interruption to their gas supply. 
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Whilst the stability and spatio-temporal coherence of these blueprints is 
important for the way that it enables gaseous knowledges to persist, travel and 
be developed upon, and for different forms of action to be employed upon 
circulations of natural gas, we should also be cautious about over-emphasising 
their ontological stability. As previously described, gas is an example of 
“phenomena in their ongoing materialization” (Barad, 2007; 151), and it is thus 
perpetually dynamic. As it moves through time and space, it is continually 
developing new forms of association, and many of these associations may also 
currently exceed human capabilities to know them. As such, security has to 
follow a moving target. In order for phenomena to continue to be facilitated, 
cancelled out, or compensated for, gas’s possible associations have to be 
mapped and remapped, and blueprints of its spaces of possibility continually 
redrawn93. 
 
 
IV. ‘Snapshots’ 
	
It is because of gas’s relational dynamism that I suggest that a second set of 
practices (after ‘blueprints’) have been developed to systematically render gas 
actionable within the UK’s gas transport industry. These practices might be 
broadly described as involving attempts to produce periodic ‘snapshots’ of 
gas’s ontological configurations, whilst it is in motion. These snapshots are 
different to blueprints in that, whilst they similarly are designed to visualise 
gas’s field of associations, their purpose is to provide an indication of the forms 
of association that gas has developed at a particular moment in time. By then 
comparing these snapshots to blueprints of gas’s spaces of possibility, I 
suggest that governing actors attempt to apprehend particular kinds of 
phenomena in the midst of their emergent becoming.  
																																																						
93 The UK industry standards are illustrative of this. Currently, these standards (which were first 
developed in 1965) are in their fifth edition. 
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Mapping Gas’s Dynamic Relations of Interiority/Exteriority 
 
These relational ‘snapshots’ can be seen to have been collected from the very 
earliest days of the UK gas industry, yet over the last 200 years, the number of 
snapshots produced, and the forms of governing action that have been made 
available through their production, have proliferated. Whilst initially such 
snapshots were relatively few in number and were pretty inaccurate – produced 
through methods such as the counting of lit windows in order to calculate 
billing amounts, or the weighing of coal in order to assess the approximate 
volume of gas that would be manufactured (Schivelbusch, 1995) – today, the 
number of snapshots produced of gas circulations on a daily basis has 
increased exponentially, and has become a highly precise art. There are 
currently a vast number of meters and other kinds of reflective devices that are 
distributed across gas’s circulatory paths and that work to measure the gas’s 
various ontological facets moment-by-moment. There are sensors to measure 
gas flow; sensors to measure gas pressure; sensors to measure temperature; 
complex chromatography units that measure its chemical specification; gas 
detectors that detect its presence. Every property that is connected to the gas 
system has a domestic gas meter installed to measure the volume of gas that is 
consumed within that place of residence. Added to these mechanical devices, 
there are also millions of human noses that belong to members of the UK 
public that have been called upon to detect gas leaks by inserting artificial 
odorants into the gas. Some of these noses have even been specially trained 
to assess the intensity of the gas’s odour94. Engineers will also look to record 
other indirect traces of gaseous phenomena, from lathering household 
detergent onto exposed pipes to detect the presence of gas and the location 
																																																						
94 Rhinology training was also provided at DNV-GL’s Flow Centre in Chilton. Rhinologists are 
trained to detect variances in the strength of the artificial odorants that are added to gas 
circulations. 
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of leaks, to looking for areas of faded grass that might indicate where gas is 
escaping from outside of properties95. New sensory technologies are also 
being continually developed, including fibre optics, within-pipe mobile camera 
units, and new varieties of flow meters96. 
 
This plethora of reflective devices has been employed to break down aspects 
of gas’s ontological configuration at given moments in time and to provide 
indications of how that gas will behave in the future. Like blueprints, they thus 
provide a means of visualizing gas’s field of possibilities, albeit within a highly 
specific spatio-temporal context. The vast majority of these devices (pressure 
sensors, temperature sensors, flow meters, and chromatography units) focus on 
gas’s constantly-changing relations of interiority. Chromatography units, for 
example, provide a particularly clear illustration of the way that gas’s relations 
of interiority are rendered knowable and actionable in near to real-time. They 
are installed at the entry points and off takes of the NTS, and their purpose is 
to break down the gas into its constitutive chemical components, thereby 
enabling the relative quantities of each material within the gas to be assessed. 
Whilst natural gas is primarily made up of methane, it typically also contains 
varying amounts of other gases such as oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen, hydrogen 
sulphide, carbon dioxide, and carbon monoxide. It might also contain other 
materials in vaporous states such as higher-level alkanes (ethane, propane, 
butane), sulphur and water. Differences in the concentrations of each of these 
chemicals can dramatically change its material qualities and can introduce a 
range of potential opportunities and threats. Increases in hydrogen sulphide, 
																																																						
95 Data for this point came from interviews with a former emergency repair engineer for 
Northern Gas Networks in 2014, and with the former network operations director from 
Northern Gas Networks in 2015. It is additionally supported by a range of archival material, 
such as British Gas's (1986)guide; “A Guide to Vegetation and Tree Surveys”. 
96 I encountered many of these new technologies first-hand during my visits to industry 
expositions (these included the expositions at the International Pipeline Conference 2014, in 
Calgary, Canada, and the IGEM Annual Conference 2014, in Loughborough, UK). 
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for instance, can make the gas highly corrosive and toxic to human bodies97, 
and any change in chemical composition will also alter the gas’s energy 
content. Changes in energy content can similarly affect consumer safety, either 
dramatically increasing the size of flames that are emitted from domestic 
appliances, or causing the gas to burn inefficiently, with poisonous carbon 
monoxide being produced as a result98. Furthermore, such alterations can 
affect the gas’s affordability, due to the way that the price of gas that is paid by 
consumers is typically fixed. Energy-rich gas will cost suppliers potential 
revenue, whilst low energy gas will mean that consumers receive less heat than 
they are paying for99.  
 
Indeed, it is for these reasons that the Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 
(GS(M)R, 1996) are enforced by the UK parliament. The GS(M)R stipulate the 
precise chemical specifications to which all transported natural gas in the UK 
should adhere100, and they state that any “person who conveys gas in a 
network must ensure that suitable and sufficient tests are carried out to ensure 
that the gas conforms with [these] requirements” (GS(M)R, 1996: 8: 5). 
Chromatography provides a means to conduct these tests.  
 
Conceptually, the practice of chromatography is interesting, for through it 
natural gas’s relations of interiority are broken down through the production of 
a series of traces that enable aspects of its fields of possibilities to be mapped 
																																																						
97 Hydrogen sulfide is particularly problematic if it enters gas streams due to the fact that it is 
not consumed when burnt. As gas is burned within domestic appliances therefore, the 
hydrogen sulfide contained within natural gas will simply pass through the appliance and into 
properties, potentially poisoning consumers (Interview, operations supervisor for St. Fergus gas 
processing terminal, Shell, 2015).  
98 This is because the burners on all domestic appliances are calibrated to efficiently burn a 
particular specification of gas - the specification typical of gas produced domestically, in the 
North Sea (Interview, former network operations director, Northern Gas Networks, 2015). 
99 Interview, emergency operations manager, National Grid (2014). 
100 These specifications were based on the chemical profile of gas from domestic reserves in 
the North Sea (Interview, operations supervisor for St. Fergus gas processing terminal, Shell, 
2015). 
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out in relational ‘snapshots’. These snapshots are then compared to blueprints 
of gas’s known possible formations, and the phenomena that they can help 
bring into being. The GS(M)R constitutes one such set of blueprints. Within it, 
we can see gas’s possible chemical associations having been already mapped 
out, and their various consequences assessed. Certain forms of chemical 
configuration have accordingly been regulated against, due to the way that 
they are regarded as leading to particular kinds of threatening phenomena. Yet 
these actions can only be employed to perform gas as secure when they are 
used in conjunction with the snapshots of its ongoing ontological 
configurations that are produced through chromatography units. 
Chromatography thus provides a means through which to identify the chemical 
associations that make up gas’s relations of interiority at a particular moment in 
time, and can therefore enable operators to identify the potential emergence 
of particular forms of gaseous phenomena whilst in the process of their 
emergent becoming. From this comparison, action can then be taken to 
manipulate gas’s relations so as to manage the phenomena that come into 
being.  
 
Whilst the majority of the reflective devices that are employed across the UK’s 
gas networks are concerned with visualizing gas’s relations of interiority, a 
number of practices are employed to also map out gas’s relations of exteriority 
at particular moments in time. A good example of this is provided by the use 
of portable ‘Gascoseeker’ gas detectors101. These are used by maintenance 
engineers to detect the presence of gas and its explosivity, typically following a 
gas leak. They work by sampling gaseous components in an atmosphere and 
assessing their relative atmospheric ratios. Not only can they identify when 
natural gas is present in a volumetric space (thereby enabling the spatial extent 
																																																						
101 This is the most commonly used brand of gas detectors within the UK gas transport industry. 
Data used in this example comes from conversations with Gas Measurement Instrument 
Limited employees at an exposition at the IGEM annual conference, 2014, and from their 
company website (www.gmiuk.com). 
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of a gaseous volume to be assessed) but they also provide a quantitative 
assessment of the relationships of exteriority that exist between the methane in 
natural gas and the oxygen in the air.  
 
This relationship is extremely important for gas engineers and emergency 
responders, for methane has become known through previous mapping 
exercises to become explosive when it enters into a specific kind of 
relationship with oxygen. In order for methane to explode, it must constitute 
between 5% and 15% of a given atmosphere, whilst the remainder must 
consist of air102. The Gascoseeker detector is thus designed to assess this 
relationship and to render it perceivable by mapping the relations between 
these gases via a digital dial on its LCD screen.  
 
Gascoseeker detectors are thus employed to render certain of gas’s relations 
of exteriority visible through the production of particular kinds of ‘snapshot’. By 
then comparing these snapshots to stabilized gaseous knowledges, actions can 
be taken to apprehend particular phenomena in the midst of their emergent 
becoming. With the case of Gascoseekers, this may involve the evacuation of 
individuals from affected or nearby property. In this way, gas may be 
prevented from developing the relations of exteriority necessary for it to take 
human life. In very severe situations where the concentration of methane within 
a property is extremely high however (and therefore where the concentration 
of methane is well above its explosive limit), governing actions also may 
involve warning responders to not immediately open doors or windows, for 
fear of letting in oxygen and bringing the gas back within a range in which it 
could realize its explosive agency103. 
 
																																																						
102 Interview, Resilience Manager, Durham and Darlington Fire and Rescue Service, 2015. 
103 Site visit, RAF Spadeadam, 2014. 
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In these ways, we can therefore see a series of attempts being made to 
produce rapid snapshots of gas’s immediate relations of interiority and 
exteriority through the deployment of a series of reflective devices. From 
consulting these snapshots and comparing them to existing blueprints of gas’s 
possible relations, attempts can also be seen to be made to facilitate, cancel 
out, or compensate for, particular kinds of gaseous phenomena, whilst they are 
in the midst of their emergent becoming. 
 
Rendering Gas More Easily Actionable 
 
In the developments that have taken place in practices of producing gaseous 
snapshots across the UK gas industry over the last 200 years, we can also 
observe attempts to expand the forms of action that can be taken upon 
circulations of natural gas by enhancing the quality of the relational snapshots 
that are produced. The quality of these snapshots, I suggest, can be broken 
down into three constitutive parts; their accuracy, reliability, and speed. The 
first of these – accuracy – concerns the degree of discrepancy between how 
gas is depicted to be circulating, and how it is actually moving at that given 
moment in space and time. Reducing these discrepancies, I argue, is key to 
effectively rendering moving gas actionable, for in order to confidently take 
particular forms of action upon the gas, it is necessary to know that the 
visualisations created of gas’s associations actually reflect gas’s ontological 
composition at that moment in time. 
 
During my fieldwork, I witnessed numerous efforts to improve the accuracy 
with which gaseous traces could be produced. The clearest example of this can 
be seen in the meticulous attention and care that is paid to the development 
and maintenance of orifice meters. This type of flow meter is just one of many 
that are deployed across UK gas networks to track the volume of gas that is 
flowing through particular pipes at given moments. Their primary role is to 
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enable gas to be rendered financially accountable, and to enable financial 
transactions to be conducted surrounding the circulation of natural gas.  
 
Operationally, these meters work by enabling a comparison to be made 
between the pressure readings that are collected at either side of a perforated 
plate that is inserted into the gas stream. This perforation, or ‘orifice’, must 
possess extremely specific dimensions in order for accurate assessments of 
gas’s flow to be produced. Even tiny alterations to its edge sharpness, bevel 
angle, or surface roughness can dramatically alter the amount of gas that 
travels through it, and this can significantly interfere with the accuracy of the 
snapshots that are created. To address this, orifice plates are designed to 
exacting specifications104, and in recognition of the fact that they may become 
damaged over time and their accuracy change105, they are typically inspected 
annually. Such inspections are extremely meticulous. During a visit to a DNV-
GL’s flow centre in Chilton, County Durham (a facility that provides meter 
testing, calibration and certification services), I had the opportunity to observe 
first-hand the thoroughness of this process. 
 
“The engineer gingerly handled the steel disks with cotton gloves. He rested them on 
a perfectly flat table made of marble. The cooling properties of the marble apparently 
allowed the plate’s heat to equalise across its surface, rendering any warping 
observable to the human eye. Using the flatness of the marble counter as a guide, he 
inspected the cooled plate for warps, searching for any indication of a change in its 
curvature. He then placed it under a microscope and pored over its surface at length, 
searching for microscopic changes in its smoothness. Eventually, he mounted the 
plate in a projector that cast a magnified silhouette of the plate’s profile onto a 
technical drawing of the plate of the same scale. Against these drawings, he then 
compared the plate’s shadow, searching for minute discrepancies that could influence 
																																																						
104 European Standard, BS EN ISO 5167-2: 2003. 
105 Such changes are typically caused by debris suspended within gas flows colliding with 
orifice plates. 
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the accuracy of the meter’s reading” (Extract from field notes, site visit, DNV-GL Flow 
Centre, 2015).  
 
One of the reasons for employing such exacting methods is that, as the 
calibration engineer explained, “in every little step there is an element of 
error”. The consequence of this is that inaccuracies can thus accumulate across 
the entirety of the transmission and distribution systems, and such 
accumulation can potentially lead to the distance between gas’s actual 
ontological configuration at a particular point in space and time and the 
snapshots that are produced of it, widening dramatically. As a senior engineer 
from National Grid who is involved with assessing fiscal metering inaccuracies 
on the NTS put it;  
 
“uncertainty is often fine [in one component] …but [the gas network] is a combination 
of many individual components. […] Each one has its own allowed uncertainty” 
(Interview, Senior Engineer, National Grid, 2015) 
 
This increasing distortion can have considerable impacts for the forms of 
gaseous phenomena that can emerge, and for the way that action can (or 
rather, cannot) be taken upon them.  Even on a single meter, the 
consequences of inaccuracies can be enormous. Minor dents, buckling or 
warping in orifice plates can potentially result in millions of pounds of lost 
revenue106, and when inaccuracies are added up over the whole system, the 
amount of revenue lost can be extremely significant. Indeed, between 2015 
and 2016, a total of 2765 GWh of gas (approximately £88 million) was 
estimated to have gone unaccounted for (National Grid, 2016)107. Whilst no 
direct danger is presented to individuals (gas has not escaped the system), the 
costs are passed on to consumers, and this can affect the affordability of the 
																																																						
106 Conversation, calibration engineer, DNV-GL Flow Centre, 2015. 
107 This represents less than 1% of total annual gas flow, but due to the vast quantity of gas 
transported across the UK each year, this amount remains financially significant. 
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gas for members of the public. Metering inaccuracies have consequently 
become a source of concern for the UK government’s industry regulator, 
OFGEM (the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets), and have recently resulted 
in the publication of a series of incentives designed to encourage gas 
companies to reduce the amount of gas that goes unaccounted for (OFGEM, 
2016).  
 
The second means through which attempts are made to improve the quality of 
gaseous snapshots concerns their reliability. Reliability refers here to the 
consistency with which these sensors produce snapshots of a particular quality. 
Whilst a flow meter might typically produce extremely accurate readings, if it 
only does so for some of the time then its snapshots are much more difficult for 
governing actors to take action upon. In this scenario, a meter that reliably 
produces less accurate traces might be preferable108. Efforts have thus been 
taken to both improve the reliability with which snapshots are produced, and 
to provide means to assess the reliability of these devices from a distance, 
without gas flow being interrupted in the process109. Modern ultrasonic flow 
meters embody both of these agendas. Not only are they extremely reliable, 
but they also send back a range of diagnostic data to network operators 
alongside each snapshot that they produce. This data relates to a wide range 
of different aspects of meter readings (as can be seen in figure 7), and these 
readings can then be used to assess whether the meter is functioning correctly, 
and whether the snapshots produced can be relied upon to inform any 
subsequent actions to be taken upon the gas. This reliability is also enhanced 
by the analysis of the data being automated, for should the uncertainty with 
which these snapshots are produced exceed a certain limit, an alarm will be 
triggered that will alert the operator and warn them that the data transmitted is 
																																																						
108 Site visit – DNV-GL Flow Centre, 2015. 
109 In order to undertake work on a pipeline and remove a meter for testing, it is often 
necessary to redirect gas flow (Interview, senior engineer, National Grid, 2015). 
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no longer reliable. As such, the operator can proceed in confidence that, 
unless an alarm sounds, the snapshots of gas’s flow rates that are recorded by 
these meters are reliable and can be safely acted upon110. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Image of an ultrasonic flow meter's diagnostics report (SICK Ltd., 2015) 
 
 
The final means through which attempts are made to improve the quality of 
gaseous snapshots concerns the speed with which they are produced. During 
my fieldwork, I observed numerous cases in which attempts had been made to 
reduce the amount of time between the production, delivery and interpretation 
of consecutive snapshots, and the moments of gas’s transformation or 
withdrawal. Within such attempts, the goal was to create a system of reflective 
devices through which users could identify emergent gaseous phenomena and 
render gas’s relations actionable quickly enough for action to be taken upon 
them before particular phenomena could fully actualize. 
 
The clearest example of these kinds of attempt can again be observed in the 
practice of chromatography. By comparing the contemporary use of 
chromatography to its deployment in the governance of town gas, we can see 
that the speed at which snapshots of gas’s chemical constitution are produced 
has accelerated dramatically. From these increases in speed, we can also 
																																																						
110 Site visit – DNV-GL Flow Centre, 2015. 
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observe the emergence of a variety of new forms of possible securing action 
that were not available during the governance of town gas. 
 
Like with natural gas today, chromatography in the past was used to measure 
the levels of harmful chemical materials that were contained within the gas, 
and to assess its energy content111. Composition was measured straight after its 
manufacture, and these measurements enabled network operators to alter the 
manufacturing process in order to produce gas that was safer and more 
profitable. In its early usage however, these kinds of chromatography practices 
were laboratory based, and involved the gas being passed through a series of 
scientific apparatuses to create a range of qualitative and quantitative traces. 
Calorific value (a measure of the gas’s energy content) was assessed through 
the use of a calorimeter (see figure 8)112. Hydrogen sulphide (a toxic chemical 
that could harm consumers) was detected through a device that passed the 
gas through a glass chamber containing lead acetate sheets (if any sheets 
visibly blackened, hydrogen sulphide was deemed to be present - see figure 
9), and a separate device was used to collect information on the carbon 
dioxide, carbon monoxide, and hydrogen components contained within the 
gas (see figure 10)113.  
 
																																																						
111 In the case of town gas however, the measurement of energy content was largely 
conducted to assess the efficiency with which gas was being manufactured. The less efficient 
this process, the more the gas cost the gas company to produce (Smith, 1945).  
112 This worked by recording the quantity of gas required to raise the temperature of 1kg of 
water by 1°C (Smith, 1945). 
113 This apparatus worked by forcing the gas to intra-act with caustic soda, oxygen and heat 
within separate reaction chambers (visible in figure 11). Through measuring the products of 
these reactions, the presence and approximate volumes of each constituent gas could be 
estimated. 
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Figure 8 - Photograph of a town gas 'calorimeter' (Fakenham Gas Museum, 2014) 
 
	
 
Figure 9 - Photograph of the apparatus used for detecting hydrogen sulphide in town gas 
(Fakenham Gas Museum, 2014) 
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Figure 10 - Photograph of the apparatus used for analyzing the chemistry of town gas 
(Fakenham Gas Museum, 2014) 
 
These experiments took a considerable amount of time to complete – a matter 
exacerbated by their multiple steps often being overseen by a single operator. 
They were also typically only conducted periodically throughout the day, 
meaning that any alterations in gas’s quality between these periods would 
evade visualization (a matter made worse by the fact that fluctuations in gas 
quality were very common in the production of town gas due to the imprecise 
nature of the gas’s manufacture). Combined, these two characteristics led to 
production of snapshots that often did not represent gas’s fields of possibilities 
particularly accurately, and which were also often produced too slowly to 
prevent sizable quantities of poor quality, and often toxic, gas from entering 
the distribution networks114. Speed was therefore significant for gas’s 
																																																						
114 The data drawn on here comes from a site visit to Fakenham town gas museum in 2014, and 
from archival research at the National Gas Archives in Warrington. Additional archival material 
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visualization and governance, both in terms of the time that it took to produce 
these snapshots, and in terms of the frequency with which snapshots could be 
produced. 
 
Today, the length of time between the production of snapshots and the 
moment when gas actually possessed these compositions has been 
dramatically reduced. Automated chromatography units are fitted to the NTS 
at all of its entry and exit points, and through the use of attached computers, 
these units break the gas down into its multiple constitutive chemical 
components and transmit the data to network operators. Different constituent 
gases take slightly different amounts of time to pass through an internal 
column, and such differences enable their identification. A quick reading by a 
modern chromatography unit will now identify gas’s internal structure in less 
than 2 minutes115, and it will also repeatedly test the gas at very short intervals, 
providing rapid updates on changes in the gas’s composition.  
 
These improvements to the speed with which snapshots are produced have 
had considerable benefits. Whilst natural gas cannot be governed by adjusting 
its manufacturing process116, it can be governed by amending the way that it is 
																																																																																																																																																														
was sourced from the library of the National Gas Museum in Leicester, and from the library at 
Fakenham town gas museum. 
115 Interestingly, different chromatography units will be used for different applications. Whilst 
certain units will be used to produce quick snapshots of gas’s chemical composition, other 
units will be employed to produce more accurate traces; a process that can take up to 20 
minutes (Interview, senior engineer, National Grid, 2015). 
116 Whilst gas is no longer manufactured, its composition is still measured for similar reasons. 
As described to me during an interview with an operations supervisor at Shell’s St. Fergus gas 
processing plant in 2015, natural gas can still contain toxic components depending upon the 
gas field it has been extracted from. A question of efficiency also still enters its governance. 
Because the price of gas that is paid by consumers is typically fixed, sudden increases in gas’s 
energy content will mean that these consumers receive more energy for their money, at the 
cost of producers. Additionally, changes in gas’s composition present further kinds of health 
risks to consumers. As described to me within my interviews with the emergency operations 
manager from National Grid in 2014, and with the former network operations director of 
Northern Gas Networks in 2015, because the gas appliances that are used by UK consumers 
are all calibrated to burn a certain specification of gas, fluctuations in its composition can result 
in dangerously exaggerated flames, or in its inefficient combustion (which could potentially 
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processed prior to its entry into the NTS. Off-specification gas can also be 
denied entry to the NTS by closing the valves that separate processing 
terminals from NTS entry points. Time is critical within these actions, for every 
minute that passes involves the inclusion of greater volumes of undesirable gas 
entering the system. A small amount of this gas can be tolerated, for it will 
simply mix with the large volume of gas that meets GS(M)R specifications that 
is already in the system. As the emergency operations manager at National 
Grid explained;  
 
“If it does enter the NTS, then it is not the end of the world. We’ll blend it. There’s 
plenty of gas in the pipeline that’s on spec, and you know, you can blend that quite 
easily. Which is why we have, you know, we give them say, five minutes once we have 
realised that’s happened. You’ve breached, then you’re off” (Interview, emergency 
operations manager, National Grid, 2014)  
 
The speed with which fluctuations in gas quality can be identified and 
responded to is thus important in this process, for if the amount of undesirable 
gas entering the system can be kept within certain limits, then its threatening 
agency can be nullified, or cancelled out. If too much off-specification gas 
enters the NTS however, then the impacts of this gas could range from it 
poisoning consumers to it causing advanced corrosion within transmission and 
distribution pipes (not to mention heavy financial penalties being placed upon 
the network operator by OFGEM)117. As such, speed has become a major focus 
within chromatography practices, to the extent that it is not just the time that it 
takes to produce snapshots or the frequency with which they can be produced 
that has become the focus of improvement, but also the speed with which 
																																																																																																																																																														
lead to the poisoning of consumers due to the production of carbon monoxide). The 
specification that these appliances were calibrated to was initially developed based on the 
chemical profile of natural gas as extracted from domestic gas reserves in the North Sea and, 
due to these potential implications, it is now legally enforced according to the UK's Gas Safety 
(Management) Regulations (1996). 
117 Interview, emergency operations manager, National Grid, 2015. 
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these visualizations can be interpreted and responded to. As the emergency 
operation manager continued; 
 
“So we have rate of change alarms. So if something started to shift, away from what it 
was doing, that rate of change and how quickly it is changing would trigger an alarm. 
You will see something is happening. Then you have tiers, so […] we will pick up the 
phone [to speak to the gas processing terminal operator] and go ‘what’s happening?’ 
Then there is a warning, 'if you don’t do something about this now, you are going to 
be off’, and then if it breaches, we will take them off. And we will tell them we’re 
going to shut you down now” (Interview, emergency operations manager, National 
Grid, 2014)  
 
What is being described here is not just an attempt to respond to rapid 
changes to gas’s chemical composition, but also an attempt to improve the 
speed with which alterations in gas’s relations of interiority can be identified 
and addressed. By sounding an alarm at the moment that these relations begin 
to change, operators are forced to immediately acknowledge changes in gas’s 
composition and to accordingly undertake responsive action. As such, through 
improving the frequency with which traces are produced, by reducing the time 
that it takes to produce these traces, and by lowering the length of time 
between the production of these traces and the deployment of responsive 
action, the temporal distance between the production of these traces and the 
transformation of gas into new forms is reduced, and through these 
improvements, new kinds of political intervention have been made available, 
enabling emergent phenomena to be arrested in advance of their actualisation. 
 
Along these three trajectories – accuracy, reliability, and speed – attempts have 
therefore been made to improve the quality of the relational snapshots that are 
produced of gas as it travels across UK gas transport networks. Each of these 
improvements to how gas’s dynamic relations and fields of contingent 
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possibilities ae visualized has also involved the opening up of new forms of 
possible securing action that can be taken upon circulations of natural gas. 
 
Reflective Apparatuses 
 
The final aspect of gas’s systematic rendering actionable regards the 
development of a specialized reflective apparatus through which multiple 
snapshots of gas’s ontological facets are produced and are reflected back to 
centralized points of interpretation. Again, the image of the bike with multiple 
wing mirrors is useful here, for it is through the aggregation of a multiplicity of 
reflective devices, their precise angling, and the careful positioning of an 
observer, that attempts can be seen to be made to bring more of the gas’s 
field of possible relations into view at any one moment, and that new forms of 
action are made available to govern the circulation of gas. I wish to illustrate 
this point in the following paragraphs through a discussion of the role of the 
remote telemetry devices and supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) systems that are currently employed within the UK’s gas transport 
networks.  
 
Remote telemetry entails the digital transfer of snapshots of gas’s relations 
over private data networks. This typically involves the installation of 
computational systems alongside the various sensors that take snapshots of 
gas’s different ontological facets across pipeline networks. These computers 
then process each sensor’s data and transmit it over a private data network. 
The data is then received and collated by network-connected SCADA systems. 
These systems can be contained within network control rooms, but they may 
also be remotely accessible via portable network-connected computers that 
are controlled by network operators. These SCADA systems provide a means 
of aggregating multiple gaseous snapshots and of assembling them in a way 
that visualizes gaseous traces in a more coherent manner, enabling gas’s field 
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of possibilities within a given moment in time to be more comprehensively 
surveyed by a single operator. Typically, this involves the translation of these 
snapshots into more easily interpretable forms through the application of 
graphical user interfaces118.  
 
Added to the visualization tools that are provided by these systems, they can 
also enable various aspects of gas transport networks to be controlled from a 
distance. Telemetry devices can be installed to remotely manage the functions 
of different assets dispersed across these networks (such as gas compressor 
turbines, emergency shut off valves and pressure regulators), and SCADA 
systems can make the control of these devices remotely available to specific 
users. As a result, not only have attempts been made to construct a system 
through which gas can be rendered knowable as it circulates, but this 
architecture has also been designed to enable a variety of governing actions to 
be performed remotely in relation to these visualizations.  
 
The benefits of creating complex apparatuses such as these becomes apparent 
when we consider how gas has been historically governed in the UK 
transmission and distribution networks, prior to the application of such 
systems. As the former network operations director for Northern Gas Networks 
reflected in relation to previous practices of corrosion monitoring; 
 
“if you have got mobile technology feeding back into a computer system, that 
analyses the data, and says well look, you don’t need to worry about that 90%, but 
you do need to go and look at this one. Well you never had that. That’s 
significant…one guy is now managing all of that, and that’s due to mobile technology. 
[…] There’s not a lot you can do with a single reading!” (Interview, former Network 
Director, Northern Gas Networks, 2015) 
																																																						
118 Data for this example comes from visits to national and regional network control rooms for 
the UK gas transport networks, and from conversations with SCADA manufacturing companies 
at the International Pipeline Conference in Calgary, 2014. 
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Here, he makes reference to how pipeline networks constitute sprawling, 
rhizomatic infrastructures that spread across wide geographical areas. Without 
a means of aggregating the snapshots that are produced across these 
networks, sensors have to be individually visited, interpreted and assessed. 
Due to their wide distribution, the manual assessment of these sensors would 
be a highly time-intensive task that involves very long intervals between 
successive checks, regardless of how frequently the sensor itself may be able 
to take readings. By automatically aggregating traces and reflecting them 
towards a central point however, gas and its associations can be made 
humanly intelligible in a way that overcomes their spatial and temporal 
incoherence. In this example, this coherence enables action to be taken upon 
corrosion that could not have been undertaken previously. Instead of corrosion 
monitoring stations having to be checked in person, and long periods of time 
consequently passing between sensor readings (a situation that would increase 
the risk of avoidable failures), corrosion on these gas systems can often now be 
monitored across their geographical extents quickly and with minimal effort, 
significantly lowering the risk of major gas escapes. 
 
Yet there are also limits to the extent to which it is possible to effectively 
construct these kinds of reflective architectures. For example, the vast 
geographical extent of these gas networks makes assembling nation-wide 
reflective devices that can precisely locate and render gas escapes intelligible 
both a technologically and economically unfeasible endeavour. Gas could 
escape from any point on any pipe across these systems, and many thousands 
of sensors would have to be deployed to reliably reflect actionable traces of 
leaks back to network operators. On the NTS, this is not such an issue, for as 
was explained to me by the senior engineer from National Grid, the periodic 
measurement of gas pressure, combined with the high pressures that this gas 
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is transported at, mean that any escape on this system will likely be large, and 
will therefore show up on near to real-time pressure maps (the linear design of 
NTS pipes means that any sudden drop in pressure will be observable through 
the difference between one pressure sensor’s reading and the readings of the 
other sensors upstream or downstream from it)119. In distribution networks 
however, pipelines are more rhizomatic, and gas pressures are generally much 
lower. This means that locating gas leaks remotely through pressure sensors is 
a nearly impossible premise. The cost of installing sensors to automatically 
detect leaks is also unfeasibly large considering the relatively small volume of 
gas that passes through each individual pipe120.  
 
To address this, gas’s governing actors have taken an alternative approach. By 
imbuing the natural gas with a humanly sensible affect by adding an artificial 
odorant, the gas is made able to affect human bodies in a more direct and 
consistent manner. By also educating members of the public regarding its 
smell and of its hazardous potential121, an attempt has been made to 
incorporate the millions of human bodies that are distributed across the UK 
into the reflective apparatus that surrounds natural gas’s circulation. Gaseous 
traces that are detected by these bodies are then similarly relayed to operators 
through a centralised gas emergency service helpline122, and through this 
telephone network, reports of gas’s escape can therefore be aggregated and 
mapped, and action can be taken upon the escaping gas.  
 
																																																						
119 You would expect to observe pressure decay being read by these sensors, too – otherwise 
the reading is likely to be due to a failure with the sensor, rather than the pipe itself (Interview, 
senior engineer, National Grid, 2015). 
120 As the health, safety and environment manager at Northern Gas Networks explained to me, 
it might be possible to observe a very big escape by consulting the pressure readings on the 
SCADA systems used by distribution networks, but this cannot be relied upon. 
121 Such public awareness campaigns have included television advertisements, posters, and 
even the distribution of ‘scratch and sniff’ cards, such as the one attached in Appendix D. 
122 This helpline is run by National Grid. In a gas emergency, call: +44(0)800 111 999. 
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Yet despite the enrolment of these human bodies, gas’s escape still highlights 
one of the major problems with such kinds of reflective apparatus: namely that, 
for gas to be governed most effectively, it has to be situated within the 
apparatus’s limited field of vision. Because reflective devices need to be 
carefully angled to convey their readings to a centralised point and to render 
natural gas more spatio-temporally coherent, they are not particularly well-
suited for visualizing gas that has escaped their focal points. Indeed, once gas 
has left a pipe, the number of facets of its ontological structure that can be 
visualized, and the efficacy with which it can be rendered coherent, is severely 
reduced. As a result, the forms of action that can be deployed upon gas are 
limited. Once it escapes the pipeline network, it becomes irretrievable. It rises 
into the atmosphere and mixes with other gaseous materials in ways that 
prevent its subsequent commercialization. 
 
Yet these limitations do not render gas completely impossible to take action 
upon. For whilst gas’s smell, for example, may only permit its detection, from 
the interpretation of snapshots of only this aspect, several extremely important 
governing actions may emerge – from the shutting off of gas flows at 
emergency valves, to the ventilation of properties, the evacuation of bodies, 
and the notification and deployment of engineers to repair the governing 
apparatus. Other traces may also be collected in the event of an escape. 
Handheld gas detectors may, for example, be deployed to locate the presence 
of gas and its atmospheric concentration, and from these assessments, new 
forms of action, including pipeline repairs, evacuation, or controlled ventilation 
may be made possible. Again, in a similar way, hazardous phenomena such as 
the loss of life may be cancelled out. Other sensors such as FLIR123 cameras 
(used by fire service personnel to render methane clouds visible in real time) 
																																																						
123 “Forward Looking Infrared Radiometer”. 
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and atmospheric modelling software such as ChemMET and FireMET124 may 
also be used to assess gas’s contingent relational associations and to thereby 
take informed action upon it.  
 
We can therefore observe within these latter examples, a number of attempts 
to produce a provisional reflective architecture. A series of mobile devices are 
deployed in the event of a gas escape, and actors swell around the gas to 
create an apparatus through which facets of gas’s ontological structure are 
rendered knowable and actionable. The extent to which escaped gas can be 
accounted for within these apparatuses is much more limited than it was within 
the more rigid gas network, however. As the gas cannot be held still within the 
focal ranges of these devices, the traces that are produced are limited in terms 
of their variety, accuracy, reliability, frequency and speed. As a result, natural 
gas becomes far less coherent in the event of the escape, and the capacities of 
governing assemblages to control its movement and agency are severely 
reduced. This typically results in a shift in the modes of governance that are 
employed in relation to gas. Rather than controlling natural gas’s circulation 
and manipulating practically every aspect of its known circulatory qualities to 
pursue various agendas such as safety, or the security of supply, governance 
practices are forced to shift to a mode of threat mitigation in which efforts are 
instead directed at simply preventing the emergence of worst-case scenarios, 
and limiting the extent of gas’s negative affects.  
 
We can therefore observe the formation of various kinds of complex security 
apparatus that have been carefully constructed around circulations of natural 
gas. These apparatuses have been specifically designed to reflect aspects of 
																																																						
124 CheMET and FireMET are two different software systems supplied by the MET Office for use 
by the emergency services. CheMET is used for modelling the dispersion of chemical releases, 
and FireMET is used for immediately assessing weather conditions and their relationships with 
chemical releases, whilst full CheMET reports are being developed (Interview, Resilience 
Manager, Durham and Darlington Fire and Rescue Service, 2015). 
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gas’s momentary ontological configurations back to centralized points of 
observation whilst the gas circulates, and in this way, they enable gas’s effects 
to be rendered more-or-less coherent, and action to be taken upon it. By 
comparing the visualizations of gas that are produced through these 
apparatuses to already established knowledges, or ‘blueprints’ of gas’s known 
possible relations, I have demonstrated how attempts can be made to 
facilitate, cancel out, or compensate for particular forms of gaseous 
phenomena.  
 
I have also described in this section however, how the inflexibility of these 
apparatuses can result in gas that escapes their gaze rapidly losing coherence 
and human intelligibility, a situation that can lead to natural gas becoming 
more difficult to take action upon and to control. Whilst I have discussed the 
way that attempts may be made to assemble provisional architectures around 
escaping gas and to render aspects of it known, I have also demonstrated how 
these architectures, perhaps unsurprisingly, cannot produce the clarity of 
visualization that more rigid infrastructural apparatuses can. They are therefore 
necessarily limited in the forms of governing action that they make available. 
 
V. Conclusion: Creating Coherence 
 
In this chapter, I have described how a security apparatus has been 
constructed to render a moving gaseous target actionable through a series of 
specialized knowledge practices. This apparatus has been shown to have been 
designed specifically around the challenging materialities that are presented 
by natural gas; namely, the ways in which its invisibility, intangibility, and 
natural odorlessness have resulted in it typically only becoming humanly 
intelligible in a spatially and temporally incoherent manner. I then described 
how this apparatus seeks to render gas’s humanly-intelligible affects more-or-
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less coherent over time and space in ways that enable a variety of securing 
actions to be taken upon it.  
 
Gas has been shown to be rendered actionable principally through two sets of 
practices. Firstly, attempts have been made to construct ‘blueprints’ of gas’s 
spaces of possibility. Drawing upon DeLanda (2013), I have described how 
humanly-intelligible traces of gaseous affects have been systematically 
produced through techniques such as experiments, investigations, simulations, 
and speculations, and I have shown how, through the analysis of these traces, 
the relationships between gas and other elements – and the way that these 
associations can contribute to the emergence of particular gaseous 
phenomena – have been identified. I have demonstrated how the lines of 
contingency that lead to particular phenomena have come to be systematically 
translated into more-or-less stable maps, or ‘blueprints’, of its field of possible 
relations, and I have described how these maps can be seen to take various 
forms, including government legislation, scientific papers, investigation reports, 
and industry standards. Through the creation of such blueprints, I have 
suggested that we can understand aspects of gas’s ontological constitution to 
be rendered humanly intelligible and more-or-less spatio-temporally coherent 
in ways that allow for different forms of action to be taken upon gas’s relations 
in the present in order to facilitate, cancel out, or compensate for, the 
emergence of particular future gaseous phenomena. 
 
The second way that gas has been shown to have been rendered actionable 
via this apparatus is through the production of gaseous ‘snapshots’. These 
snapshots are similar to blueprints in that they also involve attempts to map 
out gas’s fields of possible associations and the forms of gaseous phenomena 
that could emerge. Yet unlike blueprints, snapshots involve attempts to 
visualize gas’s different associations as they are in the process of their 
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becoming. By then comparing these snapshots to blueprints, the forms of 
agency that are presently available, or are likely to soon become available to 
the gas, can be identified and acted upon. In this way, gaseous futures are 
rendered actionable in the present, with actions being taken upon the gas and 
its constitutive associations whilst it is in motion, and as it transforms across its 
circulatory journeys. These forms of contingent relational association, and the 
kinds of emergent phenomena that can develop during gas’s circulation, form 
the focus of the following two chapters. 
 
Finally, I argued that the visualizations produced of gas’s emergent agency 
across its circulatory journeys, and the forms of actions that can accordingly be 
taken upon the gas, have been further expanded through the construction of a 
complex reflective apparatus that has been built around gas’s circulatory 
routes. This apparatus, I have argued, is specifically designed to transmit 
gaseous snapshots back to particular centralized points of observation in a way 
that renders the gas and its immediate relations more-or-less spatio-temporally 
coherent, and which allows action to be taken upon gas at a distance. 
 
In these different ways, I have attended to the specificities of natural gas’s 
material qualities as they appear throughout its circulation, and I have explored 
how these qualities are productive of a highly particular set of knowledge 
practices and securing actions that have been assembled around the gas to 
render it actionable at different points in space and time. In the next chapter, 
we stay with these qualities. I describe how the manner in which gas circulates 
as it travels between nodal points also assumes particular qualities that have 
implications for the forms of risk and opportunity that can be seen to become 
associated with its transport, and that have necessitated particular kinds of 
security practice to be employed across its circulatory journeys. 
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5 
 
Beyond (Pipe)lines: Complicating Circulations 
and their Governance  
 
 
 
“One striking characteristic of such movements, and the paths they create, is that they 
are nearly always winding and hardly ever straight”  
Ingold (2011; 129) “Footprints through the Weather-World”  
 
“Look from above at a penny on a table, then lower your gaze. The circle becomes an 
oval, squishing gradually until, as your eye reaches the table level, only a straight line 
remains” 
Sousanis (2015; 22) “Unflattening” 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Having examined the way that gas circulations are rendered actionable 
through the deployment of a complex reflective apparatus that surrounds its 
circulatory routes, I now turn to explore the ways that the circulatory qualities 
of gas – the ways in which it circulates – are productive of particular forms of 
risk and opportunity, and become the focus of security’s practice. 
 
Stretching out across the earth’s surface, pipelines are typically imagined as 
thin, silver lines of bolted steel through which constant flows of energetic 
molecules are propelled. Traversing diverse terrains and multiple countries, 
they represent the quintessential model of contemporary global circulation. 
They are simple uniform conduits, direct trajectories between one or more 
points. Through them, liquid and gaseous products are transported effortlessly, 
smoothly, and efficiently: seemingly without impediment from any form of 
	 174 
friction. They represent a perfect kind of circulation; a physical manifestation of 
a modernist ideal that values speed, fluidity, efficiency, and global 
connectedness. They are the model of circulation par excellence. 
 
This circulatory ideal has often been reflected in contemporary academic 
accounts of circulatory security. Security researchers have become fixated upon 
circulations and the practices of security that are deployed upon them (Dillon 
2005), yet circulation has typically been framed as uniform, featureless and 
linear. According to this ideal, movement has been assumed to be 
unproblematic, and little attention has been paid to its specifics. Instead, 
circulation is treated simply as something that occurs between point ‘A’ and 
point ‘B’. It is bland. It is unidirectional and featureless. It is arrhythmical. It 
consists of single straight lines; flat trajectories that connect two distanced 
nodes. As such, the bumps, textures, velocities, volumes, forces, paths, 
bifurcations, reversals, transformations, rhythms, embodied experiences, and 
other manifold qualities of circulations have been erased. Circulations have 
been reduced to simple lines.  
 
Conceptualizations of security in the academic literature have also been limited 
through these assumptions. Rather than imagining a series of practices that are 
employed along and throughout circulatory journeys, security scholars have 
often presented security as taking the form of a series of practices that firmly 
reside within these ‘A’ and ‘B’ nodal points. As I described in chapter 2, this 
has particularly been the case within the energy security literature, in which 
performances of security have been simplified to the extent that the qualities 
of energy’s movements have been almost entirely erased. The movement of 
energy products between their points of production and consumption has 
again been rendered immaterial and featureless. It is presented as a simple 
matter of circulatory maintenance that results from transactions between 
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energy producers and energy consumers, insecurity arising in the event of 
turbulence within these agreements. 
 
In this chapter, I challenge these assumptions by attending to gas’s circulatory 
journeys between such centralized nodes, describing various different qualities 
of gaseous circulations and the ways that they can be seen to present various 
opportunities and challenges for security’s performance. In this endeavour, I 
seek to problematize the pipeline and to make strange these seemingly perfect 
circulations, showing how an attention to their specific characteristics between 
nodes is urgently needed in accounts of security’s contemporary practice. This 
is achieved through a detailed empirical analysis of gas’s circulation within UK 
transmission and distribution pipelines, in which I offer an account of the 
consequences that their myriad aberrant qualities may have for our 
understandings of security governance.  
 
Notably here, I draw upon Timothy Cresswell’s (2010) work regarding the 
politics of movement. Situated within the wider literature on mobilities, 
Cresswell has identified a series of features of circulatory movements that, in 
various different ways, bring about particular kinds of politics. Whilst valuable, I 
suggest that Cresswell’s work can be expanded, particularly with regards to the 
politics that surround the mobilities of materials – a kind of circulation that is 
notably absent from his account. Building upon Cresswell’s analysis, I therefore 
draw out six circulatory qualities, each of which, at different locations in space 
and time, can be seen to have implications for the forms of (in)security that 
surround natural gas. These include: the convoluted paths and circuits of 
circulations (section II); their volumes (III); their materialities (IV); the forces that 
they exert and the forces that are exerted upon them (V); their relative 
velocities (VI); and their rhythms (VII). 
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II. Paths and Circuits 
 
Let us begin at an obvious starting point: problematizing the notion of the 
straight line within security scholars’ depictions of circulations. On a map, 
pipelines may appear as simple, uniform, mono-colour lines (see figure 1, 
p.17). There is little to note of them; no textures, no volumes, no materialities, 
no dimensions (apart perhaps, from their length). Yet whilst this archetype 
suggests that piped gas may travel in linear, unidirectional movements, the 
circulatory paths that are undertaken by gas are actually far from simple.  
 
Non-Linear Paths 
 
We can begin to trace the intricacy of gas’s paths by exploring the 
geographies of the UK’s national transmission system and local distribution 
networks. In terms of its geography, the NTS is necessarily more linear than 
distribution networks. Its linearity serves two main governing functions. First, it 
facilitates a reduction in the amount of frictional force that is exerted upon 
gaseous molecules by the pipeline walls – the fewer the number of pipes and 
the larger they are, the smaller their surface area is compared to the amount of 
gas that is being transported. This is important, for an enormous amount of 
energy is required to provide gas with the necessary motive force for it to 
circulate on a national scale. The directness of gas’s paths is thus beneficial for 
ensuring the security of supply, for it directly affects whether gas can be 
practically delivered to consumers. At the same time, the reduction in friction 
also beneficially affects gas’s cost, due to the smaller amount of energy 
needed to facilitate its transport. This is also important because compression 
costs are folded into the energy bills of consumers and can affect the gas’s 
affordability125.  
 
																																																						
125 Interview, Emergency Operations Manager, National Grid, 2014. 
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The second benefit of this linearity regards the ways in which National Grid can 
monitor and protect the system from particular kinds of threats. Such threats 
include damage caused by external actors (such as groundwork machinery), or 
from processes that are internal to the pipeline, such as corrosion (which can 
create inconsistencies in the thicknesses of pipe walls and reduce their ability 
to contain gas). The relative simplicity of the NTS permits the application of 
several governance techniques for addressing these threats that would 
otherwise not be possible. External threats, for example, can be monitored 
through aerial surveillance – the NTS’s relatively linear paths allow for 
helicopters to easily and regularly follow the length and breadth of pipelines to 
check for encroaching developments126. Internal threats on the other hand, can 
be monitored and responded to in advance through the use of pipeline 
inspection gauges, or ‘PIGs’ – tools that can sense for inconsistencies and 
developing weaknesses within pipe walls. Linearity is again important here, for 
the shape of the network permits these devices to be transmitted across long 
lengths of pipe, and for them to then be easily extracted at the other end. If 
these pipelines were to bifurcate between the point at which they were 
inserted and extracted, they would likely get stuck or lost within the system.  
 
At the same time as providing opportunities for certain forms of governing 
practice however, the linearity of the NTS also introduces a range of 
insecurities. Because large areas of the UK are dependent upon single NTS 
pipelines for their supply, the linearity of this network makes it vulnerable to 
the emergence of constraints upon individual pipelines; such constraints 
potentially resulting in the interruption of supply to millions of consumers127. 
One particular kind of constraint this linearity introduces is the possibility of 
sabotage, whereby consumers could have their gas supply interrupted by the 
intentional severance of critical pipelines. This recognised vulnerability has 
																																																						
126 Interview, Emergency Operations Manager, National Grid (2015). 
127 IGEM Annual Conference presentation by Chris Train, CEO National Grid (2014). 
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therefore led to the development and implementation of a series of additional 
security practices around gaseous circulations, including the subterranean 
concealment of gas pipes and the restricted circulation of accurate maps of the 
precise outline of the NTS128. In this way, we must appreciate how, even when 
circulations are more-or-less direct, these particular qualities can have 
significant implications for the way that security is performed; new forms of 
governance, and new forms of insecurity being made simultaneously possible. 
 
Whilst I have begun by drawing attention to the linear qualities of the NTS 
here, the paths that gas actually takes within this system are far more 
convoluted than they might first appear. To help us to understand the intricacy 
of these paths, we need to begin by examining the functions of the pipe. As 
Cresswell, citing Deleuze and Guattari (1987), importantly highlights, 
circulations rarely move freely and evenly over smooth space, but are instead 
ordered and channelled into acceptable conduits as they move across diverse 
terrains. Such ordering can take many forms, from natural channelling 
processes such as valleys and drainage basins that order flows of water, 
through to anthropocentrically-governed circulations, such as aeroplane 
movements (whereby circulatory routes are established through pre-conceived 
flight paths, geopolitical situations, weather, pilots and air traffic controllers), 
roads (where the movements of road users are defined by the location of road 
infrastructure, road safety laws, signage and police), and conserved walking 
paths (whereby walker behaviour is guided away from vulnerable ecological 
sites by the location of footpaths, the exclusion of information on those sites 
from maps, and the use of signs). The spatial ordering in many of these 
circulations can be seen to operate under manifold concerns for security, but 
all broadly cover either the way that these circulations affect space (as, for 
																																																						
128 Attempts are also made to conceal critical infrastructural assets (such as compressor 
stations) behind high soil banks and through the erection of anti-climb fencing. Notes from Site 
Visit to National Grid House (2014). 
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example, in the case of footpaths in conservation areas), or the way that space 
affects these circulations (as in the case of flight paths and the avoidance of 
certain hostile airspaces). Furthermore, the governance of these circulations 
can be seen to operate through a variety of techniques, from the construction 
of constraints to movement (as in the case of the routes of rivers, roads and 
footpaths), to techniques of active steering (planes and cars) and directional 
persuasion (planes, roads, footpaths). In each of these cases, one or more of 
these techniques is employed, and each is backed up by a distributed network 
of actants that work together to reinforce the path along which an entity 
circulates.  
 
This routing and ordering of circulations is the principle function of pipes. Pipes 
physically constrain the gas and limit the directions in which it is able to move. 
Yet despite these physical constraints, gas cannot be directly steered or 
controlled; it has to be solicited into taking particular routes. Its movement is 
thus induced by raising the pressure in one section of pipeline to a point at 
which it exceeds the pressure in another129. As a result, should the pressure in 
one area of a pipeline rise or fall, then the direction of gas flow may change. 
Gas will not move in a uni-directional manner, but may move back and forth.  
 
Friction also repeatedly overcomes the motive force that is applied to the gas 
(thereby reducing its pressure). Because of this, it has to be coerced into 
moving through the use of periodic re-compression at compressor stations 
located around the network. Furthermore, if the pressures at both ends of a 
pipe end up being the same, then the gas inside will come to a stop. For each 
of these reasons, gas does not take linear paths along pipes. It goes back and 
forth, changing direction and speed, and sometimes comes to a halt.  
 
																																																						
129 Low pressure is usually achieved by taking gas out of the system through its consumption. 
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This movement is further complicated by the fact that gas can enter the NTS at 
any one of seven reception terminals, or from the any of the multiple storage 
facilities that are located across the country130. National Grid (the NTS operator) 
has no direct control over when and where the gas will be delivered into the 
system, and it also cannot directly control where gas is taken out. As such, it is 
limited in its ability to govern the two main drivers of gas’s movement; its entry 
and exit. Instead, it has to monitor and manage the arrangement of pressures 
across the grid through the use of compressors; a governance practice known 
as ‘balancing’. This practice is essential for ensuring the continued supply of 
gas to consumers. As such, gas does not move linearly from one end of the 
country to another - it is introduced to the system at multiple points, and is 
shunted around through these pipelines, according to where it is needed. 
 
Whilst the NTS does consist of a more linear arrangement of pipes than 
distribution networks, it also does not consist of singular straight lines that 
simply transport gas up and down the country. At different points, pipes join 
and cross, and single gas streams are forced to split and diverge along 
multiple paths. Indeed, whilst certain sections of the NTS are served by single 
pipes, the design of this system is such that areas serving large numbers of 
consumers will be served by multiple pipes. In this way, a form of operational 
resilience is built into the system131. Should a fault or constraint develop upon a 
pipeline (for instance, if maintenance work has to be conducted in a certain 
area), then the gas may be persuaded to take alternative routes, circumventing 
the paths where the constraints are located. In this way, the creation of 
multiple circulatory paths is a strategic governance practice that ensures the 
security of supply, even when stress is placed upon the network.  
 
																																																						
130 Interview, Emergency Operations Manager, National Grid (2014). 
131 Interview, Emergency Operations Manager, National Grid (2014). 
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Finally, NTS pipelines are often not precisely straight. Indeed, they are semi-
flexible and often bend around landscape features. For instance, most of the 
NTS has been designed to avoid settlements and other infrastructural 
developments so that the risk of people being injured in a gas escape can be 
reduced. Avoiding developed areas also further reduces the likelihood of an 
incident taking place, for the pipes are not located in areas where the ground 
is as frequently disturbed. As the emergency operations manager at National 
Grid explained:  
 
“We have had a couple of major incidents, but they are pretty rare considering the 
amount of pipeline we have got in the ground. And that just comes down to the fact 
that the pipeline is in areas where people don’t interfere, you know, we don’t go 
anywhere near towns, the off takes are well out of the way” (Interview, Emergency 
Operations Manager, National Grid, 2015) 
 
Gas’s circulation becomes even less linear when it enters the distribution 
networks. Distribution pipes, unlike NTS pipes, are extremely rhizomatic. They 
branch off from the transmission system like capillaries, radiating out into 
thousands of divergent routes that spread across vast surface areas, and 
transporting gas to millions of dispersed properties. This rhizomatic 
arrangement results in a network that is far less vulnerable to a single failure, 
(for less consumers are reliant on any one individual path132), but it also 
simultaneously opens up new forms of vulnerability. 
 
Whilst it is theoretically possible to use inline inspection devices (PIGs) on small 
diameter pipes, the branching nature of distribution networks means that these 
devices would often get stuck at pipe junctions. The developments built on top 
of these pipes would also likely make their extraction difficult133. Pipeline 
inspection is therefore simply not possible within distribution systems, and this 
makes it far harder for network operators to accurately assess the extent of 
																																																						
132 Interview, Health, Safety and Environment Manager, National Grid (2014). 
133 Site visit, PII Pipeline Solutions (2014). 
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corrosion on their pipes, and to locate and repair these pipes before they 
begin to leak.  
 
The rhizomatic geography of distribution networks also introduces further 
vulnerabilities. Their wide spatial spread makes it far harder to protect these 
systems from external interference, and because they necessarily have to 
permeate urban fabrics that are constantly being dug up and redeveloped, 
they are far more vulnerable to accidental damage. Added to this, the 
increased proximity of property and infrastructural developments on the 
surface makes these pipes inaccessible, and getting to them for repair is 
consequently often expensive and disruptive. When combined with the 
increased population density that surrounds these pipelines, the geographies 
of distribution networks can therefore be seen to generate a plethora of 
potentially life-threatening vulnerabilities.  
 
Distribution networks are also demonstrative of how circulatory pathways can 
exhibit a range of dimensions and textures. Whilst figure 1 (p.17) represents 
pipelines as identical and uniform, each pipe within the UK’s natural gas 
infrastructure possesses distinctly different qualities. This is clearly visualised in 
‘Image 11’ in Appendix C, where we can observe a complication to the 
pipeline map. Instead of single, straight, and even lines that have monotone 
colours, this map depicts multiple lines that have numerous colours, textures 
and labels. The different textures and colours indicate the different pressures at 
which gas is transported through these pipelines (solid red=low pressure, 
dotted blue=medium pressure, dotted green=high pressure, dashed 
yellow=regional high pressure, solid and dotted purple=abandoned pipework) 
and the labels by their sides indicate the different diameters, thicknesses and 
materials of these various pipes (90PE for example, indicates a 90mm pipe 
made of polyethylene). These gaseous pathways can consequently be seen to 
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undulate; their diameters expand and contract at different points, assume 
different wall thicknesses, and change in the materials that they are 
constructed from.  
 
Such qualities are important, for they have direct implications for the capacities 
of these pipes to govern gas’s circulation. Larger diameter pipes, for example, 
can transport greater volumes of gas, and are typically stronger134. Thicker 
pipes of different kinds of materials may be more expensive, but could offer 
greater resistance from penetrative forces such as diggers and drilling 
machines (or from the vibrations of heavy traffic). The spatial context of pipes is 
also important, for their assignment to different areas involves a particular kind 
of security practice. If, for example, a pipeline has to pass nearby a sensitive 
area such as a railway, road or settlement, then wider diameter, thicker 
pipelines will be installed using stronger materials. In this way, the risk of the 
gas escaping and these other infrastructures being disrupted, is reduced135. 
 
In these ways, the qualities of the paths that gas takes have manifold 
implications for its governance. Each aspect of its journey, whether linear or 
convoluted, its relationship to geographical features, its directions, or the way 
in which it undulates as it circulates, presents a series of different challenges 
and opportunities for security performances. As a result, we cannot understand 
gas’s circulatory governance without also attending to the specific qualities of 
its circulatory paths.  
 
 
Circuits 
 
In addition to the complicatedness of these paths, security scholars have also 
commonly overlooked the ‘circular’ qualities of circulations. Very little emphasis 
																																																						
134 Interview, former Network Director, Northern Gas Networks (2015). 
135 Industry standards – IGEM (1995). 
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has been placed upon the round trips that entities make in this literature – the 
way that their circulations fold back into one another and are transformed and 
reiterated. Instead, the movements of bodies, materials and things have 
tended to be simply traced between one point of departure and another point 
of arrival136. We therefore need to ask how the circuit might change our 
perception of circulations, and how it might begin to be seen to have 
implications for the performances of security conducted around them. In the 
following paragraphs I thus trace out some tentative observations regarding 
the consequences of thinking about gaseous circuits. 
 
Observation 1: The circuit challenges the way that we treat circulatory points of 
origin. Rather than seeing a circulation, such as that of natural gas, as 
beginning at a particular location (typically for gas, its point of extraction), it 
may be useful to trace the journeys of these entities back from their assumed 
starting points. In studying entities’ earlier journeys, a number of relevant 
political issues may come into focus. For natural gas, the organic materials from 
which it was produced, the compression and heat of the rock around it, and 
the time with which these processes took to produce it, all have implications 
for the governance of present-day circulations of gas. For instance, the depths 
at which it forms, and the rock types that formed it, constitute impediments to 
the speed of its extraction, but at the same time provide valuable indicators for 
deducing its subterranean location. Similarly, the time that gas takes to form 
through these geological processes has important consequences for traditional 
conceptions of energy security. Continued societal reliance upon fossil fuels, 
the speed at which they are being depleted, and the length of time that they 
take to form, are for example, the major contributing factors behind recent 
fears over peak oil (Bridge, 2010). As such, natural gas’s geology is productive 
																																																						
136 There has been recent work elsewhere that has begun to examine the political implications 
of these round trips (for example, see the work on circular economies developed by Gregson 
and Crang, 2015, and Gregson et al. 2015). As of yet however, the implications of circularity for 
security have received little academic attention. 
	 185 
of particular kinds of security politics, and the circuit can therefore help us to 
go beyond the origins of entities that first present themselves, forcing us to 
consider the political entanglements that these circulating elements may bring 
with them as they move in the present. 
 
Observation 2: The circuit challenges the way that we treat circulatory end 
points. Gas requires us to acknowledge that consumption is not the end point 
for its political life.  Instead, consumption is a point of transformation. Gas 
continues to circulate beyond consumption, both in terms of the energy that is 
contained within it, and in terms of the transformation of chemical matter. 
Energy cannot be destroyed; as gas is consumed, its energy is converted to 
heat, light, noise, kinetic motion, or is stored in other materials. Energy in these 
new forms may also have new political effects (the stored energy in gas, for 
example, may convert to heat and light and burn human bodies). Whilst the 
circulation of this energy and its affects may be impossible to trace beyond a 
certain point due to its minute dissipation, we can still observe a range of 
diverse governing practices that have emerged around some of these 
transformations137.  
 
Similarly, gas’s chemical matter does not simply disappear – even when it is 
burnt. Whilst gas is relatively clean compared to other fossil fuels, it still 
produces a range of materials during its combustion. Gas can produce a sooty 
mixture of solid materials, and can also release a range of other gases. Whilst it 
may no longer be recognised as natural gas in these instances, the atoms that 
existed previously continue to exist after burning, albeit in new combinations. 
These new materials may similarly open up new forms of politics. Two 
particular relevant examples in this instance concern the production of carbon 
																																																						
137 Such practices can be extremely broad, from the installation of fire extinguishers that are 
designed to quench the heat of gas fires, to the introduction of gas ovens with explosion relief 
panels that are designed to absorb gas’s developing kinetic energy. 
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monoxide and carbon dioxide. Carbon monoxide is an odourless, invisible, and 
extremely toxic gas that is preferentially absorbed by the body over oxygen - a 
form of agency that can lead to bodies becoming starved of oxygen and their 
eventual death. Its production has therefore necessitated the formation of a 
number of governance practices that try to avoid human casualties, such as 
public awareness campaigns that draw attention to the causes and symptoms 
of carbon monoxide poisoning138. Carbon dioxide, in contrast, has pronounced 
insulating properties that can affect global climate. Attempts have 
consequently been made to govern its atmospheric release through a wide 
range of initiatives, including the creation of regulations on permitted vehicular 
emissions, reductions in the amount of coal that can be burnt for electricity 
generation, and the promotion of renewable energy technologies. In these 
ways, natural gas can therefore be seen to continue to have a political life 
beyond its cremation and to circulate beyond its points of consumption. 
 
Observation 3: The circuit forces us to recognise a multiplicity of points of 
transformation. Natural gas’s points of domestic consumption are only one of 
many potential points of transformation. It is consumed within power stations 
and large factories; it is ejected from overpressure valves on pipeline assets; it 
leaks from battered and ageing distribution networks; it escapes during the 
opening up of pipes for maintenance; it is vented to atmosphere in processing 
terminals; it is consumed for powering compressor turbines and other pipeline 
assets; it is injected into salt caverns for storage. Domestic consumption is thus 
only one point of its departure: gas takes multiple divergent paths throughout 
its circulatory journeys139. Again, each of these paths also involves the 
emergence of new political situations. In its leakage and atmospheric 
circulation for instance, methane comes to have particularly pronounced 
political effects. Methane has a global warming potential (a relative measure of 
																																																						
138 Site visit - ‘Carbon monoxide kills’ stand at IGEM (2015) emergency planning conference. 
139  Site visit – National Grid House, 2014. 
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the amount of heat that a gaseous material traps within the atmosphere) that is 
84 times higher than carbon dioxide over a 20-year timescale, and 25 times 
higher over a 100-year period (IPCC, 2014). It is consequently one of three 
major greenhouse gases that have been identified by the International Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) as playing a critical role in the change of global 
climate. As a consequence, gas’s leakage from pipelines has come under 
increasing scrutiny by the UK government, and is now subject to multiple 
initiatives to reduce the quantities in which it is released (DECC, 2012). As 
such, our perspective of the pathways that circulations may take needs to be 
widened, and we must remain open to the fact that gas may take alternative 
paths that may generate new forms of (in)security.  
 
III. Voluminous Circulations 
 
The second quality that I wish to draw out in this chapter concerns the 
voluminous properties of circulations, and the way in which these properties 
may have implications for the ways that security is performed around 
circulating elements. Such qualities are notably underplayed in Cresswell’s 
(2010) account. In this section, they are explored in two ways. First, I look at the 
three-dimensional spaces through which circulations travel, and second, I look 
at the property of being voluminous – of circulations having volume.  
 
Movements through Volumes 
 
Attending to the volumes through which circulations move involves taking into 
account the vertical dimension of circulatory journeys and the way that, at any 
one moment in an entity’s circulation, its vertical context may have particular 
significance for the way that security is performed in relation to it. Verticality 
has already drawn some attention from a number of scholars, particularly in 
response to complaints about the underlying conceptual horizontalism within 
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human geography. Many of these writers have looked towards vertical spaces 
above the earth’s surface for understanding geographical phenomena, and a 
particular focus has been placed upon the air within this literature, with 
explorations of the role of the air in warfare and military operations (Graham, 
2010a; Gregory, 2011, 2014; Coward, 2013); aerial mobilities (Cwerner, 2006; 
Graham, 2014), and aerial life (Adey, 2010). A smaller literature has also 
examined the vertical in relation to the urban environment (Graham and 
Hewitt, 2013; Harris, 2015; Elden, 2013). Yet, whilst security and circulation 
have entered these accounts, these references have been tangential to 
broader discussions of security and circulation within security studies. This is a 
situation that is mirrored in the smaller, but rapidly growing, literature 
concerned with below-surface verticalities. Such studies can be largely divided 
into those that have been concerned with oceanic depth (Steinberg and Peters, 
2015; Dodds, Copley and Sandwell, 2014; Bull, 2011) and those that are 
concerned with the subterranean (Bridge, 2014b; Clark, 2013a). 
 
Natural gas undergoes complex vertical journeys that extend both above and 
below the earth’s surface. Formed deep beneath the earth, it often travels for 
great distances underground and is frequently transported beneath the sea in 
vast pipeline networks. It also undertakes substantial journeys above the 
surface, rising into above ground installations for easy operational access, 
being stored within towering gas holders in liquid or gaseous form, traveling 
up buildings through pipes and into the highest points of skyscrapers, or 
circulating freely within the atmosphere. At other times it is also injected back 
into the earth, for storage within salt caverns, aquifers and depleted gas fields 
(Fevre, 2013). Throughout its circulation natural gas therefore makes 
extraordinary vertical ascents and spectacular subterranean descents. 
 
	 189 
Each of these vertical contexts must be evaluated for the ways in which they 
have implications for performances of security. The underground, for example, 
can be seen to produce both insecurities and opportunities for governance. 
Over 180,000 miles of pipe are buried beneath the surface of the UK (ENA, 
2013), and as such, the character of UK gas transport networks is distinctly 
subterranean. Yet as described previously, burying pipes is not merely an act of 
convenience – it is one of the most consistently employed tools in gas’s 
governance. As Peter Ackroyd (2012, cited in Elden, 2013) observes, the 
ground is often enrolled to protect critical infrastructure from external 
manipulation, due to the way that it offers two types of distancing. First, it 
creates a perceptual distance between humans and the buried infrastructure 
(the ground’s opacity obscuring these infrastructures and making their 
whereabouts uncertain), and second, the ground provides a physical 
separation between the gas and different kinds of external threat. The ground 
therefore assists in protecting pipes from threats such as accidental damage 
and intentional sabotage.  
 
In these two ways, we can understand the vertical to become enrolled within 
practices of governing circulations – depth here providing a degree of safety 
for circulations by making them undetectable and inaccessible. Yet the 
underground must also be appreciated for the ways in which it introduces a 
series of challenges for governance. In particular, the distancing of services 
from external interaction often makes them difficult to survey and challenging 
to maintain. As described in the previous section, specialised inspection 
techniques have been developed to survey larger transmission pipes internally, 
but assessing the health of smaller distribution assets presents major 
challenges for network operators (Jardine et al., 2012). The opacity of the 
ground also creates risks, making the gas infrastructure more vulnerable to 
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accidental damage from machinery used for groundwork and farming, with the 
majority of major leaks resulting from third party damage140. 
 
Different governance practices have consequently emerged as a means of 
trying to deal with these challenges. Newly installed gas pipes for example, 
have to have a yellow-coloured outer layer to make them more visible and 
easily identifiable by ground workers, and in a similar manner, pipeline markers 
are installed in locations where the NTS passes under roads, in order to alert 
road maintenance workers of their presence. Furthermore, specialised industry 
advisory services, such as ‘Dial Before You Dig’ and ‘Linewatch’ provide a point 
of contact for developers to check for the presence of gas pipes before they 
begin excavation. 
 
It is not just gas’s underground verticality that has implications for governance 
however. Gas’s above ground travels also reveal a variety of contexts in which 
distinct differences in altitude have implications for the insecurities that gas 
presents. Above ground installations, for example, are often more visible and 
perceived to be more vulnerable than buried assets. Because of this, they are 
often subjected to additional methods of concealment and protection, such as 
the erection of fences and earth barriers, and the employment of security 
guards. At higher altitudes however, gas travelling through high-rise flats and 
multi-occupancy dwellings is considered to present greater safety risks due to 
the number of people that are exposed to the impacts of a single incident. A 
major gas explosion in 1968 at Ronan Point141, for example, prompted a wide-
scale revision of the UK’s building regulations and the creation of a new set of 
industry standards specifically relating to gas installations within tall, multi-
occupancy dwellings (IGEM, 2012). At a higher altitude again, atmospheric 
																																																						
140 Interview, former Network Director, Northern Gas Networks (2015). 
141 Ronan Point was a large block of flats located in London. 
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methane presents a set of completely different insecurities regarding global 
climate. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Photograph of Ronan Point, 1968 
 
These examples demonstrate the significance of altitudinal variations for the 
forms of (in)security that surround one particular kind of circulation. Whilst 
these examples showcase the significance of the vertical dimension in 
conceptualising the way that security relates to circulation however, we also 
need to be careful to not simply replace horizontalism with a new orthodoxy of 
verticalism. Indeed, this is a claim made by Elden (2013), who insists that we 
engage with space not just vertically or horizontally, but by appreciating its full 
three-dimensionality. Circulations, as Elden notes, move through voluminous 
space, traveling at different angles and different (in/de)clines. As such, the 
implications of these three dimensional movements must also be assessed. 
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Figure 12 - Photograph of a water trap used for separating water from town gas (Fakenham 
Gas Museum, 2014) 
 
In the case of natural gas, gradients have significant implications for the forms 
of (in)security that emerge in relation to it. Most notably, gradients cause 
problems in conjunction with the ingress of water in distribution systems. Water 
typically enters these networks when a nearby water main bursts. The high 
pressure with which water is transported often leads to it violently churning up 
the soil around gas pipes, quickly boring holes through them and allowing the 
water to enter. Once inside the gas pipes, it can then run down declines and 
settle at low points in pipe networks. This is problematic, for it can generate 
uncontrolled interruptions in gas supply142. Such interruptions are potentially 
dangerous because they can temporarily cut off gas supply to properties, the 
flames of appliances being extinguished only for the gas to return at a later 
point. With the flames no longer consuming it, the gas can then freely enter 
these properties and accumulate in potentially explosive volumes.  
 
																																																						
142 Such interruptions are ‘uncontrolled’ because the gas supply is not reliably shut off; water 
may move within the system and cause intermittent interruptions to supply. 
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Whilst water ingress is less common in contemporary gas networks than it was 
in the past, it still presents a significant source of threat to consumer safety. 
Indeed, previously, gas was typically so ‘wet’ (due to the way it was 
manufactured) that water traps, such as the one in figure 12, were commonly 
installed across distribution networks at system low points where water was 
likely to accumulate. These traps enabled water to fall out of the gas stream 
without interrupting gas flow, and the water could then be siphoned out of the 
bottom, by an engineer at street level. Today, contemporary natural gas is 
dehumidified before it enters the NTS143, but these gradients can still lead to 
uncontrolled supply disruptions if water manages to get into the system144. 
 
Voluminous Circulations  
 
In addition to the voluminous space through which circulations travel, we must 
also appreciate how circulations have voluminous qualities. There are two ways 
that I suggest we might consider circulations to be voluminous in the case of 
gas. First, I suggest that we can think about volume in terms of quantity. This is 
perhaps most easily seen in the circulation of people, but it is also relevant to 
most forms of circulation – from flows of gas molecules, to movements of 
finance and bacteria. Importantly, the quantities of entities in circulation can 
give rise to different political situations; from contemporary fears over high 
immigration figures, to concerns over the tension between the large numbers 
of people passing through airports and the amount of friction that is created by 
contemporary security practices  (Adey, 2004), or worries about the amount of 
money that is circulating in economies (Langley, 2014). 
 
In the case of gas, quantity most commonly associated with the security of 
demand and supply. Too few gas molecules relative to the amount needed by 
																																																						
143 Site visit, St. Fergus gas processing terminal (2014). 
144 Interview, Health, Safety and Environment Manager, Northern Gas Networks (2014). 
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a given consumer (nation, organisation, individual, etc.) for example, can result 
in insecurities for users. Alternatively, a surplus relative to demand can result in 
insecurities for producers, who rely on the revenues generated by the gas’s 
sale (Lajous, 2004). Quantity is therefore at the centre of traditional 
conceptualisations of energy security.  
 
The second way that I suggest that we might think about volume concerns the 
three-dimensional space that circulating entities take up. This is different from 
the previous distinction, in that certain circulations may not necessarily need to 
be physically voluminous in order to move in large quantities (as, for example, 
in the case of transfers of electronic finance). Dependent upon the size of the 
entity in circulation, the space taken up by these circulations may also be 
dramatically different, regardless of their quantity. Such volumes are again 
important, for they may have significant implications for the nature of their 
transport and the way that security can be performed around them.  
 
Importantly for gas circulations, such voluminous qualities are dynamic, 
changing whilst it is in transit. Natural gas is extremely compressible, and its 
three-dimensional volume can consequently change dramatically, dependent 
upon the pressure and temperature of its molecules. Increasing its pressure can 
enable more molecules to inhabit the same space, and reducing its 
temperature to a point below -162°C will make it shrink and change state, from 
gas to liquid. In the process, it will reduce in volume by over 60000% 
(Mokhatab, Mak, Valappil and Wood, 2013), making its international shipment 
and sale economically viable. This, in turn, may have important implications for 
the way that national energy networks can manage the insecurities that are 
produced through their dependence upon a limited number of energy 
providers. As such, volume consequently becomes folded into practices of 
gaseous governance, with extensive effort being expended upon carefully 
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regulating its volume by manipulating pressure and temperature throughout its 
circulation. 
 
In these three ways, therefore – its movements through three-dimensional 
space, its quantities, and its three-dimensional volume – natural gas presents a 
range of opportunities and threats that, at different points in space and time, 
become entangled in performances of gaseous security. 
 
IV. Materiality 
 
A significant omission from Cresswell’s (2010) analysis of the politics of motion 
regards the material qualities of the entities in circulation. Each body, object 
and ‘thing’ has its own particular material qualities that affect the way in which 
its movement can be governed. This is a major theme in this thesis, but here I 
wish to draw attention to three particular material qualities of circulations that 
have implications for performances of security around natural gas during its 
movement: its appearances, textures, and mutability. Amongst other material 
qualities, I suggest that these qualities are productive of a number of different 
forms of (in)security and come to affect the ways in which gas can be governed.  
 
Appearances 
 
Through its very invisibility, natural gas draws our attention to the significance 
that the visual appearances of circulating elements have for performances of 
security. As I have demonstrated in chapter 5, this invisibility plays a major role 
in the forms of governance that can be performed around it, and has resulted 
in a highly specialised reflective apparatus being constructed around natural 
gas in order to render its circulations perceptible so that it can be governed. As 
such, its appearance can be seen to be productive of particular performances 
of security that have been designed around the its specific visual qualities.  
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Gas is not unique in its invisibility however. Other entities may undertake very 
different appearances and become more or less visible at various points in 
time. One example can be seen in Marieke De Goede's (2007, 2012) work on 
terrorist finance, where she analyses the way that US financial institutions have 
come to regard the hard-to-survey qualities of physical cash as constitutive of 
particular forms of danger. Unlike electronic circulations of finance (which can 
be relatively easily traced), circulations of cash are harder to follow – a quality 
that De Goede argues has led to financial institutions to consider their 
circulations suspect, and a source of potential insecurity. 
 
Visibility is not the only characteristic of different entities’ material appearance 
however, and indeed, all circulations look different, depending upon the scales 
at which they are viewed. What might appear as a pipeline from a distance 
might also be seen as millions of individual molecules when viewed up close. 
Dependent upon the level of magnification, very different forms of (in)security 
may be observed in relation to these circulations.  
 
For example, looking at gas circulations with a low magnification, they may be 
seen to become significant for security in terms of the number of million cubic 
meters of gas that enters and exits transmission and distribution networks at 
any one particular moment in time. Security from this perspective may be seen 
as a matter of a more traditional understanding of energy security, whereby the 
volume of gas entering the system must equal or exceed the volume of gas 
that is required by society.  
 
If we examine gas at the molecular level however, we may perceive completely 
different forms of gaseous politics. As is explored in detail in chapter 7, gas’s 
molecular composition at times becomes subject to a range of security 
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practices that attempt to ‘cancel out’ particular kinds of gaseous qualities (such 
as its toxicity and corrosiveness), based upon their association with the 
emergence of particular kinds of gaseous phenomena.145 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, geographers have been quick to explore the diversity 
of scales in which materiality can have social significance. Analyses have 
ranged from the work of Jane Jacobs on the material effects, and affects, of 
‘big things’, such as globally significant architectural projects, and other studies 
have focused on the other end of the spectrum, looking at the political 
significance of the molecular (Braun, 2007; McCormack, 2007; Dixon, Hawkins 
and Straughan, 2012). A number of authors have also begun to trace the 
significance of looking at materials at the nano-scale (Anderson, Kearnes and 
Doubleday, 2007; Anderson, 2007; Kearnes, 2010). Little work has yet been 
conducted on this topic in relation to security however, despite the fact that 
each of these different scales may produce very different perceptions of the 
material qualities of circulating elements and the security performances that 
surround them.  
 
Textures 
 
Natural gas also draws our attention to the different kinds of textures that 
circulations may possess. The quality of being gaseous results in gas assuming 
no fixed form; it fills volumes and takes the shape of the walls and barriers that 
contain it. It also causes it to move as a fluid through pipes, and because it is 
less dense than air, it is buoyant and rises vertically unless impeded. It is also 
compressible, making large quantities of gas more easily storable, and 
providing it with the necessary motive force to transport it along pipes. In 
different contexts (many of which are explored elsewhere in this thesis), each of 
these material qualities will come to have different and significant implications 
																																																						
145 Site visit, St. Fergus Gas Processing Terminal (2015). 
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for the performances of security that surround it. Perhaps most clearly however, 
these qualities mean that, unlike solid and relatively stable energy products like 
coal, gas requires constant containment in order to transport it. Indeed, this 
has given rise to a series of other forms of insecurity. Until relatively recently for 
example, LNG transport was economically unviable on a large scale, and as a 
consequence, natural gas has had to be transported via expensive, inflexible 
and vulnerable pipelines. These requirements limited its adoption (Patterson, 
2008). Moreover, as can be seen in the case of Russia’s manipulation of gas 
supplies to Ukraine, the rigidity of these pipelines can introduce vulnerabilities 
for gas dependent nations that rely upon gas supplies delivered through 
single, fixed networks. 
 
At times, gas can assume quite different textures, however. Grit and oils, for 
example, give gas two very different consistencies. These materials, which 
typically originate from wells during extraction, from locations where the 
network has been opened up for maintenance, or where mechanical assets 
such as compressors have leaked, can become suspended in the gas flow. Oils 
can also evaporate and become dust, integrating with the grit. As the senior 
engineer from National Grid described; 
 
“[The NTS] is continually being opened up and shut again, and being re-welded, 
being cleaned out. You are just getting particulates coming in from all sorts of entry 
and exit points really…not necessarily entry points - gas turbines that we have on the 
system have oil seals…so they do, do, get weep a little bit - that oil does get into the 
system - what it does is it evaporates, because there is no oxygen in there. And it 
forms a sort of sludge, a gunge, and as it dries itself over time it becomes a load of 
very fine particles. Some of it stays liquid, but some of it actually oxidises off, um, not 
oxidises, it just becomes evaporated into the system…sometimes you get liquids that 
do exactly the same thing as they are taken through. But it’s just general engineering 
dirt that is gradually taken through.” (Interview, Senior Engineer, National Grid, 2015) 
 
These abrasive and viscous qualities are significant for the way that the gas can 
be governed, for grit can erode and block systems, and oil can cover flow 
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meters and affect their accuracy. These textures therefore can have important 
implications for security. If left unaddressed, they could cause substantial meter 
mismeasurements, damage pipelines and potentially block domestic 
appliances, leading to gas explosions. They can also provide the gas with 
carcinogenic properties, presenting risks to engineers working on the network. 
As the senior engineer continued:  
 
“if you do see inside a pipe you can rub your hands around…and you get this very 
light brown dust…its um…I wouldn’t do it with your bare hands because it might be 
carcinogenic. […] As you get further and further into a network, the size of the burners 
are getting smaller and smaller and smaller, and the pilot lights are getting very, very 
fine. And the manifold which you sometimes see in burners and boilers and in gas 
fires, maybe not gas hobs, but certainly boilers, are very, very fine and particles can 
start to build up and clog. Um…domestically that’s not a great news story - you don’t 
want to blow someone up.” (Interview, Senior Engineer, National Grid, 2015) 
 
In this way, the different textures that are assumed by natural gas across its 
circulatory journeys can be seen to also have implications for the forms of 
insecurity that develop in relation to natural gas’s circulation, and for the way 
that security is consequently performed in relation to it. 
 
Mutability 
 
Finally, natural gas demonstrates how the material qualities of entities may 
change as they move through space. As is explored in greater detail in chapter 
7, natural gas undergoes a wide variety of transformations throughout its 
circulation. Indeed, it is an inherently dynamic material. Throughout its 
circulation it changes in pressure and volume, it changes temperature and 
state, it will become more and less wet, and it will shift in its chemical 
composition, sometimes including toxic materials such as hydrogen sulphide, 
carbon monoxide, and carcinogenic dust. As such, it is constantly in flux.  
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In contrast to gas, other entities may hold their shape and qualities relatively 
rigidly as they travel over space and time. Latour’s (1986) notion of the 
immutable mobile is one articulation of this, and numerous studies have 
described the political ramifications that the immutability of such materials can 
have (c.f. Law, 1986; Latour, 1986; de Laet, 2000). Yet security studies scholars 
have frequently made assumptions about the ontological stability of the 
circulating entities in their enquiries, and as such, the manifold ways in which 
these ontological transformations may have implications for the governance of 
different elements has often been overlooked. Mutability is not unique to gas. 
Bodies may change and look different from their passport photographs; food 
may decay and become toxic; pathogens may mutate, and would-be terrorists 
may experience changes of heart. 
 
A simple example of the political relevance that gas’s mutability can be seen in 
the way that gas changes temperature throughout its transit. Whilst gas’s 
temperature constantly changes, due to the different temperatures of the soil, 
air and water surrounding gas pipes, the heat of the sun, the thickness and 
diameters of pipes, and the materials from which they are made, there are a 
series of locations at which gas undergoes a significant drop in pressure 
(typically at distribution off takes). This pressure drop can cause the gas to 
simultaneously dramatically cool down – a temperature change that is so 
significant that it can cause the water in the air and surrounding soil to freeze 
around pipes and connected assets. This can generate a range of insecurities, 
emergency valves and other operational assets sometimes ceasing up and 
stopping functioning. For this reason, at most locations where sizable pressure 
drops occur, boilers are employed to heat up the gas before it undergoes 
changes in pressure, in an attempt to prevent it from falling to a point where it 
will freeze nearby water146. 
																																																						
146 Interview, Emergency Operations Manager, National Grid (2015). 
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In these different ways, the dynamic qualities of circulating natural gas – here, 
its appearance, texture and mutability – can be seen to have a number of 
significant implications for the manner in which security is performed around 
circulating natural gas. As is a central theme of this thesis, I suggest that we 
cannot hope to come to understand the way that security is performed around 
other circulating elements unless we also attend to their dynamic material 
qualities. 
 
V. Forces 
 
When considering the way that circulations become entangled with concerns 
for security, we must further tend to the forces that act upon these circulations, 
and the forces that these circulations also exert. The forces that surround 
circulations have received little attention from security scholars to date, but 
valuable work has been conducted within the mobilities literature around the 
constitution and consequences of certain forces – motive force, and friction 
(Cresswell, 2010; Gill, Caletrío and Mason, 2011; Pesses, 2010; Anim-Addo, 
2014). Very little attention has been paid to the way that circulations 
themselves, are forceful, however. 
 
Motive Force 
 
Motive force, as described by Cresswell (2010), is a fundamental prerequisite 
for circulation – objects have “to have a force applied to [them] before [they] 
can move” (p. 22). As I have described in relation to gas’s compression, 
significant amounts of force are required to move methane molecules through 
pipes. Across the transmission and distribution systems, gas has to have force 
applied to it at multiple points, either by compression through the use of 
turbines and boosters, or through thermal expansion, whereby heat is applied 
to increase the space between molecules, and thereby increase its pressure 
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(this is typically only practiced during processing, and is used in conjunction 
with other forms of compression)147. Importantly for Cresswell however, there is 
always a politics to motive forces. For gas compression, these political 
implications are manifold. Most obviously, following traditional understandings 
of the politics of the security of supply, compression is a closely regulated 
practice of gas governance, through which the delivery of gas to properties is 
carefully maintained; sufficient motive force must be applied in order to deliver 
gas to individual consumers. In addition to this rather basic understanding 
however, the following interview extract highlights a number of further political 
situations that surround the application of motive force to natural gas. 
 
“So we use gas pipe turbines for a lot of [compressors], but we are phasing that out 
because its…they are not operating in the sweet spot, so it’s a bit dirty to operate like 
that. So under the current emission requirements and things we’re moving a lot of our 
fleet to electricity because they are, they are more efficient. You burn the gas 
elsewhere to make the electricity, but you burn that really efficiently. And then the 
electricity runs the system. But we have tended to use gas fired turbines to run our 
compressors in the past, but because we are trying to run at a range of different 
power outputs it means you are not operating in that sweet spot for most of the 
time.  […] [W]e tend to have a range of units at each site, depending on where it is, 
the history really, when it was built. Because, you know, back, way back, we used to 
build, we would probably build more resilience into the grid than we do now. We are 
probably a bit more efficient about where we build er, multiple streams and things, 
but generally we build resilience into it. So you will tend to have a, your, main 
operating plan, which might be we will run unit A and that will manage this range of 
flows and pressures. And then if that fails, we will have, unit B will kick in and cover it. 
But what you might have is unit C and unit D as well. So, if you might say, well I’m 
going to run A and C in parallel. And if that fails you can move to B and D in parallel, 
or I might run A, B and C together. And what you can do, is what that gives you is a 
whole different range of what you can do. Because those engines will only create so 
much lift, what we call ‘head’, so in terms of pressure in and pressure out, the 
difference. The amount of flow that is going through at that time, there is a limit to 
that. There is an operating envelope. As soon as you start to get towards the limit of 
the flows or the pressure, then you maybe need to bring another unit online, or switch 
to a larger unit, but you’ve got a range of strategies at each compressor station there. 
But they are fickle things, so very difficult to operate. You know, we have a lot of 
problems with them. Failing and breaking down, and things like this. Which is why the 
resilience needs to be there, and why we are moving to the electricity, with gas-fired 
																																																						
147 Interview, Emergency Operations Manager, National Grid (2014) and Interview, Operations 
Supervisor, Shell, St. Fergus Gas Processing Terminal (2015). 
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generation as back up now. So we will generally run electricity, but obviously, in a 
power cut …then we move to a gas-fired fuel line. So the resilience will be there.” 
(Interview, Emergency Operations Manager, National Grid, 2014) 
 
In this extended extract, we can thus observe a range of insecurities that are 
associated with the production of gas’s motive force. First, there are practical 
operating requirements that necessitate the running of multiple turbines 
simultaneously to ensure that sufficient pressure to meet demand is created. 
Second, there are environmental concerns for energy efficiency, with 
references to National Grid’s increasing investment in less carbon intensive 
forms of compression. Third, there are concerns for operational resilience, and 
the difficulty of dealing with material failures such as power cuts and 
mechanical faults. Each of these concerns exist in tension with one another, 
particularly in the case of concerns for the environment – with less efficient gas 
turbines being retained to ensure that compression capacity is maintained 
even in the event of a power cut, and multiple turbines being kept running 
even when they are not pumping gas, just so that operational resilience can be 
maintained148. Motive force is thus entangled in an array of political decisions 
that concern different kinds of insecurity.  
 
Implicit within this interview extract however, are also a series of further motive 
forces that go beyond simple physical exertions. These forces, as Cresswell 
(2010) invites us to consider, involve the diverse social relations that collude to 
bring an entity into motion; they are the relational forces that are exerted 
across a network that result in particular forms of motion. Attending to motive 
force therefore requires us to ask why an entity is moving. It involves tracing 
out the wide network of interests that are involved in its motion, and in the 
case of gas, these interests include those of extraction and transportation 
																																																						
148 Compressor turbines can also take up to 8 hours to overcome inertia and get up to 
sufficient speeds to replace other turbines if they fail, meaning that operational capacity could 
take a long time to return. 
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companies who want to produce a profit, the reliance of consumers upon gas, 
and the government’s concerns for the gas network’s environmental 
acceptability. Each of these interests is expressed via varying amounts of force, 
and these forces can affect if and how the gas can circulate. Motive force is 
therefore not just a matter of physics. It is relationally produced and subject to 
ongoing political negotiation. 
 
Friction  
 
Cresswell (2010) also highlights the role of frictional forces within systems of 
circulatory governance. These operate in direct opposition to motive forces, 
slowing elements down and potentially bringing them to a stop. Just like 
motive force however, friction can both be envisioned as a physical force, or as 
a more abstract set of contextual factors that provide resistance against the 
circulation of different entities. In its literal form, friction plays an extremely 
significant role in the circulation of natural gas. As the emergency operations 
manager describes; 
 
“Imagine you sort of had a cardboard tube and you were putting ping pong balls in 
there, and that was a meter long, you would push a ping pong ball in one end and it 
comes out the other end. If that was a mile long, the same thing would happen, but it 
would be really hard to push it in. You’ve got to put more force, more energy, more 
pressure on to it at the other end of the pipeline. And eventually you going to have to 
put so much pressure in and...there’s a limit to that. So there’s only so much you can 
do. And that’s due to the friction on the inside of the walls, the friction on the inside of 
that tube is essentially what drives the pressure drop. You are losing energy as it 
moves through the pipeline. So we will see transportation losses through all of our 
pipelines. Which means pressure will drop off down the pipe. So we use a compressor 
to raise it again. And it will drop off again, over time in due course.” (Interview, 
Emergency Operations Manager, National Grid, 2014) 
 
Unless additional compression therefore takes place, the frictional forces 
operating upon the gas would force it into stasis. As such, additional 
compression is required to ensure the security of gas supply. Gas therefore 
comes to circulate in cadences, constantly fluctuating between speeding up 
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(and increasing in density), and slowing down (and dropping in density). In this 
way, literal friction becomes political through the threats that it presents to the 
security of supply. 
 
If we look at friction less literally however, we can also observe other resistant 
forces that are operating upon the gas in this example. Perhaps most clearly, 
gas is subject to the frictional forces that surround the environmental impacts 
of its transport. Gas transport networks are under increasing pressure from 
government agencies to reduce their carbon emissions (created either through 
leakage or through using gas to power turbines), and whilst gas has been 
positioned as a potential interim solution for meeting the UK’s carbon 
reduction targets as renewable generation capacity continues to be 
developed, recent reports regarding the unacceptably high extent of methane 
leakage has raised question marks over the future of natural gas transport in 
the UK149. Should natural gas’s environmental impacts become considered 
socially unacceptable, its circulation may consequently be brought to a 
standstill. Furthermore, other kinds of environmentally-led development may 
also be seen to create impediments to gas’s circulation. Improved insulation 
within houses and the installation of more efficient boilers, for example, have 
both led to an overall decline in gas consumption in the last 30 years150. As 
such, we can understand these distributed relational forces as constituting two 
different forms of frictional force that have different consequences for the way 
that security is performed around gas as it circulates. 
 
Force(s) 
 
Whilst I agree with Cresswell (2010) that scholars need to better attend to the 
politics surrounding the forces that operate upon circulations, his emphasis 
																																																						
149 Interview, Health, Safety and Environment Manager, Northern Gas Networks (2014). 
150 Interview, former Network Director, Northern Gas Networks (2015). 
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upon motivational and frictional forces unintentionally reinforces an additional 
reductive notion of circulation. For Cresswell, force is imagined either in terms 
of a push along a particular plane, or as resistance to that vectored force. 
Whilst he does note that circulations move through varied vertical space, and 
that this affects the forms of friction that consequently act upon those 
circulations, he fails (perhaps due to his focus upon human movement) to 
adequately appreciate the presence of other kinds of forces that may be 
operating in different directions, at different times, and in different places. By 
categorising force into two binary opposing camps, he thus detracts attention 
from other kinds of forces that may operate upon circulations, and which may 
significantly affect the forms of (in)security that become associated with the 
gas’s circulation151. 
 
Gas, for example, exerts varying amounts of outwards force upon pipeline 
walls. When they are manufactured, every pipe is allocated a maximum 
operating pressure at which it is allowed to transport gas. This operating 
pressure is designed in accordance with the outwards force that is exerted by 
the gas, relative to the extent to which the pipe can continue to contain it. 
Because different parts of the network are constructed from pipes that have 
different maximum operating pressures, the gas within it will therefore be 
transported at different pressures within different parts of the network. This has 
implications in terms of network constraints, for in the event of supply 
shortages in particular parts of these networks, gas pressures cannot always 
simply be raised to encourage the gas to move into areas where it is needed. 
Indeed, there are serious regulatory consequences for exceeding maximum 
operating pressures. Yet as a former engineer within British Gas’s engineering 
research station observed, the constraining force that is provided by the pipes 
																																																						
151 Not all circulating entities will be subject to the same forces, and the forces they are subject 
to will not always have the same political significance. Different kinds of circulation will 
experience various (or even the same) forces in different ways, within different spatio-temporal 
contexts, and these forces may have different political implications. 
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is not designed only in relation to the gas’s outward force. Rather, it is 
designed in relation to the combined forces of gas’s pressure and certain kinds 
of hypothesised external force. As he explained; 
 
“I think certainly you can argue that [the development of standardised maximum 
operating pressures] was quite conservative. […] So the pipe thickness for a 
transmission pipeline more… (Laughs) Its not there to contain the pressure. It’s there 
to resist somebody hitting it. So it’s a lot thicker than if you just did the simple 
pressure calculations it would be half the thickness.” (Interview, former ERS Engineer, 
Northern Gas Networks, 2015) 
 
As such, these pipes are designed in acknowledgement of the multiple forces 
that are anticipated to potentially act upon gas circulations. This situation is 
also made more complex because different sections of pipeline are perceived 
to be subject to different kinds of threat. As such, different types of pipes may 
be employed to respond to them. As gas circulates near roads or urban areas 
for example, thicker pipes with higher maximum operating pressures are likely 
to be employed in order to resist the external forces that are produced by 
heavy traffic and ground work machinery152.  
 
Yet whilst some of these forces are easily traceable – as in this case, where 
reference to such forces was made through interviews and through entries in 
industry standards – there may also exist other forces that operate upon 
circulations that are more difficult to identify. This may be because they only 
present challenges in very specific situations. During one site visit for example, 
an engineer from Northern Gas Networks described to me how repeated 
reports had been made of a gas escape on a bridge in Cumbria, yet every time 
it was investigated, no gas could be detected. The reason for this was 
eventually discovered to be because of the highly specific spatio-temporal 
conditions that led to this escape. On sunny days, the bridge would gradually 
																																																						
152 Interview, former Network Director, Northern Gas Networks (2015). Also, industry standards 
for transmission pipelines - (IGEM, 1995). 
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warm up and expand, pulling the pipes apart. Two hours later however, when 
the engineers would typically arrive to investigate, the bridge would have 
cooled down and contracted, sealing the pipe back up.  
 
Other forces may also be hard to detect due to the way that they are governed 
in incredibly banal and routinized ways that have become completely 
normalized. A case of this regards gas’s buoyancy. Because natural gas is less 
dense than air, it exerts an upwards force upon pipes. Under normal conditions 
however, this force is substantially exceeded by the downward force of the 
pipes’ weight, combined with the weight of the earth that is piled on top of it 
(figure 13). Indeed, this has become so generally acknowledged that gas’s 
buoyancy is almost entirely ignored – even in industry standards (indeed, many 
industry practitioners interviewed in this study were not aware of the hazards it 
presented). Yet, in specific cases of severe flooding when the earth around 
pipes is eroded, this force can present threats to the integrity of pipeline 
networks. When the surrounding earth is taken away and replaced by water, 
the buoyancy of the gas within these pipes can exert an upward force strong 
enough to pull them apart. Whilst extremely rare, the potential consequences 
of this are significant, potentially resulting in wide-scale network outages and 
the risk of explosions (Alderson and Finley, 2014). 
 
In these ways, we can therefore observe a series of different forces to operate 
upon circulations of natural gas in different situations, and we can also identify 
a range of forces that the gas, itself, exerts through its circulation. As I have 
shown, such forces are significant for the way that we understand security’s 
performance in relation to circulations, for they can be productive of multiple 
forms of (in)security that may otherwise be overlooked. 
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Figure 13 - Diagram of vertical forces operating on gas pipes (Alderson & Finley, 2014) 
	
 
 
VI. Velocity 
 
The fifth quality of circulations that I suggest has implications for security 
concerns velocity. As Lefebvre (2004) famously emphasised throughout his 
work, entities do not simply move through space: they simultaneously move 
through time. In order to think about circulations, we therefore need to engage 
not only with their spatial attributes, but also with their temporal qualities – the 
manners in which they move within and across time. I suggest that there are 
two aspects in which velocity has particular implications for security in the case 
of natural gas; firstly, in terms of the velocity of its movements over Cartesian 
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space relative to other things, and secondly, in terms of the speed of its 
ontological movements. 
 
Cartesian Velocity 
 
As Cresswell (2010) recognises, the speed with which entities circulate across 
Cartesian space has received significant attention within the social sciences. 
Indeed, within security studies, speed and slowness (often discussed in relation 
to frictional forces) have been examined in a number of interesting ways. 
Numerous studies have looked at the significance of speed in performances of 
contemporary warfare (Virilio, 2006; Graham, 2010a; Coward, 2009); multiple 
authors have examined the way in which certain airport security practices 
permit different bodies to move at different speeds, with the movement of VIP 
‘safe’ bodies being sped up, whilst those bodies considered riskier are slowed 
down (c.f. Wood and Graham, 2006; Adey, 2004; Vaughan-Williams, 2010); 
and Bigo (2014) has described the way in which the faster speed of data’s 
movement, relative to that of human bodies, is central to contemporary 
practices of security. Multiple studies have also focused on the speed with 
which various kinds of security apparatus can assemble and respond in relation 
to the emergence of particular types of threat. Hinchliffe et al. (2013), for 
example, have looked at the speed of attempts to ‘lock down’ biosecurity 
threats. Adey and Anderson (2011b) have documented how attempts are made 
to speed up the formation of decisions in the UK emergency services, and Nat  
O’Grady (2014) has looked at the way in which fire services are organised 
across the UK in order to increase the speed with which they can move and 
assemble over space. 
 
Gas is interesting in its circulation, in that the velocities with which it moves 
over Cartesian space are typically not a major focus within its governance. As 
the senior engineer from National Grid explained, “We are a pressure system 
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so [we] will be controlling that system on pressure”. Whilst velocity is related to 
pressure, it is only related to the differentials between pressures, not to its 
pressure per se. National Grid does have to ensure that sufficient quantities of 
gas are received by consumers at particular moments in time, but velocity is 
typically not a major requirement in this, because the NTS is typically run on a 
pressure surplus, through the use of what is known as ‘line pack’. This means 
that the speed at which gas circulates throughout the system is not typically 
entangled within concerns for security153. 
 
There are a number of scenarios in which gas’s velocity over Cartesian space 
does have implications for security, however. A good example regards the 
speed with which gas exits domestic appliances. Within every property that is 
connected to the gas network there will be a device that regulates the pressure 
of the gas that is exiting the system. This is important because, in order for gas 
to be safely burnt, its velocity has to be equal to the its burning velocity (see 
figure 14)154. A gas’s burning velocity refers to the speed at which that 
particular chemical composition of gas burns. During controlled combustions, 
the direction in which the gas is burnt is opposite to the direction in which it 
exits the appliance. If these two velocities remain the same, then all of the gas 
exiting the pipe will be safely burnt, moment by moment. Should the burning 
velocity of the gas be exceeded by the velocity with which it exits the 
appliance however, then more gas than can be burnt will enter the property. In 
this scenario, the direction of the flame may change as substantial volumes of 
gas accumulate – instead of operating against the direction of the gas flow, the 
flame will move with it, resulting in a form of combustion that expands rapidly 
outwards. In other words, it will explode (figure 15). The velocity with which gas 
travels out of pipework is therefore directly related to the kinds of security 
threat that the gas poses, with increases in velocity being perceived to 
																																																						
153 Site visit, National Grid House (2014). 
154 Site visit, RAF Spadeadam (2014). 
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potentially result in significant increases in the risk of fires and explosions. The 
role of pressure regulators on domestic appliances is thus to govern gas’s 
velocity so as to ‘cancel out’ these particular kinds of threat. 
 
 
Figure 14 - Diagram of the relative velocities involved in controlled combustion (Cowling, 2014) 
	
 
Figure 15 - Diagram of relative velocities involved in uncontrolled combustion (Cowling, 2014) 
 
In addition to the velocity of gas’s own circulations within Cartesian space, 
there are also many ways in which we can observe the significance of speed for 
responding to threats. Perhaps most clearly, speed is important in the case of 
the standardised response times to gas escape incidents. For uncontrolled 
reported escapes, emergency engineers must attend a reported escape within 
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1 hour, whilst for controlled escapes (where the consumer can independently 
shut off the flow of gas at an earlier point in the system), engineers must arrive 
at the scene of the leak within 2 hours. These response times are also 
supplemented by the Gas Safety (Management) Regulations (1996), which 
stipulate that all gas leaks must be repaired within 12 hours. Standardised 
response times such as these directly relate to the speed with which gas’s 
governing actants assemble over space, and their purpose is to try to halt gas’s 
escape before it realises its capacities to cause casualties and damage to 
property. Like all kinds of movement however, these movements also face 
resistance. The 12 hour repair rule implemented by the GS(M)R, for example, 
has caused particular controversy with network operators due to the resistance 
that these operators face in attempting to achieve a rapid repair. Excavating, 
finding and repairing leaks can be extremely time consuming, and to do this 
within 12 hours can be nearly impossible. As one engineer explained, 
 
“A lot of people within the industry said no, let’s not - we can make it safe in twelve 
hours. We can’t repair it in twelve hours. It’s impossible. We’ve got some of them that 
you can’t even find!” (Interview, former Network Director, Northern Gas Networks, 
2015) 
 
In this way, we can observe the assembly of engineers around leaks to become 
subject to significant frictional, or resistive, forces, and these forces can result 
in degrees of slowness that limit the ability of governing actants to secure 
against emerging phenomena. 
 
Relational Velocities 
 
It is not just the speed and slowness of movements through Cartesian space 
that have implications for security, however: we must also reflect upon the 
temporal qualities of their movements through relational space, and the way 
that these elements shift ontologically over time. A simple example of this can 
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be seen in the case of the oceanic circulation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by 
container ship. Gas is liquefied by cooling it to below -162°C, but after its initial 
refrigeration, no additional cooling usually takes place (Mokhatab et al., 2013). 
Throughout its journey it is therefore gradually warming, and as it warms, it 
begins to expand and convert back into its gaseous form (Ibid). In this way, it 
simultaneously moves through relational space whilst also moving across 
Cartesian space.  
 
The speed of this ontological transformation presents two particular challenges 
for its secure transportation, both of which regard human safety. The first 
concerns its composition, for the slower its circulatory journey, the more LNG’s 
chemistry and energy content will be altered. As the gas gradually warms, 
particular chemicals within the liquid gas will evaporate before others (Dobrota, 
Lalić and Komar, 2013). This typically leaves a liquid mixture that is more 
energy-rich by volume than the liquid transported at the beginning of the 
journey155. Because the UK gas network is calibrated to use a specific chemical 
composition of gas that is much lower in energy however, these increases in 
LNG’s richness would have severe safety implications if the gas were to be 
introduced to the NTS (the flames issuing from domestic appliances would be 
dangerously large)156. For this reason, a practice of reintroducing nitrogen into 
the LNG is employed within LNG reception terminals in order to govern the 
flammable agency of the LNG as it is converted back into gas.  
 
The second challenge regards LNG’s expansion. As it warms and evaporates, 
LNG also expands, creating a vast amount of pressure. Unless the expanding 
gases are released, the pressure within LNG tankers could severely threaten 
their integrity. As such, efforts are taken to govern the speed of gas’s relational 
changes whilst it is in transport, and such efforts consist of attempts to speed 
																																																						
155 This is because nitrogen, which is inert, is one of the first materials to evaporate. 
156 Interview, former Network Director, Northern Gas Networks (2015). 
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up gas’s Cartesian movement by reducing its processing and transportation 
times. The purpose of these efforts is to limit the amount of ontological change 
that gas can undergo during its journey. They also involve attempts to directly 
slow down the speed of gas’s ontological transformation, which is achieved 
through the use of enhanced insulation techniques that reduce the rate with 
which gas warms and expands. In these two ways, the speed of gas’s 
movement within relational space therefore becomes tightly enmeshed with 
particular concerns for security. 
 
In these three ways – the speed with which gas circulates over Cartesian space, 
the speed with which its governing actors react and (re)assemble over 
Cartesian space, and the speed with which the gas changes ontologically – we 
can see velocity to play and important role in the forms of insecurity that 
emerge in relation to gas’s circulation, and in the forms of security practice that 
are consequently employed to govern it. 
  
VII. Rhythms 
 
The final circulatory quality of natural gas that I want to highlight here regards 
the rhythms with which gas circulates. As Cresswell (2010) observes, various 
kinds of rhythmic movement can produce different kinds of political effect – 
from enabling the identification of risky passengers through gait analysis, to 
the association of the rhythms of rave music with certain kinds of socially 
deviant behaviour. This is the extent of Cresswell’s analysis of rhythmic 
movements in relation to governance however, and limited attention has been 
paid to their significance for performances of security elsewhere. The following 
paragraphs therefore expand upon some of the implications that gaseous 
rhythms may have for security.  
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According to Lefebvre (2004), nothing is inert; all things in the world are in 
motion within time and space, and all of these movements have different 
rhythms (repeated moments of movement and rest) that have different degrees 
of social significance, dependent upon their relation to other societal rhythms. 
Lefebvre’s perspective consequently invites us to consider a social world that, 
rather than being fixed within a singular and uniformly experienced social time, 
is characterised by a plurality of rhythms and experiences of time; it consists of 
a ‘polyrhythmic ensemble’ (Crang, 2000). 
 
Gas circulations are similarly characterised by repeated moments of movement 
and rest, acceleration and deceleration. Gas speeds up at point of 
compression, and slows down over time because of friction. It moves with 
seasonal rhythms – with increased volumes flowing over cold winter months 
and lower volumes over the summer period. It circulates with diurnal patterns, 
with increased movement as demand increases during the mornings, late 
afternoons and evenings, and at night its movement decreases, as demand 
reduces and the system is ‘line-packed’ to provide storage for the following 
day157. As such, gas’s rhythmic circulations can be seen to be closely associated 
with other societal rhythms, and in particular, with the rhythms of the human 
body. Indeed, seasonal and diurnal patterns are directly related to the rhythms 
of human social life, because gas is consumed largely in line with patterns of 
bodily thermal comfort, sleep and hunger. There is thus a close synchrony 
between the circulation of natural gas and the rhythms of the human body.  
 
It is through these countless rhythmic movements, the coming together of 
different materials, bodies and things over time that the social world is 
performed. Place is “always in a process of becoming”, and the rhythmic 
patterns with which these entities come together structures “the ongoing 
																																																						
157 Interview, Emergency Operations Manager, National Grid (2014). 
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formation of its materiality” (Edensor, 2010; 3). It is therefore by coming to 
terms with this continual performance of place that we can begin to 
understand the relationship between security and spatio-temporal movement. 
Whilst, as Edensor notes, these rhythms can bring stability and consistency to 
the becoming of place, within these rhythms there is always potential for 
creativity, change or disruption. Repetition, whilst being a defining feature of 
rhythms, does not preclude difference or the potential for change – rhythm is 
not fixed (Mels, 2004): it is performed, and these performances require effort 
(Hallam and Ingold, 2007), always holding within them “the immanent potential 
for disruption and destruction” (Edensor, 2010; 3). Insecurity is consequently 
inherent within the rhythmic performance of place. 
 
The relationships between different kinds of rhythm are of critical importance 
for Lefebvre, for it is through tensions in these relationships that he 
understands insecurities to arise. Lefebvre describes the emergence of 
insecurity through the concept of arrhythmia. Arrhythmia concerns the way 
particular rhythms fall out of attunement with one another or become 
dissonant. This can constitute a form of pathological failure; a process of ‘fatal 
de-synchronisation’ (p.78). In contrast, security can be seen to be produced 
through particular kinds of harmonious eurhythmia; the creation of synchrony 
between societal rhythms.  
 
I suggest that the practice of synchronisation constitutes a form of circulatory 
governance. Considerable effort is expended upon manipulating the temporal 
qualities of gas circulations to prevent arrhythmia, and this can perhaps best be 
seen in the practice of gas day forecasting. Attempts are made to anticipate 
the annual, seasonal and diurnal rhythms of societal demand for gas, and 
based upon these figures, a distributed assemblage of actors work to adjust 
gas’s rhythms accordingly. National Grid is the organisation responsible for 
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forecasting rhythms in demand for gas in the UK, and this information is then 
used to inform the daily operational decisions of a distributed network of 
actors within the gas industry that includes producers, shippers, service 
operators, storage operators, large energy users and government. Forecasts 
are the primary means by which the rhythms with which gas is bought and sold, 
stored, compressed and transported are managed. The projection of rhythms 
of demand is therefore a key aspect of gas governance, with a multitude of 
actions being undertaken upon them158. 
 
Projecting demand rhythms is a complicated task however, primarily because 
demand is not just characterised by a single rhythm. Instead, it is constituted 
by a multiplicity of rhythmic movements that have to be taken into 
consideration in order to produce accurate forecasts. Broadly, these rhythms 
can be broken into five groups: industrial rhythms; the rhythms of local 
distribution zones; the operational rhythms of power stations; the rhythms of 
interconnectors; and the rhythms of storage. Each of these rhythms is made up 
of many smaller rhythmic movements that result in very different overall 
characteristics and unique challenges for prediction. Rather than examine each 
of these in detail here, I want to take a brief look at the way that distribution 
network demand is forecast, and demonstrate how a vast multiplicity of 
rhythms come into play in performances of synchronic security. 
 
Synchronic Security 
 
Demand in local distribution zones is difficult to forecast. It is made up of the 
daily rhythms of the millions of people that inhabit wide regional areas and 
who use gas within their houses, offices, schools, retail centres, small 
businesses, and hospitals. These rhythms are in turn largely dependent upon 
these people’s bodily rhythms; their patterns of hunger, thermal comfort and 
																																																						
158 Interview, Demand Forecaster, National Grid (2015). 
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sleep. In order to predict demand, National Grid tries to find patterns in the 
daily consumption routines of people living in different distribution zones. The 
rhythms of when people get up, leave for work, return home, cook food, and 
go to sleep, influence the daily recorded gas demand, but they do not 
sufficiently explain the volatile rhythms that National Grid observes. This is 
primarily because the main domestic use of gas is for thermal comfort. The 
bodily rhythms that drive demand are thus also dependent upon 
meteorological rhythms – the rhythms of precipitation, temperature and wind 
chill for different areas around the country. National Grid therefore also collects 
weather data from more than twenty sites that are located across the UK’s 
distribution zones, and then uses this data to create a composite weather 
variable (CWV) that combines projected weather conditions with typical daily 
consumption patterns.  
 
Whilst this creates an improved rhythmic projection however, it still doesn’t 
adequately account for the observed demand behaviours. This is because 
consumer behaviour also contains a psychological component. When it is 
raining or unpleasant outside (but not necessarily cold), consumers will often 
still turn on their heating, particularly during transitions between hot and cold 
seasons. National Grid have consequently designed their CWV to take into 
consideration additional meteorological factors such as daylight levels, fog, 
mist, time of year, and their predicted psychological impacts. The result is a 
composite variable that mirrors rhythmic patterns in daily consumer demand 
with a high degree of accuracy (see figure 16). 
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Figure 16 - Graph of consumer demand relative to forecasts(National Grid, 2015) 
 
 
As such, we can see in the case of National Grid’s demand forecasting for local 
distribution zones an attempt to draw together multiple rhythms that are 
external to the rhythms of gas in an effort to synchronise gas’s circulations with 
them. Such attempts, I suggest, can be seen to be premised upon concerns for 
security, for it is the phenomena of the fatal arrhythmia of demand and supply 
rhythms that these practices seek to ‘cancel out’. 
 
VIII. Conclusion: Beyond Lines 
 
In this chapter, I set out to challenge the way that circulation has typically been 
framed within the critical security studies and energy security literatures. I set 
out to challenge how circulation often appears as direct, linear, unproblematic 
and boring: as inconsequential movements of ‘stuff’ that only require attention 
at periodic ‘check points’ across their journeys. In confronting this premise, I 
pursued one of the central agendas of this thesis; to examine the way that 
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different forms of (in)security become entangled with circulations across their 
journeys, as they move between nodal points.  
 
I took the example of the pipeline – the seemingly quintessential model for 
modernist circulation – and made it strange. Building upon the work of Timothy 
Cresswell (2010), I highlighted six qualities of gaseous circulations that have 
received little attention within the existing security literatures. Each of these 
qualities was then shown to have important implications for the emergence of 
different forms of insecurity, opportunity and security practice. 
 
The first of these qualities regarded the implications that the circulatory paths 
of different elements have for security. In section II, I explored the way that 
these paths are often far from linear and featureless, but can be rhizomatic and 
textured, and, in the case of gas, are not necessarily one-directional. Instead, 
natural gas was shown to travel back and forth within pipelines of different 
sizes and materials, introducing it to new forms of external actor that it could 
forms of hazardous relation with. Indeed, even when its movements were 
relatively linear and direct, I demonstrated how this linearity must be 
appreciated for the ways in which it produces different forms of (in)security – in 
this case, simultaneously enabling new forms of surveillance but also 
introducing critical vulnerabilities to sabotage and accidental damage. 
 
Also in this section, I described how we might valuably attend to the circular 
aspect of gas’s circulation. Rather than limit analyses of circulations to simply 
the travels between two nodal points, I described how gas’s points of 
production, consumption and escape are widely dispersed and may not be 
easily identifiable. I also suggested various way that we might understand gas’s 
journeys beyond these points to be productive of forms of (in)security. 
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The second of gas’s circulatory qualities explored here regarded its volume. In 
section III, I traced three ways in which volume can be understood in relation to 
the securing of circulations of natural gas. First, I described how gas circulates 
through voluminous space, demonstrating how it becomes implicated in 
various concerns for security as it travels at different altitudes. Second, I 
described how the gas can be understood as voluminous in terms of the 
quantity of molecules that are contained within its circulation, demonstrating 
how this quantity was the implicit focus of analyses of the security of supply 
and demand. Third, I described how we must appreciate the three-dimensional 
volume of circulations, outlining how this can have implications for the 
commercial viability of gas’s sale and overseas transport.  
 
In section IV, I then briefly examined some of the material qualities of natural 
gas and the way that they can be seen to become entangled with concerns for 
security across its journeys. Whilst other aspects of this entanglement form the 
focus of other of this thesis’s empirical chapters, in this section I identified 
three qualities that have particular significance for the forms of (in)security that 
arise across gas’s circulatory journeys. These were; its appearance, its 
mutability, and its textures.  
 
In section V, I then examined a number of forces that are exerted upon gas 
across its circulations. I began by describing two forceful features of these 
circulations – motive force and frictional force – that have been previously 
analysed for their political significance in the mobilities literature, but are yet to 
be meaningfully attended to in critical security studies, or energy security 
literatures. I demonstrated how these forces are implicated in a number of 
concerns for security, both in terms of the physical exertions that can be 
observed in the case of compression, or the frictional forces that are provided 
by the pipe walls (both of which can be seen to be connected to concerns for 
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the security of supply), and also in terms of the networked forces that facilitate 
and resist the gas’s continued movement. Moreover, in addition to these 
motive and frictional forces, I drew attention to a series of other forces that can 
be seen to operate upon gas circulations – and which these circulations exert – 
that are similarly productive of (in)securities in different ways. 
 
In section VI, I turned to examine the temporal qualities of gas circulations, 
with a specific focus on the significance of velocity for performances of gaseous 
security. I described how there are a number of instances in which the speed 
(or slowness) with which gas moves has significance for the way that security is 
performed. In particular, I drew attention to two forms of velocity; the speed of 
its movements across Cartesian space, and the speed of its movements across 
relational space. 
 
Finally, in section VII, I explored the way that gas’s circulations must be 
appreciated for their rhythms. I described how these rhythms become wrapped 
up in concerns for security through the practice of demand forecasting. Here, I 
drew upon Lefebvre (2004) to draw attention to a practice of synchronic 
security, whereby attempts are made to match the rhythms of gas’s circulation 
with the complex rhythms of consumer demand. Failure to achieve this 
synchrony was perceived to result in a form of ‘fatal arrhythmia’ (Ibid), whereby 
societal rhythms became disconnected from the rhythms of the gas, leading to 
the disruption of everyday life. 
 
In these different ways, I have therefore demonstrated how gas’s circulations 
are far from simple trajectories between nodes. Such circulations have myriad 
qualities that present diverse challenges and opportunities for performances of 
security. By acknowledging these qualities and their implications, we are forced 
to recognise the distribution of security’s practice along the extents of 
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elements’ circulatory journeys. As such, security is not something that is simply 
practiced at nodally specific sites; it is a continual performance that is 
conducted across the length and breadth of elements’ travels. It is to the 
specifics of these security performances that I now turn in the final empirical 
chapter.  
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6 
 
Circulation, Mutation, and Modular 
Performances of Security 
 
 
 
“There is nothing in the world that remains unchanged. All things are in a perpetual 
state of flux, and every shadow is seen to move” 
(Ovid, Metamorphoses, book XV) 
 
Gas, n.1  
‘A substance in a state in which it expands freely to fill the whole of a container, 
having no fixed shape (unlike a solid), and no fixed volume (unlike a liquid)’ 
 (Oxford English Dictionary, 2015) 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the UK’s natural gas infrastructure, a small fluctuation in gas’s calorific value 
(CV) can have wide-ranging impacts. Decreases in CV can lead to appliances 
burning the gas inefficiently, resulting in the production of carbon monoxide 
and the potential poisoning of domestic consumers. Increases in CV could lead 
to the exaggeration of flames from domestic and industrial appliances, 
resulting in fire hazards and threats to public health. Such increases may also 
elevate the explosion risk associated with the transport of gas, with lower 
volumes needing to escape before a potentially explosive atmosphere 
develops. Gas’s calorific value is therefore carefully regulated throughout the 
UK’s natural gas transport network, with a complex set of monitoring and 
securing practices constantly employed to prevent the gas from deviating from 
an exacting chemical specification.   
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The case of CV regulation is just one example of how gas’s mutability has 
become incorporated within a system of governance. Natural gas is an 
inherently protean material that throughout its circulation will undergo a series 
of dramatic alterations. At different locations and times, it will become denser 
and less dense; it will expand and contract; it will wildly fluctuate in 
temperature; it will change state (from gas to liquid, and liquid to gas); it will 
contain more and less water, and it will shift in its chemical composition in 
other ways than just its energy content159. Added to these changes, it will also 
move with manifold rhythms and velocities, change its direction of travel in 
three-dimensional space, and throughout its journey, develop various, 
contingent relationships with a wide variety of other materials, bodies and 
things. Gas circulations are thus never fixed or uniform; they undergo constant 
change, mutating from moment to moment.  
 
These transformations need to be appreciated for their different relationships 
with security’s performance. Indeed, gas’s mutation can have important 
implications for the different forms of danger and opportunity it is perceived to 
present, and it can affect the way that security is consequently performed in 
relation to it. From increases in gas’s pressure that cause it to exert greater 
force upon pipe walls, to the way that gas forms new relations with multiple 
human bodies as it travels within high-rise buildings (and consequently 
develops the capacity to cause mass casualties), each new relational mutation 
produces fresh forms of agency and opens up new potential gaseous futures 
that systems of governance attempt to form around.  
 
																																																						
159 At different times, for example, it will include and exclude various toxic materials such as 
hydrogen sulfide, carbon monoxide, and carcinogenic dust. 
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Yet whilst the mutability of elements160 has significant implications for the ways 
that security is performed, it has been almost entirely overlooked in the critical 
security studies and energy security literatures. Indeed, whilst these literatures 
have extensively explored security’s performance in relation to a wide range of 
circulating entities, scholars have tended to assume that the bodies, objects 
and things under study rigidly hold their shape and qualities throughout the 
duration of their transit, and that the performances of security conducted upon 
them remain relatively constant161.  
 
I suggest that this oversight is symptomatic of the way that performances of 
security have typically been reduced to two kinds of practice through which 
circulating elements pass, but are not deformed. The first of these practices 
might be described as circulatory filtration. Considerable effort has been 
expended in the critical security studies literature on describing the various 
means through which risky circulating entities come to be ‘bordered’ – how 
they are systematically separated from other entities in circulation that are 
considered to be safe. As a result, we now have at our disposal a wide variety 
of studies that have examined filtration practices in relation to such diverse 
circulatory figures as the terrorist (Adey, 2004; Amoore, 2007; Amoore and 
Hall, 2009; Aradau and van Munster, 2008; Vaughan-Williams, 2007); the 
‘illegal’ immigrant (Coleman, 2005; Rossmo et al., 2008; Amoore, 2006); the 
																																																						
160 Mutability is not exclusive to gas. As Pete Adey (2006) reminds us, some entities may be 
more durable than others, but all are ultimately transient and are prone to change. 
161 There has been some valuable research in other fields that has emphasised the 
transformative qualities of circulating elements. In particular, I refer to the work currently being 
conducted on circular economies (Gregson et al., 2015; Hobson, 2015; Kama, 2015), whereby 
the material transformation of entities and the ways in which they are subsequently valued are 
traced out and documented. Relevant research has also been undertaken within the literature 
on food geographies, with several historical accounts usefully documenting a range of 
technological developments in practices of circulatory governance, most notably with regards 
to the management of the decay (Nimmo, 2011; Twilley, 2014; Dunn, 2011; Atkins, 2004, 
2011, 2010). Finally, the recent (mainly geographical) work on dynamic mobilities and fluidities 
has valuable utility for conceptualising the political significance of shifting movements 
(Cresswell, 2010; Steinberg and Peters, 2015; Cresswell and Martin, 2012). Despite these 
avenues of enquiry however, little work has acknowledged the relevance of such 
transformations for performances of security. 
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asylum seeker (Devetak, 2004; Rajaram, 2008; Buckel and Wissel, 2010); the 
risky financial transaction (Goede, 2006; de Goede, 2007; Favarel-Garrigues, et 
al. 2011); the diseased body (Hinchliffe and Bingham, 2008; Hinchliffe et al., 
2013; Clark, 2013b) and the illicit narcotic (Ackleson, 2005; Bourne, 2015). Yet 
within each of these studies, there appears to be an assumption that, as their 
elements of concern pass through these nodes, they either simply come to a 
stop, or are allowed to continue. Little attention is paid to what happens to 
apprehended elements, or to how their threatening agency is addressed, 
compensated for, or ‘cancelled out’. 
 
The second practice can be described as circulatory maintenance. This features 
in both the critical security studies and energy security literatures, but it is most 
prominent in the latter162. Indeed, circulatory maintenance is the primary 
narrative of security’s practice in relation to energy (c.f. El Badri, 2008; Cornell, 
2009; Sovacool and Brown, 2010; Yergin, 2006; Bradshaw, 2009), insecurity 
being seen to stem from interruptions to energy’s circulation, and security 
featuring as a set of largely economic and political practices through which the 
continued circulation of energy products is maintained. Again, no attention is 
paid to how energy (or any other form of circulating element) is transformed 
through this practice, nor is attention paid to how the dynamic material 
qualities of the things in motion may trouble the way that their circulations are 
maintained. 
 
As such, within both of these narratives, elements are presented as being 
passive, unproblematic, and entirely immutable. In this chapter, I seek to 
provide a counter-narrative to this discourse. I argue that an attention to the 
dynamic vitality of natural gas and its mutability is necessary for understanding 
																																																						
162 For examples of narratives of circulatory maintenance in the critical security studies 
literature, see the work of Cowen (2009, 2010) that looks at the implications of frictional forces 
upon the transport of cargo, and the work Langley (2014), who has examined economic 
security in terms of the necessity of the continued circulation of finance. 
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the challenges that elements (bodies, materials, things) present for their 
governance, and for appreciating how security involves practices of relational 
organisation through which particular forms of gaseous phenomena come to 
be facilitated, compensated for, or cancelled out. Security, as I conceptualize it 
here, thus far exceeds simple practices of filtration or maintenance. It is an 
ontological project163. 
 
I pursue this argument in the following way. In section II, I provide a discussion 
of how we might conceptualise the mutation of circulating entities. I describe 
how mutations open up new forms of actual and potential agency (including 
new forms of mobility), and I draw upon the work of Foucault (2007) and 
(DeLanda, 2006) to demonstrate how we might recognise security as 
constituting a set of practices of relational organisation through which 
particular forms of gaseous phenomena come to be facilitated, compensated 
for, or cancelled out.  
 
In sections III and IV, I then turn to provide an analysis of the specific ways in 
which these relations are organised in the case of natural gas. In each section, I 
take a different point in gas’s journey within the UK’s transmission and 
distribution systems, and describe how specialized security apparatuses have 
been developed around the gas at these points to (re)arrange its relational 
configuration in different ways, according to the interests of the actors involved 
with it at these particular locations.  
 
From these analyses, I suggest that we can observe five specific techniques 
through which gas’s ontological structure comes to be rearranged: the 
distancing of exterior relations, the formation of relational ‘blocks’, the 
transformation of relations of interiority, the reinforcement of relations, and the 
																																																						
163 Or series of ontological projects. 
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formation of indicative relations. By examining these various practices, I 
suggest that mutation must be seen as being central to performances of 
circulatory security.  
 
In section V, I then conclude by proposing that we understand such security 
performances through Deleuze's (1992) concept of modulation, whereby 
assemblages of security actors orbit circulations, performing them as secure at 
different points in space and time by manipulating their relational 
arrangements. Such an approach, I suggest, may provide a means through 
which to better appreciate the dynamism of elements and the way that security 
is differentially (and dynamically) performed across entities’ circulatory 
journeys. 
 
II. Mutation and Security 
 
Mutation can be seen to create problems for security primarily through the new 
forms of possible agency164 and gaseous phenomena that it brings into 
existence. As I discussed in Chapter 5, the work of DeLanda (2006) can help us 
to understand an elements agency as being the emergent product of its 
specific configuration of interior and exterior relations. Relations of interiority 
are the sets of relations that exist between an entity’s internalised elements, 
and these define its inherent capacities to act in different ways. Relations of 
																																																						
164 Material agency is a controversial topic within security debates. In this chapter, agency is 
considered as “a matter of intra-acting; it is an enactment, not something that someone or 
something has” (Barad 2007; 178). This intra-action can occur between materials, bodies and 
‘things’, meaning that agency is not aligned with human intentionality: it is an emergent 
phenomenon that is not exclusive to either human bodies or to materials. Material agency is 
therefore not fetishized in this account (I am not a vital materialist, nor am I a post humanist in 
the typical sense of the term). Instead, matter and human bodies, following Latour (1993), are 
assumed - at least in the first instance - to have equal capacities to act. This is important for 
security, for as Barad notes, “Holding the category ‘human’ (‘nonhuman’) fixed (or at least 
presuming that one can) excludes an entire range of possibilities in advance” (2007; 178), and 
these possibilities must be seen to be constitutive of the phenomena that security seeks to 
map out and govern against. 
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exteriority are then the relations that exist between that element and other 
elements external to it. It is through the formation of particular relations of 
exteriority with other external elements that elements may actualise their 
inherent capacities to ‘act’, with certain forms of related phenomena coming to 
emerge in the process. Without the actualisation of these relations however, 
such capacities will remain latent, or virtual.  
 
I understand mutation to involve the configuration of these sets of internal and 
external relations shifting as elements move through space and time. Internal 
changes may occur through the inclusion or exclusion of internal components 
(such as in the case of natural gas flows acquiring rust particulates as they flow 
through corroding pipes, or gas having its hydrogen sulphide molecules 
removed in processing terminals). They may also occur through alterations in 
the relationships between these constitutive parts, as in the case of gas’s 
pressurization, through which it experiences shifts in the distance between the 
molecules that constitute it, and the way that their atoms vibrate. Shifts in 
relations of interiority can be extremely significant for the governance of 
circulating elements, for they can affect their irreducible properties and the 
constellation of virtuals that surround them. As a result, new capacities and 
potential futures open up that can become actualised.  
 
Whilst an entity’s constellations of virtuals, and therefore its latent capacities, 
are dependent upon these internal relations, the external relations of elements 
can also shift through changes in their surrounding milieus. This is particularly 
the case for elements that circulate widely across space and time, for their 
journeys draw them into constantly unfolding combinations of associations. As 
particular sets of relations come into being (or actualise from their virtuality) 
during these travels, so elements may realise particular forms of agency that 
have previously remained latent. In the case of gas, it comes into the proximity 
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of, and consequently forms external relations with, a wide variety of other 
elements as it circulates. Whilst these relationships may often be transient and 
fleeting, they can be sufficient for certain gaseous capacities to become 
actualised. 
 
This movement and the shifting of relations that it results in should not be 
regarded as ‘other’ to the relational construction of elements, however. 
Movement itself must be seen as a relational effect that results from the way 
that force is distributed within these relational configurations. Such forces may 
take more traditional forms, such as the motive force that is exerted upon gas 
flows by compressor turbines, but they can also be understood in a more 
Foucauldian sense – to include generative forces such as those that are applied 
through the political, economic and social relations that continue to necessitate 
and legitimise the extraction and transport of natural gas. Mobility is thus a 
product of complex webs of socio-material relations that may also undergo 
change.  
 
Building upon the observations outlined in the previous chapter, if we are to 
understand movements as emergent phenomena that result from the 
actualisation of particular sets of relations, then we must also acknowledge that 
there may be many different kinds of movements that exist in their virtuality, 
and that beyond these movements will reside immense arrays of further virtual 
relations. As has been discussed earlier, this can have implications for security’s 
performance, as the emergent movements of entities may provide them with 
the capacity to produce undesirable destabilising effects. 
  
Taking this approach, no element can be considered inherently stable or 
ontologically fixed. The gas in this study appears as a shape-shifter, a perpetual 
transformer; a traveller that is forever in the midst of metamorphosis. Its 
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relations of interiority and exteriority warp as it moves through space and time, 
transforming it ontologically and altering its properties, qualities, movements, 
and the kinds of agency that are available to it. New gaseous actualities 
emerge, fresh constellations of virtuals branch out, and new potential futures 
erupt forth. 
 
*** 
 
Bringing DeLanda’s (2006) ideas on the relational construction of emergent 
wholes into conversation with Foucault’s (2007) work on the governance of 
food scarcity can help us to develop a better understanding of the way that 
security and mutation are closely entwined. In his brief description of the way 
that circulations of grain are governed through a security apparatus, Foucault 
usefully draws our attention to the way that the whole lifecycle of grain 
becomes incorporated into the practice of security. From seed to consumption, 
grain passes through multiple hands, comes into contact with numerous 
materials, and circulates within a range of different environments. At each 
stage of its journey, the various elements that it comes into contact with exert 
themselves upon it according to their different interests, and come together to 
form an apparatus of security that manages its movement and compensates 
for, or cancels out, particular kinds of phenomena.  
 
Yet whilst Foucault’s account refers specifically to the management of the 
circulation of a material element, he is exceptionally brief in his analysis of the 
specific kinds of actions that are taken upon it, and about how the grain is 
transformed through the process. This, as Barad (2007) notes, is characteristic 
of Foucault, who exhibits a tendency to focus “on the production of human 
bodies, to the exclusion of nonhuman bodies whose constitution he takes for 
granted” (p. 169). As such, the material drops out of Foucault’s accounts, and 
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he consequently overlooks certain important aspects of the mechanics of 
security performances, and the way that the constitution of bodies and 
materials is managed through practices of security. In this chapter I attempt to 
address this absence by focussing specifically upon the relational constitution 
of materials, and by drawing upon DeLanda’s concepts of relations of 
interiority and exteriority in order to do so. 
 
For Foucault, the securing of circulating elements takes place through the 
governance of their realities. It is upon these realities that security apparatuses 
are grafted, and it is upon these realities that “[security] tries to get a hold” 
(2007; p36). For DeLanda, a whole’s reality emerges through the actualisation 
of its relations of interiority and exteriority. It comes into being through the 
ongoing development of different kinds of relations between heterogeneous 
elements. Reality thus emerges through the realisation of these relations; 
through their ‘becoming reality’. It must therefore be seen to consist of 
complex assemblages of realised relations of interiority and exteriority. As 
Barad puts it, “reality is composed […] of things-in-phenomena” (2007: 140); 
realised ‘things’, or ‘phenomena’ that are in the process of forming.  
 
This ongoing process of formation also draws attention to the vast series of 
other virtualised relations that lie beyond the relations that are currently 
actualised, however. Reality, in a given moment, is always linked to a 
proliferation of other potential realities that could (but may never) form. It is the 
governance of the process of relational formation, the management of which 
relations become real, and which remain virtual, that I argue is the focus of 
security. Security seeks to manage different entities’ relations so that those 
configurations that are perceived to constitute particular kinds of threatening 
phenomena can be “gradually compensated for, checked, finally limited, and, 
in the final degree, cancelled out” (Foucault 2007; 37), and so that, I argue, 
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other desirable relational formations might be facilitated. As such, security 
must be seen as an organisational project through which attempts are made to 
grapple with and manage the realities of circulating entities – to manage their 
ontologies – through strategically arranging their relations of interiority and 
exteriority as they move through space and time. 
 
As security scholars we consequently need to pay close attention to the 
relations of exteriority and interiority that constitute the entities of our 
enquiries. This is a difficult task, for as DeLanda (2006) notes, the complexity, 
transience, and potential imperceptibility of these relations means that it is 
never possible to exhaustively trace them. Whilst our analyses may never be 
complete however (and indeed, we would never know if they were), attempting 
to trace these relations is not a fruitless task, but one that can yield valuable 
insights into the operations of security and the ways in which circulating entities 
come to be perceived as the sources of potential opportunities and threats. As 
such, Foucault recommends that we should try to observe the points at which 
security actants “connect[…] up with the very reality of […] fluctuations” (2007; 
37). By attempting to hold the circulating entity firmly within our analytical 
sights, we can endeavour to observe the relationships that different actants 
form with it, to document the kinds of action that they undertake upon its 
relations of interiority and exteriority, and to investigate the types of logic and 
interests that drive the formation of these connections.  
 
III. Securing Natural Gas (I): Latitude 
 
So what does the operation of security in relation to the circulation of natural 
gas look like when we take this approach? What forms of securing action are 
undertaken upon the gas, and what logics inspire these actions? In order to 
examine these questions, I begin my analysis with an example, tracing out 
some of the connections that converge upon gas at a single location in space 
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and time. By taking such a latitudinal, cross-sectional ‘slice’ through the 
pipeline in this example, and by tracing the webs of relations that propagate 
forth from the gas, I believe that we can reveal a variety of security practices 
that are employed to structure its reality.  
 
The example chosen here is the gas in the pipe in figure 17. In this image 
(which was taken near Bacton in Norfolk), a signpost indicates the presence of 
a section of NTS pipeline. The gas travelling through this pipe flows in large 
volumes at high pressure (up to 85bar165), and its molecules are consequently 
tightly packed. This causes a large amount of gas to occupy the space within 
the pipe, and also results in the gas exerting considerable force upon the 
pipeline walls. Amongst other forms of potential phenomena that could 
emerge from this particular configuration of gas’s relations of interiority, two 
kinds of particularly violent gaseous capacity develop – the ability of the gas to 
cause large jet fires and the ability to cause vapour cloud explosions. At this 
singular point in its transit, it is consequently possible to observe a complex set 
of organisational practices that are applied to the gas’s interior and exterior 
relations in an attempt to ‘compensate for’, or ‘cancel out’, these forms of 
potentially life-threatening phenomena.  
 
																																																						
165 ‘Bar’ is a unit of pressure (1 bar roughly equals the earth’s atmospheric pressure at sea 
level). Most NTS pipelines operate at pressures up to 85bar, whilst regional gas networks pipe 
gas at a range of pressure tiers. Local transmission pipes transport gas at pressures up to 38 
bar, intermediate pressure distribution networks transport gas at pressures between 2 and 7 
bar, medium pressure distribution pipelines transport gas at pressures between 75millibar to 2 
bar, and low pressure distribution pipes transport gas at any pressure below 75 millibar. 1 bar 
= 1000 millibar. 
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Figure 17 - Photograph of NTS pipeline marker in Norfolk, 2014 
 
Perhaps the simplest practice of relational organisation observable here 
involves: 1) the strategic distancing of gas’s proximate external relations across 
both time and space. This can most easily be seen in the deployment of land-
use zoning practices around gas pipelines. When first installed, the pipe in 
figure 17 was distanced from areas of dense development so that the 
likelihood of it forming external relations with properties and bodies would be 
reduced166. This action alone was not sufficient to prevent gas from forming 
external relations with human bodies and properties in the future however, for 
subsequent developments may be initiated around the pipeline at a later date. 
In recognition of this, the UK’s Health and Safety Executive also attempts to 
manage the future milieus of high pressure gas installations through practices 
of land-use zoning. This involves providing Local Planning Authorities (LPA) 
																																																						
166 Industry standards (IGEM, 1995). 
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with maps that divide the land surrounding high pressure gas pipelines into 
three zones (inner, middle, outer), based upon the results of a Quantitative Risk 
Analysis (HSE, 2016). In this manner, the risk of gas forming the sets of relations 
necessary for it to realise its capacity to take life is calculated, as is the spatial 
dispersion of these risks. Each zone indicates a different level of risk, and such 
categorizations are then used to influence the LPA’s decisions as to what kinds 
of future development should be permitted within certain vicinities of the 
circulating gas.  
 
Typically, Local Planning Authorities do not authorise developments to be built 
within the zone of highest risk (<10 chances per million, per year), but in the 
middle (<1 chance per million, per year) and outer zones (<0.3 chances per 
million, per year), certain kinds of development may sometimes be permitted 
(HSE, 2016). Authorisation for such developments is dependent upon the 
degree of their perceived sensitivity – a measure that is developed through the 
consideration of the number of people who will use the planned development, 
the amount of time they will be present in the property over a 24-hour period, 
and their relative mobility (Ibid). The greater the number of people spending a 
longer amount of time in a particular space, the higher the sensitivity rating 
that that development will receive. Those sites, such as hospitals, where users 
may have reduced mobility (and therefore cannot easily evacuate an area in the 
event of an incident) will also receive a higher sensitivity score (Ibid). 
 
In this way, the HSE and Local Planning Authorities are involved in a practice of 
actively arranging gas’s relations of exteriority to strategically distance certain 
kinds of external entity from the gas so that particular relational configurations 
cannot easily become actualised. Such distancing takes place not simply over 
space (such as when human bodies are physically distanced from gas so that 
their ability to form such relations is inhibited), but also over time. Decisions 
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over the authorization of new developments are made through the calculation 
of the risk of gas actualizing particular hazardous relations, relative to the 
amount of time that a space is likely to be occupied by individual bodies. 
Likewise, assessments based upon occupant’s mobility take into consideration 
the formation of external relations over both time and space simultaneously – 
in them, attempts are made to discern whether occupants could navigate 
space sufficiently quickly to distance themselves from the gas before it formed 
life-threatening relations of exteriority with them.   
 
Such distancing practices involve the drawing of a line through gas’s virtual 
cosmos, whereby acceptable gaseous realities are separated from those that 
are deemed to be unacceptable. By ordering gas’s proximate external relations 
across time and space, an attempt is thus made to exclude gas’s unacceptable 
realities and to relegate these relations to virtuality. In this way, particular kinds 
of gaseous agency come to be limited, inhibiting the emergence of life-
threatening phenomena. This does not entail an absolute eradication of the 
phenomena however, for these relations will always continue to exist in their 
virtuality. As such, gas’s potential agency is not annihilated, but simply 
inhibited. This is also not a permanent situation, for it involves a performance 
that is always open to transformation or failure, and which maintains the 
possibility of these relations becoming actualised.  
 
Hazardous phenomena are also never completely eradicated because a 
compromise has to be made between individual safeties on the one hand, and 
on the other, the need for subsequent developments on surrounding land. 
Along the length of the NTS, bodies and buildings are not always distributed 
so that they sit totally beyond gas’s relational grasp. Despite the identification 
of risk, the actual development of property within the proximity of pipelines is 
conducted at the discretion of the Local Planning Authority, and as such, 
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development occurs according to what Foucault (2007) terms a ‘bandwidth of 
the acceptable’ (p. 6). Instead of a precise incision, or absolute boundary, 
being drawn between acceptable and unacceptable distances of people and 
property in space and time, a principle of risk is employed, whereby the 
likelihood of these relations actualising out of their virtuality is calculated, and 
the acceptability of these risks assessed. Whilst in an ideal scenario, bodies and 
buildings would be arranged so that they were sufficiently removed from gas’s 
proximity to ensure that forms of life-threatening agency were ‘cancelled out’ 
(a distance that is theoretically demarcated by the extreme limit of the outer 
zone), the use of these calculative practices enables a negotiation of interests 
to take place, and permits certain developments to occur within specific areas. 
A more definite line of unacceptability can be seen to be in operation, however 
(as is indicated by the boundary of the zone of highest risk). Past this, all 
development is prevented. Relational partitioning thus operates through a 
bandwidth of action that distinguishes an ideal, but negotiable, relational 
distance and a line of absolutely unacceptable proximity. 
 
The second practice of relational organisation then involves: 2) the construction 
of ‘blocking relations’. For gas to realise its explosive agency, it needs to form 
relations with oxygen and a source of ignition. To do this it must somehow 
come to circulate beyond the pipe (or oxygen and heat must find some way of 
entering the NTS). For either of these events to happen, the external 
relationship that the gas possesses with the pipe must change; the integrity of 
the pipe walls needs to be compromised. As such, the walls of the pipe can be 
understood to form a kind of relational block around the gas. Through the 
gas’s formation of relations of exteriority with the pipe walls, certain other 
exterior relations come to be cordoned off – as one set of relations becomes 
actualised, so others become relegated to virtuality. A relational partition is 
thus formed through the totalising presence of these particular material 
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elements that saturate the actuality of the gas, excluding the actualisation of 
other virtuals. In this way, the latent agency of gas (in this case, its ability to 
cause loss of life through an explosion or jet fire) again becomes inhibited 
through the creation of a partition, albeit one that is formed through the 
creation of blocking relations, not through the production of spatial distance. 
 
These kinds of relations require a considerable amount of effort, however. The 
transmission pipes in this example have to be made to exacting specifications. 
Their constitutive materials must possess certain strengths and levels of 
fracture toughness (a measure of their ability to resist fracture), and their wall 
thicknesses and diameters are carefully regulated, dependent upon the 
pressure of the gas flowing in that section of the network, and dependent upon 
the presence of perceived external threats (such as vibrations from nearby 
traffic). Every pipe also has to be checked and tested for minute imperfections 
and weaknesses, prior to normal operation167. In this way, different pipes are 
designed to more-or-less reliably block gas from forming certain kinds of 
external relations, dependent upon the particular properties and pressures that 
the gas possesses168, and the kinds of external threat that are perceived to be 
present within that pipe’s milieu.  
 
Again, just as relational distancing practices should not be understood as a 
means of absolutely eradicating relational phenomena, blocking relations 
should never be understood as fixed and permanent. They are precariously 
performed, and their forcing of other relations into virtuality is consequently 
always subject to resistance, is only ever temporary, and is not guaranteed.  
 
This can be clearly seen in the example of the resistance presented by 
corrosion. As Muhlbauer (2004; 61) explains, ‘manufactured metals have a 
																																																						
167 Industry standards (IGEM, 1995). 
168 Every pipe is allocated a maximum operating pressure. 
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natural tendency to revert to their original mineral form’ (a process known as 
corrosion). To differing degrees, corrosion affects practically all of the metal 
pipes in the NTS. It also presents considerable risks for the transportation of 
natural gas, because any reduction in pipe wall thickness can threaten the 
structural integrity of these pipes and therefore increase their risk of failure 
(Ibid). Such risks are made more significant by the high pressures and volumes 
in which gas flows through the NTS, for it puts a high level of stress upon the 
pipes and creates the potential for larger scale incidents. Corrosion therefore 
constitutes a resistive force to the work of the pipe’s blocking relations. Far 
from the pipe forming a permanent and guaranteed partition between gas and 
other external actants, its performances of security are always subject to 
resistive forces that work to undermine it. Without additional practices (such as 
the application of anti-corrosion measures), these relations will eventually break 
down, enabling gas to realise other forms of external relation. Security 
therefore has to be continually performed. 
 
For the transmission pipe in figure 17, corrosion takes two forms; internal 
corrosion, whereby the pipe corrodes from the inside out (usually due to a 
reaction between the pipe walls and the transported product), and subsurface 
corrosion, whereby the pipe corrodes from the outside-in (primarily due to 
either a chemical reaction between the pipe and the surrounding soil, or 
because of the presence of stray electrical currents). Industrial responses to 
internal corrosion can be seen to present a third practice of relational 
organisation. This takes the form of: 3) the manipulation of gas’s relations of 
interiority. The primary means of addressing internal corrosion involves a 
chemical alteration of the corrosiveness of gas. Natural gas’s principle acidic 
component is hydrogen sulphide, which is present in raw natural gas in varying 
volumes, depending upon the characteristics of the well from which the gas is 
extracted (Interview, Shell Operations Manager, 2nd April 2015). Hydrogen 
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sulphide reacts with water molecules that are present within the gas (or which 
have found their way into the inside of pipes via other means), and this reaction 
results in the formation of hydrosulphuric acid, a substance that can eat away at 
the steel pipe walls (Amosa, Mohammed and Yaro, 2010). Both hydrogen 
sulphide and water molecules are consequently removed from natural gas 
through the use of sophranol and silica bead filters, prior to it entering the 
NTS169. In this way, natural gas’s relations of interiority are directly manipulated, 
with threatening constituents being isolated and their agency being neutralised 
as the gas passes through the processing terminal. A line is thus again drawn 
through gas’s relational cosmos, with unacceptable relational forms being 
isolated in order to strategically inhibit the agency of the circulating gas. This 
process of inhibition is distinctly different from the techniques described 
previously however, for the changing of gas’s relations of interiority means that 
its inherent capacities and the constellation of virtualised relations that 
surround it are also directly altered. As such, the manners in which gas can 
interact with its proximate neighbours undergoes a radical transformation. 
 
In addition to the management of internal corrosion through the alteration of 
gas’s relations of interiority, efforts are also undertaken to manage the forms of 
corrosion that take place upon the outside of pipes. In these efforts, a fourth 
practice of relational organisation is visible. This practice involves: 4) the 
reinforcement of security apparatuses with successive layers of additional 
relations. Subsurface corrosion generally occurs if four requirements are 
satisfied170. An anode must be present; a cathode must be present; an 
electrical current must exist between them; and an electrolyte must be 
available to conduct this current. Anodes and cathodes are defined through 
their affinities for electrons (a property that is known as electronegativity). 
Different areas in pipe surfaces will naturally possess higher or lower levels of 
																																																						
169 Interview, Operations Supervisor, St Fergus Gas Processing Terminal (2015). 
170 Data taken from Muhlbauer (2004). 
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electronegativity, and areas that have higher electronegativity are referred to 
as cathodes, whilst lower areas are referred to as anodes. The greater the 
difference in electronegativity between cathodic areas and anodic areas, the 
more likely electrons will flow between them. This electron flow requires a 
conductive electrolyte however, which is typically provided by the soil. Should 
each of these requirements become actualised, an electrical circuit will form, 
causing metal from the anode to dissolve and migrate to the cathode, leaving 
inconsistencies in the surface of the pipe. If unchecked, these inconsistencies 
can create severe structural weaknesses in the pipe walls, and can increase the 
likelihood of their failure. 
 
To govern this process of external corrosion, anti-subsurface corrosion systems 
are employed to prevent these kinds of relations from forming (Muhlbauer, 
2004). There are two main techniques that are employed for this purpose. The 
first involves coating pipes with insulating materials that isolate the pipe from 
the surrounding soil. This forms an additional kind of blocking relation on top 
of those formed by the pipe walls, whereby the coating interrupts the 
formation of the corrosive electrical circuit, theoretically halting the decay of 
pipes. As such, we can observe the formation of successive layers of blocking 
relations around the gas, these layers working to reinforce the performance of 
security that is conducted by the pipe. Not only does the pipe wall block and 
exclude other external entities from forming relations with the gas, but this 
action is backed up by the work of an additional layer of blocking relations (the 
coating) that blocks the pipe walls from forming relations with the electrolyte. 
In this way, an attempt is made to force successive layers of virtuals to retain 
their virtuality, effectively ‘cancelling out’ escape-related phenomena.  
 
As always however, resistive forces continue to operate. Inconsistencies in 
coatings (which may be microscopic) are impossible to eradicate, and corrosion 
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can consequently continue to occur (Muhlbauer, 2004). To compensate for this, 
attempts are also made to form further relations around the gas. In this 
instance, this involves the burying of ‘sacrificial’ anodes (bodies of metal that 
have a markedly lower electronegativity than the materials the pipeline is made 
of) alongside pipelines. These anodes work as substitutes for the pipe’s anodic 
sections, causing an electrical relationship to preferentially form between them 
and the pipe’s cathodes. As a result, instead of metal migrating from one part 
of the pipe to another, it only migrates from the new anode to the areas of 
high electronegativity on the pipe. This results in the pipe actually gaining 
thickness and losing none of its structural integrity (Ibid).  
 
Latour (1991) offers some useful concepts for coming to terms with the 
relational mechanics of this process of reinforcement. He suggests that certain 
imperatives (for instance, the assurance of public safety) can become 
reinforced and made more durable through the strategic creation of particular 
kinds of relational arrangement. These structures are described as ‘programs’; 
meticulously constructed systems of relations that, through the careful 
arrangement of network forces, more-or-less consistently result in the 
production of particular given outputs (in this example, the inhibiting of gas’s 
potentially lethal capacities). Through this process, imperatives become 
translated into logics, a logic being “a programmatic way of formalising, 
justifying and deploying actions in the here and now” (Anderson, 2010a; 779).  
 
Latour is quick to point out however that such programmed systems of 
relations are always confronted with ‘anti-programs’; different forms of resistive 
force that oppose the imperative put forward by the program. From this 
perspective, corrosion can be seen to be an anti-program, or resistive force, 
that opposes a larger ontological project of gaseous security. Like all anti-
programs, it resists specific sets of relations – in this case, the blocking relations 
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established by the pipe walls. In this way, corrosion exposes the pipe to also 
be mutable, eventually transforming it to a point where it ceases to have the 
necessary force to securely contain the gas. To counter these resistive forces 
and make the program more durable, Latour suggests that programs may be 
loaded with additional reinforcing relations (what he calls ‘anti-anti-
programs’)171. The pipe coatings and the sacrificial anodes constitute a series of 
these ‘backup’ relations that work to counter the force of corrosion. As such, 
resistive forces are confronted through the creation of a forceful relational 
architecture that attempts to ensure that circulating elements comply with its 
imperatives. In doing so, reality is added to the imperative (Latour, 1991), and 
the ontologically ‘secure’ element comes to be actualised. 
 
This is not to say that reinforced programs no longer experience resistance 
however. Whilst programs of relations can produce specific kinds of realities 
that are more or less durable, they are still never permanent, and are highly 
contingent and continuously performed (Law, 2007). We should therefore take 
caution in using Latour’s notion of the ‘immutable mobile’ (a relational 
formation that retains its shape even as it moves across time and space). 
Indeed, rather than certain phenomenal objects being inherently immutable, 
we must take care to hold on to the notion that their forms and agencies are 
sustained through the governance of their actualised and non-actualised 
relations. As such, whilst some elements may indeed appear to be more 
durable than others, we must always remember that they are susceptible to 
politically significant transformations and failures. Such is the case with pipes 
and corrosion. Whilst anti-anti-programs may have been formed around the 
gas in figure 17, these corrosive forces can never be completely ‘cancelled out’ 
– they can only be ‘compensated for’. Steel transmission pipes are perpetually 
																																																						
171 There is a similarity here with Pickering's (1995) suggestion that these relational structures 
are developed through practice – that they are iterated upon to more successfully produce 
particular outcomes. Indeed, I suggest that incident reports and alterations to industry 
standards are clear examples of this iterative process. 
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vulnerable to degradation, and as a consequence, they will always be at risk of 
decay and failure.  
 
A fifth kind of organisational practice can be seen to be closely associated with 
the recognition of this vulnerability to failure. This involves: 5) the formation of 
‘indicative’, or ‘surveillant’, relations. The vulnerability of security programs to 
failure is a consequence of the mutation of their relational architectures, but 
many of these mutating relations can be difficult to perceive through human 
senses. In the case of corrosion discussed here, such changes are largely 
insensible due to their occurring beneath the earth’s surface. The perception of 
these relations may also be difficult for other reasons, too – including: 
relationships not presenting themselves within human affective registers; 
relations being widely dispersed across geographical space; or elements’ 
relational movements being either too fast or slow for human observation. 
Because of these transformations however, and because of how they can lead 
to the emergence of particular undesired realities, attempts are frequently 
made to construct relational entanglements that provide indicators of change 
within programs. These indicative relations are engineered to reflect traces of 
gas’s current relational arrangements in humanly perceivable ways in order 
that: a) the status of security programs can be assessed; b) advanced warning 
of the potential emergence of unacceptable phenomena can be facilitated; 
and c) the arrangement of new forms of securing relationship can be enabled. 
Various strategies are thus employed to collect traces of gas’s relations and to 
thereby assess and monitor the status of programmed performances of 
security, in order that particular emergent scenarios can be avoided.  
 
In the case of corrosion, indicative relations can be seen in the cathodic 
protection monitoring points that are placed across the transmission network, 
and also in the use of inline inspection devices, or ‘PIGs’. Cathodic protection 
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monitoring points are locations where a meter is installed to measure the 
strength of the electrical currents that are travelling across pipes172. Through 
these measurements, estimations of the voracity of corrosion on that section of 
pipe may be produced. Pipeline inspection devices, in contrast, operate within 
the gas stream. They are large, articulated, devices that are inserted into pipes 
and which travel within the gas flow, transmitting electromagnetic waves 
through the pipe walls and recording the signals that are bounced back. In this 
way, they enable the thickness of the pipe walls to be assessed and any 
irregularities (such as corrosion, cracks, dents) to be identified. These features 
are then mapped and evaluated to determine the necessity of repairs, prior to 
their failure173. As such, particular sets of relations are constructed around the 
gas to provide indicators of the efficacy of security’s present performances, and 
to assess the forms of possible phenomena that may potentially become 
available to the gas in the future. In this example, it is the condition of gas’s 
relations of exteriority that are being assessed. In other cases, however, such as 
in the use of chromatography units described in chapter 5, indicative relations 
will be employed to assess and monitor gas’s relations of interiority. 
 
In this way, indicative relations work as a form of relational ‘trigger’ that, if 
presented with particular stimuli, set in motion processes of relational 
reassembly. For instance, should a significant feature be identified during a PIG 
inspection, or should a cathodic protection point indicate an area of sustained 
elevated electrochemical activity, then teams of engineers will be dispatched 
to excavate and repair the pipes in question174. In this way, indicative relations 
work to render the security program actionable, and to enable gas’s governing 
actors to reinforce this program with successive sets of additional anti-anti-
programs so that the imperative of security retains its actuality. 
																																																						
172 Interview, former Network Director, Northern Gas Networks (2015). 
173 Site visit, PII Pipeline Solutions (2014). 
174 Interview, Emergency Operations Manager, National Grid (2015). 
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*** 
 
From this analysis, I have identified 5 practices through which gas’s constitutive 
relations of interiority and exteriority are strategically manipulated to 
‘compensate for’ and ‘cancel out’ particular forms of emergent phenomena. 
These five practices are: relational distancing; relational blocking; the 
reassembly of relations of interiority; relational reinforcement; and the 
construction of indicative relations. Through a single example, security 
therefore emerges as an ontological project that is enacted across time and 
space by a complex heterogeneous collection of distributed elements175. 
Particular relationally-configured realities are perceived to present certain kinds 
of threat, and these realities are therefore manipulated to ‘cancel out’ and 
inhibit the forms of agency available to the gas. As such gas’s relations must 
not be seen as static, but are instead arranged and ordered over space and 
time. Gas must therefore be viewed as being a shape-shifter. 
 
Rather than such relational change being seen as simply something that must 
be prevented or secured against, however – where change equals threat, 
threat must be stopped, and thus change must be prevented – we instead 
need to appreciate how mutation functions as an instrument of security 
governance. Mutation is both the harbinger of existential threats, and also the 
means of protection. Mutation is the primary tool of security; it is the 
instrument through which the constitution of circulating elements is 
strategically manipulated. 
 
*** 
 
																																																						
175 These practices may not be the only techniques of relational governance in existence 
however, and other undetected practices may still operate upon the natural gas in this pipe.  
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It would be easy at this point to assume that mutation simply constitutes a tool 
of restraint: a governing practice through which the emergence of particular 
forms of threatening agency is only ever inhibited. Yet in the security 
performance that surrounds the pipe in figure 17, we can also observe several 
instances in which its relational structure is manipulated in order to enable, or 
facilitate, certain forms of gaseous action. Perhaps the clearest example of this 
can be seen in the way that compressors are used across the NTS. These 
compressors are employed to force gas’s molecules closer together, increasing 
its pressure. This constitutes a manipulation of gas’s relations of interiority that 
makes available to it new ways of acting. First, it provides the gas with a form 
of mobile agency: it provides the necessary motive force to enable gas to 
move within the NTS and distribution networks. Indeed, without this pressure, 
gas would simply stop circulating. As such, compression is a means of 
maintaining gas’s circulation and thereby ensuring the security of supply. Yet it 
also assists this objective in a second way – by providing gas with the ability to 
meet the immediate demands that are placed upon the gas transport system. 
It enables large volumes of gas to be contained within the NTS at any one 
point in time, and thereby ensures that sufficient gas is available to meet 
consumer demand176. Moreover, it also provides gas with the ability to assist 
with dealing with unexpected demands that are placed upon the system. It 
provides a mechanism for storing an excess of gas within NTS pipes, and this 
process, known as ‘line packing’, enables network operators to maintain supply 
during periods of high demand. As the emergency operations manager for 
National Grid explained; 
 
“You know, we do get notifications to say what is happening. We should have an hour 
or two, or more, to be aware of a big change that is about to happen on the grid…so, 
erm, we use the line pack, to you know, pre-empt it.” (Interview, Emergency 
Operations Manager, National Grid, 2014)  
 
																																																						
176 The closer molecules are together, the more gas can be contained within a given space. 
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Yet whilst gas’s relations are manipulated to promote the realisation of these 
specific forms of agency, such alterations also endow the gas with other – less 
desirable – capacities. Increasing the pressure of the gas via ‘line packing’ not 
only enhances its motive force, but also increases its resistance against the 
blocking relations that are established by the pipe walls. When combined with 
the greater volumes that it enables the gas to travel in, the gas can be seen to 
develop the capacities to produce larger escape events such as jet fires and 
vapour cloud explosions. Relational organisation practices are thus not simply 
inhibitive; they must also be appreciated for their simultaneous productivity – 
not all forms of which might be desirable.  
 
Indeed, every kind of relational restructuring both facilitates and precludes 
certain forms of actual and potential agency. The blocking relations of the pipe 
walls, the shifts in interior relations, the distancing of certain external actants 
and the leaving in place of others, all simultaneously inhibit particular ways of 
acting, but also bring new forms of gaseous agency into existence. Indeed, 
without these relations, gas might not warm houses, heat food, or turn 
turbines.  
 
All relational arrangements also remain open to the possibility of resistance 
and opposition, regardless of how durable or oppressive they appear to be. As 
such, it is futile to characterise certain configurations as inherently restrictive, or 
oppressive, and others as being fundamentally enabling, or liberating. Instead, 
we must pay close attention to what forms of agency come to be promoted 
and inhibited through these security performances, what the effects of 
particular actions upon other actants are, and what the logics are that drive 
these performances177. 
 
																																																						
177 Indeed, this interplay between liberating and oppressive relational arrangements is 
something that Foucault was intensely aware of (see Foucault and Miskowiec, 1986). 
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Indeed, such logics may be manifold. Within the practice of compression for 
example, two logics are particularly visible. First, we can observe a concern for 
safety, whereby the performance of security is structured around the 
imperative of avoiding injury to human bodies. This is the logic that (amongst 
others), drives the formation of the blocking relations that constrain the gas; 
the practices of relational distancing that prevent houses from being built near 
pipelines; and the use of corrosion monitoring practices through which 
attempts are made to avoid a breakdown in the integrity of security 
performances. Second, we can observe a logic that concerns the security of 
supply. Here, the performance of security has been structured around the 
imperative of maintaining the circulation of gas relative to consumer demand. 
This is also the logic that, amongst other actions, drives the gas’s 
pressurisation178.  
 
The emergence of multiple logics and their influence upon security programs 
can, I suggest, be understood through the distribution of agency across these 
programs. As has been implicitly stated thus far, performances of security are 
not conducted according to the discretion of a single, centralised actant. 
Instead, each actant (HSE, National Grid, gas, the pipes, the ground workers 
that threaten them, local property developers, and so on) has its own agendas 
and imperatives, and these become subject to ongoing processes of 
negotiation. Depending upon the way that force is distributed across these 
relations, certain agendas or imperatives will come to be more or less 
influential in defining the characteristics of the security program that is formed 
around gas’s circulations at any one point in space and time. Those imperatives 
that succeed in influencing the way in which gas’s reality is constituted (to a 
																																																						
178 A number of other logics, including ones focused around concerns for cost, ethics and 
environmental conservation, may also be operating in the program of security that has formed 
around the gas in this pipe. 
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greater or lesser extent), become converted into security logics that drive, or 
structure, the way that security is programmed/performed.   
 
The emergence of potentially heterogeneous logics leads to a programming of 
security that, whilst sometimes complementary, can also contain inherent 
tensions. This is because pursuing a single logic to its extreme conclusion may 
necessarily entail the making of concessions regarding the fulfilment of others. 
To completely ensure individual safety for example, it might be necessary to 
transport gas at insufficient pressure to meet demand, or to completely cease 
the transport of gas altogether. Instead of single logics becoming totalising, a 
shuffling of imperatives therefore has to arise through which gas’s relations 
come to be organised according to different negotiated logics.  
 
We can see the results of such negotiations in the case of gas’s compression. 
Supply and safety logics coexist in tension, and in order to respond to the 
increased threats that the pressurised gas poses, a compromise has to be 
developed through an act of relational compensation. Whilst gas’s pressure is 
raised to maintain supply, adjustments are simultaneously made to the 
arrangement of gas’s relations of exteriority in order to bring the risk of 
hazardous phenomena actualising down to an acceptable level. In this 
instance, this results in pipes being thickened and shielded with concrete slabs, 
and in their being distanced from human settlements through the application 
of land use planning strategies179. As such, we can observe a process of 
relational jostling and programmatic rearrangement taking place, through 
which particular forms of gaseous agency are facilitated, and others are 
inhibited, dependent upon the outcome of the ongoing negotiations of 
interests between governing actants.  
 
																																																						
179 Interview, former Network Director, Northern Gas Networks (2015) and industry standards 
(IGEM, 1995). 
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I want to suggest that such processes of negotiation and the emergence of 
heterogeneous security logics is particularly valuable for a security literature 
that has been principally concerned with performances of security in relation to 
singular referent objects, and that has typically imagined security as being 
programmed in a more-or-less coherent way around individual concerns (such 
as the protection of the nation-state, or the protection of global climate). In 
contrast, this approach invites security scholars to appreciate the multiplicity of 
referent objects and associated interests that filter in to security performances, 
and to come to terms with the way that these interests come to be negotiated. 
The tensions and synergies between competing agendas, their negotiations, 
and the political consequences of these arrangements, requires much greater 
critical attention. 
 
IV. Securing Natural Gas (II): Longitude 
 
What I have presented so far has been a kind of ‘snapshot analysis’; a vertical 
slice through the pipe that has involved the tracing of a complex set of 
relations that converge upon a singular point in time and space. In isolating my 
analysis to this single point however, it is easy to assume that performances of 
security involve attempts to organise gas’s reality in such a way that it becomes 
relatively fixed; that gas is rendered secure once and for all through the 
formalisation of a single acceptable configuration of actualised relations that is 
maintained throughout the entirety of its circulatory journeys. This, I contend, is 
far from the case. To demonstrate this, I now turn to an alternative example:  a 
distribution pipe in a residential street in Middlesbrough (figure 18). In taking 
this example, and by undertaking an additional successive lateral slice through 
gas’s relations at this point in its journey, I suggest that we can begin to 
develop a longitudinal appreciation for the way that gas’s interior and exterior 
relations come to be organised differently along the length and breadth of the 
UK’s gas transport infrastructures.  
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The gas in figure 18 is travelling through a recently installed section of 
polyethylene pipe that is located in a residential street in Middlesbrough. This 
pipe is distinctly different to the one in figure 17, for whereas in the previous 
example, we were dealing with gas’s circulation at high pressure, this new pipe 
is part of a distribution network, and through which gas travels at low pressure. 
In holding two ‘slices’ of performances of gaseous security in relief with one 
another in this way, I hope to vividly showcase the contrasting differences in 
how gas’s relations are (re)configured at different points in space and time by 
differently programmed security performances.  
 
 
Figure 18 - Photograph of a distribution pipe in Middlesbrough, 2015 
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In selecting pipes from two apparently discrete networks however, there is a 
danger that a Foucauldian disciplinary logic could be read into these examples 
– a logic through which gas could be seen to circulate through a number of 
discrete and enclosed disciplinary environments. Such an approach would 
consider each of these enclosures to possess distinct and rigid sets of 
formalised practices of security that are consistently conducted in the same, 
programmed, ways throughout their territories of influence. This is not my 
intention. Such a reading would overlook the intricacy of security’s 
performance, and would ignore the manifold and constantly changing ways in 
which gas comes to be ontologically arranged. Far from describing 
‘segmented’, ‘immobile’, or ‘frozen’ sets of relations, where relational 
configurations come to be “fixed in […] place” (Foucault, 1977; 195), I 
highlight the transience and mutability of gas’s relations during its travels.  
 
Indeed, I consider Deleuze’s (1992) notion of modulation to be a more 
appropriate concept for describing gas’s governance. According to this 
approach, we can view security as being performed around gas through the 
exertions of a series of ‘self-deforming’, or ‘modulating’, assemblages that are 
strategically designed and enacted by a collection of elements (p.2). Unlike the 
prison, the hospital, or the asylum – architectures that constitute “explicit 
programs; […] sets of calculated, reasoned prescriptions in terms of which 
institutions are meant to be recognised, spaces arranged, [and] behaviours 
regulated” (Foucault, 1991; 80), and even unlike the programs that are 
described by Latour (1991) and Law (1986), where elements are rendered 
durable within space and time through enduring configurations of social 
relations, these modular programs conform to no such fixity. They are 
constantly in the process of (re)assembly, and security is consequently 
performed differently across the entire extent of gas’s circulatory journeys. 
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Whilst the notion of modulation has valuable utility for visualising these shifting 
performances of security however, my operationalisation of it differs 
significantly from Deleuze’s. This is because Deleuze, like Foucault, 
insufficiently attends to the specificities of the relational transformations that 
are undertaken by the materials and bodies in circulation. In this section, I draw 
attention to the way that modulation involves a series of meticulous relational 
reconfigurations that edit the agential qualities of the elements being 
governed. Gas’s governing assemblages, I argue, “transmute from point to 
point” (Ibid; 4), organising gas’s configurations of actual and virtual relations as 
they orbit around it, and thereby causing it to ontologically mutate. As such, 
modulation is a practice of governance that orders the realities of entities in 
the attempt to inhibit or facilitate the emergence of particular relational 
phenomena; it is a means of securitising mutation. In order to understand this 
process however, we have to explicitly attend to the material qualities of the 
‘thing’ in motion, and identify what qualities and forms of agency actors seek 
to ‘cancel out’. In the section that follows, I therefore examine how, at the scale 
of gas’s relations of interiority and exteriority, multiple programs of security 
come together to organise and compensate for gas’s relations in different ways 
across space and time. 
 
*** 
 
The most immediately obvious difference between how security is performed 
around the gas in the Middlesbrough example and how it was performed 
around the pipe in Norfolk, regards the propinquity of people and buildings. 
Within distribution networks, not only is it fundamentally necessary for the gas 
to approach homes and businesses (for homes and businesses form the sites of 
consumption), but it is also simply not possible for governing actors to 
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structure and arrange urban fabrics in the same way as they manage the 
milieus of transmission pipes. There is an obstinacy and durability to the urban 
landscape that often resists extensive manipulation (Karrholm, 2007), and this 
landscape is home to an array of interests that seek to organise it according to 
a variety of different, often competing, imperatives. As such, the ways in which 
gas’s relations of exteriority can be managed within these built environments is 
subject to considerable constraints. 
 
The durability of the built environment and the rhizomatic nature of the 
distribution network also contribute two further limitations to these gaseous 
security performances. First, they result in the maintenance of pipes being 
extremely costly and difficult, particularly when these pipes run under existing 
developments such as roads, railways and buildings. Partly for this reason, 
many of the pipes in operation in distribution systems in the UK are legacy 
pipes from earlier town gas networks. Some of these pipes may now be very 
old and in need of repair180.  
 
Secondly, the rhizomatic nature of these pipelines means that the in-line 
surveillance techniques that are employed to assess asset health within the 
NTS cannot be used. Because PIGs need to have a definite point of retrieval 
and can become stuck in locations where pipes diverge, they can only be used 
within linear pipeline systems181. As a result, it is often very difficult to directly 
assess the severity of corrosion in distribution pipelines across a large 
geographical area. Many of these pipes are therefore ageing and possess 
uncertain integrity. As such, they may be unable to perform the necessary 
blocking relations that are required to inhibit the gas from actualising 
threatening kinds of external relation. As such, whilst leaks on the transmission 
system are very rare (indeed, any leak could be catastrophic due to the high 
																																																						
180 Interview, Health, Safety and Environment Manager, Northern Gas Networks (2014). 
181 Site visit, PII Pipeline Solutions (2014). 
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pressures at which gas is transported within this network), such leaks are 
relatively common within distribution networks182. 
 
For these reasons, gas cannot be performed as a secure circulating entity in the 
same way that it was within the NTS. As such, the program in figure 18 looks 
quite different to the one in figure 17, involving a series of different 
organisational actions that are undertaken upon gas’s relations, these actions 
causing the gas to mutate into significantly different forms that provide it with 
very different kinds of material agency.  
 
A major difference in the security program that surrounds the Middlesbrough 
pipe for example, concerns the way that gas’s relations of interiority are 
structured. As with the gas in the NTS, gas’s pressure within distribution 
systems is strategically manipulated. Whilst the NTS typically raises the 
pressure of gas to as high a point as possible to provide motive force and a 
form of storage, the pressure of gas within distribution networks is reduced to 
as low a point as possible, in order to minimise the rates with which gas leaks 
whilst still maintaining its circulation183.  
 
This alternative programming of gas’s reality is driven by a shift in governing 
logics. The logic of safety is most influential here, for significant volumes of 
escaping gas have the potential to result in fire and explosion risks (particularly 
if they accumulate in spaces such as drains, ducts and buildings)184. These fires 
and explosions are also more likely to produce casualties or property damage, 
due to their proximity to residential areas.  
 
																																																						
182 Interview, Emergency Operations Manager, National Grid (2014). 
183 The higher the pressure in relation to an external atmosphere, the faster gas will escape 
from a compromised pipe. Interview, Health, Safety and Environment Manager, Northern Gas 
Networks (2014). 
184 Site visit, ‘Escape Chasing’ – Northern Gas Networks (2015). 
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Security of supply also continues to play a role in these programs, but the 
rhizomatic geography of the distribution pipework now reduces the number of 
people that are dependent upon any single pipe, and as a result, supply is less 
of a concern than it was on the NTS. As such, safety comes to override the 
logic of supply in the Middlesbrough context, this imperative precluding the 
transport of gas at high pressure within these environments.  
 
Such logics of safety and supply security do not exist totally in tension, 
however. Whilst high pressures are not permitted by the logic of safety, a 
minimum pressure of 35millibar must still be maintained as the gas enters 
properties. If this pressure were to fluctuate, the flames in domestic and 
industrial appliances could go out, potentially allowing the gas to subsequently 
enter these properties without being burnt. This could permit the gas to 
accumulate in potentially explosive volumes, and as such, whilst the logic of 
safety and the logic of supply maintenance can be seen to have shifted in 
relation to one another (dramatically altering the way that the security program 
is structured), this situation demonstrates how their interests can at times be 
complementary. 
 
This is not to suggest that a rigid practice of pressure governance is 
consistently performed across the entire extent of distribution networks 
however. Pressures are not the same within all locations of these systems185, for 
different pipes operate at different pressures, dependent upon the kinds of 
threats that the gas is perceived to present, given the different kinds of pipe 
through which they are travelling, and the various types of environmental 
feature in their proximity (such as buildings and infrastructures). Pressures will 
also vary depending upon the amount of motive force that is considered 
																																																						
185 Site visit, Regional Control Room, Northern Gas Networks (2016). 
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necessary to transport the gas to the furthest extremities of the network, and to 
thereby ensure the 35 millibar minimum pressure186. 
 
In addition to gas’s pressure, its internal relations are also altered in another 
way. At NTS off-take points (the sites at which gas is transferred from the NTS 
to regional distribution networks), the gas entering the distribution system has 
a humanly-perceivable artificial odorant added to it, the molecules of which 
mix with those of the gas to become inseparably entwined. This internal 
adjustment acts as an indicative relation. Whilst gas in the NTS is invisible, 
odourless, and intangible, in distribution systems where leaks are more 
prevalent, gas’s relations of interiority are manipulated to render it physically 
sensible to humans so that it can be detected before it realises its explosive or 
flammable agency187. In distribution systems, the lowered pressures and 
smaller volumes at which gas circulates mean that unodorized gas would likely 
be insensible to humans. Combined with the prevalence of leaks that occur 
within these networks, and the proximate urban infrastructures that may 
provide enclosed spaces in which gas could accumulate, this can result in 
leaking gas amassing in sufficient atmospheric volumes to realise its explosive 
capacities without being noticed. In an attempt to address this potential 
phenomena, gas is thus odourised: its relations of interiority are manipulated in 
such a way that they form an indicative exterior relation with human bodies that 
triggers particular kinds of relational reassembly. 
 
Odourising gas in this way marks a radical shift in the practice of security, 
compared to the way security was performed around the gas in figure 17. 
																																																						
186 Site visit, ‘Escape Chasing’ – Northern Gas Networks (2015). 
187 Such alterations are not considered necessary within the NTS, due to how the pressures and 
volumes of gas would result in any leak to result in such a catastrophic incident that it would 
already be rendered sensible through the noise of its release, its visible effects (such as the 
propulsion of soil and debris, or a plume of flame), or through physical sensation (such as 
through the heat produced by its combustion, or through atmospheric force) Interview, 
Emergency Operations Manager, National Grid (2014). 
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Instead of isolating human bodies from physical contact with it, here the gas is 
intentionally made to press upon, and form sensory relationships with, people. 
Indeed, these relationships are extremely specific, and have been carefully 
engineered at a molecular level – the odorant being designed to encourage 
gas to form relationships with human bodies that have three specific qualities 
that relate to its detection, distinction and the manner in which it is responded 
to. Regarding detection, this odorant has been designed so that it is only 
humanly somatically perceptible when the gas achieves certain volumetric 
limits within an atmosphere. As an engineer involved in the development of a 
suitable odorant for Wales Gas (the company responsible for the Welsh 
distribution network in the 1980’s), describes: 
 
“Quantitatively, gas odour should clearly be sufficient to provide an adequate safety 
margin whilst not being high enough to cause an unnecessarily large number of 
district complaints” (Craggs, 1981; 1) 
 
Gas’s interior relations are thus arranged so that it only forms indicative 
relations once a leak reaches a particular severity. There are three reasons for 
this. First, the cost of individual excavations and repairs within distribution 
networks is high, due to the amount of disruption that they involve and the 
high costs of materials. Second, the prevalence of leaks means that the total 
repair of the distribution networks is an economically unfeasible endeavour; 
there are simply too many leaks for gas distribution companies to realistically 
fix. And third, many of these leaks are deemed to be unlikely to result in an 
explosive incident, due to the gas not being able to achieve a sufficient 
atmospheric ratio with the air to realise its explosive capacities. In order for 
natural gas to ignite, between 5% and 15% of a given atmosphere must consist 
of methane, and the remainder must consist of air188. Many of the leaks within 
distribution networks will either be so minor that they do not release enough 
																																																						
188 Interview, Resilience Manager, County Durham and Darlington Fire and Rescue Service 
(2014). 
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gas for it to achieve these explosive limits, or they will occur in locations that 
are distanced from inhabited or enclosed spaces in which it could accumulate, 
ignite, or cause injury. In these cases, the cost of the lost gas is typically 
considered to be less than the costs of repair, and the gas is therefore allowed 
to continue to safely dissipate into the atmosphere189.  
 
Because of these constraints to repairs, gas’s odorant has been designed to 
form a particular kind of indicative relation that is based upon its explosive 
limits. Rather than indicate the presence of gas only when it achieves 
potentially explosive volumes, the odorant is designed to become perceptible 
significantly before the gas nears these limits. In this way, a safety margin is 
established; the gas forms a carefully crafted indicative relation that is 
designed to provoke a relational reassembly before the phenomena of a jet 
fire or explosion can become actualised, but at the same time enables the 
costs of repairs to be minimised. As such, we can see the negotiated interplay 
between two logics; one economic, and one of safety, and this negotiation 
results in a performance of security through which both interests are accounted 
for with varying degrees of efficiency. 
 
The second quality of the gas/human relationship facilitated by this odour then 
regards its distinction. The odorant has been designed so that leaking gas is 
easily distinguishable from other environmental odours. As Craggs explains: 
 
“Qualitatively, the odour should have ‘impact’ and be distinctive, that is, definitely 
‘gassy’ and not like old cabbages or petrol. Also, it should not fade in intensity in the 
transmission system” (Craggs, 1981; 1-2) 
 
As such, the gas’s relations of interiority are specifically engineered so that, not 
only does it press upon human olfactory organs in a volumetrically specific 
																																																						
189 Site visit, ‘Escape Chasing’ – Northern gas Networks (2015). 
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fashion, but it does so in such a way that enables an actionable response. In 
order for members of the public to identify gas leaks and be certain of their 
diagnoses, gas’s odour must be unambiguously identifiable and must always 
retain the same characteristics – regardless of the age of the gas or the 
odorant. An ambiguous odour may increase the number of leaks that are 
erroneously reported, or it may lead to a decline in the reporting of actual 
leaks, due to the public mistaking the origin of these odours for some less 
hazardous source. Furthermore, a distinctive odour can increase the speed of 
response, enabling the public to rapidly identify leaks and potentially trigger 
the security programs’ relational reassembly before the gas realises its 
explosive or flammable agency.  
 
The third, and final, quality of gas’s olfactory relationship with humans regards 
the forms of action that this odour facilitates. As Craggs describes in the 
extract that follows, gas in distribution systems is designed to elicit a particular 
type of public response.  
 
“The odour should be unpleasant – we have no wish to encourage ‘gas sniffing’ as a 
national pastime” (Craggs, 1981; 1-2) 
 
The odour of gas is thus designed to be sufficiently offensive to deter 
members of the public from enabling its free circulation for personal pleasure: 
an action that could increase the likelihood of an explosive incident. Indeed, 
creating an offensive odour has the additional advantage of also potentially 
encouraging members of the public to physically distance themselves from the 
source of the smell, further inhibiting gas’s potential lethal agency.  
 
The indicative relationships of exteriority that gas forms with human bodies can 
therefore be seen to be carefully engineered to assume three specific 
characteristics: its easy detectability, distinguishability, and ‘actionability’. 
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Instead of a practice of relational distancing, as was the case with gas in the 
example of the NTS, security in the distribution system involves gas making 
direct contact with human bodies, but in such a way that it notifies these 
individuals of its presence before its more destructive latent capacities become 
actualised. In this way, gas is configured to trigger complex acts of relational 
reassembly that work to inhibit specific forms of gaseous agency reactively, as 
they emerge.  
 
Furthermore, whilst all gas within the distribution system is odourised at its 
point of entry, we should again not see this practice as a feature of a 
disciplinary enclosure. This is because the detection of gas’s odour at different 
points in its circulation does not necessarily elicit the same kinds of reactionary 
response. Should gas be detected within a property for example, and should it 
not be able to be shut off, then emergency responders will have to attend the 
scene within an hour190. In the case of the gas being able to be turned off 
however, responders are required to arrive at the property within two hours. 
These response times are then coupled with the legislative requirements that 
are established in the Gas Safety (Management) Regulations (1996), that make 
it imperative that engineers repair or make safe the leak within 12 hours of it 
being reported.  
 
Yet these rules are not universally applied along the length of pipelines, either. 
In the case of gas being smelled within a field for example, engineers will be 
sent to investigate, but they may not be required to repair it immediately, if at 
all. Instead, distribution companies modulate their responses based upon 
computerised risk-profiling systems that assess the relational context of the gas 
at that particular point in space and time and thereby determine the necessity 
																																																						
190 Interview, former Network Director, Northern Gas Networks, 2015. 
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of repairs191. Various kinds of internal and external relationship are considered 
by these systems, their algorithms combining such factors as; the distance of 
the leak from properties, roads, footpaths and railways; the pressure of the gas 
in that location; the ground surface type; and distance of the pipe from areas 
of open ground. Through these algorithms, leaks in different locations across 
distribution networks are categorised into different degrees of risk. The most 
severe of these scores (for example, a leak within 500mm of a property) will 
necessitate its immediate repair and the leak’s constant supervision until this 
repair takes place. Other scores may facilitate deferred action however, 
whereby their respective leaks will be allocated a certain frequency with which 
they have to be reinspected (3-7 days). Re-inspection will involve the risks 
presented by these leaks being recalculated, and the necessity of their repair 
reassessed. In this way, risk is anticipated to change across time and as such, 
the way in which the program is configured is temporally as well as spatially 
sensitive. In winter months, the open ground between properties and a leak 
might freeze, trapping the gas beneath the surface and enabling it to travel 
underground into houses. Similarly, other landscape features may transform 
over time, with new developments taking place, or temporary events occurring 
in leak locations192. As such, the relational milieus of all reported leaks is 
monitored, but the security response to these leaks will be different at different 
points in space and time – security is not performed through a disciplining 
enclosure, but instead, gas’s circulation is secured through a modular 
performance that involves the formation of differently configured security 
programs around it at different locations, and at different times. 
 
In addition to differences in the way that natural gas’s relations of interiority are 
arranged, figure 18 also demonstrates the way that gas is arranged in terms of 
																																																						
191 A print-out produced through these systems to categorize the risks presented by particular 
leaks can be seen in ‘Image 9’ in Appendix C. 
192 Site visit, ‘Escape Chasing’ – Northern Gas Networks (2015). 
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its external relations. Particularly interesting in this example is the alternative 
configuration of its blocking relations. Between 1971 and 1999, a series of 
high-profile explosions occurred within UK distribution networks. These were 
caused by the failure of certain kinds of pipe material (specifically cast and 
ductile iron) that were found to be particularly susceptible to fracture and 
corrosion. As a result of these explosions, the HSE insisted upon a nation-wide 
policy of distribution pipe replacement (HSE, 2001; Thomas, 2006). Under this 
program, distribution networks were required to replace all ‘at risk’ ductile and 
cast iron pipes with polyethylene pipes by the year 2030193. As such, the 
blocking relations that were formed by the old iron pipes are currently 
undergoing a transformation, becoming gradually replaced with ones made 
from more reliable polyethylene194.  
 
Despite polyethylene’s material benefits however, mains replacement 
continues to be both costly and time-consuming. In order to minimise the risk 
of gas realising its flammable or explosive agency, but simultaneously reduce 
the costs of repairs, gas’s exterior relations are manipulated according to an 
algorithmic risk analysis tool called the ‘Mains Risk Prioritisation System’ 
(MRPS)195. Through this system, all distribution pipes are allocated a risk score 
that takes into consideration the pipe materials, their age, their operating 
pressures, their diameters, their wall thicknesses, and their locational contexts. 
These risk scores are then used to prioritise the repair of particular pipes, 
based on the risks that they are perceived to present. In this way, the security 
																																																						
193 Polyethylene was considered preferable because of its ability to form more durable blocking 
relations, it being far less brittle than cast iron, and not susceptible to corrosion. 
194 Interestingly, polyethylene pipes also have the additional benefits of their increased 
strength meaning that gas can be transported safely at higher pressures and in larger volumes 
through smaller pipes, and their enhanced flexibility meaning that it is often possible to 
conduct repairs despite the obstinacy of the built environment. Substantial excavation is often 
not required because new pipes can simply be threaded through existing iron pipes (as can be 
seen in the bottom of figure 18). 
195 Data for this example taken from Thomas (2006), and from ‘Escape Chasing’ site visits with 
Northern Gas Networks (2015). 
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programs that operate around gas are altered according to varying 
perceptions of risk. Any distribution pipes that are located more than 30 
meters from roads or buildings receive a risk score of zero, meaning that they 
are perceived to present little to no risk to human life. This is because there is 
no atmospheric enclosure near enough to the pipe to trap the gas, and 
because these pipes typically operate at insufficient pressures to enable the 
gas within them to form vapour cloud explosions if it escapes – as such, any 
gas leaking from these pipes is expected to dissipate harmlessly into the 
atmosphere.  
 
For distribution pipes that are located within 30 metres of property however, a 
range of risk scores may be allocated, dependent upon the configuration of a 
pipe’s relations of interiority and exteriority196. Aspects of these configurations 
are assessed and combined to create three different risk factors that are then 
used to help constitute an overall risk score.  
 
The first of these risk factors is referred to as the mains fracture factor. This 
takes into consideration the historic performance of pipes that share similar 
characteristics, and is used to assess the breakage history of all the pipes within 
400metres of the pipe in question. The purpose of this measure is to 
incorporate an indicator of geographically specific corrosion or stress levels 
within the calculation. Through it, the current efficacy of the gas’s blocking 
relations, as established by pipes of certain kinds, is assessed, and their need 
for reinforcement is estimated.  
 
The second factor is the gas ingress factor. This is calculated by considering 
the diameter of the mains pipe (which affects the volume of gas likely to be 
released), as well as the distance between the pipe and the nearest property 
																																																						
196 Data drawn from Thomas (2006). 
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(which indicates the estimated proximity required for the gas form lethal 
exterior relations with bodies). It also considers the area of permeable open 
ground between the gas and the nearest property (for leaking gas can travel 
through permeable ground and dissipate into the atmosphere, but concrete, 
tarmac, and even frozen soil can trap it and permit it to track under the surface 
into buildings), and whether the property has any cellars or basements. These 
could increase the explosion risk due to trapped gas being more likely to enter 
and accumulate in a below ground enclosed space, and because they are less 
frequently occupied by residents, the likelihood of a gas leak being detected is 
reduced. In these different ways, the potential mobile agency of gas is 
therefore assessed. 
 
Finally, the gas consequence factor is calculated. This takes into consideration 
the typical operating pressure of the pipe (which affects gas’s rate of 
accumulation), and the presence of windowless cellars. Windows are important 
for explosion risks, for they can enable ventilation and relieve atmospheric 
pressure. As pressurised gas accumulates within properties, the walls, ceilings, 
windows and doors that work to contain the gas become subject to outward 
atmospheric force, and these windows are often the first barriers to yield under 
the increasing pressure. Panes may shatter or be pushed out of frames, and 
failures such as these can significantly reduce the size and severity of an 
explosion – gas being able to escape the property and oxygen being able to 
enter, leading to the concentration of the gas falling below its explosive 
limit197. Because windowless cellars rarely contain sources of ventilation or 
pressure relief however, they can dramatically increase the size of explosions. 
As such, the consequence factor involves an assessment of the forms of 
potential destructive agency that could become available to the gas, should 
the blocking relations of the pipe break down. 
																																																						
197 Site visit, RAF Spadeadam (2014). 
	 270 
 
In this way, we can see an act of relational ‘compensation’ taking place around 
circulations of natural gas. Through the application of the MRPS, gas’s relations 
are manipulated according to the forms of agency that are perceived to be 
available to it. Gas that is believed to have the potential to form particular 
kinds of hazardous relations of exteriority due to its proximity to other 
elements, becomes subject to a systematic replacement of its existing blocking 
relations, with new, more forceful, relations being assembled to maintain the 
virtuality of these perceived threats. In contrast, gas that is considered to lack 
the proximate relations necessary for it to actualise such hazardous relations is 
instead allowed to continue to circulate, subject to the sets of blocking 
relations that have already been established.  
 
The pipe in figure 18 exemplifies this situation well. Because this pipe runs 
under a tarmacked road that is less than 10 metres from two rows of terraced 
houses, and because there are no gardens or verges to provide any open 
ground between the road and these properties, the MRPS flagged it up as 
being in need of urgent repair. The original cast iron pipe that served these 
properties was consequently excavated, and was subsequently replaced with a 
new polyethylene pipe, as can be observed in figure 18198.  
 
This polyethylene pipe is still attached to part of the existing cast iron main 
however. As such, figure 18 provides an excellent illustration of the 
geographical extents of different programs of security – the joint that links 
these two pipes materially expresses their limits. On one side of the joint is the 
new polyethylene pipe. Because the gas within this pipe is considered to be 
within sufficient distance of people and properties to fulfil its latent lethal 
capacities, it has become the focus of a security program that involves the 
																																																						
198 Site visit, ‘Escape Chasing’ - Northern Gas Networks (2015). 
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assembly of new blocking relations. On the other side however, a previously 
configured program of security remains in place. The ongoing work done by 
the cast iron pipe was not reinforced because the latent lethal agency of the 
gas within it was considered unlikely to actualise, due to the kinds of external 
entity currently available to it (this pipe was distanced further away from 
property). 
 
Multiple logics can again be seen to drive the formulation of these two security 
programs – indeed, the MRPS was explicitly developed as a means of 
negotiating the tensions between the distribution companies’ interests for 
financial security, and the interests of public safety that were expressed by 
both the government and these companies (Thomas 2006). Within this 
equation, logics of demand security therefore also became enmeshed in 
security’s programming, as concerns were expressed for the continued 
consumer demand for gas if its price were to rise severely as a result of the cost 
of maintenance work, of if the public lost faith in the safety of the gas system as 
a result of further explosive incidents (HSE, 2001; Thomas, 2006). More 
recently, the logic of environmental protection has also begun to enter MRPS 
calculations, as system operators have become subject to government 
incentives and penalties in relation to the amount of methane they emit across 
their networks199 (Interview, Northern Gas Networks, 21st October 2014). For 
distribution systems, where leaks are prevalent, mains replacement has 
become the primary means through which the environmental effects of 
methane emissions are addressed200. 
 
																																																						
199 Site visit, ‘Escape Chasing’ – Northern Gas Networks (2015). 
200 The cost of these penalties and the benefits of such incentives rarely makes the cost of 
excavating and replacing leaking pipe worthwhile however. Consequently, environmental 
logics only infrequently influence the formation of security programs within distribution systems 
(Interview with Northern Gas Networks Manager, 2014). 
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It is thus possible to observe a series of ongoing negotiations between the 
different interests of the heterogeneous actors that become involved in gas’s 
governance. These negotiated interests come to structure security’s 
programming. Engineers, investors, members of the public, property owners, 
highway authorities, politicians, pipeline operators, pipe materials, electrical 
currents, different soil types, diggers, not to mention the gas itself, all come to 
express themselves at different points in space and time, and as a result, enter 
into ongoing processes of relational negotiation.  
 
As a result, multiple security programs must be seen to be produced. These 
programs are constantly performed, negotiated products that are constructed 
through the relative weight of these different interests. Their moment-by-
moment relational arrangements do not simply operate upon gas’s ‘real’, or 
actualised, relations (in other words, “the stuff that’s ‘already’ there” - Nealon, 
2008; 104), but instead simultaneously “work[…] on potentials” (Ibid; 104). 
Gas’s virtual and actual relations of interiority and exteriority are thus constantly 
manipulated/modulated, throughout the entire length of its journeys in ways 
that both inhibit and facilitate the emergence of different kinds of gaseous 
agency at any one moment in space and time. 
 
V. Conclusion: Modular Performances of Security 
 
In this chapter, I have explored the way that security is performed in relation to 
the circulation of natural gas within the UK’s gas transport infrastructures. In the 
process, I have demonstrated the presence of multiple practices of relational 
rearrangement through which security is performed. Five practices have been 
identified in particular. The first regards practices of relational distancing, 
whereby gas’s agency is strategically inhibited through the removal of 
proximate entities with which it could form relations of exteriority. The second 
then concerns the practice of creating relational blocks, whereby gas is 
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prevented from forming additional relations of exteriority, due to the totalising 
presence of other exterior relations. The third relates to the practice of 
rearranging gas’s relations of interiority, whereby the entity’s irreducible 
properties and latent capacities undergo radical transformation. The fourth 
concerns practices of relational reinforcement, through which programs of 
action may become supported and made more durable. The fifth regards the 
formation of indicative relations, through which threats to performances of 
security are identified, and through which processes of relational reassembly 
may be triggered. In outlining these techniques, I have argued that security 
must be conceptualised as an ontological project through which the realities of 
circulating elements are strategically restructured. I have argued that it is 
through this restructuring that certain forms of agency and contingent 
phenomena may come to be facilitated, compensated for, or inhibited.  
 
Within this account however, security has not been presented as a singular 
performance. Security, as I have described it, is differently practiced in different 
locations, at different times. Its performance is shaped by a variety of logics 
that shift in relative importance according to the forcefulness with which the 
different heterogeneous actants involved in its governance can express their 
interests, and as such, far from describing a single articulation of what 
constitutes gas as a fundamentally ‘secure’ entity, I have argued that its 
relational constitution is modulated within UK gas infrastructures throughout 
the entire spatial and temporal extents of its circulatory journeys, according to 
the interplay of a variety of different security logics. Gas, as it is transported 
through pipelines, I argue, can therefore be seen to constitute Deleuze's (1992) 
modulated ‘serpent’, par excellence. 
 
Crucially however, focus in this chapter has been placed upon the relational 
construction of modulated elements. Emphasis has not been placed on the 
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specific political implications of individual events, because the events that 
could potentially arise must be seen to change throughout the extent of an 
entity’s circulatory journeys. Whilst these events may be extremely important, 
the purpose of this study has been to focus upon the mechanics of security’s 
practice. It is this focus on mechanics that has led this chapter to expand 
Deleuze’s (1992) conceptualisation of modulation, describing how governing 
assemblages must be seen to operate upon the relationally constituted 
realities of circulating entities in the attempt to manipulate and manage the 
kinds of phenomena that can come into being.  
 
Importantly, these relational arrangements must be recognised as being 
simultaneously both oppressive and liberating. Through the arrangement of 
both gas’s actual and virtual relations of interiority and exteriority, certain forms 
of agency and the potential futures that they may actualise can come to be 
strategically inhibited, whilst at the same time, other forms of agency (some of 
which may be unintended or undesirable) may be brought into actuality. As 
such, the securitisation of mutation through modulation is both a productive 
and restrictive practice, and one that involves constant (re)negotiation.  
 
So how might this understanding of modular performances of security have 
utility for critical security studies and energy security literatures? There are two 
particular thoughts that I want to conclude with. First, I suggest that an entity-
attentive modular approach encourages us to draw our attention away from 
nodal centres of security. Following the charge rallied by Amoore (2006; 2007), 
it challenges us to think about security performances beyond well-trodden 
spaces such as the airport, the terrestrial border, or the locations of an entity’s 
production and consumption. Instead, it requires us to think about the ways in 
which security comes to be performed throughout entities’ circulatory journeys. 
In particular, it advocates an attention to the way that circulating entities 
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transform over space, acknowledging the potential alterations they may 
undergo in terms of their appearance, their actual and potential agency, the 
ways in which they move, and the ways in which their mutations become 
entangled with concerns for security. 
 
The second benefit then regards how we conceptualize the practice of security. 
Modulation, as it is envisaged in this account, encourages us to think about 
security in a way that counters the dominant narratives of filtration and supply 
maintenance. Both the security studies and energy security literatures are filled 
with such discourses. In attending to the ways that elements mutate however, 
and by looking at the ways in which these mutations are facilitated and 
restricted, we are forced to think about security under different terms. Instead 
of simply seeing practices of filtration or maintenance, security becomes 
reframed as a constantly shifting project of relational organization that is 
differently performed, dependent upon the specific qualities of the elements in 
circulation. I have offered a number of conceptual tools though which we 
might interrogate the forms of actual and potential agency that are 
strategically inhibited and facilitated at different points in space and time, and 
by examining such practices, I suggest that we may not only develop a better 
understanding of the political significance of circulating elements and the ways 
that they are perceived to present particular kinds of threat and opportunity, 
but that we may also improve our understanding of the mechanics of security 
performances in relation to specific elements. 
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7 
Conclusion 
 
I. Security and the UK Circulation of Natural Gas 
	
This thesis has provided a detailed empirical account of the way that security is 
performed in relation to the circulatory journeys of a troublesome energetic 
material: natural gas. Working with a broad range of service providers and 
practitioners from various industry organisations (which have included National 
Grid, Northern Gas Networks, the Institute for Gas Engineers and Managers 
(IGEM), Shell, DNV-GL, Sick Engineering, PII Pipeline Solutions, Durham 
Constabulary, Durham County Council, Durham and Darlington Fire and 
Rescue Service, and the North East Ambulance Service), I have traced gas’s 
journeys through both the UK’s National Transmission System (NTS) and the 
North of England’s gas distribution network. In the process, I have described 
how a series of security performances are conducted around gas as it travels 
across the UK. 
 
Whilst gas circulations have typically been discussed in relation to security only 
with regards to their possible interruption and impact upon national energy 
security, they have been shown in this thesis to become entangled with 
security concerns in a number of ways. From concerns for public safety to fears 
for its environmental effects, costliness, and continued future supply, gas can 
be seen to develop a variety of perceived ‘dimensions of dangerousness’ 
(Dillon, 1996; Dillon & Reid, 2001) as it travels. Through these dimensions, 
gas’s circulation introduces a series of threats and opportunities to everyday 
social environments, and it is these perceived threats and opportunities, I have 
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argued, that lead to the development of multiple complex security apparatuses 
around gas circulations. Through such apparatuses, attempts are then made to 
both visualize the kinds of gaseous phenomena that are possible in a given 
moment (see chapter 4), and to regulate the conditions of possibility that affect 
their emergence (see chapter 6).   
 
In studying these practices, I have drawn attention to a proliferation of typically 
mundane security performances that permeate everyday social environments. 
Such practices are rarely regarded in terms of security: they possess little of the 
visual spectacle of contemporary practices of border security, and often lack 
the gravitas of geopolitical security rhetoric. Yet whilst they may never result in 
the realization of spectacular security moments (although some can scale up to 
such events), and whilst they often fade into the background of everyday 
existence, I have argued that we must appreciate these actions for their 
securitizing roles. I have demonstrated that within them we can observe 
numerous attempts to facilitate, “compensate[…] for, check[…], finally limit[…], 
and, in the final degree, cancel[…] out” (Foucault, 2007; 37) different kinds of 
gaseous phenomena, according to different perceptions of opportunity and 
risk. As such, these actions constitute particular kinds of security practices. 
From the distancing of gas pipelines from roads, residential properties, and 
other kinds of infrastructural development in order to reduce the likelihood of 
gas forming life-threating relations with human bodies, to the alteration of its 
chemical constitution in order to change the way that it interacts with human 
bodies, pipes and gas burner jets and thereby ‘cancel out’ particular kinds of 
risks, within and across the UK’s transmission and distribution networks, a 
whole series of security practices are employed to regulate the circulation of 
natural gas. Each of these practices, I have argued, involve attempts to both 
visualize the forms of gaseous phenomena that could form, and regulate the 
conditions necessary for their emergence.  
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II. Methodological Contributions: An Entity-Attentive Approach 
 
Key to this thesis has been an entity-attentive approach that emphasizes the 
importance of the ontological specificities of the entities in security’s focus, as 
well as the ways in which these qualities can present a series of security 
challenges across entities’ circulatory journeys. Building on Dillon’s (1996) 
observations regarding security’s literary framing, I have criticized a tendency 
of researchers to abstract security from the entities to which it is applied. As 
Dillon (1996) notes, by treating security as a noun that is attached to multiple 
referent object prefixes (national security, energy security, human security, 
etc.), the concept has often been treated as an independent, broadly 
generalizable, set of practices that can be relatively unproblematically 
transferred from one context to another. This, I have argued, has been 
combined with an overwhelming focus on the structures of security governance 
within particular nodes (such as airports, maritime ports, points of overland 
border crossing, or control rooms), at the exclusion of analyses of the specific 
qualities of the entities in motion, the ways in which they come to be perceived 
to present particular forms of danger across their journeys, and the manner in 
which these qualities necessitate highly specialized sets of practices to 
‘compensate for’, ‘limit’ or ‘cancel out’ (Foucault, 2007) their threatening 
potentialities – both within nodes, and whilst they are travelling between them.  
 
Indeed, it is as a result of such abstractions that I have suggested that, when 
security is discussed in relation to circulation, it has often been reduced to two 
sets of abstracted practices: circulatory filtration (whereby risky entities are 
identified and separated from safe ones), and practices of circulatory 
maintenance (whereby circulations are managed so that insecurities resulting 
from their interruption or delay can be avoided). These two approaches 
typically obfuscate the qualities of the entities in focus, such entities often 
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appearing as passive and inert. They consequently often appear as immutable 
mobiles (Latour, 1986): they are subjected to security’s sorting, sifting and 
mobilizing practices, but they avoid radical transformation in the process. This, 
I have demonstrated, has particularly been the case for mobile materials. 
Whilst a number of studies have examined the performance of particular kinds 
of human security subjects (see, for example, Salter, 2007; Adey, 2009; 
Vaughan-Williams, 2015), practically no attention has been paid to to the 
ontological transformations undergone by matter as security is performed 
around it, especially as it travels between governing nodes. 
 
In response to these particular complaints, I have advocated a grounded 
approach to the study of security, in which empirical attention is paid to the 
specific qualities of the bodies, materials and things across the full extents of 
their circulatory journeys, and to the ways in which these qualities become the 
focus of security’s practices. Indeed, these qualities, I insist, are critical to 
understanding security. Gas has been shown in this thesis to be a material with 
highly specific qualities that make performing security in relation to it a difficult 
task. Whilst not totally immune to human sensation, it is typically invisible, 
intangible, and odorless, the circumstances under which it naturally becomes 
present to human senses being so specific and forming so rarely that, without 
intervention, it is affectively incoherent: its humanly sensible affects are so 
spatio-temporally distributed that it is difficult for humans to know when it is 
present, where precisely it is, how it is travelling, in what volumes, and what 
forms of agency are available to it at any one moment in time. As such, its 
particular material qualities present a series of challenges for taking securing 
actions upon it. 
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Moreover, in addition to its sensory evasiveness, its vitality has also been 
shown to generate problems for security. Gas is an extremely energetic and 
vital material, and whilst these qualities are precisely those that make it a 
valuable commodity for heating homes and for generating electricity, they also 
give rise to some of its most violent capacities: its ability to ignite and to 
explode, and its ability to damage property and to take life. Added to this, it 
has been shown to be highly recalcitrant. It constantly resists the containers 
that hold it, and its density relative to air means that unless it is contained, it 
will rise into the atmosphere and will dissipate irretrievably. It is therefore a 
particularly ‘wayward’ material (Bridge, 2004), and requires complex sets of 
securing practices to be performed around it at all times, simply to render it 
present and consumable. 
 
Such different troubling material qualities also cannot be viewed as being 
fixed. A major theme in this study has been how the ontological structures of 
circulating elements are never rigid or firmly held in place. Gas ontologically 
shifts and mutates throughout its circulatory journeys, and the challenges it 
presents for security consequently also transform in the process.  
 
To understand such ontological qualities and the challenges they present for 
security however, circulating entities have to be scrutinized through a relational 
lens. This thesis has built upon Foucault’s (2007; 37) work, security being 
presented as a kind of reality management, in which security’s actors seek to 
carefully restructure entities’ realities in ways that regulate the conditions of 
possibility relating to particular kinds of phenomena.  
 
Such realities (and the phenomena that emerge) have been analyzed through 
an assemblage approach advocated by DeLanda (2006), in which they are 
regarded as products of the actualization of particular kinds of social relations - 
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relations between their internalized components (their relations of interiority), 
and their relations with other external elements (their relations of exteriority). 
Gas, as an entity, has thus been framed as a relationally-produced material, the 
form and agency of which is contingent on the arrangement of its interior and 
exterior relations at any one moment201.  
 
Through this lens, gas’s relational arrangements can be seen to be productive 
of specific kinds of security challenges, but it is not unique in being relationally 
constituted, or in its capacity for these relations to transform and mutate. 
Certain bodies, materials and things may be more susceptible to dramatic 
transformations than others, but across this thesis, I have maintained that all 
circulating entities (living or not) are subject to changing relational 
compositions as they travel, the nature of which can potentially radically alter 
the kinds of phenomenal future that are associated with their circulation.  
 
As such, security, I have argued, involves attempts to manage these relations. 
It involves visualizing the forms of association that it is possible for entities to 
realize at any one moment, and by envisaging these relations in different ways, 
attempts can then be made to trace out the phenomena that could emerge, 
and to carefully and precisely restructure entities’ constitutive relations, their 
realities, in ways that enable particular kinds of future event to be avoided, or 
their impacts mitigated.  
 
As such, the specific ontological constitutions of entities are central to 
security’s practice. Security researchers must try to hold both the apparatuses 
of security and the entities being secured in focus simultaneously. We must try 
to analyze the ways in which the qualities of security’s entities of concern come 
																																																						
201 The distinction between relations of interiority and exteriority is largely artificial, but serves 
as a conceptual tool for better understanding the relational constitution of circulating 
elements. See chapter 4 for a more detailed exploration of this point. 
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to be seen to present specific kinds of threats and challenges; the ways that 
they necessitate specialized kinds of security practice; and the precise manner 
in which these practices are designed to facilitate, ‘compensate for’, ‘limit’, or 
‘cancel out’ (Foucault, 2007) particular kinds of phenomena through the 
ontological alteration of their realities. Such an approach, I suggest, will enable 
us to far better understand the mechanics and politics of security than is 
currently possible with existing accounts of security that frame it as practices of 
circulatory filtration or circulatory maintenance. 
 
Methodological Principles of an Entity-Attentive Approach 
 
To pursue such an entity-attentive agenda for future security research, I have 
advocated three methodological principles. These principles, which were 
employed in this study, are: 
 
1. To focus upon the circulating entities with regards to which security is 
practiced. To observe and document the connections these entities 
develop with others, and to describe the ways in which actors seek to 
visualize and organize these relations. By attending to entities in these 
ways, I suggest that we can better understand how particular forms of 
threatening phenomena emerge, and how security is performed in 
response.  
 
2. To follow the journeys of circulating entities, tracing the ways that their 
ontological qualities and security’s practice change across time and 
space. By attending to the spaces and scales of circulations in this way, 
security scholars can produce accounts that exceed the spatial 
restrictions presented by nodal analyses.  
 
	 283 
3. To avoid making presumptions about the actors, practices, referent 
objects and security logics that are involved in security’s performance. In 
response to the criticism that the existing security literature has tended 
to make assumptions about the transferability of security practices 
between entities and sites of analysis, I have sought in this study to 
reject prior assumptions about the ways in which security is performed in 
relation to gas, and to instead observe how efforts were taken to 
facilitate, compensate for, and cancel out particular kinds of gaseous 
phenomena. 
 
Conceptual Approach to Security 
 
By following these three principles, by beginning with gas as my focus, and by 
resisting the urge to assume the actors, practices, referent objects and logics 
that become involved in the performances of security that surround it, I have 
developed an account of security that not only challenges notions of security 
as a practice of circulatory maintenance or filtration, but that diverges in a 
number of key ways from existing narratives of security.  
 
Security in this account is not simply a practice of bordering, or of defining 
exceptional phenomena that must be prevented/cancelled out. Instead, it is 
similar to accounts of biopolitical security (c.f. Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008), 
in that it is also seen to involve productive acts. Throughout this thesis, the 
‘exceptional’ has been reframed. Gas has been seen to be governed in and 
through its mundane ordinariness – it is constantly secured all of the time, and 
not only in exceptional circumstances. As such, the exception is shown to have 
a relatively loose hold on the practice of security. Security takes a more 
managerial form, and involves constant attempts to enhance the efficiency and 
productivity with which gas can be transported, at the same time as attempts 
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are made to ‘compensate for’ or ‘cancel out’ particular kinds of perceived 
threatening phenomena.  
 
Yet my description of security’s performance in relation to gas is also quite 
unlike biopolitical security performances. Biopolitical accounts are principally 
concerned with the referent object of the population, but in this thesis I have 
rejected the temptation to take a single referent object as my focus of study. 
Instead, security’s referent objects have been allowed to proliferate. I have 
described how performances of security involve a multiplicity of actions, 
conducted by a vast array of heterogeneous actors, and each of these actors 
takes action upon gas in accordance with their own agendas, which often 
relate to very different referent objects. Politicians have been seen to take 
action upon circulating gas according to their concerns for national 
sovereignty, relating to the geopolitical and economic turbulence in the global 
trade of energy, but they have also been shown to simultaneously take action 
upon gas according to concerns for the security of the British population – 
these actors seeking to cancel out, or compensate for, particular gaseous 
phenomena that present risks to public safety. In contrast, network operators 
have been seen to express little interest in threats to political sovereignty, but 
to take action upon gas according to their concerns for the productivity, and 
potentially survival, of their businesses. In a similar manner, homeowners took 
action upon gas according to their concerns for the protection of their property 
and for their personal safety.  
 
This thesis therefore does not provide an account of a singular referent object. 
It is not a study of ‘national security’, ‘border security’, ‘climate security’, 
‘economic security’, or even ‘energy security’. It fits none of these categories 
neatly. Whilst concerns for each of these referent objects (and others) filter into 
the actions that are taken upon circulating gas at different times, it is the 
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contention of this thesis that security cannot be reduced to any one object in 
isolation, nor can it be reduced to any one space and scale at which these 
different referent objects might be analyzed.  
 
Analytical Frameworks 
 
In addition to these observations, a number of analytical frameworks were 
developed within each of the thesis’s empirical chapters (chapters 4, 5, and 6). 
These frameworks, I suggest, may have value for studying security 
performances in other contexts. While they were developed specifically in 
relation to the circulation of gas, and like the conceptualization of security 
outlined above, should not be abstracted wholesale and applied uncritically to 
other contexts (indeed, different entities may have entirely different qualities 
that necessitate different practices, and the observations outlined here are 
certainly not exhaustive), despite these caveats, I believe that they could 
provide insights into the kinds of security practice that can be brought into 
focus through an entity-attentive research methodology.  
 
Framework (I): Security and Visualising Possibility Spaces 
 
The first framework, outlined in chapter 4, concerns the visualization of entities’ 
possible future associations. Here, I drew upon DeLanda’s (2013) concept of 
the ‘possibility space’, describing how the ontological structures of circulating 
entities are broken down into their virtual and actual relations of interiority and 
exteriority in ways that enable the identification of possible future phenomena, 
and which permit the strategic intervention in their realities, prior to the 
actualization of certain kinds of opportunity and threat. 
 
In particular, I made the distinction between two kinds of mapping process, 
summarized in table 1. These visualization practices (blueprints and snapshots), 
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enable different forms of strategic intervention to be conducted into the 
relational constellations that constitute the realities of circulating entities. 
 
Table 1: Blueprints and Snapshots 
Type of Visualization Methods of Production Example Formalizations 
Blueprints 
“More-or-less durable 
visualizations of entities’ 
known possible 
associations and the 
phenomena they can give 
reality to.” 
 
Experiments 
Investigations 
Simulations 
Speculations 
 
Scientific Papers 
Investigation Reports 
Legislation 
Standards 
Snapshots 
“Near-to-real time 
visualizations of entities’ 
present relational 
configurations.” 
 
Mechanical Sensors 
(chromatography units, 
pressure sensors, flow 
meters, temperature 
sensors) 
 
Biological Sensors (e.g. 
human noses) 
 
Data aggregation 
through user interfaces 
on SCADA systems 
 
Sensor Displays 
(portable gas detectors, 
pressure readings, flow 
rates) 
 
Blueprints are more-or-less stable ‘maps’ of gas’s spaces of possibility. They 
are not always literal maps (they often consist of reports, legislation and 
standards), but through them a series of known possible associations an entity 
can develop can be visualized, as can the phenomena that these associations 
are understood to potentially give reality to. They thus constitute formalisations 
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of existing entity-related knowledges, and are used as points of reference 
against which particular kinds of relational manipulation – different kinds of 
securing action – are considered and deployed. 
 
The other kind of visualization practice is the production of relational 
snapshots. These are more-or-less up-to-date visualizations of an entities’ 
current relational configurations. Such visualizations are typically produced 
through a series of sensors (mechanical or biological) that enable particular 
attributes of the entity and the way it is currently circulating to be identified. 
They are typically compared to blueprints of gas’s known possible relations in 
order to identify the forms of phenomena that an entities’ current relational 
arrangements could potentially lead to. In this way, security actors can 
anticipate the emergence of particular kinds of phenomena, and attempt to 
apprehend them, whilst they are in the midst of their emergent becoming. 
 
In the case of gas, I also described how this involves the construction of 
complex reflective apparatuses that produce multiple snapshots of different 
aspects of gas’s current ontological structure, and that reflect these 
visualizations back to centralised points of observation such as control rooms 
and mobile workstations. This apparatus is particularly necessary in the case of 
gas – a material that flows through a geographically sprawling subterranean 
infrastructure that is otherwise impossible for a single observer to view in its 
entirety. As such, I described how the construction of reflective apparatuses 
enables the country-wide circulation of natural gas to be rendered spatio-
temporally coherent in a way that permits different forms of securing action to 
be taken upon it.  
 
In this manner, I have developed a framework for interrogating the ways in 
which security actors seek to map out and visualize the fields of possibility that 
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relate to particular kinds of circulation. With regards to gas and the energy 
security literature, these everyday practices of mapping opportunities and 
threats across an energy infrastructure present a stark departure from accounts 
of energy security that ignore the circulatory journeys of energy products and 
reduce the forms of risk associated with their circulation to matters of 
interrupted supply or demand. In contrast, this approach highlights the 
proliferation of risks that can emerge across such networks, and provides a 
toolkit for analyzing one aspect of the extensive mundane security work that is 
conducted in the day to day operations of these infrastructures. Indeed, it also 
highlights the considerable vitality and dynamism of such circulating energy 
products. Energy security scholars need to far better attend to how energetic 
materials resist across their journeys; how they develop new forms of agency 
and can come to present new kinds of opportunity and threat – whilst they are 
in motion. Indeed, it is only by attending to these qualities that I believe we 
can properly understand recent events such as the BP oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico, the fires and explosions caused by the runaway oil train in Lac-
Mègantic, Canada, or the meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear reactor in Japan. 
As can be seen so clearly in these examples, energy products are – in different 
ways – energetic and vital, and this vitality is generative of a plethora of 
insecurities. It is thus strange, and problematic, that this vitality has been so 
starkly absent from the majority of energy security accounts to date. 
 
Turning to the critical security literature, whilst such practices have been 
observed in this thesis only in relation to gas and are therefore likely possess 
manifold contextual particularities, I believe similar practices can be observed 
in relation to other kinds of circulating entity, albeit in ways that reflect their 
own specific ontological qualities. Indeed, scholars such as Amoore (2006) and 
Vaughan-Williams (2010) have described how contemporary practices of airport 
security similarly involve attempts to break down the relationally-produced 
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identities of individual people in ways that enable the identification of 
particular kinds of possible risk. Vaughan-Williams (2010; 1075) in particular 
describes a very closely related set of practices that are employed by UK firm, 
Detica, in its NetReveal security system, in which: 
 
“Historical behaviour is contrasted with current behaviour, and high-risk changes are 
identified to alert the system operative to a potential threat. A map of activities, such 
as financial transactions, web bookings, and travel histories, can be compiled using 
billions of records from different agencies in order to build up a dynamic profile of 
individuals or groups. The stated aim of the NetReveal software is to allow data to 
`drive' the analysis in order to render networks of activity more visible than they would 
otherwise be due to the sheer volume of data. Applying this system to border security 
means that ``groups of related identities can be identified, correlated with known 
threats, and intercepted at the border before the threat can enter the country'' 
(Detica, 2009, page 4)” 
 
As such, just as in the case of gas, visualizations of passengers’ current relations 
and behaviors are contrasted against previously established blueprint 
knowledges of these bodies – these differences between visualizations then 
being used to identify particular kinds of threat, prior to their actualization. As 
such, these studies indicate the potential value of expanding this framework to 
explore the visualization of the relations of other kinds of circulating entity.  
 
My approach introduces three novelties to this work however. First, it draws 
attention to the ways in which materials and things become the focus of similar 
practices of visualization, and invites further research into how the possibility 
spaces of other materials and things (for instance, waste, food, consumer 
goods, chemicals, etc.) are visualized and assessed in terms of the risks that 
they pose. Second, it emphasizes the broader application of these practices in 
other spheres of everyday life. Moving beyond the airport, maritime, or land 
border, how do such practices come to be employed in the relatively 
mundane, day-to-day security performances that permeate - and form the basis 
of - everyday life? Third, it highlights the extension of blueprinting practices 
beyond computer databases and algorithms into normalized, mundane forms, 
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such as industry standards, legislation and policy documents, each of which 
involve different methods of production, and each of which enable different 
kinds of securing action to be deployed. Each of these strands deserves further 
analytical attention by security scholars. 
 
Framework (II): The Security/Circulation Nexus 
 
The second framework I provide concerns the different qualities of circulations 
and the ways in which they are productive of particular kinds of opportunity 
and threat (see chapter 5). Here, I build upon Cresswell’s (2010) account of the 
politics of mobility, identifying six aspects of circulation that become entangled 
with concerns for security across gas’s journeys. Again, the observations 
outlined here are not intended to be universally applicable or exhaustive, but 
are intended to provide a series of indicative examples through which to 
appreciate the significance of the circulatory journeys of entities between 
nodes for security’s practice. 
 
Table 2: Circulatory Qualities 
Circulatory Qualities Description 
Paths/Circuits Linear vs. Rhizomatic 
Uniform vs. Varied 
Unidirectional vs. Multidirectional 
Circulatory Milieus 
Expanded Points of Origin/Arrival/Transformation 
Volume 3D Movements Through Volumes 
Voluminous Circulations 
- Volume as Quantity 
- 3D Circulations 
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Materiality Appearances 
Textures 
Mutability 
Forces Motive Forces 
Frictional Forces 
Forces That Circulations Exert 
Other Forces Exerted on Circulations 
Velocity Velocity of Movements over Cartesian Space 
Velocity of Movements over Relational Space 
Rhythms Polyrhythmia 
Synchrony 
Arrhythmia  
 
In this way, I provide a series of lenses through which to highlight the necessity 
of expanding security’s analysis beyond centralized nodes, and through which 
scholars might usefully engage with the significance of entities’ circulatory 
qualities for contemporary performances of security. Again, this framework has 
a broad range of potential applications. First, it has value for the existing 
critical security literature; a field of study that has consistently ignored the 
circulatory journeys of entities due to its overwhelming focus upon nodal sites 
of security’s practice. Rather than focus only on nodes, this approach 
encourages attention to the ways in which concerns may develop across the 
travels of different bodies, materials and things. It invites questions such as: 
how, for instance, do the volumes of cargo affect the way that security can be 
practiced in relation to it in maritime ports? How does the velocity of relational 
change affect the way in which security is performed around the transport of 
donated organs? Of medicines? Of contagions?  
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Second, this approach has again got value for a literature on energy security 
that has tended to ignore energy’s circulatory journeys, and which has instead 
been preoccupied with national-scale nodes of energy production and 
consumption. Security’s practices and forms of insecurity that occur at other 
scales, between these nodes, have received minimal attention. The framework 
advocated in chapter 5 invites energy security scholars to consider the ways in 
which the materialities, and circulatory qualities of different energy products, 
necessitate security practices to be conducted around these circulations, across 
their journeys. By attending to such circulations more closely, I suggest that the 
energy security literature stands to gain a far better handle on the significance 
of energy products’ lively material qualities, and will be able to ask a series of 
important questions about the way that energy security becomes a source of 
concern and is practiced at other scales. Potential questions that need to be 
asked include: how are concerns for security ‘baked into’ the designs of 
circulatory infrastructures? What phenomena are attempts made to facilitate, 
compensate for, and cancel out, through the design of these infrastructures? 
How is action able to be taken upon circulations, whilst they are in motion? 
What different actors and interests become involved in the conduct of these 
actions? What phenomena do they seek to influence, and how do their 
different interests become a locus for tensions, synergies and negotiations? 
Indeed, it is only by attending to the spaces and scales of energy circulations 
themselves that I suggest we can we hope to answer such questions and that 
we can come to understand security’s practice in relation to circulating energy 
products. 
 
Finally, this framework offers an expansion on the mobilities literature from 
which it draws inspiration. This framework builds upon Cresswell’s (2010) 
account of the politics of movement, which like the majority of the mobilities 
literature, is principally concerned with human movements. By adopting a 
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materialist lens, I offer key developments on each of his ‘six constituent parts of 
movement’, tracing out the different forms of security politics that can emerge 
according to these different circulatory dimensions. To provide an example, 
like Cresswell, I describe how such movements progress through volumetric 
space, but I go beyond this to document the security politics that surrounds 
the ways in which these circulations can, themselves, be voluminous in different 
ways. I also draw attention to the ontological qualities of the things in motion; 
their capacities to mutate and transform (with different speeds); and their 
abilities to exert forces of different kinds. Such expansions offer a framework of 
analysis through which the existing mobilities literature can be supplemented 
with accounts of the politics that surround different kinds of material mobilities. 
 
Framework (III): Interrogating Security’s Interventions 
 
The final framework offered in this thesis concerns the practices through which 
security apparatuses work to shift and mutate circulating elements on a 
relational level to facilitate, limit, compensate for, or cancel out particular kinds 
of phenomena. In chapter 6, I argued that security must be seen to consist of a 
project – or series of projects – of reality manipulation. Five different kinds of 
manipulative action were identified in particular: the distancing of gas’s 
relations of exteriority, the formation of relational ‘blocks’, the alteration of 
relations of interiority, the assembly of relational reinforcements, and the 
development of indicative/surveillant relations (see Table 3). Through the 
application of these techniques, I demonstrated how gas’s mutating material 
qualities are not just the source of challenges for security’s practice, but are 
central to the way that security comes to be performed in relation to it. In order 
to regulate and manage the forms of gaseous phenomena that can actualize in 
the future, attempts are made in the present to actively mutate the ontological 
structure of gas – its relations of interiority and exteriority, and the qualities and 
agency that it consequently exhibits – in highly specific ways.  
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Table 3: Practices of Relational Manipulation 
 
 
Security Practice Description 
Relational Distancing Strategically distancing external entities from 
circulations in order to reduce the likelihood of 
them forming relations with one another. 
Relational Blocking Encouraging the formation of particular kinds of 
external relation in ways that block circulating 
entities from forming potentially threatening 
relations with other elements (e.g. pipes blocking 
gas from forming relations with oxygen). 
Rearranging Relations of 
Interiority 
Manipulating the constitutive relations of interiority 
of circulating elements in ways that radically alter 
the forms of agential capacity available to them 
(e.g. removing hydrogen sulfide from natural gas 
to reduce its corrosiveness and toxicity). 
Relational Reinforcement Reinforcing individual practices of relational 
manipulation described above with successive 
layers of relational alterations (e.g. blocking gas 
from forming relations with oxygen through 
installing steel pipes, but then further supporting 
these relations by covering the pipes in polythene 
to protect them from corrosion). 
Formation of 
Indicative/Surveillant 
Relations 
Encouraging particular kinds of relation to form 
with circulating entities, changes in which provide 
an indication of potentially threatening alterations 
in the security programs surrounding them and 
enable certain kinds of responsive action to be 
deployed (e.g. routine aerial surveillance of 
pipelines that enable the identification of 
encroaching vegetation or land developments 
close to pipelines). 
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Drawing upon the work of Latour (1991), I then proceeded to argue that 
security performances are programmed: they involve the meticulous 
construction of systems of relations that, through the careful arrangement of 
network forces, result in the production of particular outputs. Such programs, I 
have suggested, come into being through negotiations between security 
actors over their individual interests, with multiple interests coming to be 
represented in single programs. Security’s performance is thus dependent 
upon the force with which each actor can express their interests within these 
negotiations.  
 
Using this notion of relational programming, I then built upon it with the 
concept of modulation that is advocated by Deleuze (1992), demonstrating the 
multiplicity of programs that can develop across the length of an entities’ 
circulations, and highlighting their potential dynamism and responsiveness. Yet 
unlike Deleuze, who is critiqued in this thesis for his focus on the assemblages 
that govern, rather than on the specific transformations undergone by the 
elements in circulation, here I highlight how such modulations simultaneously 
involve the transformation of the things in circulation at the ontological level, in 
accordance with particular kinds of perceived opportunity and threat.  
 
In this way, I offer an account of security’s practice that is far more nuanced 
than reductive narratives of circulatory maintenance and filtration. I provide an 
analytical framework for studying security that emphasises the way it involves 
meticulous practices of transforming vital circulating elements in order to 
condition the kinds of phenomenal future that can emerge, and provide a set 
of tools through which to study the way that particular opportunities and risks 
are regulated according to the different interests that influence these 
performances. 
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Such an approach, I think, has value for critical security studies in four main 
ways. First, it can inform the way in which we engage with the security 
performances that surround human bodies. Bodies have often appeared in this 
literature as passive, unproblematic and immutable. Whilst there is literature on 
the way that particular kinds of human subject are performed (see Vaughan-
Williams, 2015; Salter, 2007), and Foucault’s work on the production of 
disciplined and self-governing subjects has of course been seminal, more 
attention needs to be given to the application of these techniques in different 
security contexts. For instance, in reducing airport security to practices of 
filtration and flow maintenance, we have been left with little impression of how 
the threatening agency of risky circulating bodies is actually ‘cancelled out’ or 
dealt with. Instead, bodies are simply seen to be apprehended, at which point 
they are ‘secure’ and are afforded no further attention. Likewise, very little 
consideration has been paid to the way that different kinds of secured subject 
are produced in various, constantly changing, ways across circulations. Rather 
than just sorting and apprehending bodies at airport security points, how, for 
example, are particular kinds of secure circulation performed through 
dispersed practices such as passengers having particular items removed from 
their persons at security checkpoints, through seatbelt warning signs being 
deployed mid-flight; flight marshals surveying and potentially apprehending 
passengers; blast-proof cockpit doors limiting the capacities of these 
passengers to compromise the safe operation of the plane; or even through 
free flight socks being handed out in attempts to cancel out the risk of cases of 
potentially life threatening deep vein thrombosis? Indeed, whilst there is 
increasing interest being attributed to security’s socio-material performances, 
limited attention has been paid to security’s practices of sculpting and molding 
circulating entities and the ways through which particular kinds of threat come 
to be precisely attended to. 
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Second, this approach provides security scholars with a set of tools for studying 
in detail the ways in which circulating materials are governed at the ontological 
level across their circulatory journeys, as well as the kinds of threats and 
opportunity that drive these practices and the ways in which these entities have 
the capacity to transform and express themselves vitally as they move. Rather 
than seeing them as simply being filtered, or their circulation being simply 
maintained, this approach encourages security scholars to appreciate how, just 
as with humans, materials become subjects of security’s practice and are 
transformed in the process - particular kinds of perceived agency and 
phenomenal future becoming facilitated, compensated for, limited, and 
cancelled out. For instance, the circulation of cargo is not simply subject of 
circulatory maintenance practices (as it appears in the work of Cowen, 2009), 
but is the subject of a variety of different security practices involving attempts 
to regulate the conditions of possibility that surround particular kinds of 
perceived threat. From the deployment of container sealing tags, to the use of 
x-ray scanners, container ventilation holes, refrigerators for foodstuffs, 
holograms for determining the authenticity of DVDs and CDs, and the fences, 
gates and identification cards needed to access port spaces in the governance 
of cargo, a series of complex socio-technical security apparatuses are 
constructed around different kinds of cargo circulations in order to 
ontologically transform these entities in ways that facilitate, compensate for, 
limit and cancel out particular kinds of perceived future scenario.  
 
Thirdly, this approach may assist security scholars in exploring how security is 
practiced in relation to intangible entities and ‘things’, such as data and 
discourse. What, for instance, might it mean to stay with the trouble relating to 
the circulation of data? These circulations certainly present unique challenges 
methodologically, given that it may be difficult, if not impossible, to follow 
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them across their journeys. Indeed, the spaces and scales at which these 
elements circulate may be radically different to the geographies of circulation 
that are described in this thesis, with new forms of politics emerging as a result. 
Yet the way that opportunities and threats are visualized, and the manner in 
which attempts are made to intervene in their realities, can, I believe, be 
similarly attended to through such a relational, entity-attentive approach. 
Moreover, such an approach has particular value here in that it encourages us 
to examine the dynamic (de)materializations of these elements and the politics 
that can emerge; from the way that data sometimes materializes in forms such 
as memory sticks that can get lost, or appears in printed confidential 
documents that can get photographed. At other times it will travel diffusely 
through cables and servers as series of binary values. Exploring the possibilities 
and political situations that come to surround these different ontological 
qualities and their modes of circulation, as well as the different notions of 
security that play into them and the ways that they become regulated and 
manipulated (for example, through encryption, redaction or deletion), could 
prove a particularly fruitful avenue of future security research.  
 
Finally, I suggest this approach has value for critical security studies in terms of 
the way it takes seriously the practices of negotiation that inform the 
construction of security programs. I believe that the expansion of security’s 
referent objects presents a significant challenge for a security literature that 
continues to distill its outputs into discrete categories relating to single referent 
objects (for example: national security, global security, economic security, 
financial security, climate security, social security, environmental security, 
energy security and so on). Instead of endorsing such distinctions, this thesis 
requires scholars to closely consider the ways in which different concerns for 
security interleaf, overlap, and become negotiated. I believe that far more work 
needs to be done to explore these forms of interaction, from both from a 
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latitudinal perspective (whereby these processes of negotiation are examined 
at particular points within circulations), and from a longitudinal perspective 
(whereby the overlaps, synergies, frictions and negotiations that relate to 
multiple security concerns are examined across the spatial extents of 
circulations). This, I suggest, invites us to investigate a series of questions. 
How, for example, do the interests surrounding one point within a circulation, 
for instance, the collection of competing interests that swell around security’s 
performance in locations where gas is being fracked, come to be balanced 
against the collection of interests that are located further downstream? Do they 
become balanced? Whose interests win out? And who and what’s security is 
ensured through these negotiated actions? Moreover, other related questions 
might include: how do these negotiations affect the kinds of phenomena that 
can come to emerge? Who and what have their interests represented through 
these processes of negotiation? And conversely, who and what have their 
interests excluded? Attending to the political complexity of these security 
performances and the way that they come to be programmed according to 
multiple interests, is a much needed avenue for further study. 
 
III. Conclusion: An Entity-Attentive Security Agenda 
 
I have provided in this thesis a series of analytical frameworks through which to 
conduct future entity-attentive security research. This thesis has looked at the 
way that security is performed in relation to just one element: natural gas. It 
has documented a series of strategies through which gas’s material qualities 
present different risks, challenges and opportunities for security, and it has 
described the ways that these qualities have resulted in a series of specialized 
techniques to render gas actionable and take action upon it. Yet this is just one 
study. There is a vast number of other bodies, materials and things that 
circulate within contemporary societies, and which have yet to be explored in 
an entity-attentive way. Indeed, whilst Dillon (2005) has described how studies 
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of security have come to be developed around “the circulation of everything”, 
including “every conceivable kind of circulation or flow of peoples and things, 
of energy and finance, of water and food, of capital and information, of images 
and discourses, of science and technology, of weapons and ideas, of drugs and 
of sex (AIDS to prostitution), of microbes and diseases” (p. 2), very little of this 
expansive literature has actively engaged with the ontological qualities of these 
various elements, nor have they examined the ways in which their structures 
come to be transformed through security’s practice. From the many other kinds 
of energy product that are currently in circulation (including oil, coal, electricity, 
nuclear materials, and water – in both hydro and tidal capacities), through to 
the movement of other kinds of bodies, objects and immaterial things, there is 
considerable scope to produce entity-attentive accounts of security that 
valuably explore the ways in which these elements have aspects of their agency 
facilitated, compensated for, or cancelled out, across their journeys. As such, 
we are faced with much work if we are to examine the different troubling 
qualities of these elements and the ways in which they come to be addressed 
through security’s manifold performances. 
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Appendix A 
 
List of data sources: 
I. Interviews 
 
Date: Organization: Role: 
21/5/15 Durham Constabulary Contingency Planning Officer 
27/6/14 Northeast Ambulance 
Service 
Emergency Planning and Resilience 
Manager 
8/8/14 National Grid Emergency Operations Manager, Gas 
Systems Operations 
21/10/14 Northern Gas Networks Health, Safety and Environment Manager 
28/10/14 Durham and Darlington 
County Council (Local 
Planning Authority) 
Contingency Planning Officer (in charge 
of overseeing Durham and Darlington 
Major Accident Hazard Pipeline 
Emergency Plan)  
3/11/14 DNV-GL Orifice Plate Calibration Engineer 
3/11/14 SICK Engineering Ultrasonic Flow Metering Engineer 
25/3/15 Northern Gas Networks Health, Safety and Environment Manager 
13/4/15 Shell (UK) Operations Manager, St. Fergus Gas 
Processing Terminal  
20/5/15 National Grid Energy Forecaster, Short Term 
Forecasting Team, Gas Systems 
Operations 
20/11/15 National Grid Senior Engineer, Metering 
5/12/15 Durham and Darlington 
Fire and Rescue Service 
Resilience Manager 
18/12/15 British Gas, Northern 
Gas Networks & IGEM 
Former Network Operations Director. 
Also former engineer at ERS. Now Chair 
of IGEM’s Technical Coordinating 
Committee (which oversees the 
development of the accepted industry 
standards) 
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II. Site visits 
	
Date: Location: Description: 
4/4/14 to 
6/4/14 
Fakenham Gas Museum, Fakenham Museum visit and archival 
research 
27/6/14 Hebburn Ambulance Station - 
Northeast Ambulance Service 
Half day tour and 
demonstration of ambulance 
facilities and resources for 
dealing with gas incidents  
8/8/14 National Control Centre and 
National Grid House, Warwick 
Full day tour of National 
Grid House, including 
overview of different 
departments and 
operational structure. Visited 
the national gas control 
room and was given a 
description of its functions 
and strategic arrangement. I 
also received a 
demonstration of several 
pieces of gas management 
software, was taken through 
NTS maps, pipe by pipe. 
23/9/14 Understanding the Causes of Gas 
Fires and Explosions, RAF 
Spadeadam, DNV-GL 
2 day industry training event 
involving lectures and live 
demonstrations of different 
varieties of potential gas fire 
and explosion 
21/10/14 Northern Gas Regional Operations 
Office  
Brief tour and overview of 
the roles of different 
working groups 
17/11/14 PII Pipeline Solutions, Cramlington Half day tour and lectures 
on ‘smart pig’ (inline 
inspection) technologies. 
Industry event organised by 
IGEM 
6/2/15 St Mary’s College gas engineering 
works (leak detection) – Northern 
Gas Networks 
Hour long conversation with 
network maintenance 
engineers from Northern 
Gas Networks, describing 
methods for ascertaining 
location of leaks. 
	 303 
27/2/15 National Gas Museum, Leicester Half day museum visit 
8/2/15 to 
10/2/15 & 
19/2/15 to 
20/2/15 
National Gas Archives, Warrington Multiple days of archival 
research  
25/3/15 ‘Escape Chasing’ day (multiple 
locations across the North of 
England distribution network) – 
National Gas Networks 
Full day tour provided by 
the Health, Safety and 
Environment Manager from 
Northern Gas Networks. 
Involved picking up reports 
of leaks and traveling across 
the Northeast to the 
locations where these leaks 
had been reported. I was 
then provided 
demonstrations of how 
these leaks were located 
and assessed in terms of the 
risks they posed, and also 
how their threats were 
addressed 
13/4/15 St. Fergus Gas Processing Terminal Full day tour of St Fergus 
gas terminal 
21/5/15 Loughborough Materials and Failure 
Analysis Centre, DNV-GL 
Two hour tour, including 
demonstration of the 
investigation process 
following fatal incidents 
25/8/15 Neville’s Cross mains replacement 
work, Durham – Northern Gas 
Networks 
Hour long conversation with 
network maintenance 
engineers from Northern 
Gas Networks.  
3/11/15 DNV-GL Flow Centre, Chilton 
(including orifice meter calibration 
laboratory) 
Full day tour and 
demonstration of meter 
calibration processes.  
28/11/16 Northern Gas Regional Control 
Room 
Half day demonstration of 
the functions and daily 
operations of the regional 
control room 
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III. Seminars and Industry Briefings 
 
Date: Title: Description: 
4/11/14 “Constraint Management” 
National Grid 
Webinar Briefing 
16/11/14 “Emergency Operations” 
National Grid 
Webinar Briefing 
11/11/14 “Physical Operations of the NTS and 
Winter Forecasting” 
National Grid 
Webinar Briefing 
29/11/14 “Pipeline Risk Management” 
International Pipeline Conference & 
Exposition, 2014 
Full Day Tutorial 
21/5/15 “Black Dust Revealed” DNV-GL 
Materials and Failure Analysis 
Laboratories, Loughborough 
Half Day Seminar 
 
IV. Conferences 
 
Date: Conference: 
10/6/14 Institute of Gas Engineers and Managers (IGEM) Annual Conference 
2014, Loughborough 
29/11/14 to 
3/10/14 
International Pipeline Conference & Exposition 2014, Calgary, 
Canada 
19/11/14 ‘Don’t Panic!’ IGEM Southwest & Wales Sections Emergency 
Planning Gas Conference, Bristol 
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Appendix B 
 
Sample Interview Extract 
 
Interview with Senior Engineer, National Grid 
20th November 2015 
 
Speaker 1: Okay, so great. I was hoping if we could maybe start by talking about your role in 
National Grid. Are you able to talk through a little of what you do? #00:00:33-0#  
 
Speaker 2: Sure. We are an operational appliance team, and um, the part of the team that I look 
after we are responsible for full pipe pressure transmission measurement both on and off the 
system…as a consequence of that work we look after the management of NTS 
shrinkage…which is the amount of gas that we use for moving gas from the point of supply to 
the point of delivery. So that’s usually terminals and storage sites, interconnectors obviously 
need to… distribution zones, or direct connect, off takes of the gas. Now we are with 
transmission, so all of our measurements are done at high pressure. And high pressure to me is 
anything above 40bar gauge. So it is high pressure. That work means that the team that you 
have seen is really quite technical. And it’s unusual that it is quite young as well, so it’s great to 
be learning that…these skills on that basis, but I have been in this industry mainly from 
research, I came from research about 15 years ago, and I have always worked on material 
based research within the gas industry. So I came over here to…for some other parts of the 
business…I haven’t gone back yet, but er…so I started in shrinkage. Shrinkage at that point 
was merely a function of the amount of compressor fuel we used which is to drive the er, 60 odd 
compressor sites, sorry 60 odd units, we have 23 compressor sites around the UK for moving 
the gas from the beach terminals to the point of requirement. Once we had analyzed that 
initially, we started to reduce own-use gas by better control, making sure that we didn’t use the 
units when they are not actually required, and trying to improve the husbandry or the 
maintenance of a unit so there weren’t the reasons that a control room would run a unit without 
actually compressing any of the gas, they would only run a unit when they did need it. So there 
was this reliability issue. So a lot of work was done over the 2000 to 2008 period to improve on 
reliability and that…the fruition of that is we are seeing about 95% to 98% availability of all units, 
which is very high. Considering some of them are fairly ancient as well in terms of their gas 
terminal and design, they are quite mature. But that doesn’t matter, we are not trying to fly 
supersonically…so that doesn’t really worry…we are trying to be as effective and efficient 
as…but they are not quite as efficient as you would probably like. The introduction of dry lonox 
combustion due to reduced emissions, you’ve got selective catalytic reduction…all of these 
techniques are now adding parasitic loads to these guys’ engines, so their efficiency is actually 
going down, although their overall effectiveness in terms of their environmental footprint is going 
up. Which is good. So we have seen a reduction in compressor fuel, but then we started to see 
a lot of uncertainty around measurement that was starting to impact on the overall levels of 
shrinkage. And shrinkage is a collection of both the gas that you’ve measured on the system, 
minus the gas that you have taken off the system. And that bit there is shrinkage. And you say, 
well I’ve measured the fuel gas that I have used, I’ve got a little bit which I know about because 
of the flow weighted average process which we use to not disadvantage domestic customers, 
depending on gas source and location. We can then look at usage in the distribution zone, 
which is usually a small component, and the little left over is unaccounted for. It’s not leakage, 
which is…we…all of our system is welded. Or where it is not welded, it is extremely heavily 
flanged (Laughs) as you can see on the examples just through there! Um, we are 
not…distribution zones have shrinkage and they have different components within that 
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shrinkage amount. They will have leakage because they have a whole collection of different 
piping structures and infrastructure, er but they also have theft, which we don’t. If you are going 
to tap in to a 50, 60 bar main, well good luck! It’s incredibly difficult. We don’t see that. We are 
purely seeing uncertainty in measuring as a consequence of… new metering systems, people 
not quite understanding the new metering systems, the change in the commercial regime… 
Because it has come on as the rest of the business has been gradually regulated. We sit there 
and we are trying to minimise shrinkage for the community because it’s a cost which is picked 
up by everybody who uses the system. It is part of the transportation…what we call commodity 
charges, which is the transportation charge, in which shrinkage is passed on. A higher 
shrinkage means that the commodity charge goes up, which means you and I have to pay 
slightly higher for our gas bill. Because that part is a pass through cost from shipper to the end 
consumer. So we will reduce that…you know, the costs for shrinkage in 2013/14 were around 
about 85 million, of which UAG contributed 70-80% of that. Which is quite a high cost. Except 
that the industry is 20billion per annum. So let’s get that in reality. So you know, in terms of 
er…you and I, 85 million is a huge amount of money…um…but in terms of the overall 
throughput of the system it is a comparatively small…its top quartile. If you go…all the 
transmission companies that publish sufficient data for you to make a judgement, we are top 
quartile. About 0.3, 0.29 percent of throughput. That is very good. That is We’ve got some 
American networks, who are the easiest to compare because they have got to publish more and 
more data, um, they can be anything up to 1.5. I have seen 0.2, but that is probably a very 
unusual way of them declaring their results rather than…than…so it’s not bad. Despite the 
complexity of the network. But we have to keep it down. We have to keep…and that’s what our 
team does. Its management, its talking to asset owners. We don’t own assets, we don’t own 
metering assets sorry, so… #00:07:16-6#  
 
Speaker 2: You don’t own any of the meters? #00:07:19-1#  
 
Speaker 1: We own about thirty to be fair, but we are gradually offsetting those as well. But 
there are over 400 across the whole system and we own thirty. So it’s a very small subset of the 
whole system. #00:07:32-6#  
 
Speaker 2: Mmm. I’m still trying to get my head around the different uses of meters on the 
system. So you have got fiscal meters, but there are different grades of meters as well, aren’t 
there? What are the purposes of the different levels? #00:07:41-9#  
 
Speaker 1: Yeah there are. Well, as I showed you earlier, the diagram of the development of the 
network over the last 40-45 years er, you will have seen philosophical changes in how you 
manage, how you control the network. It’s easy to control a point to point network. It’s much 
harder to control a very integrated network, which is what we have now. Um, there was a view 
early on in the development of the gas industry in a regulators sense, and we are talking about 
mid-nineties now, um, that National Grid should have a view of what terminals were doing. So 
we had check metering. So in other words, a terminal would meter, they would tell us what they 
metered, and outside their door we would have effectively another set of metering. Well, any 
physicist would tell you, anybody will tell you actually, if you have two watches, they won’t tell 
exactly the same time. Close, but not quite on the same time. And that’s what happens with 
metering. So who do you believe. So check metering had a pretty…I was going to say 
chequered, but we have had a fairly limited history because quite rightly they could turn around 
and say I spent X million you know and all this on this equipment. My reading says 20, you say 
20.01. What are we doing? Who’s right? And you know, both readings are valid within their 
respective uncertainty. But of course you are talking about huge sums of money. So check 
metering went away… and check metering was always there to say is…is the uncertainty on 
that measurement slightly high? It wasn’t built to the same standards so it was actually doomed 
from the start. The industry settled on fiscal measurement quite early on fortunately, so you are 
measured to a fiscal uncertainty of one percent on volume and one point one percent on 
energy. And the reason the energy is slightly higher is because you actually calculate from gas 
composition calorific value. And there is always a bit of uncertainty on your measurement of gas 
chromatography. So that’s why you go to one point one. And that’s fine. Everyone accepts that, 
the modern equipment is more than capable of demonstrating that uncertainty is well inside 
that. So from a fiscal point of view, that’s what we have on the system. We don’t have feeder 
meters. We are a pressure control system. Our modelling, our network modelling, which is run 
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in parallel to the system control, will give you indicative calculations of flow. We are a pressure 
system so they will be controlling that system on pressure. And that pressure is to maintain the 
exit point pressures of above 40 bar. That’s it. So we do that. And they supply the system to that 
basis. So metering then, within a feeder meter…a feeder is the bit of pipe that’s actually from A 
to B, that’s what we call the big transmission thing of which twenty, thirty-five… …lots of 
branches off them, but twenty nine big ones. We don’t have any meters on them. Mainly 
because they are a meter at one point, two meters in diameter. That is a huge meter, by any 
stretch of the imagination, that is a huge meter. That is very expensive. If I say to you look I’m 
going to spend 50-60 million on a meter, you are going to pay for it through commodity charge 
and all I’m going to do is make sure that meter’s just saying well look I’ve got some flow in that 
direction, not that direction. Well you going to say ‘mmm. Not sure I’m going to pay for that.’ And 
that’s where OFGEM works. You can model it very quickly, very reliably offline, very cheaply. 
And that is sufficient. You measure…we have all of the measurement points for pressure and 
temperature around the system anyway, so fine. We are relatively comfortable that we can 
control the system very safely.  #00:11:47-4#  
 
 - End of Extract -  
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Appendix C 
 
 
Image 1:  
 
Photograph of excavated cast iron medium-pressure gas main, Neville’s Cross, 
Durham (2016)  
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Image 2:  
 
Photograph of excavated cast iron medium-pressure gas main, Neville’s Cross, 
Durham (2016)  
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Image 3:  
 
Photograph of inlet facilities at St. Fergus Gas Processing Terminal, Scotland 
(2014). Gas from drilling platforms in the North Sea emerges onshore from its 
undersea transmission pipes at this location 
 
 
Image 4: 
 
 Photograph of multiple holes that have been dug in an attempt to locate a gas 
leak on a distribution main in Durham (2014) 
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Image 5:  
 
Photograph of example document analyzed as part of this study. Documents in 
this photograph include training documents, legislative documents, advertising 
material for devices and assets, and instruction manuals. 
 
 
 
Image 6:  
 
Photograph of a live demonstration of a gas explosion at an industry training 
day at RAF Spadeadam (2014) 
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Field Note Extract 1:  
 
“Understanding the Causes of Gas Fires and Explosions” Industry training 
event, DNV-GL’s explosion modelling facility at RAF Spadeadam – 23/9/14 
 
 
“An alarm sounded in the briefing room in which we were receiving a lecture on the 
kinds of fire and explosion that could develop within gas networks. We all put in the 
earplugs that had been handed to us, and within seconds, a dull thump shook the 
room. Some of the pictures that had been fixed to the walls with Velcro tape fell to the 
ground, only to be immediately stuck back up by one of the event organizers. The 
lecture continued for about half an hour, after which the group of 20 or so of us (made 
up of engineers, network operators and investigators for the HSE), were taken outside 
to witness our final demonstration of the weekend. 
 
We trouped across the muddy ground, passing bits of pipework and testing 
equipment that were emerging awkwardly out of thick concrete test pads. In front of 
us was positioned a bright blue shipping container that had been cordoned off with 
yellow tape. We formed a line along this barrier, distanced safely from the imminent 
blast. The test was designed to show us the difference between two explosive 
scenarios. First, a domestic gas explosion, in which the property was vacant, and 
without furnishings. The second, a similar explosion, but where the property was 
inhabited and had been furnished. The purpose of this test was to demonstrate how 
the fixtures within properties interrupted convection currents and thereby forced gas 
to mix more effectively with the oxygen inside. The result, they claimed, was that the 
second explosion should be far more powerful, due to the increased number of 
methane and oxygen molecules that were forced to form relations with one another 
and a source of heat. 
 
To model the first scenario, the container was filled with a mixture of natural gas and 
oxygen, the end of the container being sealed with a thick polythene sheet. An alarm 
then again sounded, warning of an imminent explosion, and the gas was ignited. A 
ball of flame about the size of a car erupted from the end of the container, making a 
low ‘woofing’ noise. Compared to previous demonstrations, this was fairly undramatic.  
 
To model the second scenario, the container was then filled with different objects; bits 
of pipe, boxes, and crates. It was then sealed, and the same amount of gas and 
oxygen was introduced to the container. Again, an alarm sounded before the gas was 
lit, but this time the explosion was enormous. The ball of fire was fifteen, maybe 
twenty feet long. The noise was deafening, the heat intense (even from thirty feet 
away), and the pressure wave that was produced tore at our clothes and skin with 
considerable force. Several participants recoiled from the blast, myself included“ 
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Field Note Extract 2:  
 
Escape Chasing Site Visit Northern Gas Networks – 25/3/15 
 
“Scanning down a print-out of reported leaks that needed to be investigated that day, 
the Health, Safety and Environment Manager from Northern Gas Networks 
highlighted a number of incidents. “We will have already missed the FCO’s (first call 
operatives) on these ones”, he said as he gestured to the sheet. “But we should be 
able to get to these other leaks in time to catch one of the guys”. Our first aim of the 
day was to meet up with an FCO to observe how leaks were assessed for riskiness – a 
difficult task, given that FCOs are constantly on the move, responding to newly 
reported leaks. We jumped into his car, and drove to the first location. We had missed 
the FCO (we would later catch up with one at another site), but I was introduced to 
the engineers attending to the leak. We spoke around one of the holes that they had 
dug, and they explained what the current job involved. As this leak had concerned gas 
that could be ‘felt, seen or heard’ (due to the force with which it was leaving the pipe 
creating noise, pressing against skin and moving soil), it had to be responded to 
quickly and could not be left unattended. It had taken a while to pin down its location, 
due to the gas becoming trapped under the nearby road, and it moving through 
service ducts under the street (these are used for accessing cables – gas entering 
them can be particularly dangerous because explosive atmospheres may develop 
beneath peoples’ feet). It was because of these factors that the first reports of the leak 
had been made over half a mile away.” 
 
One of the other engineers then proceeded to describe to me the process of ‘bar 
holing’: a technique used for identifying the locations of leaks. This process involves 
drilling small holes into the ground at equal distances from the approximate location 
that the leak was reported. A tool is then used to suck out any gas that is in these 
holes, and a gas detector is inserted to detect the presence of gas. Holes where gas is 
found to return the fastest provide an indication of the direction from which gas is 
leaking.” 
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Image 7:  
 
Diagram of pertinent features at the scene of a gas escape in Middlesbrough 
during an ‘Escape Chasing’ site visit (2014) 
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Image 8: 
 
 Photograph of an ongoing mains replacement job observed as part of an 
‘Escape Chasing’ site visit day (2014). The polyethylene pipe in this picture has 
been threaded through the existing iron main observable at the bottom of the 
picture, allowing these pipes to be replaced without entirely excavating the 
road. 
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Image 9:  
 
Photograph of a printout sheet of the risk assessments that have been 
conducted in relation to reported gas escapes checked that day. Taken during 
an ‘Escape Chasing’ site visit (2014) 
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Image 10:  
 
Scan of an email exchange with a Northern Gas Networks maintenance 
engineer regarding an earlier site visit (2014). Here, the engineer describes 
how some engineers resort to using divining rods to locate hard-to-find buried 
pipes. 
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Image 11:  
 
Map of a section of the North of England gas network at a 1:1050 scale. Maps 
such as these would be used in interviews to discuss the way that gas travelled 
and the forms of action that would be taken upon it at different points. 
Particularly interesting during these conversations would be why certain 
information was considered sufficiently pertinent to be included on these 
maps. 
 
	 319 
Image 12: 
 
 Cropped technical drawing of the arrangements of assets and pipework within 
a particular gas facility. Maps such as these were useful for observing the small-
scale actions that were taken upon gas as it moved through these networks. 
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Appendix D 
 
Example ‘Scratch and Sniff’ card 
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